fix(cli): prevent shell injection in quick_commands exec type - #3049
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Kewe63 wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(cli): prevent shell injection in quick_commands exec type#3049Kewe63 wants to merge 1 commit into
Kewe63 wants to merge 1 commit into
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shell=True with a config-provided command string allowed shell operators (`&&`, `|`, `$(...)` etc.) to be interpreted by the shell. A malicious or compromised config.yaml entry could therefore run arbitrary commands. Switch to shlex.split() + shell=False so the command is parsed into an argument list and passed directly to execvp, with no shell involvement. Shell metacharacters in the command string are now treated as literal arguments rather than operators. Also add a ValueError handler to report unterminated-quote parse errors clearly instead of silently failing.
alt-glitch
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type/security
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Summary
quick_commandsof typeexecinconfig.yamlwere executed withshell=True, allowing shell metacharacters (&&,|,$(...), backticks) to be interpreted by the shell. A malicious or compromised config entry could run arbitrary commands beyond the intended one.shlex.split()+shell=Falseso the command is parsed into an argument list and passed directly to the OS — no shell involved, metacharacters are treated as literal arguments.ValueErrorhandler to surface unterminated-quote parse errors clearly.Before: