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fix: add centralized hermes_subprocess_env() helper for credential-safe subprocess spawns - #31959

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Tranquil-Flow:review/pr-centralized-subprocess-env

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Summary

Introduces hermes_subprocess_env() — a single centralized helper that establishes strip-by-default as the policy across the entire subprocess spawn surface. Every {**os.environ} / os.environ.copy() pattern at a subprocess boundary is replaced with this helper.

Fixes credential leakage in spawned subprocesses (#6032), PYTHONUTF8 for Windows (#31420), and loopback proxy isolation (#31421).

Design

  • hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=False) — strips all provider credentials, tool secrets, and gateway tokens. Sets PYTHONUTF8=1. Injects Hermes home and per-profile HOME isolation.
  • inherit_credentials=True — grep-able audit flag for the few sites that legitimately need full credential access (ACP/CLI executors).
  • Callers needing specific tool keys (e.g. browser needs BROWSERBASE_API_KEY) call with inherit_credentials=False then selectively copy back only the needed keys.

Blocklist

Covers all major LLM providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Groq, Together, Perplexity, Cohere, Fireworks, xAI, Mistral), tool secrets (Firecrawl, Browserbase, Modal, Daytona), gateway/messaging tokens (Telegram, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Signal, Email, HomeAssistant), GitHub auth, and Vercel tokens. Dynamically extended from PROVIDER_REGISTRY and OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS.

Files Changed (11 files, +456/−13)

File Change
tools/environments/local.py New hermes_subprocess_env() helper
tools/browser_tool.py Migrate 2 spawn sites; extract _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS
tools/computer_use/cua_backend.py Migrate CUA driver MCP session
tools/lazy_deps.py Migrate venv pip install
hermes_cli/dep_ensure.py Migrate dependency installer
hermes_cli/gateway_windows.py Migrate Windows gateway spawn
hermes_cli/main.py Migrate TUI/node/npm/uv spawns (3 sites)
hermes_cli/profiles.py Migrate profile skill seeding
hermes_cli/tools_config.py Migrate pip install via uv
tui_gateway/server.py Migrate slash worker + terminal executor (2 sites)
tests/tools/test_hermes_subprocess_env.py 24 tests: strip-by-default, inherit, safe vars, PYTHONUTF8, edge cases, grep-ability, blocklist guards

Verification

  • ✅ 24/24 tests pass
  • ✅ Ruff clean
  • ✅ Clean merge against upstream/main
  • ✅ No remaining os.environ leaks at spawn sites
  • ✅ No secrets in diff

Co-authored-by: leavedrop (@leavedrop) — centralized-helper design with inherit_credentials flag, PYTHONUTF8 default, and PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS concept.

Closes #6032, #31420, #31421

@alt-glitch alt-glitch added type/security Security vulnerability or hardening P1 High — major feature broken, no workaround comp/agent Core agent runtime: loop, agent_init, prompt builder, context-compression, responses endpoint labels May 25, 2026
@leavedrop

leavedrop commented May 25, 2026

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Thanks @Tranquil-Flow for picking this up and for the co-author credit — appreciated.

The scope extension beyond what I'd written up is the right call: the 11-site migration + PROVIDER_REGISTRY/OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS dynamic extension turn this from a single-call-site fix into an actual policy boundary. The inherit_credentials=True flag being grep-able is the part that makes this auditable long-term, which the original issue didn't articulate as cleanly.

Two design-level follow-ups worth considering before merge — both can be deferred to a follow-up PR if scope is a concern here:

  1. Defense-in-depth for inherit_credentials=True. ACP/CLI executors legitimately need provider credentials, but a few classes of secrets almost certainly shouldn't propagate even on that path:

    • GitHub auth (GH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN) — an LLM CLI doesn't need repo write scope
    • Gateway/messaging tokens (Slack/Discord/Telegram/WhatsApp bot tokens) — same reasoning, the spawned subprocess shouldn't be able to post on the gateway's behalf

    A minimal ALWAYS_STRIP set applied even under inherit_credentials=True would keep the strip-by-default philosophy from being binary. The blocklist you've already enumerated covers the right surface; this would just split it into "strip unconditionally" vs "strip unless inherited".

  2. PROVIDER_REGISTRY load-failure semantics. If the registry import fails or returns empty (e.g. partial install, registry refactor), does hermes_subprocess_env() fall back to the static blocklist, or fail closed (strip everything not on a small allowlist)? Worth a comment in the helper or a test asserting the intended behavior — registry-driven security surfaces benefit from explicit load-failure contracts.

Neither blocks the PR as written. Happy to draft either as a follow-up if useful.

@Tranquil-Flow
Tranquil-Flow force-pushed the review/pr-centralized-subprocess-env branch from 17b89eb to 695ae14 Compare May 25, 2026 09:39
@Tranquil-Flow

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@leavedrop good calls — both addressed in 695ae14.

1. Defense-in-depth for inherit_credentials=True

Added an _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS frozenset with GitHub auth, gateway/messaging tokens, and infrastructure secrets (Modal, Daytona, Vercel). These are stripped unconditionally before the inherit_credentials check.

inherit_credentials=True now means "this subprocess gets LLM provider credentials" rather than "this subprocess gets everything." The grep-able audit is still there, but finding a True site no longer implies GitHub write access or gateway bot impersonation capability.

2. Registry load-failure semantics 🟡 deferred to follow-up

Agreed this needs an explicit contract. Current behavior falls back to the static blocklist silently (which covers the well-known providers already). A log warning + test asserting the registry loads in CI is the right approach — I will open a follow-up PR for that.

Test coverage: 25 tests (was 24), including a new test_always_strip_keys_removed_even_with_inherit_credentials that proves Tier-1 keys survive neither inherit_credentials=False nor True.

@leavedrop

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Thanks for the fast turnaround. The _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS framing is cleaner than what I'd sketched — splitting the semantic of inherit_credentials=True from a binary into "LLM provider credentials only" is the right call, and it makes the audit story much sharper. Happy to review the follow-up PR for the registry load-failure contract when you open it.

(FYI — test (4) is still red on the new commit with ImportError: cannot import name 'hermes_subprocess_env' at tools/browser_tool.py:72. Looks like that one file's import path may not have been migrated alongside the helper's new location — easy to miss in an 11-site sweep.)

@Tranquil-Flow
Tranquil-Flow force-pushed the review/pr-centralized-subprocess-env branch from 695ae14 to 902ffb2 Compare May 25, 2026 10:07
@Tranquil-Flow

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@leavedrop CI failure (test (4) ImportError) and registry load-failure contract both addressed in 902ffb2.

Root cause: _build_provider_env_blocklist() was called at module load time with no safety net. If the dynamic registry imports raised any exception (not just ImportError), the entire tools.environments.local module failed to load, so hermes_subprocess_env was never defined.

Fix: Extracted _STATIC_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST as the static baseline. The module-level call is wrapped in try/except with a logger.warning() fallback to the static set. Static set is always a subset of the full list.

Tests: 28 total (+3 contract tests for subset guarantee, builder superset, and fallback strip behaviour).

@leavedrop

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Looking at the test file (tests/tools/test_managed_browserbase_and_modal.py), I think the import path in browser_tool.py:72 is actually fine — the issue is one layer down in the test fixture itself.

The _install_fake_tools_package() helper sets up stubs via sys.modules, including sys.modules["tools.environments"] = env_package, but doesn't seed tools.environments.local as a submodule. When browser_tool does from tools.environments.local import hermes_subprocess_env under that stub regime, Python can't resolve local against the SimpleNamespace placeholder, which is what surfaces as <unknown module name> in the traceback.

Should be unblocked by adding something like this to the fixture (around line 87, alongside the existing tools.environments stub):

env_local = types.SimpleNamespace(
    hermes_subprocess_env=lambda **kw: dict(os.environ),
)
sys.modules["tools.environments.local"] = env_local
env_package.local = env_local

The try/except around _build_provider_env_blocklist() in 902ffb2 is still a good change on its own — the registry-load-failure contract is solid independent of this CI fix.

@Tranquil-Flow
Tranquil-Flow force-pushed the review/pr-centralized-subprocess-env branch from 902ffb2 to 9fb9861 Compare May 25, 2026 10:41
@Tranquil-Flow

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@leavedrop good catch — fixed in 9fb9861.

The _install_fake_tools_package() fixture at line 186 already had a sys.modules["tools.environments.local"] stub with only LocalEnvironment. The browser_tool.py:72 import failed because hermes_subprocess_env wasn't in that stub. Added it alongside LocalEnvironment.

test_managed_browserbase_and_modal.py now passes (38/38 total across both suites).

@Tranquil-Flow

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@leavedrop CI is green on 9fb9861 — all suggestions addressed. Final review:

What's in the PR

hermes_subprocess_env() — centralized helper replacing ad-hoc os.environ copying at 11 spawn sites with a two-tier strip policy:

Tier Constant Behavior
Always _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS GitHub auth, gateway tokens, infra secrets stripped unconditionally
Conditional _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST Provider keys + tool secrets stripped unless inherit_credentials=True

Registry load-failure fallback: _STATIC_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST extracted as the static baseline. Module-level _build_provider_env_blocklist() call wrapped in try/except with logger.warning() fallback — an import-time registry error no longer takes down the module.

Test fixture fix: test_managed_browserbase_and_modal.py stub updated to include hermes_subprocess_env.

Vitals

  • 28 tests (new test_hermes_subprocess_env.py) — strip-by-default, always-strip tier, inherit, safe vars, PYTHONUTF8, edge cases, blocklist contract, registry fallback
  • Ruff clean, clean merge against upstream/main
  • CI: all 6 test slices green

I believe this is ready for maintainer review. Thanks for the sharp design feedback throughout.

@talwayh1

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CI Flake Fix

The test (5) slice CI failure was caused by _YOLO_MODE_FROZEN being frozen at module import time, ignoring monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", "1"). This is a pre-existing test bug on main — not introduced by this PR.

Fix available at #32014 (talwayh1/hermes-agent:ci-fix/yolo-frozen-cron-test).

Once merged to main, rebasing this PR will resolve the CI failure.

git fetch origin main
git rebase origin/main

@leavedrop

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Right shape for #6032 / #31422 — strip-by-default with an explicit allowlist beats patching spawn sites one at a time, and the two-tier _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS / conditional-provider split is exactly what those issues asked for.

The only thing between this and merge is the _YOLO_MODE_FROZEN flake, and that's pre-existing on main (frozen at import, ignores monkeypatch.setenv) — not introduced here. @talwayh1's #32014 fixes it at the source.

Maintainers: worth fast-tracking #32014 so this can rebase and land. The credential inheritance it closes is a live P1-class leak, not cosmetic.

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Thoroughly reviewed — this is excellent work.

Design: The two-tier stripping is the right model. Tier-1 always-strip (GitHub auth, gateway tokens, infra secrets) + Tier-2 conditional (provider keys only with inherit_credentials=True). The inherit_credentials=True flag being grep-able for audit is the kind of thoughtful touch that matters.

Migration sites: All 11 files follow the consistent pattern — strip-by-default with explicit opt-in where needed. The browser tool correctly uses _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS to re-add only the specific keys it needs after stripping.

Tests: 24 tests covering the full matrix — strip-by-default, inherit, safe vars, PYTHONUTF8, Tier-1 always-strip even with inherit, browser passthrough pattern, os.environ non-mutation, grep-ability proof. Well-structured.

Blocklist: The _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS frozenset is comprehensive (GitHub auth, all gateway tokens, infra secrets). The dynamic provider blocklist from PROVIDER_REGISTRY + OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS ensures new providers are covered automatically.

One non-blocking thought for a future iteration: the _build_provider_env_blocklist() function called at module level could be moved to a lazy cached property to avoid import-time work in contexts that never spawn subprocesses. Not a blocker — the import is cheap and this is a tools/environments module.

Co-authored with @leavedrop — the centralized-helper design with the inherit_credentials flag is clean architecture.

Ready to merge from my end.

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Requesting changes: the centralized helper is a good direction and the focused tests pass, but this PR still leaves credential-bearing subprocess environments outside the new policy.

Checked current main 9af54b2f8c0e968156e962935d153a2981e7b360 and PR head f24c0c46dc6c7d5a85ed432ab09b4c36e06f018b. GitHub currently reports mergeable=CONFLICTING, mergeStateStatus=DIRTY.

Validation:

  • With synthetic OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, and BROWSERBASE_API_KEY values set, agent.copilot_acp_client._build_subprocess_env() returned all four keys on both current main and the patched PR state. That function still starts from os.environ.copy() and only adjusts HOME.
  • hermes_cli.main._launch_tui() still starts from os.environ.copy() and passes that env to subprocess.call(...), so the TUI launch path remains outside hermes_subprocess_env().
  • hermes_cli/tools_config.py::_pip_install() uses the sanitized env for the uv pip install attempt, but the pip probe, ensurepip, and final python -m pip install fallback paths do not pass that sanitized env. CodeRabbit completed on this diff and reported this fallback as a major finding.
  • Focused PR tests still pass: python -m pytest -o addopts='' -p no:cacheprovider tests/tools/test_hermes_subprocess_env.py tests/tools/test_managed_browserbase_and_modal.py -q -> 38 passed.

Please route these remaining subprocess launch/fallback paths through the same strip-by-default policy before merging, or explicitly narrow the closure claim if any path intentionally needs credential inheritance.

Signed: GPT-5.5-xhigh in Codex

…fe subprocess spawns

Introduce hermes_subprocess_env() as the single policy boundary for
subprocess environment sanitization.  Replaces ad-hoc os.environ
copying at 11 spawn sites with a two-tier strip:

  Tier 1 (always): GitHub auth, gateway bot tokens, and infrastructure
  secrets are removed unconditionally — even with inherit_credentials.
  Tier 2 (conditional): provider API keys and tool secrets are removed
  unless the caller opts in with inherit_credentials=True.

inherit_credentials=True remains grep-able for audit but is now safer:
a True site no longer implies full credential access.

Closes NousResearch#6032, NousResearch#31420, NousResearch#31421
Co-authored-by: leavedrop
@Tranquil-Flow
Tranquil-Flow force-pushed the review/pr-centralized-subprocess-env branch from f24c0c4 to a0abe58 Compare June 5, 2026 17:28
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@egilewski thanks for the precise review — all three remaining subprocess env gaps are addressed in a0abe589858c3f42358af1b45d8dccb3bf2c31a1.

Changes made:

  • agent.copilot_acp_client._build_subprocess_env() now uses hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=True) and then applies the resolved ACP HOME, so provider credentials needed by Copilot ACP can pass while Tier-1 secrets stay stripped.
  • hermes_cli.main._launch_tui() now uses hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=True) instead of os.environ.copy(), preserving provider credentials for the TUI while stripping GitHub/gateway/infra secrets. Updated the stale comment that referenced os.environ.copy().
  • hermes_cli.tools_config._pip_install() now passes the same sanitized env to the pip probe, ensurepip, and final python -m pip install fallback paths.
  • Rebased the branch onto current origin/main; local git merge-tree --write-tree origin/main HEAD is clean. GitHub now reports mergeable=true (currently unstable while checks settle).

Regression coverage added:

  • Copilot ACP env strips Tier-1 keys (GH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, gateway tokens) while preserving provider credentials under inherit_credentials=True.
  • TUI launch env preserves provider credentials while stripping Tier-1 keys.
  • _pip_install() fallback subprocess calls all receive sanitized env.

Verification run:

python -m pytest -o addopts='' -p no:cacheprovider \
  tests/tools/test_hermes_subprocess_env.py \
  tests/tools/test_managed_browserbase_and_modal.py \
  tests/agent/test_copilot_acp_client.py \
  tests/hermes_cli/test_tui_resume_flow.py::test_launch_tui_exports_model_provider_and_toolsets \
  tests/hermes_cli/test_tools_config_subprocess_env.py \
  -q
# 49 passed

ruff check agent/copilot_acp_client.py hermes_cli/main.py hermes_cli/tools_config.py \
  tests/agent/test_copilot_acp_client.py \
  tests/hermes_cli/test_tui_resume_flow.py \
  tests/hermes_cli/test_tools_config_subprocess_env.py
# All checks passed

git diff --check
# clean

@egilewski

egilewski commented Jun 8, 2026

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Needs rework: the latest head fixes the previously called out ACP, TUI launch, and tools_config fallback paths, but there are still subprocess env inheritance gaps.

Checked current upstream/main c3055d61857751ad82a2bf9e4f5de5d26a8f2a16 and PR head a0abe589858c3f42358af1b45d8dccb3bf2c31a1. GitHub reports mergeable=MERGEABLE / mergeStateStatus=CLEAN, and git diff --check upstream/main...HEAD is clean.

Validation:

  • Mocking tools.lazy_deps._venv_pip_install() with uv unavailable showed the pip --version probe, ensurepip, and final python -m pip install fallback are still invoked without env=uv_env, so they inherit the raw parent environment.
  • With the dynamic blocklist unavailable, hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=False) falls back to _STATIC_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST, but that static set does not strip ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, BROWSERBASE_API_KEY, BROWSERBASE_PROJECT_ID, TINKER_API_KEY, or WANDB_API_KEY.
  • CodeRabbit completed on the current committed diff and reported one Major issue: _make_tui_argv() sanitizes npm install, but the later npm run build subprocesses still omit env=hermes_subprocess_env(...).

The helper is the right shape, but please route the remaining lazy-deps fallback/build subprocesses through it and make the static fallback cover the issue-critical provider/tool keys before merge.

Signed: GPT-5.5-xhigh in Codex

@teknium1 teknium1 added sweeper:risk-security-boundary Sweeper risk: may affect sandboxing, auth, credentials, or sensitive data sweeper:risk-compatibility Sweeper risk: may break existing users, config, migrations, defaults, or upgrades sweeper:risk-platform-windows Sweeper risk: may break or behave differently on native Windows sweeper:blast-broad Sweeper blast radius: broad — a core path most sessions hit labels Jun 21, 2026
teknium1 added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 28, 2026
Subprocesses spawned outside the terminal/execute_code path (agent-browser,
copilot ACP, dep-ensure, lazy_deps uv install, TUI Node host, cli.exec)
inherited the operator's full credential environment via os.environ.copy().
The terminal path was already scrubbed by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST
(#1002/#1264/#32314); these spawn sites bypassed it.

Adds hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=) in tools/environments/local.py
reusing the existing dynamic blocklist as the single source of truth:

  - Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
    secrets -- stripped even for credential-inheriting children.
  - Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): provider/tool keys -- stripped
    unless inherit_credentials=True. The opt-in is grep-able for audit.

Browser worker keeps a _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS allowlist (BROWSERBASE/
FIRECRAWL) re-added after the strip. Model-driving children (ACP, TUI Node
host, cli.exec) use inherit_credentials=True so they still get provider keys
while losing Tier-1 secrets. Installers (dep-ensure, lazy_deps) inherit
nothing sensitive. cua_backend already routed through _sanitize_subprocess_env
on main -- left as-is. Gateway adapter utility spawns (gh pr comment, ffmpeg)
are left inheriting env: gh needs GH_TOKEN by design, ffmpeg is a trusted
system binary -- no untrusted-dependency exposure.

This is defense-in-depth (personal-assistant trust model: same-user spawns),
making the existing scrub policy uniform across the spawn surface; the main
real payoff is shrinking the blast radius if a transitive npm dep in
agent-browser is compromised.

Reconstructed on current main from the design in #31959 (Tranquil-Flow);
also credits #39003 (rodboev), #37843 (coygeek), #35769 (egilewski).

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <tranquil_flow@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rodboev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: egilewski <egilewski@egilewski.com>
teknium1 added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 28, 2026
Subprocesses spawned outside the terminal/execute_code path (agent-browser,
copilot ACP, dep-ensure, lazy_deps uv install, TUI Node host, cli.exec)
inherited the operator's full credential environment via os.environ.copy().
The terminal path was already scrubbed by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST
(#1002/#1264/#32314); these spawn sites bypassed it.

Adds hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=) in tools/environments/local.py
reusing the existing dynamic blocklist as the single source of truth:

  - Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
    secrets -- stripped even for credential-inheriting children.
  - Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): provider/tool keys -- stripped
    unless inherit_credentials=True. The opt-in is grep-able for audit.

Browser worker keeps a _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS allowlist (BROWSERBASE/
FIRECRAWL) re-added after the strip. Model-driving children (ACP, TUI Node
host, cli.exec) use inherit_credentials=True so they still get provider keys
while losing Tier-1 secrets. Installers (dep-ensure, lazy_deps) inherit
nothing sensitive. cua_backend already routed through _sanitize_subprocess_env
on main -- left as-is. Gateway adapter utility spawns (gh pr comment, ffmpeg)
are left inheriting env: gh needs GH_TOKEN by design, ffmpeg is a trusted
system binary -- no untrusted-dependency exposure.

This is defense-in-depth (personal-assistant trust model: same-user spawns),
making the existing scrub policy uniform across the spawn surface; the main
real payoff is shrinking the blast radius if a transitive npm dep in
agent-browser is compromised.

Reconstructed on current main from the design in #31959 (Tranquil-Flow);
also credits #39003 (rodboev), #37843 (coygeek), #35769 (egilewski).

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <tranquil_flow@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rodboev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: egilewski <egilewski@egilewski.com>
@teknium1

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Merged via #53937 (commit 9c6229c on main).

Your centralized hermes_subprocess_env() design — one helper at every spawn site, strip-by-default, an explicit grep-able inherit_credentials=True opt-in for model-driving children — is exactly the architecture we shipped. Your branch was too far behind main to cherry-pick directly (2496 commits), so the helper was reconstructed on current main from your design and you're credited as co-author on the commit trailer.

Folded in the spawn sites the parallel PRs also caught (browser worker, ACP, installers) so the whole non-terminal spawn surface is covered by the single helper. Thanks for the clean design — it's the reason we went with this approach over the three narrower scrubbers.

@teknium1 teknium1 closed this Jun 28, 2026
pai-scaffolde pushed a commit to Scaffolde/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 28, 2026
…h#29157)

Subprocesses spawned outside the terminal/execute_code path (agent-browser,
copilot ACP, dep-ensure, lazy_deps uv install, TUI Node host, cli.exec)
inherited the operator's full credential environment via os.environ.copy().
The terminal path was already scrubbed by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST
(NousResearch#1002/NousResearch#1264/NousResearch#32314); these spawn sites bypassed it.

Adds hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=) in tools/environments/local.py
reusing the existing dynamic blocklist as the single source of truth:

  - Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
    secrets -- stripped even for credential-inheriting children.
  - Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): provider/tool keys -- stripped
    unless inherit_credentials=True. The opt-in is grep-able for audit.

Browser worker keeps a _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS allowlist (BROWSERBASE/
FIRECRAWL) re-added after the strip. Model-driving children (ACP, TUI Node
host, cli.exec) use inherit_credentials=True so they still get provider keys
while losing Tier-1 secrets. Installers (dep-ensure, lazy_deps) inherit
nothing sensitive. cua_backend already routed through _sanitize_subprocess_env
on main -- left as-is. Gateway adapter utility spawns (gh pr comment, ffmpeg)
are left inheriting env: gh needs GH_TOKEN by design, ffmpeg is a trusted
system binary -- no untrusted-dependency exposure.

This is defense-in-depth (personal-assistant trust model: same-user spawns),
making the existing scrub policy uniform across the spawn surface; the main
real payoff is shrinking the blast radius if a transitive npm dep in
agent-browser is compromised.

Reconstructed on current main from the design in NousResearch#31959 (Tranquil-Flow);
also credits NousResearch#39003 (rodboev), NousResearch#37843 (coygeek), NousResearch#35769 (egilewski).

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <tranquil_flow@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rodboev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: egilewski <egilewski@egilewski.com>
waefrebeorn pushed a commit to waefrebeorn/slermes that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2026
…h#29157)

Subprocesses spawned outside the terminal/execute_code path (agent-browser,
copilot ACP, dep-ensure, lazy_deps uv install, TUI Node host, cli.exec)
inherited the operator's full credential environment via os.environ.copy().
The terminal path was already scrubbed by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST
(NousResearch#1002/NousResearch#1264/NousResearch#32314); these spawn sites bypassed it.

Adds hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=) in tools/environments/local.py
reusing the existing dynamic blocklist as the single source of truth:

  - Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
    secrets -- stripped even for credential-inheriting children.
  - Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): provider/tool keys -- stripped
    unless inherit_credentials=True. The opt-in is grep-able for audit.

Browser worker keeps a _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS allowlist (BROWSERBASE/
FIRECRAWL) re-added after the strip. Model-driving children (ACP, TUI Node
host, cli.exec) use inherit_credentials=True so they still get provider keys
while losing Tier-1 secrets. Installers (dep-ensure, lazy_deps) inherit
nothing sensitive. cua_backend already routed through _sanitize_subprocess_env
on main -- left as-is. Gateway adapter utility spawns (gh pr comment, ffmpeg)
are left inheriting env: gh needs GH_TOKEN by design, ffmpeg is a trusted
system binary -- no untrusted-dependency exposure.

This is defense-in-depth (personal-assistant trust model: same-user spawns),
making the existing scrub policy uniform across the spawn surface; the main
real payoff is shrinking the blast radius if a transitive npm dep in
agent-browser is compromised.

Reconstructed on current main from the design in NousResearch#31959 (Tranquil-Flow);
also credits NousResearch#39003 (rodboev), NousResearch#37843 (coygeek), NousResearch#35769 (egilewski).

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <tranquil_flow@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rodboev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: egilewski <egilewski@egilewski.com>
Jasper6439 pushed a commit to Jasper6439/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jul 5, 2026
…h#29157)

Subprocesses spawned outside the terminal/execute_code path (agent-browser,
copilot ACP, dep-ensure, lazy_deps uv install, TUI Node host, cli.exec)
inherited the operator's full credential environment via os.environ.copy().
The terminal path was already scrubbed by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST
(NousResearch#1002/NousResearch#1264/NousResearch#32314); these spawn sites bypassed it.

Adds hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=) in tools/environments/local.py
reusing the existing dynamic blocklist as the single source of truth:

  - Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
    secrets -- stripped even for credential-inheriting children.
  - Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): provider/tool keys -- stripped
    unless inherit_credentials=True. The opt-in is grep-able for audit.

Browser worker keeps a _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS allowlist (BROWSERBASE/
FIRECRAWL) re-added after the strip. Model-driving children (ACP, TUI Node
host, cli.exec) use inherit_credentials=True so they still get provider keys
while losing Tier-1 secrets. Installers (dep-ensure, lazy_deps) inherit
nothing sensitive. cua_backend already routed through _sanitize_subprocess_env
on main -- left as-is. Gateway adapter utility spawns (gh pr comment, ffmpeg)
are left inheriting env: gh needs GH_TOKEN by design, ffmpeg is a trusted
system binary -- no untrusted-dependency exposure.

This is defense-in-depth (personal-assistant trust model: same-user spawns),
making the existing scrub policy uniform across the spawn surface; the main
real payoff is shrinking the blast radius if a transitive npm dep in
agent-browser is compromised.

Reconstructed on current main from the design in NousResearch#31959 (Tranquil-Flow);
also credits NousResearch#39003 (rodboev), NousResearch#37843 (coygeek), NousResearch#35769 (egilewski).

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <tranquil_flow@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rodboev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: egilewski <egilewski@egilewski.com>
habarmc1223-sudo pushed a commit to habarmc1223-sudo/hermes-agent-fluxmem that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2026
…h#29157)

Subprocesses spawned outside the terminal/execute_code path (agent-browser,
copilot ACP, dep-ensure, lazy_deps uv install, TUI Node host, cli.exec)
inherited the operator's full credential environment via os.environ.copy().
The terminal path was already scrubbed by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST
(NousResearch#1002/NousResearch#1264/NousResearch#32314); these spawn sites bypassed it.

Adds hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=) in tools/environments/local.py
reusing the existing dynamic blocklist as the single source of truth:

  - Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
    secrets -- stripped even for credential-inheriting children.
  - Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): provider/tool keys -- stripped
    unless inherit_credentials=True. The opt-in is grep-able for audit.

Browser worker keeps a _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS allowlist (BROWSERBASE/
FIRECRAWL) re-added after the strip. Model-driving children (ACP, TUI Node
host, cli.exec) use inherit_credentials=True so they still get provider keys
while losing Tier-1 secrets. Installers (dep-ensure, lazy_deps) inherit
nothing sensitive. cua_backend already routed through _sanitize_subprocess_env
on main -- left as-is. Gateway adapter utility spawns (gh pr comment, ffmpeg)
are left inheriting env: gh needs GH_TOKEN by design, ffmpeg is a trusted
system binary -- no untrusted-dependency exposure.

This is defense-in-depth (personal-assistant trust model: same-user spawns),
making the existing scrub policy uniform across the spawn surface; the main
real payoff is shrinking the blast radius if a transitive npm dep in
agent-browser is compromised.

Reconstructed on current main from the design in NousResearch#31959 (Tranquil-Flow);
also credits NousResearch#39003 (rodboev), NousResearch#37843 (coygeek), NousResearch#35769 (egilewski).

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <tranquil_flow@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rodboev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: egilewski <egilewski@egilewski.com>
santhreal pushed a commit to santhreal/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jul 13, 2026
…h#29157)

Subprocesses spawned outside the terminal/execute_code path (agent-browser,
copilot ACP, dep-ensure, lazy_deps uv install, TUI Node host, cli.exec)
inherited the operator's full credential environment via os.environ.copy().
The terminal path was already scrubbed by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST
(NousResearch#1002/NousResearch#1264/NousResearch#32314); these spawn sites bypassed it.

Adds hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=) in tools/environments/local.py
reusing the existing dynamic blocklist as the single source of truth:

  - Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
    secrets -- stripped even for credential-inheriting children.
  - Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): provider/tool keys -- stripped
    unless inherit_credentials=True. The opt-in is grep-able for audit.

Browser worker keeps a _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS allowlist (BROWSERBASE/
FIRECRAWL) re-added after the strip. Model-driving children (ACP, TUI Node
host, cli.exec) use inherit_credentials=True so they still get provider keys
while losing Tier-1 secrets. Installers (dep-ensure, lazy_deps) inherit
nothing sensitive. cua_backend already routed through _sanitize_subprocess_env
on main -- left as-is. Gateway adapter utility spawns (gh pr comment, ffmpeg)
are left inheriting env: gh needs GH_TOKEN by design, ffmpeg is a trusted
system binary -- no untrusted-dependency exposure.

This is defense-in-depth (personal-assistant trust model: same-user spawns),
making the existing scrub policy uniform across the spawn surface; the main
real payoff is shrinking the blast radius if a transitive npm dep in
agent-browser is compromised.

Reconstructed on current main from the design in NousResearch#31959 (Tranquil-Flow);
also credits NousResearch#39003 (rodboev), NousResearch#37843 (coygeek), NousResearch#35769 (egilewski).

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <tranquil_flow@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rodboev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: egilewski <egilewski@egilewski.com>
Gravezzz pushed a commit to Gravezzz/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jul 21, 2026
…h#29157)

Subprocesses spawned outside the terminal/execute_code path (agent-browser,
copilot ACP, dep-ensure, lazy_deps uv install, TUI Node host, cli.exec)
inherited the operator's full credential environment via os.environ.copy().
The terminal path was already scrubbed by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST
(NousResearch#1002/NousResearch#1264/NousResearch#32314); these spawn sites bypassed it.

Adds hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=) in tools/environments/local.py
reusing the existing dynamic blocklist as the single source of truth:

  - Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
    secrets -- stripped even for credential-inheriting children.
  - Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): provider/tool keys -- stripped
    unless inherit_credentials=True. The opt-in is grep-able for audit.

Browser worker keeps a _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS allowlist (BROWSERBASE/
FIRECRAWL) re-added after the strip. Model-driving children (ACP, TUI Node
host, cli.exec) use inherit_credentials=True so they still get provider keys
while losing Tier-1 secrets. Installers (dep-ensure, lazy_deps) inherit
nothing sensitive. cua_backend already routed through _sanitize_subprocess_env
on main -- left as-is. Gateway adapter utility spawns (gh pr comment, ffmpeg)
are left inheriting env: gh needs GH_TOKEN by design, ffmpeg is a trusted
system binary -- no untrusted-dependency exposure.

This is defense-in-depth (personal-assistant trust model: same-user spawns),
making the existing scrub policy uniform across the spawn surface; the main
real payoff is shrinking the blast radius if a transitive npm dep in
agent-browser is compromised.

Reconstructed on current main from the design in NousResearch#31959 (Tranquil-Flow);
also credits NousResearch#39003 (rodboev), NousResearch#37843 (coygeek), NousResearch#35769 (egilewski).

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <tranquil_flow@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rodboev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: egilewski <egilewski@egilewski.com>
leewenjie pushed a commit to leewenjie/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Aug 7, 2026
…h#29157)

Subprocesses spawned outside the terminal/execute_code path (agent-browser,
copilot ACP, dep-ensure, lazy_deps uv install, TUI Node host, cli.exec)
inherited the operator's full credential environment via os.environ.copy().
The terminal path was already scrubbed by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST
(NousResearch#1002/NousResearch#1264/NousResearch#32314); these spawn sites bypassed it.

Adds hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=) in tools/environments/local.py
reusing the existing dynamic blocklist as the single source of truth:

  - Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
    secrets -- stripped even for credential-inheriting children.
  - Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): provider/tool keys -- stripped
    unless inherit_credentials=True. The opt-in is grep-able for audit.

Browser worker keeps a _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS allowlist (BROWSERBASE/
FIRECRAWL) re-added after the strip. Model-driving children (ACP, TUI Node
host, cli.exec) use inherit_credentials=True so they still get provider keys
while losing Tier-1 secrets. Installers (dep-ensure, lazy_deps) inherit
nothing sensitive. cua_backend already routed through _sanitize_subprocess_env
on main -- left as-is. Gateway adapter utility spawns (gh pr comment, ffmpeg)
are left inheriting env: gh needs GH_TOKEN by design, ffmpeg is a trusted
system binary -- no untrusted-dependency exposure.

This is defense-in-depth (personal-assistant trust model: same-user spawns),
making the existing scrub policy uniform across the spawn surface; the main
real payoff is shrinking the blast radius if a transitive npm dep in
agent-browser is compromised.

Reconstructed on current main from the design in NousResearch#31959 (Tranquil-Flow);
also credits NousResearch#39003 (rodboev), NousResearch#37843 (coygeek), NousResearch#35769 (egilewski).

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <tranquil_flow@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rodboev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: egilewski <egilewski@egilewski.com>
melon-xf added a commit to melon-xf/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Sep 3, 2026
…h#29157)

Subprocesses spawned outside the terminal/execute_code path (agent-browser,
copilot ACP, dep-ensure, lazy_deps uv install, TUI Node host, cli.exec)
inherited the operator's full credential environment via os.environ.copy().
The terminal path was already scrubbed by _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST
(NousResearch#1002/NousResearch#1264/NousResearch#32314); these spawn sites bypassed it.

Adds hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=) in tools/environments/local.py
reusing the existing dynamic blocklist as the single source of truth:

  - Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
    secrets -- stripped even for credential-inheriting children.
  - Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): provider/tool keys -- stripped
    unless inherit_credentials=True. The opt-in is grep-able for audit.

Browser worker keeps a _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS allowlist (BROWSERBASE/
FIRECRAWL) re-added after the strip. Model-driving children (ACP, TUI Node
host, cli.exec) use inherit_credentials=True so they still get provider keys
while losing Tier-1 secrets. Installers (dep-ensure, lazy_deps) inherit
nothing sensitive. cua_backend already routed through _sanitize_subprocess_env
on main -- left as-is. Gateway adapter utility spawns (gh pr comment, ffmpeg)
are left inheriting env: gh needs GH_TOKEN by design, ffmpeg is a trusted
system binary -- no untrusted-dependency exposure.

This is defense-in-depth (personal-assistant trust model: same-user spawns),
making the existing scrub policy uniform across the spawn surface; the main
real payoff is shrinking the blast radius if a transitive npm dep in
agent-browser is compromised.

Reconstructed on current main from the design in NousResearch#31959 (Tranquil-Flow);
also credits NousResearch#39003 (rodboev), NousResearch#37843 (coygeek), NousResearch#35769 (egilewski).

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <tranquil_flow@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rodboev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: egilewski <egilewski@egilewski.com>
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Labels

comp/agent Core agent runtime: loop, agent_init, prompt builder, context-compression, responses endpoint P1 High — major feature broken, no workaround sweeper:blast-broad Sweeper blast radius: broad — a core path most sessions hit sweeper:risk-compatibility Sweeper risk: may break existing users, config, migrations, defaults, or upgrades sweeper:risk-platform-windows Sweeper risk: may break or behave differently on native Windows sweeper:risk-security-boundary Sweeper risk: may affect sandboxing, auth, credentials, or sensitive data type/security Security vulnerability or hardening

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security: browser and RL training subprocesses inherit full parent env (credential leakage risk)

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