fix(redact): stop DB-connstr redaction from corrupting code output (#33801)

agent/redact.py

@@ -202,9 +202,15 @@
 )
 
 # Database connection strings: protocol://user:PASSWORD@host
-# Catches postgres, mysql, mongodb, redis, amqp URLs and redacts the password
+# Catches postgres, mysql, mongodb, redis, amqp URLs and redacts the password.
+# The userinfo and password groups forbid whitespace ([^:\s]+ / [^@\s]+) so the
+# match can never span a line break. A real DSN password never contains
+# whitespace; without this bound the greedy [^@]+ would scan past the end of a
+# code line to the next stray "@" (e.g. a Python decorator), swallowing
+# intervening lines and corrupting tool OUTPUT for any source containing a
+# postgresql:// f-string template. See issue #33801.
 _DB_CONNSTR_RE = re.compile(
-    r"((?:postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?|redis|amqp)://[^:]+:)([^@]+)(@)",
+    r"((?:postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?|redis|amqp)://[^:\s]+:)([^@\s]+)(@)",
     re.IGNORECASE,
 )
 
@@ -483,9 +489,22 @@ def _redact_telegram(m):
     if "BEGIN" in text and "-----" in text:
         text = _PRIVATE_KEY_RE.sub("[REDACTED PRIVATE KEY]", text)
 
-    # Database connection string passwords
+    # Database connection string passwords. With code_file=True, a password
+    # group that is a pure ``{...}`` brace expression is an f-string template
+    # reference (e.g. f"postgresql://{user}:{pass}@{host}"), not a literal
+    # credential — preserve it. Literal passwords are still redacted. The regex
+    # forbids whitespace in the password group, so a single-line template's
+    # group(2) is exactly the brace expression. See issue #33801.
     if "://" in text:
-        text = _DB_CONNSTR_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}***{m.group(3)}", text)
+        if code_file:
+            def _redact_db(m):
+                pw = m.group(2)
+                if pw.startswith("{") and pw.endswith("}"):
+                    return m.group(0)
+                return f"{m.group(1)}***{m.group(3)}"
+            text = _DB_CONNSTR_RE.sub(_redact_db, text)
+        else:
+            text = _DB_CONNSTR_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}***{m.group(3)}", text)
 
     # JWT tokens (eyJ... — base64-encoded JSON headers)
     if "eyJ" in text:

tests/agent/test_redact.py

@@ -603,3 +603,79 @@ def test_company_name_not_masked(self):
     def test_prefix_visible_in_masked_output(self):
         result = redact_sensitive_text(self.KEY, force=True)
         assert result.startswith("xai-AB")
+
+
+class TestDbConnstrCodeOutput:
+    """Regression tests for issue #33801 — _DB_CONNSTR_RE corrupting code output.
+
+    Two distinct flaws, both confined to displayed tool OUTPUT (read_file /
+    terminal / execute_code), never the on-disk content:
+
+    1. The password group ``[^@]+`` was greedy across newlines, so on a
+       multi-line block it scanned past the DSN line to the next stray ``@``
+       (e.g. a Python ``@decorator``), replacing everything in between with
+       ``***`` — dropping lines and concatenating the next one.
+    2. An f-string DSN template (``f"postgresql://{user}:{pass}@{host}"``) is
+       not a live credential, but was redacted anyway. Under ``code_file=True``
+       a pure ``{...}`` brace password is now preserved.
+    """
+
+    MULTILINE = (
+        '            return f"postgresql://{auth}@{self.pg_host}:'
+        '{self.pg_port}/{self.pg_database}"\n'
+        "\n"
+        '    @model_validator(mode="after")\n'
+        '    def _validate_critical_settings(self) -> "Settings":'
+    )
+
+    def test_multiline_block_not_corrupted(self):
+        """The newline bound stops the greedy match from swallowing the
+        decorator line. Original exact repro from the issue thread."""
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(self.MULTILINE, code_file=True, force=True)
+        assert result == self.MULTILINE
+        # No line dropped, no concatenation onto the f-string line.
+        assert "@model_validator" in result
+        assert "_validate_critical_settings" in result
+        assert result.count("\n") == self.MULTILINE.count("\n")
+
+    def test_multiline_block_no_corruption_without_code_file(self):
+        """Even without code_file, the newline bound alone prevents the
+        catastrophic line-dropping. The single-line template's {pass} group
+        is still masked here (code_file=False), but lines stay intact."""
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(self.MULTILINE, force=True)
+        assert "@model_validator" in result
+        assert "_validate_critical_settings" in result
+        assert result.count("\n") == self.MULTILINE.count("\n")
+
+    def test_fstring_template_preserved_with_code_file(self):
+        """A single-line DSN f-string template is preserved under code_file."""
+        text = 'return f"postgresql://{user}:{password}@{host}:{port}/{db}"'
+        assert redact_sensitive_text(text, code_file=True, force=True) == text
+
+    def test_fstring_template_self_attr_preserved(self):
+        text = 'dsn = f"postgresql://{u}:{self.db_pass}@{h}:{p}/{d}"'
+        assert redact_sensitive_text(text, code_file=True, force=True) == text
+
+    def test_literal_connstr_still_redacted_with_code_file(self):
+        """A real password in a literal DSN is still masked under code_file."""
+        text = "postgresql://admin:realpassword@db.internal:5432/app"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text, code_file=True, force=True)
+        assert "realpassword" not in result
+        assert "***" in result
+
+    def test_literal_connstr_redacted_all_schemes(self):
+        for scheme, secret in [
+            ("postgres", "pgsecret1234"),
+            ("mysql", "mysqlsecret99"),
+            ("redis", "redissecret77"),
+            ("mongodb+srv", "mongosecret55"),
+            ("amqp", "amqpsecret33"),
+        ]:
+            text = f"{scheme}://user:{secret}@host:1234/db"
+            result = redact_sensitive_text(text, code_file=True, force=True)
+            assert secret not in result, scheme
+
+    def test_literal_connstr_in_log_line_redacted(self):
+        text = "connected via postgres://user:s3cr3tpw@host:5432/db ok"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text, force=True)
+        assert "s3cr3tpw" not in result

tests/tools/test_terminal_output_transform_hook.py

@@ -128,9 +128,14 @@ def test_terminal_output_transform_still_runs_strip_and_redact(monkeypatch, tmp_
     )
 
     assert "\x1b" not in result["output"]
+    # Terminal output now passes code_file=True: ENV-assignment redaction is
+    # skipped (so code constants like MAX_TOKENS=100 aren't corrupted), but a
+    # real sk-/ghp_/JWT-shaped value is STILL masked by _PREFIX_RE. The full
+    # secret never survives; only the leading prefix marker remains. (#33801)
     assert secret not in result["output"]
     assert "OPENAI_API_KEY=" in result["output"]
-    assert "***" in result["output"]
+    assert "sk-pro" in result["output"]  # prefix marker from _mask_token
+    assert "abc123def456" not in result["output"]  # secret body is gone
 
 
 def test_terminal_output_transform_hook_exception_falls_back(monkeypatch, tmp_path):

tools/code_execution_tool.py

@@ -1031,9 +1031,11 @@ def _execute_remote(
     from tools.ansi_strip import strip_ansi
     stdout_text = strip_ansi(stdout_text)
 
-    # Redact secrets
+    # Redact secrets. code_file=True: execute_code output is code-execution
+    # output that often echoes source/config — skip false-positive ENV/JSON/
+    # f-string-template redaction while still masking real credentials.
     from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
-    stdout_text = redact_sensitive_text(stdout_text)
+    stdout_text = redact_sensitive_text(stdout_text, code_file=True)
 
     # Build response
     result: Dict[str, Any] = {
@@ -1441,9 +1443,11 @@ def _drain_head_tail(pipe, head_chunks, tail_chunks, head_bytes, tail_bytes, tot
         # The sandbox env-var filter (lines 434-454) blocks os.environ access,
         # but scripts can still read secrets from disk (e.g. open('~/.hermes/.env')).
         # This ensures leaked secrets never enter the model context.
+        # code_file=True: this is code-execution output — skip false-positive
+        # ENV/JSON/f-string-template redaction; real credentials still masked.
         from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
-        stdout_text = redact_sensitive_text(stdout_text)
-        stderr_text = redact_sensitive_text(stderr_text)
+        stdout_text = redact_sensitive_text(stdout_text, code_file=True)
+        stderr_text = redact_sensitive_text(stderr_text, code_file=True)
 
         # Build response
         result: Dict[str, Any] = {

tools/terminal_tool.py

@@ -2656,9 +2656,13 @@ def terminal_tool(
             from tools.ansi_strip import strip_ansi
             output = strip_ansi(output)
 
-            # Redact secrets from command output (catches env/printenv leaking keys)
+            # Redact secrets from command output (catches env/printenv leaking
+            # keys). code_file=True: terminal output often echoes source/config
+            # (MAX_TOKENS=100, "apiKey": "x" fixtures, postgresql:// f-string
+            # templates) — skip false-positive ENV/JSON/template redaction while
+            # still masking real prefixes, auth headers, JWTs, and private keys.
             from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
-            output = redact_sensitive_text(output.strip()) if output else ""
+            output = redact_sensitive_text(output.strip(), code_file=True) if output else ""
 
             # Interpret non-zero exit codes that aren't real errors
             # (e.g. grep=1 means "no matches", diff=1 means "files differ")