fix(cli): show provider in status bar (#11191) by EdderTalmor · Pull Request #11227 · NousResearch/hermes-agent

EdderTalmor · 2026-04-16T20:57:45Z

Summary

Show the active provider in the CLI status bar when available
Keep narrow layouts compact and preserve existing width trimming

Verification

/home/dell/.venv/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/cli/test_cli_status_bar.py -q

teknium1 · 2026-04-21T10:08:23Z

Thanks for the contribution, @EdderTalmor!

Closing this as a duplicate of #9847 (by @Vic563), which targets the same fix/feature. We're consolidating on that PR for review.

If you want to help push it over the line, please jump in there — or if you think your approach is better for a specific reason that isn't covered in the other PR, let us know and we can reopen.

Port from Kilo-Org/kilocode#11240. Their issue #11227 lost a user's entire working directory: a built-in-skill sentinel location resolved to the server cwd and the skill-removal endpoint ran a recursive delete on it. Hermes' /skills uninstall path (skills_hub.py) is already hardened, but the agent-facing skill_manage(action='delete') path did a bare shutil.rmtree(skill_dir) with no last-line validation. Add _validate_delete_target(): refuse to rmtree a path that (1) isn't strictly inside a known skills root, (2) is a skills root itself, or (3) is reached via a symlink/junction. Tests: 4 cases (normal delete works; symlinked dir, skills-root, out-of-tree all refused). E2E verified with real symlink + file I/O.

…true) runs async (#46968) * fix(skills): guard recursive skill delete against tree-escape Port from Kilo-Org/kilocode#11240. Their issue #11227 lost a user's entire working directory: a built-in-skill sentinel location resolved to the server cwd and the skill-removal endpoint ran a recursive delete on it. Hermes' /skills uninstall path (skills_hub.py) is already hardened, but the agent-facing skill_manage(action='delete') path did a bare shutil.rmtree(skill_dir) with no last-line validation. Add _validate_delete_target(): refuse to rmtree a path that (1) isn't strictly inside a known skills root, (2) is a skills root itself, or (3) is reached via a symlink/junction. Tests: 4 cases (normal delete works; symlinked dir, skills-root, out-of-tree all refused). E2E verified with real symlink + file I/O. * fix(delegation): forward background flag in delegate_task dispatch delegate_task is an _AGENT_LOOP_TOOLS member, so every surface (CLI, gateway, desktop/TUI) routes it through AIAgent._dispatch_delegate_task. That forwarder passed every schema field except background, so delegate_task(background=true) was silently downgraded to a synchronous run and returned the sync results payload instead of a delegation_id. The model sees background in the schema (the call validates), but the value never reached the function. Add the one missing kwarg so async background delegation actually engages.

…true) runs async (NousResearch#46968) * fix(skills): guard recursive skill delete against tree-escape Port from Kilo-Org/kilocode#11240. Their issue NousResearch#11227 lost a user's entire working directory: a built-in-skill sentinel location resolved to the server cwd and the skill-removal endpoint ran a recursive delete on it. Hermes' /skills uninstall path (skills_hub.py) is already hardened, but the agent-facing skill_manage(action='delete') path did a bare shutil.rmtree(skill_dir) with no last-line validation. Add _validate_delete_target(): refuse to rmtree a path that (1) isn't strictly inside a known skills root, (2) is a skills root itself, or (3) is reached via a symlink/junction. Tests: 4 cases (normal delete works; symlinked dir, skills-root, out-of-tree all refused). E2E verified with real symlink + file I/O. * fix(delegation): forward background flag in delegate_task dispatch delegate_task is an _AGENT_LOOP_TOOLS member, so every surface (CLI, gateway, desktop/TUI) routes it through AIAgent._dispatch_delegate_task. That forwarder passed every schema field except background, so delegate_task(background=true) was silently downgraded to a synchronous run and returned the sync results payload instead of a delegation_id. The model sees background in the schema (the call validates), but the value never reached the function. Add the one missing kwarg so async background delegation actually engages.

* fix(skills): guard recursive skill delete against tree-escape Port from Kilo-Org/kilocode#11240. Their issue #11227 lost a user's entire working directory: a built-in-skill sentinel location resolved to the server cwd and the skill-removal endpoint ran a recursive delete on it. Hermes' /skills uninstall path (skills_hub.py) is already hardened, but the agent-facing skill_manage(action='delete') path did a bare shutil.rmtree(skill_dir) with no last-line validation. Add _validate_delete_target(): refuse to rmtree a path that (1) isn't strictly inside a known skills root, (2) is a skills root itself, or (3) is reached via a symlink/junction. Tests: 4 cases (normal delete works; symlinked dir, skills-root, out-of-tree all refused). E2E verified with real symlink + file I/O. * feat(desktop): allow /browser connect on a local gateway /browser was hardcoded as terminal-only in the desktop slash palette, so the chat GUI rejected it with "only available in the terminal interface." The TUI already drives the live CDP connection via the browser.manage RPC. Wire the same RPC into the desktop dispatcher as a /browser action handler, gated to local-gateway connections ($connection.mode !== 'remote'). connect mutates BROWSER_CDP_URL (and may launch Chrome) in the gateway process, so it's only meaningful when that process runs on this machine; a remote gateway gets a clear "local gateway only" message instead.

…search#46929) Port from Kilo-Org/kilocode#11240. Their issue NousResearch#11227 lost a user's entire working directory: a built-in-skill sentinel location resolved to the server cwd and the skill-removal endpoint ran a recursive delete on it. Hermes' /skills uninstall path (skills_hub.py) is already hardened, but the agent-facing skill_manage(action='delete') path did a bare shutil.rmtree(skill_dir) with no last-line validation. Add _validate_delete_target(): refuse to rmtree a path that (1) isn't strictly inside a known skills root, (2) is a skills root itself, or (3) is reached via a symlink/junction. Tests: 4 cases (normal delete works; symlinked dir, skills-root, out-of-tree all refused). E2E verified with real symlink + file I/O.

…true) runs async (NousResearch#46968) * fix(skills): guard recursive skill delete against tree-escape Port from Kilo-Org/kilocode#11240. Their issue NousResearch#11227 lost a user's entire working directory: a built-in-skill sentinel location resolved to the server cwd and the skill-removal endpoint ran a recursive delete on it. Hermes' /skills uninstall path (skills_hub.py) is already hardened, but the agent-facing skill_manage(action='delete') path did a bare shutil.rmtree(skill_dir) with no last-line validation. Add _validate_delete_target(): refuse to rmtree a path that (1) isn't strictly inside a known skills root, (2) is a skills root itself, or (3) is reached via a symlink/junction. Tests: 4 cases (normal delete works; symlinked dir, skills-root, out-of-tree all refused). E2E verified with real symlink + file I/O. * fix(delegation): forward background flag in delegate_task dispatch delegate_task is an _AGENT_LOOP_TOOLS member, so every surface (CLI, gateway, desktop/TUI) routes it through AIAgent._dispatch_delegate_task. That forwarder passed every schema field except background, so delegate_task(background=true) was silently downgraded to a synchronous run and returned the sync results payload instead of a delegation_id. The model sees background in the schema (the call validates), but the value never reached the function. Add the one missing kwarg so async background delegation actually engages.

…h#47245) * fix(skills): guard recursive skill delete against tree-escape Port from Kilo-Org/kilocode#11240. Their issue NousResearch#11227 lost a user's entire working directory: a built-in-skill sentinel location resolved to the server cwd and the skill-removal endpoint ran a recursive delete on it. Hermes' /skills uninstall path (skills_hub.py) is already hardened, but the agent-facing skill_manage(action='delete') path did a bare shutil.rmtree(skill_dir) with no last-line validation. Add _validate_delete_target(): refuse to rmtree a path that (1) isn't strictly inside a known skills root, (2) is a skills root itself, or (3) is reached via a symlink/junction. Tests: 4 cases (normal delete works; symlinked dir, skills-root, out-of-tree all refused). E2E verified with real symlink + file I/O. * feat(desktop): allow /browser connect on a local gateway /browser was hardcoded as terminal-only in the desktop slash palette, so the chat GUI rejected it with "only available in the terminal interface." The TUI already drives the live CDP connection via the browser.manage RPC. Wire the same RPC into the desktop dispatcher as a /browser action handler, gated to local-gateway connections ($connection.mode !== 'remote'). connect mutates BROWSER_CDP_URL (and may launch Chrome) in the gateway process, so it's only meaningful when that process runs on this machine; a remote gateway gets a clear "local gateway only" message instead.