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fix(file_tools): prevent agent from silently disabling exec approval via config write - #14639

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fix(file_tools): prevent agent from silently disabling exec approval via config write#14639
Subway2023 wants to merge 1 commit into
NousResearch:mainfrom
Subway2023:config_modify

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fix(file_tools): prevent agent from silently disabling exec approval via config write

What does this PR do?

write_file and patch tools had no protection against writes to ~/.hermes/config.yaml. A malicious or prompt-injected agent could exploit this to silently disable exec approval:

  1. Call read_file("~/.hermes/config.yaml") to read the current config.
  2. Call write_file or patch to set approvals.mode: off.
  3. All subsequent execute_code calls bypass check_all_command_guards() entirely — approval_mode == "off" causes it to return {"approved": True} unconditionally.

This PR adds ~/.hermes/config.yaml to the sensitive path protection in _check_sensitive_path(). Any attempt by an agent to write to the config file is rejected before reaching the filesystem, regardless of whether the path is expressed as an absolute path or via ~.

Related Issue

Fixes #

Type of Change

  • 🐛 Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
  • ✨ New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
  • 🔒 Security fix
  • 📝 Documentation update
  • ✅ Tests (adding or improving test coverage)
  • ♻️ Refactor (no behavior change)
  • 🎯 New skill (bundled or hub)

Changes Made

  • tools/file_tools.py: add _get_hermes_config_resolved() to lazily resolve and cache the canonical path of ~/.hermes/config.yaml (via get_config_path().resolve(), with expanduser fallback)
  • tools/file_tools.py: add a guard at the end of _check_sensitive_path() that rejects writes when the target path matches the Hermes config file — covers both write_file and patch entry points
  • tests/tools/test_file_tools.py: add TestSensitivePathCheck with 5 cases covering the new protection and verifying no regression on normal file writes or existing system-path blocks

How to Test

  1. Run the new test class: pytest tests/tools/test_file_tools.py::TestSensitivePathCheck -v — all 5 cases should pass.
  2. Run the full file tools suite: pytest tests/tools/test_file_tools.py -q — all 28 tests should pass.
  3. In a live session, ask the agent to write approvals:\n mode: off to ~/.hermes/config.yaml — confirm it receives an error response containing "Refusing to write to Hermes config file".

Checklist

Code

  • I've read the Contributing Guide
  • My commit messages follow Conventional Commits (fix(scope):, feat(scope):, etc.)
  • I searched for existing PRs to make sure this isn't a duplicate
  • My PR contains only changes related to this fix/feature (no unrelated commits)
  • I've run pytest tests/ -q and all tests pass
  • I've added tests for my changes (required for bug fixes, strongly encouraged for features)
  • I've tested on my platform:

Documentation & Housekeeping

  • I've updated relevant documentation (README, docs/, docstrings) — or N/A
  • I've updated cli-config.yaml.example if I added/changed config keys — or N/A
  • I've updated CONTRIBUTING.md or AGENTS.md if I changed architecture or workflows — or N/A
  • I've considered cross-platform impact (Windows, macOS) per the compatibility guide — or N/A
  • I've updated tool descriptions/schemas if I changed tool behavior — or N/A

Screenshots / Logs

# Agent attempts to disable exec approval
write_file("~/.hermes/config.yaml", "approvals:\n  mode: off\n")
→ {"error": "Refusing to write to Hermes config file: ~/.hermes/config.yaml\nAgent cannot modify security-sensitive configuration. Edit ~/.hermes/config.yaml directly or use 'hermes config' instead."}
pytest tests/tools/test_file_tools.py -q
28 passed, 6 warnings in 0.75s

@alt-glitch alt-glitch added type/security Security vulnerability or hardening P0 Critical — data loss, security, crash loop tool/file File tools (read, write, patch, search) labels Apr 23, 2026
@alt-glitch

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Related to #8738 — both address config.yaml write protection. This PR adds the file_tools guard; #8738 takes a broader approach.

teknium1 added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 1, 2026
Subway2023's #14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
teknium1 added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 1, 2026
SuperInstance pushed a commit to SuperInstance/hermes-construct that referenced this pull request Jun 1, 2026
Subway2023's NousResearch#14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
teknium1 added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 1, 2026
…37046)

* fix(file_tools): block agent writes to ~/.hermes/config.yaml to prevent silent approval bypass

* fix(approval): pair terminal-side gate for ~/.hermes/config.yaml writes

Subway2023's #14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>

* chore(release): map Subway2023 for PR #14639 salvage

* fix(models): add gemini-3.5-flash to Gemini OAuth + API-key pickers

#34581 swapped gemini-3-flash-preview -> gemini-3.5-flash in the
OpenRouter and Nous lists but missed the curated Gemini catalogs, so
the Google OAuth (google-gemini-cli) picker still offered the retired
gemini-3-flash-preview slug and gemini-3.5-flash was unselectable.

Per Google's docs gemini-3-flash-preview was renamed to gemini-3.5-flash
and is served via Cloud Code Assist, so this completes the rename for:
- google-gemini-cli (OAuth/Code Assist) picker
- gemini (API-key) picker
- gemini provider default_aux_model

copilot keeps gemini-3-flash-preview (separate backend, own slug).

---------

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
teknium1 added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 1, 2026
* fix(file_tools): block agent writes to ~/.hermes/config.yaml to prevent silent approval bypass

* fix(approval): pair terminal-side gate for ~/.hermes/config.yaml writes

Subway2023's #14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>

* chore(release): map Subway2023 for PR #14639 salvage

* docs: expand quickstart Skills section

The Skills section was two bare commands with no framing — it never said
what a skill is, how skills load, or what the install slug means. Expanded
to explain the concept, the bundled catalog, install/browse/use flow, and
slash-command activation. Removed the inaccurate /skills chat-command hint
(skills become individual /<name> commands; hermes skills is the CLI verb).

---------

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
kossteg pushed a commit to kossteg/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2026
kossteg pushed a commit to kossteg/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2026
…ousResearch#37046)

* fix(file_tools): block agent writes to ~/.hermes/config.yaml to prevent silent approval bypass

* fix(approval): pair terminal-side gate for ~/.hermes/config.yaml writes

Subway2023's NousResearch#14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>

* chore(release): map Subway2023 for PR NousResearch#14639 salvage

* fix(models): add gemini-3.5-flash to Gemini OAuth + API-key pickers

NousResearch#34581 swapped gemini-3-flash-preview -> gemini-3.5-flash in the
OpenRouter and Nous lists but missed the curated Gemini catalogs, so
the Google OAuth (google-gemini-cli) picker still offered the retired
gemini-3-flash-preview slug and gemini-3.5-flash was unselectable.

Per Google's docs gemini-3-flash-preview was renamed to gemini-3.5-flash
and is served via Cloud Code Assist, so this completes the rename for:
- google-gemini-cli (OAuth/Code Assist) picker
- gemini (API-key) picker
- gemini provider default_aux_model

copilot keeps gemini-3-flash-preview (separate backend, own slug).

---------

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
kossteg pushed a commit to kossteg/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2026
* fix(file_tools): block agent writes to ~/.hermes/config.yaml to prevent silent approval bypass

* fix(approval): pair terminal-side gate for ~/.hermes/config.yaml writes

Subway2023's NousResearch#14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>

* chore(release): map Subway2023 for PR NousResearch#14639 salvage

* docs: expand quickstart Skills section

The Skills section was two bare commands with no framing — it never said
what a skill is, how skills load, or what the install slug means. Expanded
to explain the concept, the bundled catalog, install/browse/use flow, and
slash-command activation. Removed the inaccurate /skills chat-command hint
(skills become individual /<name> commands; hermes skills is the CLI verb).

---------

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
kossteg pushed a commit to kossteg/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2026
sed -i coverage for ~/.hermes/config.yaml and .env was added in NousResearch#14639,
but perl -i and ruby -i — which perform the same direct file mutation —
were not covered. The existing perl/ruby pattern only catches -e/-c (code
evaluation), not -i (file mutation), so:

  perl -i -pe 's/approvals.mode: on/approvals.mode: off/' ~/.hermes/config.yaml

bypasses the approval gate entirely, letting the agent flip approvals.mode
off mid-session via the mtime-keyed config cache reload.

Add a single pattern mirroring the sed -i lines: `\b(?:perl|ruby)\s+-[^\s]*i`
against both _HERMES_CONFIG_PATH and _HERMES_ENV_PATH. Three regression
tests pin the new coverage.
T02200059 pushed a commit to T02200059/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 18, 2026
Subway2023's NousResearch#14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
T02200059 pushed a commit to T02200059/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 18, 2026
T02200059 pushed a commit to T02200059/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 18, 2026
…ousResearch#37046)

* fix(file_tools): block agent writes to ~/.hermes/config.yaml to prevent silent approval bypass

* fix(approval): pair terminal-side gate for ~/.hermes/config.yaml writes

Subway2023's NousResearch#14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>

* chore(release): map Subway2023 for PR NousResearch#14639 salvage

* fix(models): add gemini-3.5-flash to Gemini OAuth + API-key pickers

NousResearch#34581 swapped gemini-3-flash-preview -> gemini-3.5-flash in the
OpenRouter and Nous lists but missed the curated Gemini catalogs, so
the Google OAuth (google-gemini-cli) picker still offered the retired
gemini-3-flash-preview slug and gemini-3.5-flash was unselectable.

Per Google's docs gemini-3-flash-preview was renamed to gemini-3.5-flash
and is served via Cloud Code Assist, so this completes the rename for:
- google-gemini-cli (OAuth/Code Assist) picker
- gemini (API-key) picker
- gemini provider default_aux_model

copilot keeps gemini-3-flash-preview (separate backend, own slug).

---------

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
T02200059 pushed a commit to T02200059/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 18, 2026
* fix(file_tools): block agent writes to ~/.hermes/config.yaml to prevent silent approval bypass

* fix(approval): pair terminal-side gate for ~/.hermes/config.yaml writes

Subway2023's NousResearch#14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>

* chore(release): map Subway2023 for PR NousResearch#14639 salvage

* docs: expand quickstart Skills section

The Skills section was two bare commands with no framing — it never said
what a skill is, how skills load, or what the install slug means. Expanded
to explain the concept, the bundled catalog, install/browse/use flow, and
slash-command activation. Removed the inaccurate /skills chat-command hint
(skills become individual /<name> commands; hermes skills is the CLI verb).

---------

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
T02200059 pushed a commit to T02200059/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 18, 2026
sed -i coverage for ~/.hermes/config.yaml and .env was added in NousResearch#14639,
but perl -i and ruby -i — which perform the same direct file mutation —
were not covered. The existing perl/ruby pattern only catches -e/-c (code
evaluation), not -i (file mutation), so:

  perl -i -pe 's/approvals.mode: on/approvals.mode: off/' ~/.hermes/config.yaml

bypasses the approval gate entirely, letting the agent flip approvals.mode
off mid-session via the mtime-keyed config cache reload.

Add a single pattern mirroring the sed -i lines: `\b(?:perl|ruby)\s+-[^\s]*i`
against both _HERMES_CONFIG_PATH and _HERMES_ENV_PATH. Three regression
tests pin the new coverage.
T02200059 pushed a commit to T02200059/hermes-agent that referenced this pull request Jun 18, 2026
…rc files

tools/approval.py already denies tee/redirection writes to every
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (~/.ssh/*, ~/.netrc/.pgpass/.npmrc/.pypirc, shell
rc files, ~/.hermes/config.yaml/.env) via the DANGEROUS_PATTERNS tee/`>`
rules, but cp/mv/install were only paired for _SYSTEM_CONFIG_PATH (/etc) and
the project-relative env/config target. So `cp evil ~/.ssh/authorized_keys`
(SSH-key implant / persistence), `cp creds ~/.netrc`, and `cp evil ~/.bashrc`
(login-time command injection) auto-approved while the equivalent tee/`>`
forms were denied — an unpaired write deny is theater (same rationale as
NousResearch#14639 / commit ee11882, which paired the terminal side for
~/.hermes/config.yaml writes but did not touch these cp/mv/install verbs on
the broader sensitive set).

Add one (cp|mv|install) DANGEROUS_PATTERNS entry reusing the existing
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET fragment, anchored via _COMMAND_TAIL so it fires on
the destination (last arg) only: reading OUT of a sensitive path
(`cp ~/.ssh/config /tmp/x`) stays auto-approved. Description differs from the
system-config cp entry so the two keep distinct approval keys (no silent
cross-approval). Additive — does not subsume the /etc or project-config rules.

Adds TestSensitiveCopyMovePattern: 5 positive cases (ssh authorized_keys,
ssh private key via mv, netrc via install, bashrc, ~/.hermes/config.yaml) +
2 negative guards (copy FROM ssh, unrelated copy). The ssh/netrc/bashrc
positives fail on main and pass on this branch; the negatives stay green
both ways.
xyshanren pushed a commit to xyshanren/hermes-agent-cn that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2026
…ousResearch#37046)

* fix(file_tools): block agent writes to ~/.hermes/config.yaml to prevent silent approval bypass

* fix(approval): pair terminal-side gate for ~/.hermes/config.yaml writes

Subway2023's NousResearch#14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>

* chore(release): map Subway2023 for PR NousResearch#14639 salvage

* fix(models): add gemini-3.5-flash to Gemini OAuth + API-key pickers

NousResearch#34581 swapped gemini-3-flash-preview -> gemini-3.5-flash in the
OpenRouter and Nous lists but missed the curated Gemini catalogs, so
the Google OAuth (google-gemini-cli) picker still offered the retired
gemini-3-flash-preview slug and gemini-3.5-flash was unselectable.

Per Google's docs gemini-3-flash-preview was renamed to gemini-3.5-flash
and is served via Cloud Code Assist, so this completes the rename for:
- google-gemini-cli (OAuth/Code Assist) picker
- gemini (API-key) picker
- gemini provider default_aux_model

copilot keeps gemini-3-flash-preview (separate backend, own slug).

---------

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
xyshanren pushed a commit to xyshanren/hermes-agent-cn that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2026
xyshanren pushed a commit to xyshanren/hermes-agent-cn that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2026
…rc files

tools/approval.py already denies tee/redirection writes to every
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (~/.ssh/*, ~/.netrc/.pgpass/.npmrc/.pypirc, shell
rc files, ~/.hermes/config.yaml/.env) via the DANGEROUS_PATTERNS tee/`>`
rules, but cp/mv/install were only paired for _SYSTEM_CONFIG_PATH (/etc) and
the project-relative env/config target. So `cp evil ~/.ssh/authorized_keys`
(SSH-key implant / persistence), `cp creds ~/.netrc`, and `cp evil ~/.bashrc`
(login-time command injection) auto-approved while the equivalent tee/`>`
forms were denied — an unpaired write deny is theater (same rationale as
NousResearch#14639 / commit 4e9d886, which paired the terminal side for
~/.hermes/config.yaml writes but did not touch these cp/mv/install verbs on
the broader sensitive set).

Add one (cp|mv|install) DANGEROUS_PATTERNS entry reusing the existing
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET fragment, anchored via _COMMAND_TAIL so it fires on
the destination (last arg) only: reading OUT of a sensitive path
(`cp ~/.ssh/config /tmp/x`) stays auto-approved. Description differs from the
system-config cp entry so the two keep distinct approval keys (no silent
cross-approval). Additive — does not subsume the /etc or project-config rules.

Adds TestSensitiveCopyMovePattern: 5 positive cases (ssh authorized_keys,
ssh private key via mv, netrc via install, bashrc, ~/.hermes/config.yaml) +
2 negative guards (copy FROM ssh, unrelated copy). The ssh/netrc/bashrc
positives fail on main and pass on this branch; the negatives stay green
both ways.
xyshanren pushed a commit to xyshanren/hermes-agent-cn that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2026
sed -i coverage for ~/.hermes/config.yaml and .env was added in NousResearch#14639,
but perl -i and ruby -i — which perform the same direct file mutation —
were not covered. The existing perl/ruby pattern only catches -e/-c (code
evaluation), not -i (file mutation), so:

  perl -i -pe 's/approvals.mode: on/approvals.mode: off/' ~/.hermes/config.yaml

bypasses the approval gate entirely, letting the agent flip approvals.mode
off mid-session via the mtime-keyed config cache reload.

Add a single pattern mirroring the sed -i lines: `\b(?:perl|ruby)\s+-[^\s]*i`
against both _HERMES_CONFIG_PATH and _HERMES_ENV_PATH. Three regression
tests pin the new coverage.
xyshanren pushed a commit to xyshanren/hermes-agent-cn that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2026
Subway2023's NousResearch#14639 blocks write_file/patch to ~/.hermes/config.yaml, but
the terminal side was only partially paired: echo>/tee/cp/mv to config.yaml
already tripped the project-config pattern, while `sed -i` and direct edits
slipped through with auto-approve. An unpaired write_file deny is theater per
SECURITY.md — the agent could flip approvals.mode=off via `sed -i` and the
mtime-keyed config cache reloads it mid-session.

config.yaml IS the security policy (approvals.mode/yolo/permanent allowlist
live there), so it warrants real pairing, not a half-door. Add a
_HERMES_CONFIG_PATH fragment mirroring _HERMES_ENV_PATH, fold it into
_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET (covers tee/>/>>/cp/mv), and add sed -i coverage for
both config.yaml and .env. Pins 9 regression tests including no-regression
guards (reads pass, /tmp writes pass).

Co-authored-by: sbw2025 <subw3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>
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P0 Critical — data loss, security, crash loop tool/file File tools (read, write, patch, search) type/security Security vulnerability or hardening

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