fix(security): shell-quote workdir in SSH/Docker/Singularity to prevent command injection - #1799
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0xbyt4 wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(security): shell-quote workdir in SSH/Docker/Singularity to prevent command injection#17990xbyt4 wants to merge 1 commit into
0xbyt4 wants to merge 1 commit into
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…nt command injection
The workdir parameter from terminal_tool was interpolated unescaped into
shell commands: f'cd {work_dir} && {exec_command}'. A crafted workdir
like '/tmp/$(rm -rf /)' would execute the subshell as command substitution.
Fixed by wrapping work_dir with shlex.quote() in all three backends.
SSH was the most critical (always triggered), Docker and Singularity
only triggered for ~-prefixed paths but fixed for defense in depth.
Contributor
|
This is now fixed via PR #5629 (merged), which sanitizes workdir with tilde-aware shlex.quote + an allowlist validator. Thanks for flagging the vulnerability! |
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Summary
The
workdirparameter fromterminal_toolwas interpolated unescaped into shell commands:A crafted workdir like
/tmp/$(rm -rf /)would execute the subshell as command substitution on the target host.Attack path: LLM tool call →
terminal_tool(command="ls", workdir="/tmp/$(malicious)")→SSHEnvironment._execute_oneshot→ shell injection on remote host. Theworkdirparameter bypasses dangerous command checks since those only inspect thecommandargument.Fixed with
shlex.quote(work_dir)in all three backends:tools/environments/ssh.py— always triggered (highest risk)tools/environments/docker.py— only for~-prefixed pathstools/environments/singularity.py— only for~-prefixed pathsTest plan
TestWorkdirShellEscaping::test_workdir_with_shell_metacharacters_is_escaped— proves$(rm -rf /)in workdir is quoted