feat: replace kimi-k2.5 with kimi-k2.6 on OpenRouter and Nous Portal

agent/auxiliary_client.py

@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ def _normalize_aux_provider(provider: Optional[str]) -> str:
 # the standard chat API and third parties) are NOT clamped.
 # Source: https://platform.kimi.ai/docs/guide/kimi-k2-5-quickstart
 _KIMI_INSTANT_MODELS: frozenset = frozenset({
+    "kimi-k2.6",
     "kimi-k2.5",
     "kimi-k2-turbo-preview",
     "kimi-k2-0905-preview",

agent/redact.py

@@ -13,6 +13,48 @@
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
+# Sensitive query-string parameter names (case-insensitive exact match).
+# Ported from nearai/ironclaw#2529 — catches tokens whose values don't match
+# any known vendor prefix regex (e.g. opaque tokens, short OAuth codes).
+_SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMS = frozenset({
+    "access_token",
+    "refresh_token",
+    "id_token",
+    "token",
+    "api_key",
+    "apikey",
+    "client_secret",
+    "password",
+    "auth",
+    "jwt",
+    "session",
+    "secret",
+    "key",
+    "code",           # OAuth authorization codes
+    "signature",      # pre-signed URL signatures
+    "x-amz-signature",
+})
+
+# Sensitive form-urlencoded / JSON body key names (case-insensitive exact match).
+# Exact match, NOT substring — "token_count" and "session_id" must NOT match.
+# Ported from nearai/ironclaw#2529.
+_SENSITIVE_BODY_KEYS = frozenset({
+    "access_token",
+    "refresh_token",
+    "id_token",
+    "token",
+    "api_key",
+    "apikey",
+    "client_secret",
+    "password",
+    "auth",
+    "jwt",
+    "secret",
+    "private_key",
+    "authorization",
+    "key",
+})
+
 # Snapshot at import time so runtime env mutations (e.g. LLM-generated
 # `export HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS=false`) cannot disable redaction mid-session.
 _REDACT_ENABLED = os.getenv("HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS", "").lower() not in ("0", "false", "no", "off")
@@ -108,6 +150,30 @@
 # Negative lookahead prevents matching hex strings or identifiers
 _SIGNAL_PHONE_RE = re.compile(r"(\+[1-9]\d{6,14})(?![A-Za-z0-9])")
 
+# URLs containing query strings — matches `scheme://...?...[# or end]`.
+# Used to scan text for URLs whose query params may contain secrets.
+# Ported from nearai/ironclaw#2529.
+_URL_WITH_QUERY_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(https?|wss?|ftp)://"          # scheme
+    r"([^\s/?#]+)"                    # authority (may include userinfo)
+    r"([^\s?#]*)"                     # path
+    r"\?([^\s#]+)"                    # query (required)
+    r"(#\S*)?",                       # optional fragment
+)
+
+# URLs containing userinfo — `scheme://user:password@host` for ANY scheme
+# (not just DB protocols already covered by _DB_CONNSTR_RE above).
+# Catches things like `https://user:token@api.example.com/v1/foo`.
+_URL_USERINFO_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(https?|wss?|ftp)://([^/\s:@]+):([^/\s@]+)@",
+)
+
+# Form-urlencoded body detection: conservative — only applies when the entire
+# text looks like a query string (k=v&k=v pattern with no newlines).
+_FORM_BODY_RE = re.compile(
+    r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*=[^&\s]*(?:&[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*=[^&\s]*)+$"
+)
+
 # Compile known prefix patterns into one alternation
 _PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
     r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])(" + "|".join(_PREFIX_PATTERNS) + r")(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])"
@@ -121,6 +187,72 @@ def _mask_token(token: str) -> str:
     return f"{token[:6]}...{token[-4:]}"
 
 
+def _redact_query_string(query: str) -> str:
+    """Redact sensitive parameter values in a URL query string.
+
+    Handles `k=v&k=v` format. Sensitive keys (case-insensitive) have values
+    replaced with `***`. Non-sensitive keys pass through unchanged.
+    Empty or malformed pairs are preserved as-is.
+    """
+    if not query:
+        return query
+    parts = []
+    for pair in query.split("&"):
+        if "=" not in pair:
+            parts.append(pair)
+            continue
+        key, _, value = pair.partition("=")
+        if key.lower() in _SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMS:
+            parts.append(f"{key}=***")
+        else:
+            parts.append(pair)
+    return "&".join(parts)
+
+
+def _redact_url_query_params(text: str) -> str:
+    """Scan text for URLs with query strings and redact sensitive params.
+
+    Catches opaque tokens that don't match vendor prefix regexes, e.g.
+    `https://example.com/cb?code=ABC123&state=xyz` → `...?code=***&state=xyz`.
+    """
+    def _sub(m: re.Match) -> str:
+        scheme = m.group(1)
+        authority = m.group(2)
+        path = m.group(3)
+        query = _redact_query_string(m.group(4))
+        fragment = m.group(5) or ""
+        return f"{scheme}://{authority}{path}?{query}{fragment}"
+    return _URL_WITH_QUERY_RE.sub(_sub, text)
+
+
+def _redact_url_userinfo(text: str) -> str:
+    """Strip `user:password@` from HTTP/WS/FTP URLs.
+
+    DB protocols (postgres, mysql, mongodb, redis, amqp) are handled
+    separately by `_DB_CONNSTR_RE`.
+    """
+    return _URL_USERINFO_RE.sub(
+        lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}://{m.group(2)}:***@",
+        text,
+    )
+
+
+def _redact_form_body(text: str) -> str:
+    """Redact sensitive values in a form-urlencoded body.
+
+    Only applies when the entire input looks like a pure form body
+    (k=v&k=v with no newlines, no other text). Single-line non-form
+    text passes through unchanged. This is a conservative pass — the
+    `_redact_url_query_params` function handles embedded query strings.
+    """
+    if not text or "\n" in text or "&" not in text:
+        return text
+    # The body-body form check is strict: only trigger on clean k=v&k=v.
+    if not _FORM_BODY_RE.match(text.strip()):
+        return text
+    return _redact_query_string(text.strip())
+
+
 def redact_sensitive_text(text: str) -> str:
     """Apply all redaction patterns to a block of text.
 
@@ -173,6 +305,16 @@ def _redact_telegram(m):
     # JWT tokens (eyJ... — base64-encoded JSON headers)
     text = _JWT_RE.sub(lambda m: _mask_token(m.group(0)), text)
 
+    # URL userinfo (http(s)://user:pass@host) — redact for non-DB schemes.
+    # DB schemes are handled above by _DB_CONNSTR_RE.
+    text = _redact_url_userinfo(text)
+
+    # URL query params containing opaque tokens (?access_token=…&code=…)
+    text = _redact_url_query_params(text)
+
+    # Form-urlencoded bodies (only triggers on clean k=v&k=v inputs).
+    text = _redact_form_body(text)
+
     # Discord user/role mentions (<@snowflake_id>)
     text = _DISCORD_MENTION_RE.sub(lambda m: f"<@{'!' if '!' in m.group(0) else ''}***>", text)
 

hermes_cli/models.py

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 # Fallback OpenRouter snapshot used when the live catalog is unavailable.
 # (model_id, display description shown in menus)
 OPENROUTER_MODELS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [
-    ("moonshotai/kimi-k2.5",            "recommended"),
+    ("moonshotai/kimi-k2.6",            "recommended"),
     ("anthropic/claude-opus-4.7",       ""),
     ("anthropic/claude-opus-4.6",       ""),
     ("anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6",     ""),
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ def _codex_curated_models() -> list[str]:
 
 _PROVIDER_MODELS: dict[str, list[str]] = {
     "nous": [
-        "moonshotai/kimi-k2.5",
+        "moonshotai/kimi-k2.6",
         "xiaomi/mimo-v2-pro",
         "anthropic/claude-opus-4.7",
         "anthropic/claude-opus-4.6",
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ def _codex_curated_models() -> list[str]:
         # (map to OpenRouter defaults — users get familiar picks on NIM)
         "qwen/qwen3.5-397b-a17b",
         "deepseek-ai/deepseek-v3.2",
-        "moonshotai/kimi-k2.5",
+        "moonshotai/kimi-k2.6",
         "minimaxai/minimax-m2.5",
         "z-ai/glm5",
         "openai/gpt-oss-120b",

tests/agent/test_redact.py

@@ -376,3 +376,138 @@ def test_preserves_surrounding_text(self):
         result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
         assert result.startswith("User ")
         assert result.endswith(" said hello")
+
+
+class TestUrlQueryParamRedaction:
+    """URL query-string redaction (ported from nearai/ironclaw#2529).
+
+    Catches opaque tokens that don't match vendor prefix regexes by
+    matching on parameter NAME rather than value shape.
+    """
+
+    def test_oauth_callback_code(self):
+        text = "GET https://api.example.com/oauth/cb?code=abc123xyz789&state=csrf_ok"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "abc123xyz789" not in result
+        assert "code=***" in result
+        assert "state=csrf_ok" in result  # state is not sensitive
+
+    def test_access_token_query(self):
+        text = "Fetching https://example.com/api?access_token=opaque_value_here_1234&format=json"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "opaque_value_here_1234" not in result
+        assert "access_token=***" in result
+        assert "format=json" in result
+
+    def test_refresh_token_query(self):
+        text = "https://auth.example.com/token?refresh_token=somerefresh&grant_type=refresh"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "somerefresh" not in result
+        assert "grant_type=refresh" in result
+
+    def test_api_key_query(self):
+        text = "https://api.example.com/v1/data?api_key=kABCDEF12345&limit=10"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "kABCDEF12345" not in result
+        assert "limit=10" in result
+
+    def test_presigned_signature(self):
+        text = "https://s3.amazonaws.com/bucket/k?signature=LONG_PRESIGNED_SIG&id=public"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "LONG_PRESIGNED_SIG" not in result
+        assert "id=public" in result
+
+    def test_case_insensitive_param_names(self):
+        """Lowercase/mixed-case sensitive param names are redacted."""
+        # NOTE: All-caps names like TOKEN= are swallowed by _ENV_ASSIGN_RE
+        # (which matches KEY=value patterns greedily) before URL regex runs.
+        # This test uses lowercase names to isolate URL-query redaction.
+        text = "https://example.com?api_key=abcdef&secret=ghijkl"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "abcdef" not in result
+        assert "ghijkl" not in result
+        assert "api_key=***" in result
+        assert "secret=***" in result
+
+    def test_substring_match_does_not_trigger(self):
+        """`token_count` and `session_id` must NOT match `token` / `session`."""
+        text = "https://example.com/cb?token_count=42&session_id=xyz&foo=bar"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "token_count=42" in result
+        assert "session_id=xyz" in result
+
+    def test_url_without_query_unchanged(self):
+        text = "https://example.com/path/to/resource"
+        assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
+
+    def test_url_with_fragment(self):
+        text = "https://example.com/page?token=xyz#section"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "token=xyz" not in result
+        assert "#section" in result
+
+    def test_websocket_url_query(self):
+        text = "wss://api.example.com/ws?token=opaqueWsToken123"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "opaqueWsToken123" not in result
+
+
+class TestUrlUserinfoRedaction:
+    """URL userinfo (`scheme://user:pass@host`) for non-DB schemes."""
+
+    def test_https_userinfo(self):
+        text = "URL: https://user:supersecretpw@host.example.com/path"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "supersecretpw" not in result
+        assert "https://user:***@host.example.com" in result
+
+    def test_http_userinfo(self):
+        text = "http://admin:plaintextpass@internal.example.com/api"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "plaintextpass" not in result
+
+    def test_ftp_userinfo(self):
+        text = "ftp://user:ftppass@ftp.example.com/file.txt"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "ftppass" not in result
+
+    def test_url_without_userinfo_unchanged(self):
+        text = "https://example.com/path"
+        assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
+
+    def test_db_connstr_still_handled(self):
+        """DB schemes are handled by _DB_CONNSTR_RE, not _URL_USERINFO_RE."""
+        text = "postgres://admin:dbpass@db.internal:5432/app"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "dbpass" not in result
+
+
+class TestFormBodyRedaction:
+    """Form-urlencoded body redaction (k=v&k=v with no other text)."""
+
+    def test_pure_form_body(self):
+        text = "password=mysecret&username=bob&token=opaqueValue"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "mysecret" not in result
+        assert "opaqueValue" not in result
+        assert "username=bob" in result
+
+    def test_oauth_token_request(self):
+        text = "grant_type=password&client_id=app&client_secret=topsecret&username=alice&password=alicepw"
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        assert "topsecret" not in result
+        assert "alicepw" not in result
+        assert "client_id=app" in result
+
+    def test_non_form_text_unchanged(self):
+        """Sentences with `&` should NOT trigger form redaction."""
+        text = "I have password=foo and other things"  # contains spaces
+        result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
+        # The space breaks the form regex; passthrough expected.
+        assert "I have" in result
+
+    def test_multiline_text_not_form(self):
+        """Multi-line text is never treated as form body."""
+        text = "first=1\nsecond=2"
+        # Should pass through (still subject to other redactors)
+        assert "first=1" in redact_sensitive_text(text)