fix(security): bind sandbox mutations to durable authority - #10396
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Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 12 included reviews per hour; 11 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change makes sandbox cancellation non-destructive and identity-bound. It adds APF policy handling, verified policy authority to managed workload rebuilds, mutation-lock protection, and stronger registry replacement validation. ChangesSandbox lifecycle authority
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to Unsupported deferred-provider plans are rejected before activation or publication, preventing unintended provider effects or sandbox creation. No actionable merge-blocking risk remains after normal checks and review. Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
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In `@src/lib/onboard/cancel-rollback.test.ts`:
- Around line 128-148: Update all affected cases in
src/lib/onboard/cancel-rollback.test.ts: lines 128-148, remove the unused
runOpenshell, removeSandbox, and clearOnboardSession mocks and their call
assertions while retaining the log assertion; lines 150-166, remove the
runOpenshell mock and assertion while retaining guidance-text assertions; lines
51-66, arm the rollback with replacementFingerprint or remove this redundant
case because re-arming is already covered by the latest-identity test.
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📒 Files selected for processing (22)
src/lib/onboard.tssrc/lib/onboard/cancel-rollback.test.tssrc/lib/onboard/cancel-rollback.tssrc/lib/onboard/created-sandbox-finalization.tssrc/lib/onboard/managed-workload-rebuild-transaction.test.tssrc/lib/onboard/managed-workload/rebuild/commit.tssrc/lib/onboard/managed-workload/rebuild/contract.tssrc/lib/onboard/managed-workload/rebuild/plan.tssrc/lib/onboard/managed-workload/rebuild/recovery.tssrc/lib/onboard/managed-workload/rebuild/replacement-authority.tssrc/lib/onboard/managed-workload/rebuild/transaction.tssrc/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.test.tssrc/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.tssrc/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/provider-publication.test.tssrc/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/provider-publication.tssrc/lib/state/registry-rebuild-authority.test.tssrc/lib/state/registry/rebuild-authority.tstest/runtime/policy/managed-policy-receipt-fixture.tstest/runtime/policy/policies-permissive-policy.test.tstest/runtime/policy/policies.test.tstest/runtime/policy/policy-explain-cli.test.tstest/runtime/policy/policy-mutation-read-failure.test.ts
💤 Files with no reviewable changes (1)
- test/runtime/policy/managed-policy-receipt-fixture.ts
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Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Code Coverage OverviewLanguages: TypeScript TypeScript / code-coverage/pluginThe overall line coverage in commit 1346f90 in the TypeScript / code-coverage/cliThe overall line coverage in commit 1346f90 in the Show a line coverage summary of the most impacted files.
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Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
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Reviewed latest PR commit 32c74ca7a03accf7d0e65c9b689c91b6a83e4046.
Product-scope verdict: BLOCKED. Issue #9833 accepts the durable-authority work, but it also keeps existing managed onboarding behavior and names managed-image startup and MCP discovery as required validation. The implementation now refuses every deferred plan with an inference, messaging, extra, or Hermes tool-gateway provider in src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create-plan-materialization.ts:264-278. The live managed-image activation and both MCP-discovery jobs fail at that refusal. Restoring the supported path while preserving immutable provider attachment needs either an identity-bound OpenShell operation or an explicit maintainer decision that changes the accepted behavior and validation contract.
Review verdict: REQUEST_CHANGES.
Blocking findings:
src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create-plan-materialization.ts:264-278turns the security limitation into a supported-path regression. The three live failures reproduce the new error before sandbox creation. The fail-closed behavior is safe in isolation, but it is not a complete implementation of the accepted onboarding contract.src/lib/onboard/managed-workload/rebuild/transaction.ts:101-127treats an injected, sandbox-name-keyed NemoClaw lock as the publication authority. That lock cannot fence a same-name replacement performed directly through OpenShell after the final identity read and before the local registry CAS, and it cannot freeze an externally managed effective policy. The regression atsrc/lib/onboard/managed-workload-rebuild-transaction.test.ts:915-958makes the competing replacement voluntarily take the same lock, so it does not exercise the external race. The accepted #7744 architecture already assigns this boundary to the provider-owned durablestateMutationfence; this transaction does not consume that authority. Use the provider-bound durable fence or obtain a maintainer architecture decision before claiming the replacement is bound through publication.- The changed explanatory text in
src/lib/onboard/cancel-rollback.ts:8-23,:30-38, and:69-76still says the guard “rolls back” and that the exit hook “fires” the rollback. The implementation now only preserves the sandbox and emits recovery guidance. Rename the boundary and update the comments so operators and future callers do not infer deletion or registry cleanup.
Security verdict: FAIL overall.
- Secrets and Credentials: PASS — provider and credential effects remain behind verification or are refused before mutation.
- Input Validation and Data Sanitization: PASS — fingerprints, gateway ports, policy receipts, and replacement metadata are constrained.
- Authentication and Authorization: FAIL — rebuild publication relies on a stale-able observation plus a cooperating local lock instead of the provider-owned durable mutation authority.
- Dependencies and Third-Party Libraries: PASS — no dependency or artifact-source change.
- Error Handling and Logging: PASS — unsafe name-based cleanup is removed, partial publication is surfaced, and recovery data is preserved.
- Cryptography and Data Protection: PASS — the change uses existing SHA-256 identity fingerprints and does not alter transport or key handling.
- Configuration and Security Headers: PASS — no security-header or deployment-default weakening found.
- Security Testing: FAIL — the same-name replacement test bypasses the non-cooperating OpenShell path, and required managed-image/MCP validation currently fails.
- System Security: FAIL — immutable sandbox identity and effective policy are not atomically fenced through replacement publication.
Validation: PASS locally for the intended unit boundaries, but FAIL for the full supported behavior. The affected CLI tests passed (150), changed integration tests passed (139), CLI type-check passed, and CLI/plugin builds passed. GitHub currently reports failures for CLI/Required Checks (coverage ratchet) and for managed-image activation plus both MCP-discovery runs (the provider-refusal regression).
Documentation verdict: BLOCKED by the stale rollback terminology above. The rest of the changed errors and recovery guidance are direct and preserve the immutable identity fingerprint.
Cross-issue result: the repository sweep found no automatic candidate above its confidence floor. Independent root-cause review found a direct conflict with accepted epic #7744 at the publication boundary. Open PR #10116 overlaps the production rebuild/policy-authority area and must be deduplicated when either implementation changes. No adjacent fix was established above medium confidence; #9833 is the primary issue, not an adjacent issue.
Review-cycle completeness: viewer senthilr-nv is independent of author apurvvkumaria. Pagination was terminal for 4 issue comments, 1 submitted review, 1 resolved inline thread/comment, 7 commits, 64 check runs, and 1 legacy status context. All seven PR commits report GitHub verification; all five contributor commits carry matching DCO sign-offs, and the two integration merges are GitHub-signed. The PR Review Advisor artifacts and the resolved CodeRabbit thread were reviewed.
GitHub merge state before this review: OPEN, non-draft, latest PR commit unchanged, base commit e0c2e9b6079f61040195c528f3169ce98d449591, CONFLICTING/DIRTY, review required, and squash auto-merge off.
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Re-reviewed latest PR commit 79655698a37903479fe5c6ab6f6cfc80a6bbb3a5 after its merge from main. The conflict resolution adds current policy-revalidation plumbing, but it does not change the three blockers in my review of 32c74ca7a03accf7d0e65c9b689c91b6a83e4046.
Product-scope verdict: BLOCKED. The accepted #9833 contract keeps existing managed onboarding behavior and requires managed-image startup and MCP-discovery validation. src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create-plan-materialization.ts:266-280 still refuses every deferred plan with an inference, messaging, extra, or Hermes tool-gateway provider. The prior live activation and both MCP-discovery runs failed at this unchanged code. Completing the supported path requires identity-bound OpenShell provider attachment or an explicit maintainer decision that changes the accepted behavior and validation contract.
Review verdict: REQUEST_CHANGES. The blocking findings remain:
- The deferred-provider refusal is safe in isolation but regresses accepted provider-backed onboarding.
src/lib/onboard/managed-workload/rebuild/transaction.ts:101-127still uses a cooperating, sandbox-name-keyed local lock instead of the provider-owned durablestateMutationfence required by #7744.src/lib/onboard/managed-workload-rebuild-transaction.test.ts:915-958still makes the competing same-name replacement voluntarily take that lock, so it does not cover an OpenShell/external substitution between the final identity read and registry publication.src/lib/onboard/cancel-rollback.ts:8-23,:30-38, and:69-76still describe rollback/deletion although the implementation only preserves recovery state and emits guidance.
Security verdict: FAIL overall. Secrets and Credentials PASS; Input Validation and Data Sanitization PASS; Authentication and Authorization FAIL because publication lacks provider-owned durable mutation authority; Dependencies and Third-Party Libraries PASS; Error Handling and Logging PASS; Cryptography and Data Protection PASS; Configuration and Security Headers PASS; Security Testing FAIL because the race test uses a cooperating contender and the required live paths fail; System Security FAIL because immutable sandbox identity and effective policy are not atomically fenced through publication.
Validation: the current commit passes CLI/plugin builds, the affected CLI tests (150), changed integration tests (139), and CLI type-check locally. The merge commit is GitHub Verified. Current PR workflows require NVIDIA runner approval and have not reported required contexts or a latest-commit PR Review Advisor result; the three available CodeQL check runs pass. A context that has not reported is not passing.
Documentation verdict: BLOCKED by the unchanged rollback terminology. The other changed recovery guidance remains accurate.
Cross-issue result: the repository sweep produced no automatic candidate above its confidence floor. Independent review still finds a direct architecture conflict with accepted epic #7744 and overlapping rebuild/policy-authority work in open PR #10116. No adjacent fix was established above medium confidence; #9833 remains the primary issue.
Review-cycle completeness: pagination is terminal for 4 issue comments, 2 submitted reviews, 1 resolved inline thread/comment, 8 commits, 3 current check runs, and 1 legacy status context. All eight commits report GitHub verification; the five contributor commits carry matching DCO sign-offs, and the three integration merges are GitHub-signed. Viewer senthilr-nv remains independent of author apurvvkumaria.
GitHub merge state before this review: OPEN, non-draft, latest PR commit 79655698a37903479fe5c6ab6f6cfc80a6bbb3a5, base commit cce965b77563d7ff32891d598aa0ced94fb1a70a, mergeable but blocked, and auto-merge off.
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
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🌿 Preview your docs: https://nvidia-preview-pr-10396.docs.buildwithfern.com/nemoclaw |
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Reviewing commit under review cd15b07a525e035bf959939ae3c3ba72f7f12509 against the #10332 regressions in E2E run 33016214930.
The latest commit correctly limits deferSandboxEffectsUntilPolicyVerification to APF and keeps APF providerless. That change should restore ordinary managed provider attachment and remove the credential_binding ... provider is not attached cluster.
I am requesting changes because the current effective diff does not address the remaining failures:
-
Fresh-gateway global-policy inspection still fails. Six jobs stopped at
OpenShell global policy authority inspection failed: the policy query did not complete successfully. This PR does not changeinspectActiveGlobalPolicyor its preflight. The current code still rejects any nonzeropolicy list --global --limit 1result before it can classify an absent global policy. Add a real OpenShell 0.0.106 fresh-gateway regression test and make the production query classify only a structured, successful absence result. Run the query after gateway readiness and preserve the selected gateway environment. -
The creation receipt still combines immutable ownership with mutable policy state.
revalidateCreatedSandboxPolicyRegistrationstill requires the original receipt hash and version to equal the current policy hash and version. Legitimate GPU, preset, Shields, and rebuild mutations therefore invalidate ownership unless every path rotates the receipt atomically. Add a compare-and-set receipt rotation for each NemoClaw-owned policy mutation, or split immutable create authority from the mutable policy revision. Covernetwork-policy,rebuild-openclaw, Hermes GPU compatibility, resume, and same-name fresh onboarding. -
The managed-rebuild corrections described in the PR body are absent from the current effective diff. The rebuild transaction and registry rebuild-authority files are byte-identical between base commit
9de5af7aef0d313231926f71436f1e8d8271bcacand this commit. Restore an effective replacement-authority change. It must consume the provider-owned durablestateMutationfence from #7744; a sandbox-name-keyed local lock does not fence a non-cooperating OpenShell replacement. The replacement must receive a new identity-bound policy receipt before atomic registry publication. -
Normal route-reservation and pairing finalization remain unchanged. The new
requireAbsentoption protects only providerless APF. It does not addressThe sandbox create route reservation is not owned by this onboarding sessionfrom Model Router, and this PR does not change the scope-upgrade watcher finalization path. Preserve onereservationSessionIdand final route selection through create and atomic registration. Start and bind the watcher to the same sandbox generation before final pairing settlement. -
The latest PR commit has no full manual E2E evidence. Ordinary CI and direct managed-image startup do not exercise these lifecycle failures. Before merge, run the affected jobs on this exact commit, then run the complete PR E2E matrix. The result must show that the #10332 failure signatures above are absent; a skipped or unexecuted target is not passing evidence.
Security verdict: FAIL. Secrets and credentials, input validation, dependencies, error handling, cryptography, and configuration are acceptable in the current diff. Authentication and authorization, security testing, and holistic security posture remain failed because receipt authority is not preserved through every mutation and replacement-publication boundary.
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Reviewing commit under review cd15b07a525e035bf959939ae3c3ba72f7f12509.
Product scope
PASS. Accepted #9833 defines providerless-only fresh APF creation, identity-bound preservation, and a stop before provider or credential effects when immutable-ID attachment is unavailable. The implementation does not yet satisfy that accepted contract.
Review verdict
CHANGES_REQUESTED.
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[P1] Stop provider selection before APF credential effects —
src/lib/onboard/machine/core-flow-phases.ts:122. The fast path checks already-populated context and four inference environment keys, then admits providerless APF before web-search or messaging intent exists. Sandbox handling later runsconfigureWebSearchorensureValidatedWebSearchCredentialandreconcileSandboxMessagingbeforeassertProviderlessApfCreatePlan. A fresh interactive web-search choice, orNEMOCLAW_WEB_SEARCH_PROVIDERwith its key, can therefore validate and persist a credential before the providerless refusal. Move the APF providerless gate ahead of every web-search and messaging prompt, validation, and persistence path. Add fresh interactive and explicit-environment tests proving that refusal performs no credential, provider, or sandbox effect. -
[P1] Document every cancellation point and an executable recovery path —
docs/reference/commands.mdx:898. Cancellation is installed at the policy-tier selector and both preset selectors, not only the policy preset step. The implementation now preserves the onboarding session, whilesrc/lib/onboard/lifecycle-contracts.md:128still says cancellation clears it. Update the public and owning guidance together to state whenonboard --resumeis safe and when an administrator must perform identity-bound removal. The PR description must also remove managed-rebuild claims that are absent from the current diff; PR #10116 remains open and the effective overlap is only a test-helper import.
Security verdict
FAIL.
- Secrets and credentials — FAIL: APF can validate and persist web-search or messaging credentials before refusing the plan.
- Input validation and data sanitization — PASS: sandbox names, route reservations, and identity fingerprints remain constrained.
- Authentication and authorization — PASS for the changed APF boundary: the reservation is bound to gateway, session, and providerless state and is rechecked before creation.
- Dependencies and third-party libraries — PASS: no dependency or artifact changes.
- Error handling and logging — WARNING: the refusal can claim no effect after a credential effect, and retained-state recovery is not executable from the guidance.
- Cryptography and data protection — PASS: no cryptographic mechanism changed; durable identity values remain fingerprints.
- Configuration and security headers — WARNING: web-search and messaging configuration can enter after the early APF environment gate.
- Security testing — FAIL: the new negative tests stub messaging to empty and do not cover fresh interactive or explicit web-search and messaging credential paths.
- System security — FAIL: the authoritative providerless assertion runs after credential-selection effects, so the complete state transition violates the accepted ordering contract.
Validation
npm run typecheck:cli, git diff --check, npm run checks:repository, and npm run docs:validate passed. Targeted Vitest runs passed 290 tests; 43 tests reached only the review workspace's read-only ~/.nemoclaw path and failed with ConfigPermissionError, not a behavior assertion. GitHub reports all 65 check runs complete: required checks, commit-lint, dco-check, check-hash, and changes succeeded; policy-permitted jobs are skipped.
Documentation verdict
FAIL for the cancellation scope, recovery procedure, stale owning lifecycle text, and stale PR description noted above.
Cross-issue result
No adjacent open-issue candidate survived the capped fingerprint search. PR #10116 is still open; the current diff has no substantive rebuild overlap.
Review-cycle completeness
Terminal pagination is complete for issue comments, submitted reviews, inline comments and nested threads, commits, check runs, and legacy statuses. Viewer senthilr-nv is independent of the author. All 12 PR commits are GitHub Verified, and dco-check succeeds. Current state before this write: OPEN, non-draft, MERGEABLE/BLOCKED, CHANGES_REQUESTED, auto-merge off.
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Reviewed commit under review 09663703459b565bd1ee1d3b249b2eee0a5aa87d against base dea11d97f22d9f3bda71622226b37ec106f7e046.
Product-scope verdict: BLOCKED
Issue #9833 has accepted externally managed policy and providerless APF scope.
It does not accept permanent sandbox-name retirement.
This PR exposes no authenticated, identity-bound resolution operation and permanently rejects the retained name.
Add a supported resolver with an administrator receipt, or record an Accept product decision for permanent retirement with the required owner and validation plan.
Review verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED
The merge resolves the base conflict and correctly preserves main's Hermes effective-policy-source qualification.
The prior blockers remain, and conflict resolution introduces 2 additional post-create credential/recovery blockers.
-
APF reads credentials before refusal.
enabledChannels: nullpasses the generic guard, then Hermes and DCode messaging preparation reads ambient credential metadata before the later APF refusal.
Direct probes observed 6 credential reads for each agent; the DCode path also repeated placeholder registration.
Treatnullas unresolved provider intent and refuse before any credential/provider effect, or resolve it to an explicit empty selection first. -
Policy evidence is not bound atomically to immutable sandbox identity.
The create boundary reads policy by mutable sandbox name and assignsobservedPolicyEvidencebefore the post-read identity check.
A one-way substitution persisted{identity:A, evidence:replacement-policy}.
An ABA substitution restored A for identity checks, continued one verified effect, and retained B's policy evidence.
Bind immutable identity and effective policy in one authoritative observation, and never persist evidence before that binding succeeds. -
The locked onboarding decision is discarded.
runOnboardderivesresume,fresh, and names before locking.
It callsresolveEntryOptions()again under the lock but ignores the returned decision.
A state-change probe returnedresume:falsebefore the lock andresume:trueunder the lock, while execution still usedfalse.
Use the complete locked result and recompute every dependent value. -
Hermes credential reconciliation bypasses recovery and immutable identity.
Conflict resolution places credential-env reconciliation after registry publication but outside both post-create recovery wrappers.
Read, write, restart, health, or final-policy failure can therefore leave a created and registered sandbox without durable retained recovery.
The credential file and gateway restart also target only mutablesandboxName.
An ABA probe producedrevalidate:A, credential-write:B, revalidate:A, restart:B, revalidate:A.
Wrap the full step in durable recovery and require an immutable-ID condition at every read, write, restart, and health boundary. -
Ordinary provider cleanup can mutate a same-name replacement.
Recreation performs one pre-cleanup check, then issues 9 independent mutable-name provider-detach commands.
A probe changed identity after the first detach; the remaining 8 detaches executed against replacement B and returned success.
Revalidate immutable identity at each authoritative detach, or use an identity-bound OpenShell mutation. -
Total recovery-writer failure has no restart-durable authority.
The retry owner retains its final attempt only in process memory and an exit handler.
If every session and journal write fails, restart has no marker that the sandbox mutation occurred.
Establish durable write-ahead recovery authority before mutation, or refuse the mutation when that authority cannot be established. -
Independent recovery omits the full authority checkpoint.
The durable registry checkpoint includes policy authority, observed authority, route, and managed creation receipt.
The independent record reduces this to policy hash/version plus identity, gateway, and lifecycle fields.
Persist the complete authority and provenance tuple needed after session or registry loss. -
Material recovery guidance remains false or unsafe.
Every failure caught by the post-identity create boundary is recorded as “policy authority validation failed,” including unrelated runtime failures.
Credential-reconciliation failures bypass retained recovery entirely.
Lock contention also tells administrators to runrm -feven when a live process owns the lock.
Use a neutral post-create failure class unless policy qualification failed, and remove manual lock deletion guidance.
The normal recovery facade now serializes ledger writes under the onboarding lock, and the under-lock retained-name denial remains effective.
Those fixes do not close the blockers above.
Nine-category security verdict: FAIL
- 1 Secrets and Credentials: FAIL (pre-refusal APF reads and name-based Hermes credential mutation).
- 2 Input Validation and Data Sanitization: PASS.
- 3 Authentication and Authorization: FAIL (policy ABA, stale admission, and name-based credential/provider mutations).
- 4 Dependencies and Third-Party Libraries: PASS.
- 5 Error Handling and Logging: FAIL (missing Hermes recovery, total writer loss, and false classification).
- 6 Cryptography and Data Protection: PASS.
- 7 Configuration and Security Headers: PASS.
- 8 Security Testing: FAIL (the reproduced adversarial cases have no regression coverage).
- 9 System Security: FAIL (TOCTOU, restart recovery, and partial-mutation guarantees remain incomplete).
Validation and documentation
- Focused CLI validation: 8 files, 172 tests passed.
- Focused integration validation: 3 files, 43 tests passed.
npm run typecheck:cli: passed.npm run docs: passed with 0 errors and 2 warnings; generated variants are current.git diff --check: passed; the worktree is clean.- Independent security, correctness, and documentation passes reproduced the APF, policy ABA, stale-entry, Hermes mutation, permanent-writer, and provider-cleanup failures.
Documentation blocks only on material behavior and safety.
The false failure cause and rm -f instruction meet that threshold.
Ordinary grammar, duplication, helper-shape, and minor clarity findings remain non-blocking.
Cross-issue result
The required sweep classified 30 open candidates.
It established no adjacent fix, contradiction, duplicate, or follow-on.
The closest issues, #10220, #10494, and #7994, have different failing owners and are unchanged by this PR.
Review-cycle completeness
Viewer senthilr-nv is independent from PR author apurvvkumaria and every commit author.
Pagination is terminal: 7 PR issue comments, 4 owning-issue comments, 21 submitted reviews, 2 review threads, 2 inline comments, 54 commits, and every current check/status context.
Both threads are resolved, and no thread or comment page has a next page.
GitHub reports every PR commit Verified.
Ordinary commit 2aeff9c35dfab81b96d4ff32f2c30d2b5aa030a3 has no Signed-off-by trailer, although the current PR-body dco-check passes; 9 merge commits also omit trailers.
CodeRabbit reports success for this commit.
No PR Review Advisor run or trusted Manual PR E2E run is bound to this commit/base.
The current source ref has no open CodeQL alert, but the PR CodeQL workflow and 17 other checks were still running at the last collection.
GitHub merge state: BLOCKED
The PR is OPEN, non-draft, MERGEABLE/BLOCKED, CHANGES_REQUESTED, with auto-merge off.
Required changes, commit-lint, dco-check, and check-hash pass.
The required aggregate checks context has not reported, so it is not passing.
Do not approve or enable auto-merge.
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
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Reviewed commit under review 4625e45d9eae9656f83d51ca155cc4680b8d3119 against base dea11d97f22d9f3bda71622226b37ec106f7e046.
Product scope: BLOCKED pending maintainer direction
Accepted issue #9833 establishes providerless-only APF and durable, identity-bound recovery. The implementation is within that scope, but it still has no supported authenticated, identity-bound retained-recovery resolution path. Instead, src/lib/onboard/entry-options.ts:345-362 and docs/reference/commands.mdx:908-913 permanently retire the sandbox name. #9833 does not accept that irreversible lifecycle, and the maintainer-required Manual PR E2E explicitly requires retained-recovery resolution.
Review verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED
The new commits correctly reject explicit non-OpenClaw APF input before credentials or sandbox effects, retain recovery after Hermes credential reconciliation failure, defer policy evidence until the second identity check, and pass an available GPU fallback fingerprint into recovery. The following blockers remain:
- The generic APF boundary accepts a pre-resolved non-OpenClaw plan.
src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.ts:316-351checks only the outeragent, notcreateIntent.resolved.policy.options.agentNamefromsandbox-create-intent-types.ts:25-36. A direct probe with outeragent: nulland resolvedagentName: "hermes"reached the post-guard resolver/effect boundary. Reject resolved Hermes/DCode input and any outer/resolved mismatch before resolver or other effects. - Effective-policy evidence is not atomic with immutable identity across true ABA substitution. At
orchestration.ts:672-683, policy is still read by mutable name. A direct A→B→A probe read B's policy, restored identity A before the second identity check, and completed with{identity: A, evidence: "replacement-policy"}. The new ordering closes one-way A→B substitution, not ABA. Bind the effective-policy read to the immutable sandbox identity or a provider-owned atomic authority. - Name-only mutation edges remain. Hermes credential write, restart, and health operations at
orchestration.ts:536-570,messaging/applier/agent-config.ts:137-156, andactions/sandbox/runtime/hermes-lifecycle.ts:10-29can target replacement B between checks. Provider cleanup validates once atorchestration.ts:1800-1804, then runs nine name-only detach operations insandbox-provider-cleanup.ts:142-169,255-272; a probe produced[A,B,B,B,B,B,B,B,B]. Revalidate or identity-bind each mutation. - Independent recovery is not restart-complete. The record in
retained-sandbox-recovery.ts:25-47omits the create-attempt nonce when identity is unavailable and does not preserve the complete policy-authority/managed-creation receipt tuple. A probe retained the nonce only in the replaceable active session. If every writer fails,orchestration.ts:105-155retains the retry only in process memory; the probe made three attempts and left no restart-visible marker. Persist a complete, durable blockade that survives session replacement and total writer failure. - The locked entry decision is discarded.
src/lib/onboard.ts:2753-2757derivesfresh,resume, and name choices before the lock;:2795recomputes them under the lock but ignores the result, while:2797-2801uses the stale values. Use the complete in-lock decision for resume, fresh, and name reentry. - Recovery and operator guidance remain materially unsafe or false.
orchestration.ts:630-661,696-705labels unrelated post-gate runtime/effect failures as policy-authority validation failures.portable-retirement-authority.ts:562-568advises directrm -feven for a live lock holder, contradicting inode-checked cleanup instate/onboard-session.ts:1335-1380. The public APF docs omit the OpenClaw-only restriction, and the new recovery text says to use--freshwith another name although the implementation requires the explicit--fresh --name <new-name>form. - Per-commit DCO evidence is incomplete. GitHub reports all 59 commits Verified, but ordinary commit
2aeff9c35dfab81b96d4ff32f2c30d2b5aa030a3lacks aSigned-off-by:trailer; nine merge commits also have no trailer. The PR-body DCO check is successful, but that does not establish the requested per-commit evidence.
Security verdict: FAIL
- Secrets and credentials: FAIL
- Input validation: FAIL
- Authentication and authorization: FAIL
- Dependencies: PASS
- Error handling and logging: FAIL
- Cryptography and data protection: PASS
- Configuration security: FAIL
- Security testing: FAIL
- System security: FAIL
Validation
The complete 53-file effective diff was reviewed. At this commit, focused CLI suites passed (72 tests in the primary pass; 186 tests in an independent security pass), two spawned onboarding/finalization checks passed, CLI typecheck passed, documentation build passed with 0 errors and 2 warnings, and git diff --check passed. Adversarial probes reproduced the resolved-agent bypass, true ABA policy misbinding, Hermes and provider-cleanup substitution, missing independent nonce, and total recovery-writer loss. No open CodeQL alert remains on the source branch.
Documentation verdict: BLOCKED
The --fresh selection clarification is otherwise accurate, but the four executable-contract mismatches in blocker 6 are material rather than grammar or style findings.
Cross-issue sweep: NONE
The required sweep searched 30 current candidates. The closest issues were #10297 (deferred installer onboarding for other runtimes), #10220 (managed llama.cpp endpoint authority after onboarding), #7994 (unrelated recovery test seams), and #10494 (Hermes config-seal mutation). None is fixed, contradicted, duplicated, or materially advanced by this diff. #9833 remains the owning accepted issue.
Review-cycle completeness and GitHub state
Viewer senthilr-nv is independent of all PR commit authors. Terminal pagination covered 7 issue comments, 22 submitted reviews, 2 inline comments in 2 resolved threads, 59 commits, 61 check runs, 3 statuses, and 15 current-commit workflow runs; all second pages were empty. The current PR Review Advisor run was collected; its operations specialist independently confirms the missing resolution path. CodeRabbit is paused after an older reviewed range, though its current status context is successful.
The PR is OPEN, non-draft, MERGEABLE/BLOCKED, with CHANGES_REQUESTED; auto-merge is off. Required contexts changes, commit-lint, dco-check, and check-hash are successful, while the required aggregate checks context has not reported. No successful trusted Manual PR E2E evidence is bound to this commit and base; the posted requirement still names old commit 10cfe1349b8b44f7a17acbc3ce0d16028ff7ee1c.
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
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Reviewed latest PR commit ddbea24a5320cadd0b60502c7e1726421472edc4 against base SHA 0bc245a60129541bbf26e3e9256036bcd4e78336. This is a merge-only update; the stable effective-diff patch ID is unchanged from the fully reviewed 310bfe761fe3237f3d37e557954af0f5c0873d5f revision.
Product scope: BLOCKED pending maintainer direction
Issue #9833 is an accepted issue for durable, identity-bound external-policy lifecycle behavior. It does not accept permanent sandbox-name retirement as the recovery lifecycle. This PR still has no supported authenticated, identity-bound retained-recovery resolution path. Either implement that path or record an explicit maintainer decision accepting permanent name retirement and its ownership, compatibility, security, and validation consequences.
Review verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED
The newest functional commits correctly re-read and use fresh, resume, sandbox name, and base-image decisions after acquiring the onboarding lock. One-way state-directory replacement is also detected. The following blocking findings remain.
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Session persistence can report success after directory A→B→A substitution.
saveSessionrevalidates a pinned directory but commits through path-basedfs.renameSync(tmpFile, SESSION_FILE)and returns without canonical readback (src/lib/state/onboard-session.ts:1198-1229). The current probe swapped the directory during rename, wrote the new session into B, restored A before the post-check, and returned the new session while canonical A retained the old session. The lock checks also accept restored A. Bind the commit to the directory that ownsonboard.lock, or perform fail-closed canonical readback against the expected update.clearSessionremains an unpinned path mutation (:1250-1257). -
True sandbox/policy A→B→A substitution remains. Identity A is sampled around policy verification, but the policy read uses the mutable sandbox name (
src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.ts:664-684;policy-creation-receipt.ts:106-121,182-205). The current probe completed with four checks and persisted B'sreplacement-policyevidence under A with no recovery. Bind the effective-policy read and publication atomically to immutable sandbox identity. -
The authoritative generic APF guard still accepts pre-resolved Hermes and Deep Agents Code plans when the outer agent is null. The guard does not validate
resolved.policy.options.agentName(orchestration.ts:316-355). Current probes for both agents reached the post-guard boundary once; explicit Hermes and Deep Agents Code inputs correctly refused with zero later calls. Require matching outer and resolved agent authority and providerless OpenClaw at this exported boundary. -
Credential and cleanup mutations remain name-bound. Hermes reconciliation can write credentials to replacement B before its second identity check (
orchestration.ts:536-570;messaging/applier/agent-config.ts:137-156). Provider cleanup performs nine independent name-based detach calls after one identity check (sandbox-provider-cleanup.ts:142-169); the current probe targeted A, then B, across those calls. Refuse these operations until the mutation is immutable-identity-bound, or revalidate at every supported mutation edge. -
Independent recovery remains restart-incomplete. When sandbox identity is unavailable, the durable record omits the create-attempt nonce; clearing the session loses the only nonce and distinct attempts can collapse (
sandbox-gpu-create-flow.ts:393-425,542-555;retained-sandbox-recovery.ts:35-47,465-477). The record also omits the complete policy-authority/provenance/managed-creation-receipt tuple. Permanent failure of every recovery writer remains process-memory-only (orchestration.ts:105-139; current probe: three attempts, no durable marker). -
Material operator text remains unsafe or false. Non-policy post-create failures are labeled
policy authority validation failed(orchestration.ts:630-705); lock failure recommends unconditionalrm -feven for a live holder (portable-retirement-authority.ts:562-568); APF documentation omits the executable OpenClaw-only scope (docs/reference/commands.mdx:463-483); and recovery text omits the required--fresh --name <new-name>invocation (docs/reference/commands.mdx:909-913). These are behavior and safety contradictions, not grammar or style findings.
Required verdicts and evidence
- Security: FAIL. Categories 1 credentials, 2 input validation, 3 authorization, 5 error handling, 7 configuration, 8 security testing, and 9 system security fail. Categories 4 dependencies and 6 cryptography pass.
- Validation: Passing for executed checks but insufficient for approval. At this commit, independent runs passed 139 critical CLI tests, 17 focused integration tests, 154 documentation-focused source tests, three spawned security probes, CLI type-check, and the effective-diff check. Adversarial probes reproduced every blocker above. Current GitHub checks are rerunning after the merge-only commit; approval is independently blocked by the review findings.
- Documentation writer review: BLOCKED by the four material behavior/safety contradictions in finding 6. The newest state-write diagnostics are accurate.
- Cross-issue sweep: No adjacent fix, contradiction, duplicate, or follow-on met the required evidence threshold among the 30 capped open-issue candidates.
- Review-cycle completeness: Viewer
senthilr-nv; terminal pagination completed for 7 issue comments, 23 submitted reviews, 2 inline threads/2 comments, 62 commits, 61 current check runs, and 3 status contexts. Every PR commit is GitHub Verified. Both newest functional commits have DCO trailers, but ordinary commit2aeff9c35dfab81b96d4ff32f2c30d2b5aa030a3and ten merge commits lack per-commit DCO trailers. No trusted Manual PR E2E run is bound to this commit/base and covers real onboarding plus retained-recovery resolution. - GitHub merge state before this review: OPEN, non-draft, MERGEABLE/BLOCKED; auto-merge is off.
Please keep the fail-closed recovery behavior, but close the immutable-mutation, durable-state, and operator-recovery contracts before requesting approval.
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Reviewed latest PR commit 66adb50b74d48ad60e7db5910ff6fcb547905bcd against base 705372dab8d4d28c0daf058aec1579ffc482db4c. The merge from main materially changed the policy-authority implementation and introduced a new blocking regression; the earlier security blockers also remain.
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The merged create path no longer persists the created sandbox identity.
runSandboxCreateWithPolicyAuthorityChecksno longer declares or invokespersistCreatedSandboxIdentity(src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.ts:594-709), while the production call still passes it (:2304-2305) and the next policy-registration step requires the durable identity (:2325-2327).npm run typecheck:clifails, and the focused orchestration run fails 5/56 tests. At runtime the identity callback is never called, so a new create reaches the durable-identity guard without its journal and cannot complete normally. Restore the identity-persistence step before policy verification and reconcile the merged tests/source. -
The merge also dropped route-reservation ownership and exact cleanup.
reserveSandboxInferenceRouteprotects only rows that already havependingPolicyVerification(src/lib/state/registry.ts:658-694), so a live pending route without that checkpoint can be overwritten.removeSandboxRouteReservationIfCurrentis absent although production calls it (src/lib/onboard/sandbox-lifecycle.ts:16-23). Focused probes/tests reproduce both replacement and the missing-function runtime failure. Preserve the reservation owner from admission through policy verification and make cleanup compare-and-delete that owner. -
The true same-name policy A→B→A substitution still succeeds. An adversarial current-source probe changed the named sandbox to identity B during the policy read and back to A before the post-read identity check. The function returned
doneand persistedreplacement-policyunder identity A. Policy evidence must be read through an identity-bound authority or be independently bound and validated so a mutable-name ABA cannot attach B's evidence to A. -
The onboarding session directory A→B→A write race still reports false success. A current-source probe replaced the session directory around
renameSync(src/lib/state/onboard-session.ts:1198-1229) and restored the pinned directory before revalidation.saveSessionreturned successfully, the authoritative session file was absent, and the file existed only in the replacement directory. Bind the write/rename/readback to the directory identity that owns the onboarding lock;clearSessionat:1250-1257needs the same mutation binding. -
The prior security findings remain reproducible/static-current: pre-resolved Hermes/DCode APF plans can bypass the outer-agent gate; Hermes credential reconciliation and provider detach still mutate by sandbox name after separate identity checks; retained recovery still omits the create-attempt nonce and full authority/receipt tuple and has no supported authenticated identity-bound resolution path. Documentation also still gives unsafe unconditional
rm -flock guidance, misclassifies non-policy post-create failures as policy failures, and contradicts the non-resumable recovery path with--resumeguidance.
Validation: plugin build PASS; npm run typecheck:cli FAIL; broader focused CLI run FAIL (8 failed, 269 passed); critical adversarial probes FAIL; git diff --check PASS. GitHub reports all 63 PR commits Verified. One ordinary commit (2aeff9c35dfab81b96d4ff32f2c30d2b5aa030a3) lacks a DCO trailer; 11 merge commits also lack trailers. Current pull-request workflows are action_required, and no trusted Manual PR E2E is bound to this commit/base.
Product scope: the accepted #9833 durable-authority contract remains valid, but permanent sandbox-name retirement is not an accepted substitute for authenticated identity-bound recovery. Review: CHANGES_REQUESTED. Security categories: 1 FAIL, 2 FAIL, 3 FAIL, 4 PASS, 5 FAIL, 6 PASS, 7 FAIL, 8 FAIL, 9 FAIL. Documentation: BLOCKED. Cross-issue sweep: no adjacent issue met the repository relationship threshold. Review-cycle pagination is complete. Auto-merge remains off.
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com>
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PR Review Advisor finished for commit |
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Reviewed latest PR commit 1346f909e6ddb331f65426f30c4640b187dbe64a against base 705372dab8d4d28c0daf058aec1579ffc482db4c.
The newest commit changes only the recovery integration fixture from provider-backed to providerless. It fixes the superseded CI expectation but does not change production code. The earlier merge-composition regressions are resolved: created identity is again persisted before policy verification, Hermes finalization is restored, and route reservation ownership now has exact cleanup. The remaining findings below are executable authorization, TOCTOU, and recovery-durability defects, so they are not safe to defer merely because ordinary CI passes.
Product-scope verdict: BLOCKED. Accepted issue #9833 authorizes the durable-authority contract, but this implementation still permanently retires retained sandbox names without a supported authenticated, identity-bound resolution path. That is not an accepted replacement product contract.
Review verdict: CHANGES_REQUESTED.
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Pre-resolved Hermes/DCode intents bypass the authoritative APF agent gate.
src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.ts:319-358validates the outer agent and provider lists but never binds that value tocreateIntent.resolved.policy.options.agentName. Exact probes showed pre-resolved Hermes, pre-resolved DCode, and outer OpenClaw/resolved Hermes all reaching the post-guard effect. Bind and compare the resolved agent at this generic create boundary and refuse before any credential, provider, route, or sandbox effect. -
A true policy A→B→A substitution can persist B's policy evidence for identity A.
src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.ts:686-697surrounds a mutable-name policy read with separate identity samples, whilesrc/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/policy-creation-receipt.ts:199-215also reads by name. The exact probe returned success and persisted{ identity: A, evidence: replacement-policy }. Read policy evidence through an immutable created-sandbox authority/receipt and bind it atomically under the mutation fence. -
Hermes credential reconciliation can mutate a replacement before substitution is detected.
src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.ts:539-573performs name-based credential environment mutation, restart, and health work between authority checks. The probe mutated identity B and only then entered recovery. The mutation, restart, and health boundaries must be pinned to the immutable created identity or protected by an exclusion primitive across the operation. -
Provider cleanup can detach resources from different same-name identities. The check around
src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.ts:1931-1945calls multiple mutable-name operations insrc/lib/onboard/sandbox-provider-cleanup.ts:142-169; the probe observed the nine detach calls spanning A and B. Each detach needs identity-bound ownership or per-operation authoritative revalidation under the lock. -
Onboarding state writes are not bound to the directory that owns the lock.
src/lib/state/onboard-session.ts:1198-1228independently pins the current session directory, separate from lock ownership at:1355-1372. The directory-substitution probe reported success while writing into the replacement directory and leaving the authoritative session absent. Bind session read/write/delete and canonical readback to the directory identity that owns the onboarding lock. -
Retained recovery is neither reconstructible nor durable under permanent writer failure. The retained record omits the create-attempt nonce and full gateway/lifecycle/identity/effective-policy/managed-receipt authority tuple (
src/lib/state/onboard-session.ts:1831-1866;src/lib/state/onboard-session/retained-sandbox-recovery.ts:35-47,465-475). The retry atsrc/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.ts:108-142is process-local; a permanent writer failure left no durable evidence after restart. Persist the complete authority tuple through an independent durable owner and provide authenticated identity-bound resolution before allowing reuse. -
The recovery text remains materially unsafe or contradictory.
src/lib/onboard/sandbox-create/orchestration.ts:637-675labels non-policy post-create failures as policy-authority failures;src/lib/onboard/portable-retirement-authority.ts:562-568gives unconditional manual lock deletion guidance even for a live holder;docs/reference/commands.mdx:463-483presents an OpenClaw-only APF path without that scope; anddocs/reference/commands.mdx:909-913omits the required--name <new-name>invocation. These are behavior and safety contradictions, not grammar/style findings.
Nine-category security verdict: FAIL overall. Secrets/Credentials FAIL; Input Validation/Data Sanitization FAIL; Authentication/Authorization FAIL; Dependencies/Third-Party Libraries PASS; Error Handling/Logging FAIL; Cryptography/Data Protection PASS; Configuration/Security Headers FAIL; Security Testing FAIL; System Security FAIL.
Validation: CLI type-check PASS; git diff --check PASS; 283 focused CLI tests PASS; 174 documentation-focused source tests PASS; changed recovery integration 7/7 PASS. Independent adversarial probes reproduced the resolved-agent bypass, policy ABA, credential mutation of B, provider cleanup across A/B, directory/lock substitution, and total recovery-writer loss. Current GitHub CI is still running, so the proposed “all green” condition is not met; green ordinary tests would not invalidate these reproduced forbidden cases.
Documentation verdict: BLOCKED only by the four material safety/behavior contradictions in finding 7; ordinary grammar, style, duplication, and minor clarity remain non-blocking.
Cross-issue result: No adjacent fix, contradiction, duplicate, or follow-on met the repository evidence threshold among the 30 capped open-issue candidates.
Review-cycle completeness: Viewer senthilr-nv; terminal pagination completed for 7 issue comments, 25 submitted reviews, 2 inline threads/comments, 67 commits, 61 current check runs, 1 status context, and 15 current workflow runs. Every PR commit is GitHub Verified. Commit 2aeff9c35dfab81b96d4ff32f2c30d2b5aa030a3 and 11 merge commits lack per-commit DCO trailers, although the current DCO declaration check passes. No trusted Manual PR E2E evidence is bound to the current commit/base and covers real onboarding plus retained-recovery resolution.
GitHub merge state before this review: OPEN, non-draft, MERGEABLE/BLOCKED; auto-merge is off. Please keep the resolved fail-closed improvements, but close the authority, durability, and operator-recovery contracts before requesting approval.
Focused inference-routing E2E — PASS
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<!-- markdownlint-disable MD041 --> ## Outcome Retained sandboxes now keep their exact post-create authority across verification failures, retries, process restarts, and concurrent state changes. Provider, credential, policy, cleanup, and onboarding-session operations refuse same-name replacement or substituted state before crossing their mutation boundary. ## Reason The security follow-up review on merged PR #10396 identified seven composition gaps that its original outer-boundary tests did not exercise. This follow-up closes only those gaps while preserving the accepted behavior from issue #9833. ### Related issues Part of #9833 ## Changes - Bind pre-resolved agent intent to the outer agent at the generic create entry and refuse unsupported interceptor plans before credential, provider, route, registry, or sandbox effects. - Compare the observed base policy within effective policy evidence so a temporary policy substitution cannot produce a receipt for the original sandbox identity. - Revalidate immutable sandbox and policy authority immediately before and after each Hermes credential mutation, gateway restart, and health check. - Revalidate immutable identity around every provider detach so one cleanup sequence cannot span same-name sandbox replacements. - Bind onboarding-session reads, writes, deletes, and durable readback to the state directory and file identities that own the onboarding lock. - Preserve gateway name and port, lifecycle generation, immutable sandbox identity, verified effective-policy identity, create-attempt nonce, and managed creation receipt in both recovery stores. A recovery-only session reconstructs its independent record after restart when the writer recovers and otherwise keeps different-name onboarding blocked. - Remove unsafe lock-removal guidance, use accurate post-create failure text, scope interceptor documentation to its owning agent, and give an exact different-name fresh-onboarding command. ## Verification - `npx vitest run --project integration test/onboarding/onboard-fresh-create-identity.test.ts` — 15/15 passed on exact head `104fd285b6f38c546739e9ab939e569ef0058253`. - Focused CLI security files for policy receipts, orchestration, identity gates, exit handling, session locking, normalization, and retained recovery — 149/149 passed. - Focused provider-cleanup and recovery-documentation integration files — 31/31 passed. - Lock-bound retained-recovery admission slice — 1/1 selected case passed. - `npm run typecheck:cli` — passed. - `npm run checks:repository` — passed. - `npm run format` — passed. - `npm run docs` — passed. - Normal pre-commit, commit-msg, and pre-push hooks — passed, including repository checks, growth guardrails, secret scanning, and CLI type-checking. - GitHub reports commits `89bbc2ea81836a943fe6937677fd75c1c6b04d23`, `c6f9ec152425b368979ce18c220fa2c6a9a08a58`, and `104fd285b6f38c546739e9ab939e569ef0058253` as `Verified`. - The reviewed diff contains no secret values, API keys, or credentials. Recovery evidence contains credential environment names only. ## Review notes Review provenance: dismissed follow-up review [5044391071](#10396 (review)). Failing-before and passing-after evidence: - Pre-resolved nondefault agent intent reached create-plan materialization before repair; the public process matrix now refuses it with zero credential, route, provider, registry, or sandbox effects. - Policy replacement between stable identity observations was accepted before repair; `refuses replacement policy bytes between stable identity observations` now passes. - Same-name replacement could receive Hermes credential mutations before repair; `refuses a same-name replacement at the credential mutation edge` now passes. - Multi-step provider cleanup continued on a replacement identity before repair; `stops before detaching from a same-name replacement` now passes. - Restored state-directory swaps could redirect session reads, writes, and deletes before repair; the three lock-bound directory-swap probes now pass. - Independent recovery-writer failure lost restart reconstruction before repair. The two-process reconstruction probe now passes, and persistent writer failure keeps the durable recovery-only session blocked without repeating sandbox creation. - Recovery output, lock guidance, and agent-scoped command documentation contradicted executable behavior before repair; focused source and documentation assertions now pass. QA escape and detection gap: the merged tests proved outer identity checks and ordinary recovery, but mocked or skipped the lower-level multi-step mutation edges, effective-policy substitution, restored-directory races, and permanent journal-writer failure across restart. This PR adds public-process, concrete generic-boundary, filesystem-race, and two-process recovery probes at those enforcement points. Independent security review was bound to base `7409b8fcef5749fda938fcd09072bd50ba90fe73` and head `104fd285b6f38c546739e9ab939e569ef0058253`. All nine categories passed with no findings: secrets and credentials; input validation and data sanitization; authentication and authorization; dependencies and third-party libraries; error handling and logging; cryptography and data protection; configuration and security headers; security testing; and system security. --- Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com> <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Improved onboarding recovery by preserving creation, identity, gateway, lifecycle, and policy evidence. * Added safer recovery for interrupted onboarding, including reconstruction of missing recovery records. * Added stronger protection against same-name sandbox replacement during cleanup and recovery. * **Bug Fixes** * Prevented continuation when recovery information or policy evidence is incomplete, inconsistent, or outdated. * Added identity revalidation during gateway recovery and provider cleanup. * Improved onboarding lock handling and safer retry guidance. * **Documentation** * Updated recovery guidance to require administrator-confirmed removal and a new sandbox name. * Clarified that APF recovery instructions apply to OpenClaw. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> --------- Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria <akumaria@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
7 participants
Summary
This follow-up closes the remaining identity and authority gaps found after #10332.
Cancellation preserves incomplete sandboxes for identity-bound recovery, unsupported deferred provider attachment fails closed, and interceptor-mode provider intent is refused before credential, provider, route, or sandbox effects.
Related Issue
Part of #9833
Changes
Type of Change
Quality Gates
DGX Station Hardware Evidence
Verification
Signed-off-by:line and every commit appears asVerifiedin GitHubpre-commit,commit-msg, andpre-pushhooks passed, ornpm run validate:prpassed after refreshingorigin/mainwhen hooks were skipped or unavailablenpm run typecheck:clipassed, andnpm run checks:repositorypassednpm testfor broad runtime/test-harness changes;npm run checkfor repo-wide validation/coverage changes — command/result:npm run docsbuilds without warnings (doc changes only)Signed-off-by: Apurv Kumaria akumaria@nvidia.com