fix(ssh): quote remote workdir and path operands in one-shot execution

[WAXLYY]

What changed

Quoted remote path operands embedded in SSH shell commands with shlex.quote() in tools/environments/ssh.py.

This includes:

• one-shot execution workdir handling
• mkdir -p path operands
• temporary file reads via cat
• temp cleanup via rm -f

Also added regression tests covering:

• injection-like workdir input
• legitimate workdirs containing spaces
• quoted temp-path helper behavior

Why

The one-shot SSH execution path embedded workdir directly into the remote shell command without quoting. This could lead to command injection and also broke valid directory paths containing spaces.

Quoting these operands ensures they are treated as data by the remote shell and makes behavior consistent with the persistent shell path.

How to test

• Run with TERMINAL_ENV=ssh and TERMINAL_SSH_PERSISTENT=false using:
  • workdir="/tmp/a; touch /tmp/pwned #"
  • before the fix, an unintended extra command may run
  • after the fix, it must not
• Run with:
  • workdir="/tmp/release artifacts"
  • confirm the command executes in the correct directory
• Verify sudo-based SSH commands also run in the intended directory

Validation

• pytest tests/tools/test_ssh_environment.py -q → 14 passed, 11 skipped
• python -m compileall tools/environments/ssh.py tests/tools/test_ssh_environment.py → successful

[teknium1]

This is now fixed via PR #5629 (merged), which sanitizes workdir with tilde-aware shlex.quote + an allowlist validator. Thanks for flagging the vulnerability!