fix(file-safety): block read_file on HERMES_HOME credential stores (#17656)

agent/file_safety.py

@@ -105,7 +105,23 @@ def is_write_denied(path: str) -> bool:
 
 
 def get_read_block_error(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Return an error message when a read targets internal Hermes cache files."""
+    """Return an error message when a read targets a denied Hermes path.
+
+    Two categories are blocked:
+      * Internal Hermes cache files under ``HERMES_HOME/skills/.hub`` —
+        readable metadata that an attacker could use as a prompt-injection
+        carrier.
+      * Credential stores at the top of ``HERMES_HOME`` (``auth.json``,
+        ``auth.lock``, ``.anthropic_oauth.json``) — plaintext provider
+        keys / OAuth tokens that the agent never needs to read directly.
+
+    Callers that resolve relative paths against a non-process cwd
+    (e.g. ``TERMINAL_CWD`` in ``tools/file_tools.py``) MUST pre-resolve
+    and pass the absolute path string.  This function's own ``resolve()``
+    is anchored at the Python process cwd, so a relative input like
+    ``"auth.json"`` would otherwise miss the denylist when the task's
+    terminal cwd differs from the process cwd.
+    """
     resolved = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()
     hermes_home = _hermes_home_path().resolve()
     blocked_dirs = [
@@ -122,4 +138,21 @@ def get_read_block_error(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
             "and cannot be read directly to prevent prompt injection. "
             "Use the skills_list or skill_view tools instead."
         )
+
+    # Credential stores under HERMES_HOME hold plaintext provider keys
+    # and OAuth tokens. The agent never needs to read these directly —
+    # auxiliary_client / credential_pool consume them through process
+    # env / OAuth flows that bypass read_file. Block read access so a
+    # prompt-injection reaching read_file can't exfiltrate them.
+    blocked_credential_files = {
+        hermes_home / "auth.json",
+        hermes_home / "auth.lock",
+        hermes_home / ".anthropic_oauth.json",
+    }
+    if resolved in blocked_credential_files:
+        return (
+            f"Access denied: {path} is a Hermes credential store "
+            "and cannot be read directly. Provider tools consume these "
+            "credentials through internal channels."
+        )
     return None

tests/agent/test_file_safety_credentials.py

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+"""Tests for HERMES_HOME credential-file read blocking in file_safety.
+
+Regression for https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/17656 —
+``read_file`` was previously only sandboxed against ``HERMES_HOME`` itself,
+which left ``auth.json`` and ``.anthropic_oauth.json`` (plaintext provider
+keys + OAuth tokens) readable by the agent. A prompt-injection reaching
+``read_file`` could exfiltrate active credentials.
+
+These tests verify that ``get_read_block_error`` returns a denial message
+for the credential stores while leaving arbitrary ``HERMES_HOME`` files
+readable, and that the existing ``skills/.hub`` deny still applies.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+
+@pytest.fixture()
+def fake_home(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Point ``_hermes_home_path()`` at a tmp dir for isolated checks."""
+    import agent.file_safety as fs
+
+    home = tmp_path / "hermes_home"
+    home.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(fs, "_hermes_home_path", lambda: home)
+    return home
+
+
+def _create(home: Path, rel: str | Path) -> Path:
+    """Create the file (with parents) so realpath() resolves it."""
+    p = home / rel
+    p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    p.write_text("dummy", encoding="utf-8")
+    return p
+
+
+def test_auth_json_blocked(fake_home):
+    from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
+
+    auth = _create(fake_home, "auth.json")
+    err = get_read_block_error(str(auth))
+    assert err is not None
+    assert "credential store" in err
+    assert "auth.json" in err
+
+
+def test_auth_lock_blocked(fake_home):
+    from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
+
+    lock = _create(fake_home, "auth.lock")
+    err = get_read_block_error(str(lock))
+    assert err is not None
+    assert "credential store" in err
+
+
+def test_anthropic_oauth_json_blocked(fake_home):
+    from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
+
+    oauth = _create(fake_home, ".anthropic_oauth.json")
+    err = get_read_block_error(str(oauth))
+    assert err is not None
+    assert "credential store" in err
+
+
+def test_arbitrary_hermes_home_file_not_blocked(fake_home):
+    """Non-credential files inside HERMES_HOME stay readable."""
+    from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
+
+    safe = _create(fake_home, "session_log.txt")
+    assert get_read_block_error(str(safe)) is None
+
+
+def test_subdirectory_named_auth_json_not_blocked(fake_home):
+    """Only the top-level auth.json is the credential store; a file with the
+    same name in a subdirectory (e.g., a skill mock) must remain readable."""
+    from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
+
+    nested = _create(fake_home, Path("skills") / "my-skill" / "auth.json")
+    assert get_read_block_error(str(nested)) is None
+
+
+def test_skills_hub_block_still_applies(fake_home):
+    """Regression guard: the original skills/.hub deny must keep working."""
+    from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
+
+    hub_file = _create(fake_home, "skills/.hub/manifest.json")
+    err = get_read_block_error(str(hub_file))
+    assert err is not None
+    assert "internal Hermes cache file" in err
+
+
+def test_path_traversal_resolves_to_blocked(fake_home, tmp_path):
+    """A path that traverses through a sibling dir back into HERMES_HOME's
+    auth.json must still be caught — the check resolves through realpath."""
+    from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
+
+    _create(fake_home, "auth.json")
+    sibling = tmp_path / "elsewhere"
+    sibling.mkdir()
+    traversal = sibling / ".." / "hermes_home" / "auth.json"
+    err = get_read_block_error(str(traversal))
+    assert err is not None
+    assert "credential store" in err
+
+
+def test_symlink_to_auth_json_blocked(fake_home, tmp_path):
+    """A symlink pointing at HERMES_HOME/auth.json from outside the home
+    must be blocked — readlink-resolution catches the indirection."""
+    from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
+
+    target = _create(fake_home, "auth.json")
+    link = tmp_path / "shim.json"
+    try:
+        os.symlink(target, link)
+    except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
+        pytest.skip("symlinks not supported on this platform/filesystem")
+    err = get_read_block_error(str(link))
+    assert err is not None
+    assert "credential store" in err
+
+
+def test_read_file_tool_blocks_relative_path_under_terminal_cwd(
+    fake_home, tmp_path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Bypass guard: a relative path like ``"auth.json"`` resolved by
+    ``read_file_tool`` against ``TERMINAL_CWD == HERMES_HOME`` must still
+    be blocked, even though ``get_read_block_error``'s own ``resolve()``
+    is anchored at the (different) Python process cwd.
+    """
+    import json
+
+    import tools.file_tools as ft
+
+    _create(fake_home, "auth.json")
+    # Force the file_tools resolver to anchor relative paths at HERMES_HOME
+    # while the Python process cwd remains tmp_path (a different directory).
+    monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_CWD", str(fake_home))
+    monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        ft, "_get_live_tracking_cwd", lambda task_id="default": None
+    )
+
+    out = json.loads(ft.read_file_tool("auth.json"))
+    assert "error" in out
+    assert "credential store" in out["error"]

tools/file_tools.py

@@ -474,8 +474,13 @@ def read_file_tool(path: str, offset: int = 1, limit: int = 500, task_id: str =
             })
 
         # ── Hermes internal path guard ────────────────────────────────
-        # Prevent prompt injection via catalog or hub metadata files.
-        block_error = get_read_block_error(path)
+        # Prevent prompt injection via catalog or hub metadata files,
+        # and block credential stores under HERMES_HOME.  Pass the
+        # already-resolved path so a relative-path read against
+        # TERMINAL_CWD == HERMES_HOME (e.g. "auth.json") still hits the
+        # denylist — get_read_block_error's own resolve() runs against
+        # the Python process cwd, which can differ.
+        block_error = get_read_block_error(str(_resolved))
         if block_error:
             return json.dumps({"error": block_error})