refactor(cron): derive one-shot run-claim TTL from HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT - #59567
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Follow-up to #59524. The one-shot running-claim stale-recovery window was a fixed 30-min constant. Derive it from the cron inactivity timeout instead (HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, the same limit the scheduler enforces per run) so the safety valve tracks how long a run may actually go quiet: - unset/invalid -> default 600s inactivity -> TTL 1800s (unchanged behaviour) - positive N -> max(N * 3 headroom, 1800s floor) - 0 (unlimited) -> no finite bound -> fall back to the 1800s constant The fixed constant is kept as the floor + unlimited-case fallback. Resolved once per due-scan. HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT is a pre-existing internal env var (already read by cron/scheduler.py); no new config surface. E2E: with HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=1200 the claim now survives to 60min where the old fixed 1800s constant wrongly expired it at 30min mid-run. +1 derivation test; 640/640 cron tests pass.
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NousResearch#59567) Follow-up to NousResearch#59524. The one-shot running-claim stale-recovery window was a fixed 30-min constant. Derive it from the cron inactivity timeout instead (HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, the same limit the scheduler enforces per run) so the safety valve tracks how long a run may actually go quiet: - unset/invalid -> default 600s inactivity -> TTL 1800s (unchanged behaviour) - positive N -> max(N * 3 headroom, 1800s floor) - 0 (unlimited) -> no finite bound -> fall back to the 1800s constant The fixed constant is kept as the floor + unlimited-case fallback. Resolved once per due-scan. HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT is a pre-existing internal env var (already read by cron/scheduler.py); no new config surface. E2E: with HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=1200 the claim now survives to 60min where the old fixed 1800s constant wrongly expired it at 30min mid-run. +1 derivation test; 640/640 cron tests pass.
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* chore(release): map author emails for PR #56854/#57417 salvage
* test(gateway): pin source.profile=None on MagicMock fixtures hitting _adapter_for_source
The routing sweep sends these paths through _adapter_for_source, which
reads source.profile. A bare MagicMock auto-attribute is truthy, so the
fixtures looked like stamped secondary profiles and hit the new
fail-closed branch. Real SessionSource.profile is None or str
(AGENTS.md pitfall #17).
* test(gateway): pin random tip in topic-mode /new test to kill 1-in-380 flake (#59380)
test_group_new_keeps_existing_reset_semantics_when_dm_topic_mode_enabled
asserts 'parallel work' not in the /new reply — but /new appends a
random tip from hermes_cli.tips (380 entries), and one tip's text
contains exactly that phrase (the delegate_task concurrency tip). CI
failed on PR #59331 slice 2 when the dice landed on it. Pin
get_random_tip in the test.
* fix(gateway): isolate multiplex profile config env reads
Fixes #50051 by preserving nested gateway.multiplex_profiles and routing gateway config env reads through the active profile secret scope when present.
This keeps secondary profile adapter startup from inheriting default-profile platform tokens or port-binding enables while preserving legacy single-profile behavior outside a scope.
Constraint: latest upstream main f57ff7aef1d3 still reproduced both nested-config loss and cross-profile env leakage
Rejected: special-casing API_SERVER_* only | left other profile-scoped tokens vulnerable to the same leak
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: keep future gateway/config env reads on the scoped helper path unless a variable is explicitly process-global
Tested: pytest -q tests/gateway/test_multiplex_phase0.py tests/gateway/test_multiplex_credential_isolation.py tests/gateway/test_config.py -k 'multiplex or scope or getenv or api_server or relay'
Not-tested: full gateway startup across live platform adapters
* feat(sessions): full filter surface for prune + bulk archive subcommand (#59327)
* feat(sessions): full filter surface for prune + new bulk archive subcommand
hermes sessions prune previously only supported --older-than N (integer
days) and --source — no way to target a window like 'the last 5 hours'
(e.g. a batch of CI smoke-test sessions), and no non-destructive option.
- SessionDB.prune_sessions gains keyword filters that AND together:
started_before/started_after epoch bounds, title_like, end_reason,
cwd_prefix, min/max_messages, archived tri-state. Default call is
byte-for-byte compatible (90-day cutoff, ended-only, source).
- New SessionDB.list_prune_candidates (backs --dry-run + confirmation
previews) and SessionDB.archive_sessions (bulk soft-hide via the
existing set_session_archived lineage-aware path; nothing deleted).
- CLI: prune gains --newer-than/--before/--after (durations like 5h/2d/1w,
bare days, or ISO timestamps), --title, --end-reason, --cwd,
--min/--max-messages, --include-archived, --dry-run. New
'hermes sessions archive' takes the same filters, requires at least one,
and is idempotent. Both show a preview before confirming.
- Dashboard /api/sessions/prune accepts the same filters + dry_run.
- Docs: sessions.md + cli-commands.md updated.
Filter parsing lives in hermes_cli/session_filters.py with unit tests;
DB filters covered in tests/test_hermes_state.py.
* feat(sessions): prune/archive filters for model, provider, user, chat, branch, tokens, cost, tool calls
Extends the prune/archive filter surface to everything identifiable in
the sessions table:
- --model (substring on model slug), --provider (exact on
billing_provider, case-insensitive), --user, --chat-id, --chat-type
(exact), --branch (substring on git_branch), --min/--max-tokens
(input+output), --min/--max-cost (USD, actual_cost_usd falling back to
estimated_cost_usd), --min/--max-tool-calls.
- SessionDB prune/archive/list_prune_candidates now share the filter
kwargs via **filters into _prune_filter_where (unknown names raise
TypeError); candidates listing + CLI preview now include the model.
- Any attribute filter (except legacy --source) suppresses the implicit
90-day default so 'prune --model X' matches all ages.
- Dashboard /api/sessions/prune passes the new fields through.
- Docs + tests updated (7 new DB tests, 3 new parser tests).
* fix(gateway): read multiplex_profiles from nested gateway section
load_gateway_config() only surfaced the top-level `multiplex_profiles`
key into gw_data before calling GatewayConfig.from_dict(). A config.yaml
that pinned the flag under the nested `gateway:` section -- the form
written by `hermes config set gateway.multiplex_profiles true` -- was
silently ignored, so the gateway loaded with multiplex_profiles=False.
from_dict() already honors the nested fallback, but load_gateway_config()
builds gw_data from top-level keys first, so the nested value never
reached it.
Read gateway.multiplex_profiles into gw_data when the top-level key is
absent, mirroring the existing nested fallback for max_concurrent_sessions.
Adds a load_gateway_config() regression test that writes a config.yaml
with `gateway.multiplex_profiles: true` and asserts the loaded config has
multiplex_profiles=True (fails without the fix).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(skills): don't request Brotli for the centralized skills index
The Skills Hub 'Browse Hub' landing page and index-backed search render
empty on fresh deployments (e.g. Fly.io VPS agents) with no stale cache.
Root cause: the centralized index at /docs/api/skills-index.json is a
large body (~34MB, tens of MB compressed) served with Content-Encoding:
br. httpx's streaming Brotli decoder — backed by brotlicffi 1.2.0.1,
which is pinned so aiohttp can decode Discord attachments — trips over
its own output_buffer_limit on a payload this size and raises:
DecodingError("brotli: decoder process called with data when
'can_accept_more_data()' is False")
_load_hermes_index() catches that (DecodingError is an httpx.HTTPError
subclass) and silently falls back to the on-disk cache. On a fresh box
that cache never existed, so HermesIndexSource.is_available is False,
the index contributes 0 skills, and the hub landing page — which is
built solely from an empty-query index search — is blank. Existing
installs only appear to work because they serve a (possibly weeks-)stale
cached index instead.
Fix: request 'gzip, deflate' on the index fetch so httpx never
negotiates the broken Brotli path, and retry once with 'identity' if a
DecodingError still occurs (defends against a proxy that ignores the
header). Falls through to the stale cache only when both attempts fail.
Verified on a live staging VPS agent: index_available flips False->True
and the featured landing list repopulates from 0 to 12.
Also un-freezes already-deployed images: skills added after an image was
built (e.g. the 'unbroker' optional skill) become reachable again via
the index, which is the whole point of the centralized catalog.
* feat(sessions): any prune filter matches all ages; preview shows age span (#59415)
Bare 'hermes sessions prune' keeps the historical 90-day default, but any
filter — now including --source — suppresses the implicit cutoff, so
'prune --source cron' targets ALL cron sessions instead of silently only
those older than 90 days (the surprise a user hit live: 'No sessions
match ... source cron' despite plenty of recent cron runs).
- CLI preview + confirmation now show the match count plus the oldest
and newest matching session start times before deleting.
- Dashboard /api/sessions/prune mirrors the semantics: attribute filters
without an explicit older_than_days match all ages (model_fields_set
distinguishes an explicit 90 from the Pydantic default); dry_run
responses gain oldest_started_at/newest_started_at.
- Docs + argparse help updated; tests for both surfaces.
* fix: reject stale one-shot cron jobs
* fix(cron): guard update_job past-one-shot + enrich rejection message (#59395)
Widen the #59395 fix to the sibling site: update_job's schedule-change path
(cron/jobs.py) had the SAME unguarded compute_next_run -> next_run_at pattern,
so updating a job's schedule to a one-shot >ONESHOT_GRACE_SECONDS in the past
would re-create the ghost job (next_run_at=None, state='scheduled', never fires)
that create_job now rejects. Apply the identical guard on update (raise before
any disk write, so the original job is left intact), with regression tests for
the reject + future-accept cases.
Also surface ONESHOT_GRACE_SECONDS in the raised ValueError (not just the
warning log) so a caller knows how far in the past is too far. Message from the
competing PR #59410 by @isheng-eqi.
Co-authored-by: isheng-eqi <265044697+isheng-eqi@users.noreply.github.com>
* perf(cli): TTFT round 2 — live reasoning by default, partial-line streaming, prompt-build cache, stale budget-warning docs (#59389)
Follow-up to #59332 targeting the remaining PERCEIVED first-token latency
(the wire streaming was already per-token; these fix what the user sees):
1. display.show_reasoning default ON. On thinking models the reasoning
phase streams for tens of seconds; with the display off users stare
at a spinner the whole time and read it as a stall. Flipped in
DEFAULT_CONFIG, load_cli_config defaults, tui_gateway raw-YAML
fallbacks, and the hermes setup status line (all four read sites kept
in sync). Gateway per-platform defaults intentionally stay off —
messaging chats shouldn't fill with thinking text. /reasoning hide
still turns it off and persists.
2. Response box force-flushes long partial lines. _emit_stream_text only
painted on newline, so a response opening with a long paragraph
stayed invisible until the first \n — seconds of blank box. Now
partial lines wrap at terminal width and paint as tokens arrive
(mirrors the reasoning box's 80-char force-flush that existed since
day one). Table blocks remain batch-aligned; no content loss at wrap
boundaries (regression tests added).
3. hermes_time timezone resolution uses read_raw_config (mtime-cached +
libyaml C loader) instead of a raw yaml.safe_load of config.yaml
(~110-140ms measured) inside the FIRST system prompt build. First
build drops 320ms -> ~155ms on a 200-skill install.
4. Stale docs: configuration.md (en+zh) still documented the 70%/90%
[BUDGET WARNING] tool-result injections. Those were removed in April
2026 (c8aff7463) precisely because they hurt task completion; current
behavior is exhaustion-message + one grace call, no mid-loop
injection, no cache impact. Docs now describe reality.
Verified: token-count compression decisions already use API-reported
last_prompt_tokens (rough estimators are preflight-only and cost ~1.7ms
even on 1.7MB histories — not worth touching).
* fix(cron): reject past one-shot timestamps in update_job fallback + resume_job (#59395)
Completes the #59395 bug-class fix. create_job and update_job's
schedule-change path already reject past one-shots (via #59410/#59438);
this closes the two remaining doors that stored next_run_at=None for a
'once' schedule and re-created the silent ghost job:
1. update_job fallback-recompute (the safety-net that re-derives
next_run_at when it's missing on an enabled, non-paused job)
2. resume_job (resuming a paused one-shot whose time has already passed
— empirically confirmed to create a scheduled job that never fires)
The redundant update_job schedule-change hunk from the original PR was
dropped (already on main via #59438). Adds resume-reject + update-reject/
accept regression tests.
Salvaged from #59428 by isheng-eqi.
* chore: map isheng-eqi in AUTHOR_MAP for #59428 salvage
check-attribution CI fails on unmapped bare (non-noreply) contributor
emails. isheng-eqi's commit email (ishengeqi@163.com) has no + so it does
not auto-resolve — add the explicit mapping.
* fix(file-sync): re-deliver deferred Ctrl+C via raise_signal, not os.kill (Windows hard-kill)
_sync_back_once defers a SIGINT that lands mid-sync, then re-delivers it once the
sync completes so the user's Ctrl+C isn't lost. It did so with
os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGINT). That is not graceful on Windows: os.kill
only treats CTRL_C_EVENT(0)/CTRL_BREAK_EVENT(1) as console events; any other
value (SIGINT == 2) routes to TerminateProcess(sig), so a Ctrl+C during a
remote-backend (ssh/daytona/modal) sync-back hard-kills the whole CLI session
(exit code 2) on Windows instead of raising KeyboardInterrupt.
Use signal.raise_signal(signal.SIGINT) (3.8+), which invokes the restored
handler through C raise() on every platform. Verified on Windows: raise_signal
runs the handler (graceful) while os.kill(getpid, SIGINT) TerminateProcess-es
the process. Adds a cross-platform regression test that runs on Windows too (it
stubs the locked sync body, so unlike test_file_sync_back.py it needs no fcntl).
* fix(error-classifier): retry HTTP 408 as timeout instead of aborting as format_error
_classify_by_status() routes every other transient HTTP status to a retryable
reason (500/502 -> server_error, 503/529 -> overloaded, 429 -> rate_limit,
413 -> payload_too_large), but 408 Request Timeout fell through to the generic
`400 <= status < 500` branch and was classified as a non-retryable
format_error -- the same bucket as a 400 Bad Request.
A 408 is a transient timing failure the server itself flags as safe to retry
(RFC 9110 15.5.9), not a malformed request, so the retry loop aborted the turn
when a simple retry would recover. Common trigger: a reverse proxy in front of
a self-hosted backend (llama.cpp / Ollama / vLLM) returns 408 when a long
generation outruns the proxy's request-read window.
Route 408 to the existing FailoverReason.timeout (rebuild client + retry).
Add a regression test plus a boundary test asserting 400 stays non-retryable.
* test(error-classifier): 408 boundary coverage — Copilot user_request_timeout shape, never auto-compress, falsification guard
Folded from PR #56932 (@allenliang2022) — same fix as #56909, submitted 45min later; the test coverage was the richer half.
* chore: map allenliang2022 in AUTHOR_MAP for #56932 test fold-in
* test(cron): cover cron_list/status/tick/create CLI helpers
Salvaged from #40430; re-verified on main, tightened, tested.
Co-authored-by: xuezhaolan <xuezhaolan@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(web): use get_env_value for Firecrawl config resolution
The Firecrawl provider used os.getenv() to read FIRECRAWL_API_KEY and
FIRECRAWL_API_URL, which only checks the process environment. When
values are supplied through Hermes's ~/.hermes/.env config mechanism
(via hermes_cli.config.get_env_value), they are not guaranteed to be
present in os.environ for every gateway/tool execution path.
Switch to get_env_value() which checks both os.environ and the .env
file, matching the pattern used by other providers (nous_subscription,
setup, discord adapter).
Fixes #40190
* fix(web): widen config-aware env resolution to exa/parallel/tavily/brave-free providers
Same bug class as #40190: these providers read credentials via bare
os.getenv(), so keys stored in ~/.hermes/.env (hermes config layer)
were invisible in execution paths that never exported them into the
process environment. Add get_provider_env() on the WebSearchProvider
module as the shared config-aware lookup (get_env_value with os.getenv
fallback) and route all credential reads through it. SearXNG already
did this (#34290); Firecrawl fixed in the preceding cherry-picked
commit by @liuhao1024.
* fix(skills): apply disabled-skill gate to CLI/TUI preloaded skills
build_preloaded_skills_prompt() (hermes -s <skill>, and tui_gateway's
HERMES_TUI_SKILLS deployment env var) loads skills via _load_skill_payload()
with a raw identifier, bypassing get_skill_commands()' scan-time disabled
filter entirely. Result: a skill an operator disabled via skills.disabled
still gets force-loaded and injected into every session — including every
session on a shared tui_gateway deployment where the operator set
HERMES_TUI_SKILLS.
The bundle-invocation path (#59156) already re-checks get_disabled_skill_names()
for exactly this reason; preloaded-skill loading was the other _load_skill_payload
call site still missing it.
Fix: check each resolved skill's name (and raw identifier) against
get_disabled_skill_names() before injecting it. A disabled skill is now
reported the same way an unknown one already is (skipped, listed in the
returned missing_identifiers) — no return-shape or caller changes needed.
No behavior change when no skill is disabled.
* fix(cli): pass custom_providers to resolve_display_context_length (#59314)
The CLI model-switch display (both picker and direct-switch paths)
omitted the custom_providers keyword when calling
resolve_display_context_length(). The function already supports it
(and the gateway correctly passes it), but the CLI call sites relied
on the fallthrough to probe-down default (256K) even when a
custom_providers entry specified a per-model context_length.
Fix: pass agent._custom_providers at both resolve_display_context_length
call sites in HermesCLI._apply_model_switch_result(), matching the
pattern already used for config_context_length.
* fix(gateway): relax session_key traversal guard to allow interior '/' (#59322)
The CWE-22 traversal guard in SessionEntry.from_dict rejects any
interior '/' in session_key, but session_key is a logical routing
key (never used as a filesystem path) and Google Chat resource names
legitimately contain '/' (spaces/<id>, spaces/<id>/threads/<id>).
All Google Chat sessions were silently dropped on gateway start.
Split the validation: session_id keeps the strict _is_path_unsafe
guard (it's the value used as a filename); session_key now uses a
relaxed _is_session_key_unsafe helper that only blocks genuine
traversal vectors (parent-dir '..', leading '/', leading '\', leading
Windows drive-letter prefix) and allows interior '/'.
* fix(tui_gateway): honor launch profile terminal.cwd for dashboard chat
Dashboard /chat for the default (launch) profile attaches to the
dashboard process's in-memory TUI gateway. The Node PTY child receives a
bridged TERMINAL_CWD env var, but the in-memory gateway process does not,
so cwd resolution fell through to os.getcwd() (wherever `hermes
dashboard` was launched) and ignored the configured terminal.cwd.
Read the launch profile's config.yaml directly in the in-memory cwd
resolution: a configured terminal.cwd now wins over a stale process env
and the launch directory. Widened to the resume/fallback session-cwd
sites (not just _completion_cwd) via a shared _default_session_cwd()
helper so fresh AND resumed sessions honor the config.
Co-authored-by: ygd58 <buraysandro9@gmail.com>
* fix(cron): prevent double-execution of one-shot jobs across concurrent schedulers
When two scheduler processes (gateway + desktop) run concurrently,
both could pick up the same one-shot job from get_due_jobs() because
its next_run_at was not advanced before execution started — only
recurring jobs were advanced (L3446). This caused duplicate deliveries
and wasted token spend (#59229).
Now _get_due_jobs_locked advances a one-shot's next_run_at by 60s
before returning it as due, persisted immediately under the same
file lock. mark_job_run re-anchors next_run_at on completion, so a
tick death between advance and execution only delays the job by one
tick window — it is never lost.
Closes #59229
* chore: credit isheng-eqi for #59446 in AUTHOR_MAP
* fix(cron): durable run-claim for one-shots instead of a fixed +60s advance
The +60s next_run_at advance only delayed a duplicate one-shot dispatch by
one tick — a job that outlives the 60s tick interval (the reported 2.5-min
research prompt) still re-fired on the next tick after the window expired,
so the concurrent gateway+desktop double-delivery persisted.
Replace it with a durable run_claim (at+by, mirroring fire_claim) stamped
on the one-shot under the same jobs lock get_due_jobs holds, and checked at
the top of the due-scan: a fresh claim held by an in-flight run makes every
other scheduler process skip the job for its ENTIRE run, not one tick.
mark_job_run() clears the claim on completion; a ONESHOT_RUN_CLAIM_TTL
(30 min) safety valve re-dispatches a claim left by a tick that died mid-run
so a one-shot is never wedged.
E2E: long-running one-shot no longer double-fires at +28/+61/+120/+179s;
completion clears the claim + disables the job; crash recovery re-arms past
the TTL. +3 regression tests.
* fix(dashboard): accept HA ingress prefix paths
Allow mainstream reverse-proxy path mounts to keep their X-Forwarded-Prefix when Home Assistant Supervisor ingress already consumes nearly the old 64-character budget. Keep validation bounded and keep rejected non-empty prefixes diagnosable with a deduplicated warning.
Constraint: HA Supervisor ingress prefixes are 63 chars before add-on subpaths, so the old 64-char cap dropped valid dashboard deployments.
Rejected: remove the length cap entirely | a bounded header budget is still a conservative validation guard.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep prefix validation centralized in hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix so auth routes, cookies, and SPA asset rewriting agree.
Tested: python probe for the 73-char HA ingress prefix; scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_prefix.py -q; .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py -k 'spa_assets_are_read_as_utf8' -q; python -m ruff check hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/prefix.py tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_prefix.py; git diff --check
Not-tested: full test suite
* fix(mcp): sanitize server names for auth env keys
Server names with non-env-safe characters (dots, slashes, spaces)
produced invalid env-var keys like MCP_MY.SERVER_API_KEY or
MCP_GITHUB/MCP_API_KEY, breaking .env writes and ${VAR} header
substitution. _env_key_for_server now replaces any character outside
[A-Za-z0-9_] with an underscore.
Co-authored-by: Hermes Agent <agent@nousresearch.com>
* fix telegram explicit private thread routing
* fix(background-review): guard summarize against list-shaped tool responses (#59437)
`summarize_background_review_actions` was structured on the assumption
that every parsed tool response is a fully-typed dict-of-fields. In
practice the memory/skill tools — and their wrappers over Mem0 OSS and
the skill_manage MCP server — sometimes serialize `_change` as a list
or scalar, and clamp `operations` to a single string when the field
came in via a partial JSON bridge.
The original code did the equivalent of:
change = data.get("_change", {})
change.get("description", "")
so when `_change` was a list the inner .get crashed with
`AttributeError: 'list' object has no attribute 'get'`, every ~10
turns the user saw the entire background review collapse.
Three defensive guards in summarize_background_review_actions:
- `call_details.get(tcid, {})` → `call_details.get(tcid) or {}` plus
`isinstance(detail, dict)` coercion. Catches stale scalar/None
values when a fork inherits partial state from a stale tool_call_id.
- `operations = detail.get("operations") or []` → `isinstance(ops_raw, list)`
coerce, then per-entry isinstance check before `.get()`. Skips
non-dict items without raising; an entire surrounding review no
longer goes down because one entry was malformed.
- `change = data.get("_change", {})` → `isinstance(change_raw, dict)`
coerce. The originally-reported crash class for skill_manage with
list-shaped _change now falls through to the generic summary path.
And the caller in `_run_review_in_thread` is wrapped in a try/except
that maps any residual summarize exception to `actions = []` and
emits a 'partial results' warning, so even an entirely unanticipated
shape won't take down the outer review — the user only sees
'Background memory/skill review failed' instead of the prior hard
crash that lost every successful action the fork had completed.
Tests: tests/test_background_review_list_shapes.py — standalone
pytest-free runner, 7/7 PASS:
a_change_as_list_does_not_crash (originally-reported shape)
a_change_as_int_does_not_crash (scalar fallback)
b_operations_as_string_treated_as_empty
b_operations_as_none_treated_as_empty
c_operations_contains_non_dict_entries (verbose-mode per-entry filter)
d_detail_non_dict_replaced_with_empty
e_call_defends_via_try_except (structural anchor)
Refs NousResearch/hermes-agent#59437
* chore: map Ahmett101 noreply email in AUTHOR_MAP for #59455
* test(tui_gateway): isolate verification.status not_applicable test from stray tmp markers
test_verification_status_outside_workspace_is_not_applicable passed tmp_path as
the cwd and asserted status == not_applicable, relying on tmp_path having no
project-marker ancestor. _marker_root() walks up to ~6 levels, so a stray marker
in a shared tmp-root ancestor (e.g. a /tmp/package.json left by another tool)
made project_facts_for() resolve tmp_path as a workspace and flip the status to
unverified. Green in clean CI, red on any dev box with a polluted /tmp.
Force the no-facts precondition by monkeypatching project_facts_for -> None so
the test deterministically exercises the not_applicable branch regardless of
ambient filesystem state. Test-only; no production change.
* fix(gateway): stop post-/stop stale interrupt from silently swallowing the next message
A /stop sets _interrupt_requested on the session's cached agent, but the
flag is only cleared by the turn finalizer. When the stopped run is hung
or still draining, the flag survives the forced lock release and the
session's NEXT user message is killed at the top of the tool loop
(conversation_loop.py interrupt check): the run completes with
interrupted=True, api_calls=0 and an empty response, which
_normalize_empty_agent_response passed through as pure silence — the
user's message was swallowed with no trace except a
'response ready: ... api_calls=0 response=0 chars' log line.
Two-layer fix:
- _interrupt_and_clear_session now evicts the cached agent whenever it
releases the running state. The next message rebuilds the agent from
session history (mirroring the /new and /model paths), while the old
agent object keeps its interrupt flag so a hung drain still dies when
it unblocks. This intentionally does NOT clear the flag in place:
turn_context deliberately preserves a pending interrupt across turn
start (it carries interrupt-message delivery), and clearing it could
revive a hung run the user just stopped.
- _normalize_empty_agent_response distinguishes a drain from a swallowed
turn: an interrupted run that did work (api_calls > 0) stays silent as
before (deliberate stop/steer; queued messages are delivered by the
recursive drain inside _run_agent), but an interrupted run with ZERO
api_calls never processed the user's message at all and now surfaces a
'send it again' notice instead of nothing.
Same silent-delivery class as a1f76ba7e (#29346), which covered the
extract-stripped case; regression tests added next to that coverage.
Fixes #44212
* test(gateway): update stale expectation — #31884 surfaces retry hint for uninterrupted zero-call drops
The PR predates #31884, which changed the non-interrupted api_calls==0
empty path from silence to a retry hint. Flip the contributed test to
assert the current (correct) behavior.
* chore: map AIalliAI id-form noreply email in AUTHOR_MAP for #44222 salvage
* fix(gateway): drop interrupt sentinel before chat delivery (#7921)
* chore: map waseemshahwan in AUTHOR_MAP for #56841 salvage
* docs: correct Python support to 3.11-3.13 (#59572)
requires-python is >=3.11,<3.14, so '3.11+' was misleading (implied
3.14+ works). Fixed in CONTRIBUTING.md and the docs-site mirror.
* fix(web): correct 'disabled plugin' diagnosis for web backends (#59573)
When a bundled web provider (firecrawl, tavily, exa, ...) is listed in
plugins.disabled, its provider never registers and the web_search/
web_extract dispatchers emitted the misleading "No web extract provider
configured. Set web.extract_backend to ..." — even though the backend was
configured correctly. The real fix is to re-enable the plugin.
- web_tools.py + web_search_registry.py: when the configured backend names
a disabled bundled web plugin, both dispatchers now point the user at the
actual cause (re-enable the plugin) instead of a wrong config hint.
- plugins_cmd.py cmd_enable: enabling by canonical key now also clears the
manifest-name alias (web-firecrawl) from plugins.disabled, so the
suggested command actually re-enables the plugin ('explicit disable wins'
matches on the name too).
- plugins_cmd.py cmd_toggle / _run_composite_ui / _run_composite_fallback:
the interactive 'hermes plugins' menu now persists the canonical key
(web/firecrawl), never the bare manifest name — the drift that put the
offending entry in plugins.disabled in the first place.
Follow-up to #59518 (which fixed web credential resolution, a different
cause). Fixes the disabled-plugin symptom reported after that PR.
* refactor(cron): derive one-shot run-claim TTL from HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT (#59567)
Follow-up to #59524. The one-shot running-claim stale-recovery window was a
fixed 30-min constant. Derive it from the cron inactivity timeout instead
(HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, the same limit the scheduler enforces per run) so the
safety valve tracks how long a run may actually go quiet:
- unset/invalid -> default 600s inactivity -> TTL 1800s (unchanged behaviour)
- positive N -> max(N * 3 headroom, 1800s floor)
- 0 (unlimited) -> no finite bound -> fall back to the 1800s constant
The fixed constant is kept as the floor + unlimited-case fallback. Resolved
once per due-scan. HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT is a pre-existing internal env var
(already read by cron/scheduler.py); no new config surface.
E2E: with HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=1200 the claim now survives to 60min where the
old fixed 1800s constant wrongly expired it at 30min mid-run. +1 derivation
test; 640/640 cron tests pass.
* feat(secrets): pluggable SecretSource interface + multi-source orchestrator
Introduces a first-class secret-source contract so password managers
(Bitwarden today, 1Password next, third-party vaults as plugins) plug
into one orchestrated startup path instead of each hardcoding into
env_loader.
- agent/secret_sources/base.py: SecretSource ABC (fetch-only contract:
never raises, never prompts, sync with orchestrator-enforced timeout),
shared ErrorKind taxonomy, FetchResult, run_secret_cli() minimal-env
subprocess helper, API versioning for plugin compatibility.
- agent/secret_sources/registry.py: registration gating (name/scheme
uniqueness, api_version, shape), apply_all() orchestrator owning
precedence (mapped-beats-bulk, first-claim-wins, override_existing
never crosses sources, protected bootstrap tokens), conflict warnings,
per-var provenance, per-source wall-clock timeout.
- Bitwarden converted to a registered BitwardenSource (bulk shape);
behavior unchanged, apply_bitwarden_secrets kept as legacy shim.
- env_loader._apply_external_secret_sources now drives the orchestrator;
provenance labels resolve through registry (e.g. '(from 1Password)').
- PluginContext.register_secret_source() for external backends.
- secrets.sources optional ordering key in DEFAULT_CONFIG + example.
- tests/secret_sources/: 47 new tests incl. reusable conformance kit
(SecretSourceConformance) that plugin authors run against their source.
* refactor(secrets): extract shared cache/result substrate for secret sources
Pull the disk-cache + FetchResult substrate out of bitwarden.py into a new
agent/secret_sources/_cache.py: FetchResult, CachedFetch, is_valid_env_name,
and a generic DiskCache (atomic mkstemp -> chmod 0600 -> os.replace write,
0700 cache dir, TTL-gated read AND write). Bitwarden now consumes it via a
module-level DiskCache instance and thin wrappers, so the security-sensitive
atomic-write/0600/TTL logic lives in exactly one place instead of being
copy-pasted per backend (and drifting). Behavior is unchanged — the full
Bitwarden suite passes untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(secrets): add 1Password (op://) secret source
Resolve provider credentials from 1Password op://vault/item/field references
at startup via the official `op` CLI, alongside the existing Bitwarden source.
Users map env-var names to references in secrets.onepassword.env; after .env
loads, each is resolved with `op read` and injected into os.environ. Auth is
whatever `op` already uses (service-account token or desktop/interactive
session) — Hermes never authenticates or installs `op` itself.
Startup-safe and fail-open: a missing binary, expired auth, a bad reference,
or an empty value each warn and fall back to existing credentials, never
blocking startup. Successful, complete pulls are cached in-process and on disk
(<hermes_home>/cache/op_cache.json, 0600) via the shared DiskCache; only
secret values are stored, never the token (auth is fingerprinted into the
key). Adds `hermes secrets onepassword {setup,status,set,remove,sync,disable}`
(aliases op/1password), config defaults, the cli-config example, docs, and
hermetic tests.
Hardening applied across both backends in env_loader: each source runs in its
own guard, config sections are coerced to dict, and cache_ttl_seconds is
coerced defensively — so a malformed secrets: section can't abort startup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(secrets): remove unused masked_secret_prompt import from onepassword CLI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(secrets): make 1Password bootstrap token reliable outside systemd
The 1Password secret source resolves op:// references using
OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN read from os.environ. Under systemd the gateway
gets that token via EnvironmentFile, but cron jobs, subprocesses, CLI
runs, macOS launchd, and Docker containers spawn fresh interpreters with
no inherited shell state — so they silently failed to resolve any
reference and fell back to empty strings.
Two patches close the gap, matching Bitwarden's reliability guarantees:
1. env_loader: auto-load ~/.hermes/.op.env after .env so the gitignored
bootstrap token is available everywhere. override=False plus an
explicit guard ensure it never clobbers a token already in env (e.g.
from a systemd EnvironmentFile, which keeps precedence).
2. credential_pool: _get_env_prefer_dotenv() now prefers the resolved
value in os.environ when .env still holds a raw op:// reference,
instead of handing a URL to provider auth. Non-op:// values keep the
existing .env-takes-precedence behaviour.
Also gitignore .op.env, document the three bootstrap-token options, and
add tests covering auto-load, no-override, and the resolved-vs-raw
precedence (plus regression guards).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(secrets): adapt 1Password onto the SecretSource interface
Follow-up on the cherry-picked #36896 commits, wiring 1Password into
the new registry as the reference *mapped* source:
- OnePasswordSource adapter (shape=mapped, scheme=op): fetch-only —
precedence, override semantics, conflict warnings, and env writes
move to the orchestrator; apply_onepassword_secrets kept as legacy
shim like Bitwarden's.
- Registered in _ensure_builtin_sources; mapped op:// bindings now
outrank bulk Bitwarden project dumps on contested vars.
- _cache.py FetchResult/is_valid_env_name re-exported from base so
there is exactly one canonical definition; bitwarden.py re-adapted
onto the contributor's DiskCache substrate.
- ErrorKind classification for op failures (auth/binary/empty/network).
- Registry + conformance coverage for OnePasswordSource, incl. the
headline multi-source test: both vaults claim the same var, mapped
1Password wins, conflict surfaced, provenance correct.
- env_loader tests migrated off the legacy apply_* mocks onto the
fetch layer; AUTHOR_MAP entry for @hwrdprkns.
* fix(interrupt): run user-approved commands from a clean interrupt slate
A user-approved terminal/execute_code command could be SIGINT-killed
(exit 130 + "[Command interrupted]") by a stale interrupt bit that landed
on the execution thread during the blocking approval-wait, while the
result still carried the "...approved by the user." note. The terminal
tool runs sequentially inline on the execution thread, and nothing
cleared or re-checked the bit between approval-grant and env.execute.
Clear the current thread's interrupt bit once before an approved command
spawns its child (terminal foreground; execute_code local + remote), and
enrich the note to "...approved by the user, then interrupted." on a
genuine post-start interrupt instead of implying success. A genuine
interrupt arriving after execution starts (or during a retry backoff)
still SIGINTs the command; non-approved commands keep current behavior.
Adds regression tests covering stale-bit-clears, genuine-interrupt-still-
kills, the retry-backoff window, natural-exit-130 (not mislabeled), and
execute_code local + remote.
* chore: map hellno in AUTHOR_MAP for #49033 salvage
* feat(oneshot): add --usage-file JSON usage report to hermes -z (#59615)
* feat(oneshot): add --usage-file JSON usage report to hermes -z
Pipelines driving hermes -z (batch reviewers, cron scripts, eval
harnesses) had no way to account for per-invocation spend: the agent
computes estimated_cost_usd and full token counts internally, but
oneshot mode discards everything except the final response text.
- hermes -z PROMPT --usage-file PATH writes a JSON report after the
run: estimated_cost_usd, cost_status/source, input/output/cache/
reasoning/total tokens, api_calls, model, provider, session_id,
completed, failed.
- Written even when the run fails (with a failure field) so callers
can always account for spend; the write itself is best-effort and
never masks the run's own outcome.
- Flag registered in both the full parser and the Termux fast path;
added to both value-flag scan sets so profile detection stays
correct.
Validation: 6 unit tests + live E2E (real -z run produced a report
with real OpenRouter cost + token counts).
* test: include usage_file kwarg in oneshot dispatch assertions
The two dispatch tests assert the exact kwargs dict passed to
run_oneshot; the new usage_file kwarg must appear there.
* test(desktop): regression-guard fetchJsonViaOauthSession headers (#40069)
Closes #40069.
Salvaged from #40242; re-verified on main, tightened, tested.
Co-authored-by: maxpetrusenkoagent <maxpetrusenkoagent@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(desktop): default HERMES_DESKTOP_CWD to cwd when --cwd omitted
Salvaged from #40363; re-verified on main, tightened, tested.
Co-authored-by: alex-heritier <alex-heritier@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(banner): size skills display to terminal width instead of fixed 8/47
Salvaged from #40273; re-verified on main, tightened, tested.
Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <liuhao1024@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(plugins): surface entry-point plugins in hermes plugins list
Salvaged from #40346; re-verified on main, tightened, tested.
Co-authored-by: tjboudreaux <tjboudreaux@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(config): add display.timestamp_format and honor it in CLI timestamps
Salvaged from #40303; re-verified on main, tightened, tested.
Co-authored-by: pdmartins <pdmartins@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs: Plugins subcategory under Extending + secret-source plugin guide + 1Password sidebar fix (#59613)
* docs(secrets): secret-source plugin developer guide + sidebar registration for 1Password page
- New developer-guide/secret-source-plugin.md: SecretSource contract
(never raises/prompts, fetch-only, timeout budget), framework-vs-plugin
ownership table, mapped-vs-bulk shape guidance, run_secret_cli()
subprocess-safety, registration + timing note, conformance kit usage,
ErrorKind reference.
- Register user-guide/secrets/onepassword in the sidebar (page shipped
in #59498 but was not listed, so it was unreachable from nav).
- Cross-link the user-guide plugin section to the new dev guide.
* docs: group all plugin guides under a Plugins subcategory in Extending
- Move guides/build-a-hermes-plugin.md -> developer-guide/plugins/index.md
(both locales) and make it the category landing page (slug pinned to
/developer-guide/plugins).
- New sidebar subcategory Developer Guide > Extending > Plugins holding
the general guide + all 8 provider-plugin docs (llm-access, memory,
context-engine, secret-source, model, image-gen, video-gen, web-search);
provider-doc URLs unchanged.
- Client redirect /guides/build-a-hermes-plugin -> /developer-guide/plugins.
- Update 30 cross-links across both locales.
* refactor(skills): finish shop-app→shop rename in zh-Hans docs
The English-side rename from #38138 already landed on main; this carries
the remaining zh-Hans i18n catalog + doc-page rename so the localized
docs match the skill's canonical name.
* feat(skills): add dynamic-workflow orchestration skill
Adapts Claude Code's research-preview dynamic workflows (plan-in-code
fan-out, hundreds of subagents per session) to Hermes invariants.
The ported mechanic is plan/loop/intermediate-state-out-of-context, not
more subagents. Documents the two real orchestration layers and the hard
capability boundary between them:
- Layer A (execute_code): deterministic fan-out, SANDBOX_ALLOWED_TOOLS
only, cannot call delegate_task
- Layer B (delegate_task batch): LLM-judgment fan-out
Plus the synchronous trap (delegate_task is turn-scoped, cancelled on new
message; durable/resumable = kanban swarm) and the genuinely-new piece:
the adversarial-convergence verification recipe (N independent attempts
with varied framings + M refuters, keep only located claims that survive
refutation, iterate to convergence).
Self-contained: inlines the load-bearing fan-out hygiene rather than
hard-depending on local-only skills; references the shipped kanban swarm
subsystem for the durable path.
* docs(skills): tighten dynamic-workflow per donovan-yohan review
Address all 5 review points against actual delegate_task behavior:
- child toolsets are subject to delegate restrictions (leaf strips
delegate_task/clarify/memory/send_message/execute_code), not 'full'
- durable work has lighter options than kanban (cron one-shot,
managed background terminal) for simpler cases
- unique per-run /tmp/wf_<name>_<uuid> dir + freshness/count check so
a stale interrupted run isn't read as success
- note that one delegate_task batch is capped by
delegation.max_concurrent_children; large fan-out needs bounded waves
- delegate_task exposes no per-task model/profile field (per-task keys
are goal/context/toolsets/role); model/profile-scoped runs go via
delegation config, cron, kanban, or separate process
* feat(curator): add `hermes curator usage` — all-skills usage view
Surfaces the usage_report()/provenance() data layer added in #36701 as a
user-facing CLI command. Unlike `hermes curator status` (scoped to
curator-managed agent-created candidates), `usage` lists every skill on disk
— bundled built-ins and hub-installed included — with per-skill use/view/patch
counts and an agent/bundled/hub provenance tag.
Flags: --sort {activity,recent,name}, --provenance {agent,bundled,hub} filter,
--json for machine-readable output.
* docs: browser provider plugin guide + complete the plugin routing map (#59817)
- New developer-guide/browser-provider-plugin.md: BrowserProvider ABC
(session lifecycle, CDP contract, bb_session_id back-compat key,
raise/never-raise split between create and close/cleanup),
get_setup_schema() hermes-tools integration, discovery, checklist.
Closes the one gap in the provider-plugin family — the ABC and
ctx.register_browser_provider() existed with zero docs.
- Register the page in the Plugins sidebar subcategory.
- Extend the routing map on the Plugins landing page (both locales)
with the previously missing rows: web-search, browser, secret-source,
and dashboard-auth surfaces.
* [verified] fix: account for codex replay in compression tail budget
* chore: add bigstar0920 to AUTHOR_MAP
* fix(ci): make the CI timing report unflakeable (#59818)
The 'CI timing report' job is pure observability — it collects per-job/step
durations from the GitHub API after the run and publishes an HTML gantt
report + PR-vs-main timing diff. It gates nothing (all-checks-pass does not
include it), yet it could redden a PR: the script makes dozens of paginated
API calls with the shared repo GITHUB_TOKEN and had zero retry handling, so
a single 403 (rate-limit burst when several PRs run CI concurrently) failed
the job. Observed twice in a row on PR #59805.
- api_get(): retry 403/429/5xx and connection errors with exponential
backoff, honoring Retry-After / X-RateLimit-Reset (max 5 attempts, 120s
cap). Non-transient statuses (404 etc.) still fail fast.
- main(): exhausted retries raise TimingsUnavailable, caught to emit a
degraded summary line + placeholder HTML artifact and exit 0 — a metrics
collector must never fail the PR's checks. No timings JSON is written on
the degraded path so an empty baseline can never be cached.
- ci.yml: baseline-save steps on main skip gracefully when no JSON exists.
Verified with a mocked urlopen harness: retry-then-success (3 attempts),
exhausted-retries -> TimingsUnavailable, 404 fails fast without retry,
degraded main() exits 0 with summary + placeholder and no JSON, and the
--from-json happy path is unchanged.
* fix(auxiliary): floor compression timeout so reasoning models don't fall back to marker (#54915)
* feat(compression): extend Codex 272K compaction autoraise to gpt-5.4
The ChatGPT Codex OAuth backend caps both gpt-5.4 and gpt-5.5 at a 272K
context window, but the autoraise that lifts the compaction trigger to 85%
only matched gpt-5.5. On gpt-5.4 the global 50% threshold fired at ~136K —
half the usable window — compacting far earlier than necessary.
Rename _is_codex_gpt55 -> _is_codex_gpt54_or_gpt55 and match both families.
The one-time user notice is now model-aware (shows the actual slug). The
config key codex_gpt55_autoraise is kept as-is for backward compatibility.
Adds gpt-5.4 coverage to the autoraise tests.
* fix(compression): autoraise gpt-5.3-codex-spark threshold to 70% (#48621)
gpt-5.3-codex-spark has a native 128K context window but the default
50% compaction trigger fires at ~64K, wasting half the usable window
before the session has accumulated enough turns to summarize
meaningfully. This raises the trigger to 70% (~90K) on the Codex OAuth
route only, leaving ~38K headroom for the summary and continued
conversation before the 128K hard limit.
The override is not gated by allow_codex_gpt55_autoraise because 128K
is the model's native window (unlike gpt-5.5's artificial 272K Codex
cap). Non-Codex routes are unaffected.
Also adds a boundary regression test verifying the short-session
scenario from the issue always yields a non-empty compressible window
(no silent context wipe).
* fix(compression): keep Codex gpt-5.5 autoraise from lowering a higher threshold
The Codex gpt-5.5 compaction autoraise (#40957) overrode the effective
threshold unconditionally. If a user had set compression.threshold above
0.85, agent_init dropped them down to 0.85. That wastes usable window and
contradicts the feature's whole point: use more of the context, not less.
It happened silently too, since the one-time notice is suppressed when the
override doesn't raise.
The override is an autoraise. It must only raise. Pulled the apply logic
into a small pure helper that clamps the Codex case to never lower a
higher-or-equal user threshold, and emits the notice only when it actually
fires. Other overrides (Arcee Trinity) keep their existing unconditional
behavior.
Fixes the Codex gpt-5.5 compaction autoraise lowering a user's higher
configured threshold. A user on the Codex OAuth route with
compression.threshold > 0.85 was silently clamped to 0.85, compacting
earlier than they asked and using less of the 272K window the feature was
meant to unlock. The autoraise now only ever raises.
N/A
- [x] 🐛 Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] ✨ New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] 🔒 Security fix
- [ ] 📝 Documentation update
- [ ] ✅ Tests (adding or improving test coverage)
- [ ] ♻️ Refactor (no behavior change)
- [ ] 🎯 New skill (bundled or hub)
- `agent/agent_init.py`: added `_resolve_compression_threshold()`, a pure
helper that combines the global threshold with a per-model override. The
Codex gpt-5.5 autoraise never lowers a higher-or-equal user threshold;
the notice is returned only when it actually raises. Rewired `init_agent`
to call it, replacing the unconditional `compression_threshold = _model_cthresh`.
- `tests/agent/test_arcee_trinity_overrides.py`: added 5 cases for the
helper — raise from default, never-lower regression, equal-is-noop,
no-override passthrough, and non-codex (Trinity) unconditional apply.
1. Set `compression.threshold: 0.90` and run gpt-5.5 on provider `openai-codex`.
2. Before: effective threshold drops to 0.85, no notice. After: stays 0.90.
3. Run `scripts/run_tests.sh tests/agent/test_arcee_trinity_overrides.py`.
Stash `agent/agent_init.py` and the new cases fail; restore and they pass.
- [x] I've read the [Contributing Guide](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [x] My commit messages follow [Conventional Commits](https://www.conventionalcommits.org/) (`fix(scope):`, `feat(scope):`, etc.)
- [x] I searched for [existing PRs](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pulls) to make sure this isn't a duplicate
- [x] My PR contains **only** changes related to this fix/feature (no unrelated commits)
- [x] I've run `pytest tests/ -q` and all tests pass
- [x] I've added tests for my changes (required for bug fixes, strongly encouraged for features)
- [x] I've tested on my platform: macOS 15 (Darwin 25.5)
- [x] I've updated relevant documentation (README, `docs/`, docstrings) — or N/A
- [x] I've updated `cli-config.yaml.example` if I added/changed config keys — or N/A
- [x] I've updated `CONTRIBUTING.md` or `AGENTS.md` if I changed architecture or workflows — or N/A
- [x] I've considered cross-platform impact (Windows, macOS) per the [compatibility guide](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#cross-platform-compatibility) — or N/A
- [x] I've updated tool descriptions/schemas if I changed tool behavior — or N/A
* fix(agent): dedupe Codex gpt-5.5 autoraise notice across agent inits
The Codex gpt-5.5 compaction-threshold autoraise notice re-fired on every
agent init. Because the gateway rebuilds the agent per inbound message, the
notice spammed long-running Discord/Telegram/etc. sessions, and the only
documented remedy (`compression.codex_gpt55_autoraise false`) disables the
useful autoraise behavior itself.
Gate both emission surfaces — the CLI startup print and the gateway
`_compression_warning` replay — on a persisted per-profile marker under
`$HERMES_HOME` (`.codex_gpt55_autoraise_notice`), keyed on the from→to
percentages the notice displays. The notice now shows at most once per
profile; the autoraise still fires and `codex_gpt55_autoraise: false` still
disables it; and a later change to the raised threshold re-notifies once.
Docs updated to match.
* fix(agent): don't apply Codex gpt-5.5 autoraise notice when an external context engine is active
When context.engine selects a plugin engine (e.g. LCM), the host
compression threshold — including the Codex gpt-5.5 50% -> 85%
autoraise — only configures the built-in ContextCompressor and never
reaches the plugin. The autoraise notice still fired, telling the user
auto-compaction was raised when nothing actually changed, and the
startup context-limit line printed the host percent next to the
engine's own threshold_tokens, contradicting itself.
- Clear _compression_threshold_autoraised when a plugin engine is
selected, suppressing both the CLI startup notice and the gateway
turn-1 replay via _compression_warning.
- Print the active engine's own threshold_percent in the startup
context-limit line so percent and token count agree.
- Built-in behavior is preserved, including the fallback path where a
configured engine fails to load and the built-in compressor takes
over.
Fixes #44439
* test: expect model slug in autoraise notice dict (follow-up to gpt-5.4 extension)
* chore: add tanmayxchoudhary to AUTHOR_MAP
* fix(tui): stop hermes --tui -m from persisting the model globally (#59805)
The -m flag seeds HERMES_MODEL/HERMES_INFERENCE_MODEL for the launched TUI
process only. But the per-turn config sync (_sync_agent_model_with_config)
computed its target via _config_model_target(), which fell back to those
env vars whenever config.yaml had no model.default — the normal state for
custom-provider-only setups. The sync then replayed the -m model as a
/model switch, and with model.persist_switch_by_default (default true)
_persist_model_switch wrote model.default/provider/base_url into
config.yaml. A one-shot CLI flag became the permanent global model,
visible in every new session and every model picker.
Two-sided fix:
- _config_model_target() no longer falls back to the env seed. Empty
model = config expresses no preference = sync is a no-op. The agent
keeps the session-scoped -m model; config.yaml edits still sync.
- _apply_model_switch() gains persist_override; all three internal
callers (config sync, /moa one-shot swap, /moa post-turn restore) pass
persist_override=False so session-mechanical switches can never write
config.yaml regardless of the persist-by-default setting. User-typed
/model keeps its existing flag/config behavior.
E2E-verified against an isolated HERMES_HOME with a custom-provider-only
config + -m env seed: sync no longer fires, config.yaml byte-identical,
_resolve_model() still returns the seed for the session's own agent.
* fix(tui): support model picker refresh
* fix(tui): probe active custom model provider
* fix(tui): keep bare custom model listing stable
* fix(web): refresh dashboard model picker
* fix(auxiliary): refresh auto-routed provider credentials on 401
Infer the concrete auxiliary auth provider from the selected client base
URL so provider:auto routes can refresh Copilot/Codex/Anthropic/Nous
credentials after auth errors, instead of skipping refresh because
resolved_provider stayed 'auto'. Adds the copilot branch to
_refresh_provider_credentials and evicts the stale auto-route cache
before retrying.
Fixes #20832. Salvaged from PR #20837, reapplied surgically onto current
main (branch predated the _retry_same_provider_sync/async extraction).
* fix(auxiliary): recover from stale fallback-candidate credentials instead of aborting
A fallback candidate can itself carry a stale credential (e.g. an
expired ANTHROPIC_TOKEN picked up by _try_anthropic). Its 401 previously
propagated out of the fallback call site and aborted the auxiliary task
— for compression: a 60s cooldown + context marker while the session
kept growing past the context cap. Live case: mattalachia debug dump
(Jul 2026), Codex timeout → Anthropic 401 x5 → 296K 'Cannot compress
further'.
Now each fallback candidate call is wrapped: on auth error, refresh the
candidate's provider credentials and retry once; if unrefreshable, mark
the provider unhealthy and walk the discovery chain again so the next
viable candidate serves. Sync + async paths. Non-auth errors still
raise unchanged.
* chore: add fanyangCS to AUTHOR_MAP
* Revert "docs(skills): tighten dynamic-workflow per donovan-yohan review"
This reverts commit 4f008b6412588a54a0e7569bdb9dd07cc537378b.
* Revert "feat(skills): add dynamic-workflow orchestration skill"
This reverts commit 5e5191b9faeaf2ea6aac64fa5fe6d753fc95e0f0.
* fix(agent): run Z.AI overload adaptive backoff on the overloaded path
Z.AI Coding Plan GLM-5.2 reports server overload as HTTP 429 code 1305
("temporarily overloaded"). classify_api_error routes that to
FailoverReason.overloaded (so a valid credential pool isn't burned), but
the adaptive Z.AI backoff was gated on is_rate_limited — which excludes
overloaded — so it never ran (policy=default) and the request failed after
a few quick short retries.
Two compounding causes, both fixed here:
1. Detect the Z.AI overload 429 directly and let its adaptive backoff run
on the overloaded path, not only the rate_limit path.
2. Raise the retry ceiling for this narrow case via
zai_coding_overload_retry_ceiling(). The long-backoff tier
(30/60/90/120s) starts after short_attempts (3) retries, but the default
api_max_retries is also 3, so the loop always gave up before the long
tier could run — leaving the whole long-backoff schedule as dead code.
Scope is limited to the existing narrow is_zai_coding_overload_error match,
so other providers' 429/503/529 handling is unchanged.
* test(retry): cover Z.AI overload retry ceiling reachability
Assert the invariant that the Z.AI overload retry ceiling exceeds the
short-retry threshold (the original bug had them equal, so the long tier
was dead code), and walk the attempt range the retry loop actually
traverses to prove the full 30/60/90/120s long-backoff schedule now runs.
* refactor(retry): single-source Z.AI overload short-attempts + drop change-detector assert
Follow-up on the salvage of #59523. Two low-risk cleanups surfaced by review:
- Extract _ZAI_CODING_OVERLOAD_SHORT_ATTEMPTS as a module constant so
adaptive_rate_limit_backoff() and zai_coding_overload_retry_ceiling()
share one source of truth. Previously both hardcoded short_attempts=3
independently; tuning one without the other would silently desync the
retry ceiling from the backoff schedule.
- Replace the tautological formula-mirroring assert in
test_zai_overload_retry_ceiling_exceeds_short_attempts with a behavior
invariant (ceiling leaves headroom for every long-backoff entry), per the
repo's contracts-over-snapshots testing rule.
* fix: fetch Codex quota from credential pool
* test: lock Codex usage percent polarity
* fix(usage): scope Codex usage pool fallback to AuthError, keep singleton token on account_id read failure
Follow-up hardening on the cherry-picked pool-fallback fix. The original
_resolve_codex_usage_credentials wrapped BOTH resolve_codex_runtime_credentials()
and the separate _read_codex_tokens() account_id read in one broad
'except Exception: pass', which had three problems:
1. A transient refresh/network failure (non-AuthError) from the resolver was
silently swallowed and downgraded to pool.select(), which could report
/usage limits for a DIFFERENT pool account than the one actually running.
On main that error surfaced. This is a real behavior regression for the
multi-account/pool case.
2. If the resolver succeeded but only the account_id read raised, the whole
singleton tier was abandoned in favor of a pool token that carries no
ChatGPT-Account-Id header (PooledCredential has no account_id concept),
risking a wrong-account read or 401.
3. 'except Exception' masked genuine programming errors.
Fix: narrow the outer catch to AuthError (the documented 'no creds' failure
mode of both functions), and read account_id in a best-effort inner try so a
partial/missing singleton store can't sink an otherwise-usable credential.
Transient errors now propagate and fail open via the outer fetch_account_usage
guard rather than mis-routing to the wrong account. Adds debug breadcrumbs and
a comment characterizing when the tier-3 pool path actually fires.
Guard tests: a non-AuthError resolver failure must NOT swap to the pool
(fail-open, no snapshot); an account_id read failure keeps the singleton token.
Updated the existing pool-fallback test to use AuthError (the real failure
mode) instead of a generic RuntimeError.
* chore: map spiky02plateau in AUTHOR_MAP for #32824 salvage
The salvaged commits from #32824 use a bare
spiky02plateau@users.noreply.github.com (no numeric-id + prefix), which the
contributor-check.yml gate does not auto-resolve (it only skips the
<id>+<user>@users.noreply form). Add the explicit mapping so attribution CI
passes and release notes credit @spiky02plateau.
* feat(docker): re-seed a terminally-dead Nous bootstrap session on boot (#59983)
The stage2-hook auth.json seed is first-boot-only ([ ! -f auth.json ]) to avoid
clobbering rotated refresh tokens on restart. That guard means a container whose
Nous bootstrap session took a terminal invalid_grant (tokens cleared,
providers.nous.last_auth_error.relogin_required stamped) cannot recover from a
restart — it stays unauthenticated until the credential is replaced.
Add a self-heal path: an orchestrator that manages the container supplies a
freshly-issued session via HERMES_AUTH_JSON_REBOOTSTRAP (distinct from the
create-only *_BOOTSTRAP var). On boot, scripts/docker_rebootstrap_nous_session.py
swaps ONLY the providers.nous entry, and ONLY when the on-disk entry is provably
terminal (quarantine marker + no usable tokens). Healthy/rotating/absent/
unparseable auth.json is always a no-op, so the env is safe to leave set across
restarts and never clobbers a good token. Pure stdlib, runs as its own
subprocess, always exits 0 so a re-seed error never fails the boot.
Reuses the same terminal predicate as get_nous_session_validity() so we re-seed
only a session that is genuinely dead.
* feat(auth): log forensic detail at Nous quarantine so terminal auth death is visible
A NAS-hosted Fly agent's Nous bootstrap session can take a terminal
invalid_grant and get quarantined in _quarantine_nous_oauth_state, which
clears the dead tokens from auth.json. Until now this quarantine was
completely silent: the only signal was a downstream "No access token found"
WARNING once the credential pool was already empty, which is too late to
root-cause. Because the Fly log drain is WARNING-only, nothing about the
terminal death reached centralized logging, and a real incident could not be
diagnosed because the evidence was never recorded.
Emit a WARNING+ forensic record AT the quarantine point, before the token
material is cleared. Fields: refresh_token hash prefix (12-char SHA-256 hex,
correlates to NAS's refreshTokenHash), client_id, agent_key_id, error code,
reason, auth.json path/size/mtime/exists, and whether the token was already
past its own expiry. WARNING level is deliberate — INFO never reaches the Fly
drain.
Redaction safety (load-bearing): the log dict is built only from computed
values (hash prefix, sizes, booleans). No raw refresh_token, access_token, or
agent_key bytes are ever passed into the log call, avoiding Hermes's known
credential-literal corruption bug class. A test asserts the raw refresh token
substring is absent from all emitted log output.
Note: no session_id field exists on Nous auth state; provenance is captured
via client_id + agent_key_id, which are non-secret routing identifiers.
* test: drop worktree-path sanity guard that fails in CI
The test_module_resolves_to_this_worktree guard asserted auth.__file__ contained
'worktrees/bootstrap-h2-logging' — a local dev crutch to defeat the editable-
install trap (venv points at the main checkout). In CI the code lives at
/home/runner/work/... so the assertion always fails. It never belonged in the
committed suite; the 5 behavioural tests are what matter.
* feat(status): expose nous_session_valid on /api/status for hosted-agent self-heal
A hosted agent whose Nous bootstrap session dies terminally (invalid_grant /
quarantine) looks HEALTHY to every liveness/connectivity probe — the machine,
relay ws, and dashboard all stay up — yet every inference turn hard-fails with
a provider-auth error until a human re-logs-in. Nothing currently surfaces that
condition to NAS.
Add get_nous_session_validity() (valid|terminal|unknown), classified from local
auth-store state (no working token required), and report it on the public
/api/status payload. NAS's 2-min health sweep reads it and re-mints the
bootstrap session in place on 'terminal'.
Anti-flap: only a terminal failure (relogin_required / persisted quarantine
marker with tokens cleared) maps to 'terminal'; transient/mid-rotation blips and
merely-expiring tokens report 'unknown' so a healthy box never triggers a
spurious re-mint.
Part of the hosted-agent bootstrap-session self-heal (NAS side reads this field).
* feat(display): show file_path in skill_view tool progress lines (#60079)
When skill_view loads a supporting file (references/, scripts/,
templates/) instead of the main SKILL.md, the CLI quiet-mode line and
the friendly tool labels now show 'name → file_path' so it's clear
which file was actually read.
* fix(gateway): detect config token credential collisions (#59321)
Co-authored-by: markoub <2418548+markoub@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(gateway): avoid cross-profile session recove…
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NousResearch#59567) Follow-up to NousResearch#59524. The one-shot running-claim stale-recovery window was a fixed 30-min constant. Derive it from the cron inactivity timeout instead (HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, the same limit the scheduler enforces per run) so the safety valve tracks how long a run may actually go quiet: - unset/invalid -> default 600s inactivity -> TTL 1800s (unchanged behaviour) - positive N -> max(N * 3 headroom, 1800s floor) - 0 (unlimited) -> no finite bound -> fall back to the 1800s constant The fixed constant is kept as the floor + unlimited-case fallback. Resolved once per due-scan. HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT is a pre-existing internal env var (already read by cron/scheduler.py); no new config surface. E2E: with HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=1200 the claim now survives to 60min where the old fixed 1800s constant wrongly expired it at 30min mid-run. +1 derivation test; 640/640 cron tests pass.
leewenjie
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NousResearch#59567) Follow-up to NousResearch#59524. The one-shot running-claim stale-recovery window was a fixed 30-min constant. Derive it from the cron inactivity timeout instead (HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, the same limit the scheduler enforces per run) so the safety valve tracks how long a run may actually go quiet: - unset/invalid -> default 600s inactivity -> TTL 1800s (unchanged behaviour) - positive N -> max(N * 3 headroom, 1800s floor) - 0 (unlimited) -> no finite bound -> fall back to the 1800s constant The fixed constant is kept as the floor + unlimited-case fallback. Resolved once per due-scan. HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT is a pre-existing internal env var (already read by cron/scheduler.py); no new config surface. E2E: with HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=1200 the claim now survives to 60min where the old fixed 1800s constant wrongly expired it at 30min mid-run. +1 derivation test; 640/640 cron tests pass.
randlee
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Aug 11, 2026
NousResearch#59567) Follow-up to NousResearch#59524. The one-shot running-claim stale-recovery window was a fixed 30-min constant. Derive it from the cron inactivity timeout instead (HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, the same limit the scheduler enforces per run) so the safety valve tracks how long a run may actually go quiet: - unset/invalid -> default 600s inactivity -> TTL 1800s (unchanged behaviour) - positive N -> max(N * 3 headroom, 1800s floor) - 0 (unlimited) -> no finite bound -> fall back to the 1800s constant The fixed constant is kept as the floor + unlimited-case fallback. Resolved once per due-scan. HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT is a pre-existing internal env var (already read by cron/scheduler.py); no new config surface. E2E: with HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=1200 the claim now survives to 60min where the old fixed 1800s constant wrongly expired it at 30min mid-run. +1 derivation test; 640/640 cron tests pass.
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Summary
The one-shot cron running-claim's stale-recovery TTL (#59524) was a fixed 30-min constant. It now derives from
HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT— the same inactivity limit the scheduler enforces per run — so the safety valve tracks how long a run may actually go quiet instead of a magic number.Changes
cron/jobs.py:_oneshot_run_claim_ttl_seconds()resolves the TTL fromHERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT:max(N × 3 headroom, 1800s floor)0(unlimited runs) → no finite bound → fall back to the 1800s constanttests/cron/test_jobs.py: newtest_run_claim_ttl_derived_from_cron_timeout(all branches) + the TTL-expiry test now reads the resolved value.Why
The claim's real job is to be cleared by
mark_job_runthe instant a run completes; the TTL only recovers a claim left by a tick that died mid-run. A deployment that raisesHERMES_CRON_TIMEOUTfor long jobs should get a proportionally longer recovery window — a fixed 1800s would wrongly expire a claim mid-run once a job legitimately runs past 30 min.HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUTis a pre-existing internal env var (already read bycron/scheduler.py); no new config surface added.Validation
640/640 cron tests pass. Live E2E: with
HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=1200the claim survives to 60 min where the old fixed 1800s constant wrongly expired it at 30 min mid-run.Infographic