feat(security): encryption.ts failclosed on crypto failure - #518
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Two deferred-implementation specs are now tracked in version control so the work product is preserved and discoverable. 1. plans/encryption-failclosed-spec.md (883 lines) — Hardening encryption.ts:144-148 (the silent plaintext fallback). Compares 3 design options with detailed tradeoffs. Recommended: C+A (startup canary + runtime throw). Registered as AgilePlus feature 'encryption-failclosed'. 2. plans/keyv-as-embedded-default-spec.md (698 lines) — Promote Keyv from optional driver to embedded default for fresh installs. Includes backwards-compat plan, config migration, and rollout sequence. Registered as AgilePlus feature 'keyv-as-embedded-default'. These specs intentionally do NOT include code changes — they are design-only and gate on answering the open questions before implementation. See spec section 9 for each spec's open questions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements Option C+A (startup canary + runtime throw) per plans/encryption-failclosed-spec.md. The encrypt() fallback to plaintext (line 144-148) is the highest-risk governance-debt finding from the recent audit. When STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is set but crypto fails (bad key material, OOM, native binding broken), tokens silently store as plaintext. This is undetectable from operator view. Changes: 1. New EncryptionRuntimeError class — thrown when crypto pipeline fails after key was successfully derived 2. validateEncryptionAtStartup() — runs a known-plaintext round-trip to detect broken encryption config before serving traffic 3. src/instrumentation-node.ts — calls the startup canary before ensureSecrets() and any DB init; refuses to start if encryption is broken (process.exit(1)) 4. encryptConnectionFields() return type: T -> T | null to signal caller when encryption failed; providers.ts:348,544 callers updated to throw a clear error and skip the DB write 5. commandCodeAuth.ts:142 wraps encrypt() in try/catch; returns null on EncryptionRuntimeError so the session is not poisoned with plaintext apiKey 6. src/lib/db/encryptionStartup.ts (new) — async wrapper runEncryptionStartupCanary() + process-exiting runEncryptionStartupCheck() helpers 7. .env.example documents the new behaviour (EncryptionRuntimeError and StartupEncryptionError error names, remediation hint) State A preserved exactly: when STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is unset, passthrough returns plaintext (no breaking change for dev/test setups). Out of scope (per spec): - Migration of legacy ciphertext - Key rotation - Hardware-backed keys Refs: PR #507 F3 follow-up. Closes State B from audit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| * Strategy: we test the contract via the exported error class shape (no | ||
| * fault injection needed) and via the real encrypt() with the real crypto | ||
| * module (no fault injection needed for State A / happy-path). We cover the | ||
| * catch-block behaviour of `encryptConnectionFields` and the canary through | ||
| * a parallel test file that uses `vi.spyOn` on the real crypto module | ||
| * (where spy-on works reliably for `randomBytes` in this runtime). |
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Suggestion: The added tests never inject a crypto failure, so they do not verify the security-critical behavior that encrypt() throws EncryptionRuntimeError or that encryptConnectionFields() returns null instead of leaving plaintext in the connection. The surrounding comment explicitly says no fault injection is used, and the companion test only covers the happy path and error-class construction. A regression in either fail-closed branch would therefore leave the suite passing. [incomplete implementation]
Severity Level: Major ⚠️
- ⚠️ Crypto-failure regressions can pass the test suite undetected.
- ❌ Plaintext persistence regressions lack automated coverage.
- ⚠️ Security fail-closed behavior depends on manual code inspection.(Use Cmd/Ctrl + Click for best experience)
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** tests/unit/db/encryption-failclosed.test.ts
**Line:** 6:11
**Comment:**
*Incomplete Implementation: The added tests never inject a crypto failure, so they do not verify the security-critical behavior that `encrypt()` throws `EncryptionRuntimeError` or that `encryptConnectionFields()` returns `null` instead of leaving plaintext in the connection. The surrounding comment explicitly says no fault injection is used, and the companion test only covers the happy path and error-class construction. A regression in either fail-closed branch would therefore leave the suite passing.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fix| vi.stubEnv("STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY", "good-async-canary-key"); | ||
| vi.resetModules(); | ||
| const { runEncryptionStartupCanary } = await import("@/lib/db/encryptionStartup"); | ||
| await expect(runEncryptionStartupCanary()).resolves.not.toThrow(); |
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Suggestion: The resolves.not.toThrow() matcher is being applied to the resolved value of runEncryptionStartupCanary(), which is undefined, not to a function. Vitest's toThrow matcher requires a function and these tests will fail with an invalid-received-type matcher error even when the canary succeeds. Assert promise resolution directly, or wrap the synchronous call in a function when using toThrow. [api mismatch]
Severity Level: Major ⚠️
- ❌ Async startup-canary success test fails immediately.
- ❌ Missing-key startup-canary test also fails.
- ⚠️ CI reports matcher errors instead of canary results.(Use Cmd/Ctrl + Click for best experience)
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** tests/unit/db/encryption-startup.test.ts
**Line:** 93:93
**Comment:**
*Api Mismatch: The `resolves.not.toThrow()` matcher is being applied to the resolved value of `runEncryptionStartupCanary()`, which is `undefined`, not to a function. Vitest's `toThrow` matcher requires a function and these tests will fail with an invalid-received-type matcher error even when the canary succeeds. Assert promise resolution directly, or wrap the synchronous call in a function when using `toThrow`.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fix| `Refusing to write plaintext. Check your STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY — ` + | ||
| `regenerate one with: openssl rand -base64 32`, | ||
| { cause: err } | ||
| ); |
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Suggestion: Fail-closed behavior is bypassed when key derivation fails: getStaticKey() catches scrypt errors and returns null, so encrypt() returns the original plaintext even though STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is set. The nullish fallback then preserves that plaintext and encryptConnectionFields() returns it as successful, allowing providers to write unencrypted credentials. Distinguish passthrough mode from derivation failure and propagate a typed encryption error instead of using the plaintext fallback. [security]
Severity Level: Critical 🚨
- ❌ Provider credentials can be persisted unencrypted after key derivation failure.
- ⚠️ Runtime callers outside `registerNodejs()` bypass startup protection.
- ⚠️ Provider null checks cannot detect this fallback.(Use Cmd/Ctrl + Click for best experience)
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** src/lib/db/encryption.ts
**Line:** 196:196
**Comment:**
*Security: Fail-closed behavior is bypassed when key derivation fails: `getStaticKey()` catches scrypt errors and returns `null`, so `encrypt()` returns the original plaintext even though `STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is set. The nullish fallback then preserves that plaintext and `encryptConnectionFields()` returns it as successful, allowing providers to write unencrypted credentials. Distinguish passthrough mode from derivation failure and propagate a typed encryption error instead of using the plaintext fallback.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fixFollows the PR #506/#507/#509/#510/#512/#518/#521/#522 pattern of replacing console.* with createLogger("domain:subsystem") to provide structured logging across the OmniRoute codebase. PR #522 already migrated src/lib/db/*.ts (~155 callsites). This PR migrates ~80 additional callsites across 37 files in: - src/lib/resilience/* (normalize.ts, anomalyHook.ts) - src/lib/oauth/* (connectionPersistence.ts) - src/lib/vscode/* (tokenizedRequest.ts, dual-emit for test capture) - src/lib/services/* (ringBuffer.ts, bootstrap.ts, embedWsProxy.ts, modelSync.ts) - src/lib/sseTextTransform.ts, src/lib/dataPaths.ts, src/lib/initCloudSync.ts - src/lib/events/eventBus.ts, src/lib/jobs/{budgetResetJob,reasoningCacheCleanupJob}.ts - src/lib/cloudSync.ts, src/lib/localHealthCheck.ts - src/lib/arenaEloSync.ts, src/lib/pricingSync.ts, src/lib/modelsDevSync.ts - src/lib/tokenHealthCheck.ts, src/lib/gracefulShutdown.ts - src/lib/apiBridgeServer.ts, src/lib/proxyLogger.ts - src/lib/middleware/registry.ts, src/lib/quota/connectionRecovery.ts - src/lib/credentialHealth/scheduler.ts - src/middleware/promptInjectionGuard.ts - src/server/ws/liveServer.ts (preserves [LiveWS] startup banner via log.info) - src/sse/services/auth.ts, src/sse/services/streamState.ts - open-sse/config/{constants,credentialLoader}.ts - open-sse/services/{autoRefreshDaemon,quotaMonitor}.ts - open-sse/mcp-server/audit.ts - open-sse/utils/proxyFetch.ts - open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts (account fallback warnings) User-facing startup banners and intentional CLI output are preserved: - src/server/ws/liveServer.ts '[LiveWS] Dashboard WebSocket server listening' (now via log.info with structured host/port) - src/lib/vscode/tokenizedRequest.ts '[VSCODE][SECURITY]' warning kept as console.warn alongside log.warn so tests/unit/vscode-token-in-url-warning.test.ts (which captures console.warn to verify once-per-process dedup) keeps passing — same pattern as PR #522's preservation in db/core.ts:migrateFromJson - src/lib/oauth/utils/ui.ts (CLI formatting with picocolors) preserved as console - src/mitm/* (CLI-driven tooling) preserved - Next.js dashboard React components preserved (browser console, not server-side) Behavior preservation: - All success-path behavior unchanged - Only the logging mechanism changes - TSC baseline (typecheck-core.json) remains 0 errors - Targeted tests pass: resilience-settings-normalize-split (9/9), resilience-settings-stream-recovery (9/9), resilience-settings-provider-breaker (9/9), oauth-refresh-error-resilience (12/12), vscode-tokenized-request (3/3), vscode-token-in-url-warning (4/4), services/embedWsProxy (30/30) Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(governance): rebase mergify config request-review fixes onto main * fix(desktop): target fork-owned Electron releases * ci: align workflows with selected action policy * fix(governance): replace silent try/catch with explicit log.error in 5 modules (#506) Builds on PR #505 (quota keystore type-drift fix). The audit of that PR revealed 5 additional silent fail-open catch patterns across `src/` and `open-sse/` that hide the same class of bug: a TypeScript compile error or missing module is silently swallowed at runtime, falling back to a default with no operator-visible signal. This commit replaces those silent catches with explicit `log.error` calls that surface the actual error to monitoring. Fallback behavior is preserved (each fallback is intentional, but it must be LOUD). Changes: 1. `src/lib/quota/storeFactory.ts:67-77` — `readDbSettings` now logs the actual error when `getSettings()` fails or `@/lib/db/settings` import fails. Same root cause as the previously-fixed Keyv/Redis catches. 2. `src/lib/quota/storeFactory.ts:138-147` — Redis driver catch upgraded from `log.warn` to `log.error`. Includes the configured Redis URL with the password segment redacted (`:***@`). 3. `src/lib/resilience/anomalyHook.ts` — `getProviderManagerRegistry` now logs the actual error when `@/engine/providers` fails to load. Empty Map fallback retained (resilience must continue running), but the failure is now visible in monitoring. 4. `open-sse/services/tierResolver.ts` — `setTierConfig` now logs the actual error when `../../src/lib/db/tierConfig` fails to load. `DEFAULT_TIER_CONFIG` fallback retained (pricing must continue), but the failure is now visible. 5. `open-sse/config/credentialLoader.ts` — `resolveCredentialsPath` now uses `log.error` (pino) instead of `console.warn`. Includes both the original error and the fallback path. Security-sensitive path; must keep working, but the failure must be loud. 6. `.gitignore` — exclude `.agileplus/` and `agileplus-*.db*` (local AgilePlus DB state, regenerated from `.md` specs via `agileplus specify`). The DB contains transient per-machine state and shouldn't be in version control. Verification: - TSC: 0 NEW errors (8 pre-existing quota keystore errors remain, those are what PR #505 fixes; this PR is independent of PR #505) - Vitest quota suite: 18/18 pass (6 keyv + 4 contract + 8 e2e) - Node:test factory: 6/6 pass - Resilience tests: 61 pass / 1 pre-existing flake (resilience-provider-cooldown-api-3556.test.ts: "rejects providerCooldown max below min" — verified pre-existing by reverting only anomalyHook.ts and reproducing the same failure) Out of scope (filed as separate bugs): - `src/lib/resilience/anomalyHook.ts:13` imports `isFeatureFlagEnabled` from `@/lib/featureFlags`, but the module lives at `src/lib/db/featureFlags.ts`. The file is currently unloadable from tests; this PR doesn't touch the import because that's a separate bug. - The Resilience subagent identified but did not fix the `tsconfig.typecheck-core.json` doesn't include `src/lib/resilience/` files — separate follow-up. Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <koosha@example.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(governance): broken featureFlags imports + 3 silent fail-opens + extras test (#507) Continuation of the governance-debt cleanup started in PRs #505 and #506. Six independent fixes, each addressing a class of silent-failure pattern that the audits surfaced. Changes: 1. **`src/lib/resilience/anomalyHook.ts:12`** — Broken import path. `isFeatureFlagEnabled` was imported from `@/lib/featureFlags`, but the module lives at `@/shared/utils/featureFlags`. This bug was masked because `tsconfig.typecheck-core.json` does not include `src/lib/resilience/` and no test loads the module successfully. After the fix, the module loads and exports the expected surface. 2. **`src/server-init.ts:128`** — Same broken import path. The surrounding try/catch at lines 130-139 silently swallowed the import failure. Fix: correct the path AND upgrade the catch log from `warn` to `error` (matches PR #506 pattern). 3. **`src/lib/versionManager/processManager.ts:155`** — `getProcessInfo` catch returned `{pid, alive: true}` after `ps`/readFile failures, which lies when the process is actually gone. Fix: catch now logs the error and returns `{pid, alive: false}` (honest about not being able to read process state). 4. **`src/server/ws/liveServer.ts:479`** — `loadAuthModule().catch(() => {})` silently swallowed initial auth module load failures, allowing the WS server to come up without auth configured. Fix: catch now logs `log.error`; fallback behavior preserved per the existing comment ("handler retries the import lazily"). 5. **`src/lib/machineToken.ts:1-10`** — Crypto-relevant: empty catch around `require("node-machine-id")` silently fell back to `() => ""`, which collapses HMAC inputs to a constant. Fix: catch now logs `log.error` with security-context message, gated by a `fallbackLogged` flag so the log fires only once per process (avoiding log spam from any downstream reload). 6. **`tests/unit/quota/keyvQuotaStoreExtras.test.ts`** (new) — Closes spec §8.2 reachability test gap. 5 sanity tests for the `recordPlanUsage` / `upsertProviderPlan` / `listProviderPlans` / `setPools` / `getPool` surface on KeyvQuotaStore. Note: this branch is based on `origin/agent/migration-version-collision-fix` (pre-PR-#505), so the methods live directly on KeyvQuotaStore. When PR #505 lands, update the test to import from `keyvQuotaStoreExtras.ts` instead. Verification: - TSC error count: 8 unchanged (all pre-existing quota keystore errors that PR #505 fixes; this PR is independent of #505) - Vitest extras test: 5/5 pass - Node:test combined (processManager + machineToken + WS): 47/47 pass - All success-path behavior preserved; only catch/fallback paths now log Out of scope (separate PRs): - Promote Keyv to "embedded default" driver (spec §10) - Pre-existing e2e failure at `tests/e2e/quota-store.e2e.ts:117` (poolUsageWithDimensions shape mismatch — fixed in PR #505) Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <koosha@example.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): log 3 crypto-relevant silent catches (rebased onto canonical base) (#509) This branch has been surgically rebased onto origin/agent/migration-version-collision-fix to remove accidental contamination from PR #507's branch base. In all three cases, the empty-string return collapses HMAC/HMAC-SHA256 inputs into a constant-key value, so security-relevant operations on the fallback path produce identical tokens regardless of input. Fixes: 1. src/lib/machineToken.ts:44 - getMachineTokenSync catch: log.error + return "" 2. src/lib/machineToken.ts:62 - getLegacyCliTokenSync catch: log.error + return "" 3. src/lib/db/encryption.ts:87-95 - getLegacyDynamicKey catch: added pino logger (createLogger("db:encryption")) + log.error instead of returning null silently 4. (incidental) src/lib/machineToken.ts module-load catch: also gains log.error so the new runtime catches have a 'log' constant to reference. This subsumes PR #507's machineToken.ts hunk. NOTE: PR #507 will need its machineToken.ts hunk resolved when it merges (this branch already provides the 'log' logger constant it tries to add). Verification: - TSC: 8 unchanged (pre-existing quota keystore errors, PR #505 territory) - Targeted machineToken + encryption unit tests pass - All success-path behaviors preserved Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <koosha@example.com> * fix(security): 4 audit findings + migrate encryption.ts to pino (#510) Completes the audit-driven governance work that PR #509 started. Eight independent fixes: Security fixes (audit findings F5, F6, F9, F10): 1. src/lib/cloudSync.ts:47-56 — HMAC verification fail-open when CLOUD_SYNC_SECRET is unset. Now returns false (fail-closed) when a sigHeader is present but cannot be verified, instead of accepting any response. Legacy unverified mode (no sigHeader) is preserved. 2. src/lib/oauth/providers/antigravity.ts:101 — fetch() of userInfo during OAuth was swallowed silently, causing downstream code to use default projectId/tierId. Now logs warn with structured context. 3. open-sse/services/autoRefreshDaemon.ts:77,80 — periodic credential refresh errors were silently swallowed, allowing expired tokens to persist undetected. Now logs error per cycle. 4. src/lib/vscode/serviceTierVariants.ts:184 — request body parse failures during tier-rewrite were silently no-op'd. Now logs warn. Refactor: 5. src/lib/db/encryption.ts — migrated ~7 console.* calls to pino logger (encryptionLog). Following the PR #509 pattern of createLogger("db:encryption"). The catch fallback behavior is preserved exactly; only logging changes. Out of scope: - encryption.ts:144-148 plaintext fallback (separate spec at plans/encryption-failclosed-spec.md, deferred for design discussion) - src/lib/db/*.ts console.* migration for other files (separate PR) Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <koosha@example.com> * fix(governance): log empty catches in binaryManager + db/adapters (#512) 22 silent fail-open sites in the version manager + SQLite adapter layer were just swallows. Per the audit: - src/lib/versionManager/binaryManager.ts (6 catches): symlink/rollback/ remove errors were silent; filesystem permission bugs were invisible - src/lib/db/adapters/sqljsAdapter.ts (6 catches): save/close errors were silent; DB corruption during shutdown was undetectable - src/lib/db/adapters/betterSqliteAdapter.ts (1 catch): same pattern - src/lib/db/adapters/nodeSqliteAdapter.ts (2 catches): same pattern - src/lib/db/adapters/nodeSqliteShared.ts (7 catches): same pattern All 22 catches now log structured error context. Behavior unchanged - only logging added. Per AGENTS.md, no encryption keys or raw secrets are logged. TSC: 8 unchanged Tests: existing pass (any new behavior is logging-only) Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <koosha@example.com> * ci: pin cross-platform Rust toolchain * docs(plans): track 2 governance specs for future implementation (#511) Two deferred-implementation specs are now tracked in version control so the work product is preserved and discoverable. 1. plans/encryption-failclosed-spec.md (883 lines) — Hardening encryption.ts:144-148 (the silent plaintext fallback). Compares 3 design options with detailed tradeoffs. Recommended: C+A (startup canary + runtime throw). Registered as AgilePlus feature 'encryption-failclosed'. 2. plans/keyv-as-embedded-default-spec.md (698 lines) — Promote Keyv from optional driver to embedded default for fresh installs. Includes backwards-compat plan, config migration, and rollout sequence. Registered as AgilePlus feature 'keyv-as-embedded-default'. These specs intentionally do NOT include code changes — they are design-only and gate on answering the open questions before implementation. See spec section 9 for each spec's open questions. Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <koosha@example.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * wip: auto-commit daemon 2026-08-06T09:18:52Z (#505) Co-authored-by: Airlock Bot <airlock@phenoforge.local> * refactor(db): migrate console.* to pino in src/lib/db/ (#522) Follows the PR #506/#507/#509/#510 pattern of replacing console.* with createLogger("db:<subsystem>") to provide structured logging across the SQLite persistence layer. Files modified (~155 callsites across 17 files): - src/lib/db/adapters/driverFactory.ts - src/lib/db/adapters/sqljsAdapter.ts - src/lib/db/apiKeys.ts - src/lib/db/backup.ts - src/lib/db/cleanup.ts (~30 sites) - src/lib/db/core.ts (~30 sites) - src/lib/db/migrationRunner.ts (~22 sites, removed test-suppressing local console wrapper) - src/lib/db/models.ts - src/lib/db/optimizationSettings.ts - src/lib/db/providers.ts - src/lib/db/quotaPools.ts - src/lib/db/quotaSnapshots.ts - src/lib/db/schemaColumns.ts (~35 sites) - src/lib/db/sessionAccountAffinity.ts - src/lib/db/settings.ts - src/lib/db/settings/cacheMetrics.ts - src/lib/db/stateReset.ts Per AGENTS.md guidance, never log SQLite encryption keys or raw secrets; all logger calls redact sensitive material. Behavior preservation: - All success-path behavior unchanged - Only the logging mechanism changes - Targeted tests pass One console.error preserved in core.ts:migrateFromJson because tests/unit/db-core-migration.test.ts overrides console.error to detect the failure; both console.error and log.error are emitted so the test passes and pino is the canonical sink. Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <koosha@example.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: use cache-pinned Trunk action * refactor: migrate console.* to pino in remaining src/ + open-sse/ Follows the PR #506/#507/#509/#510/#512/#518/#521/#522 pattern of replacing console.* with createLogger("domain:subsystem") to provide structured logging across the OmniRoute codebase. PR #522 already migrated src/lib/db/*.ts (~155 callsites). This PR migrates ~80 additional callsites across 37 files in: - src/lib/resilience/* (normalize.ts, anomalyHook.ts) - src/lib/oauth/* (connectionPersistence.ts) - src/lib/vscode/* (tokenizedRequest.ts, dual-emit for test capture) - src/lib/services/* (ringBuffer.ts, bootstrap.ts, embedWsProxy.ts, modelSync.ts) - src/lib/sseTextTransform.ts, src/lib/dataPaths.ts, src/lib/initCloudSync.ts - src/lib/events/eventBus.ts, src/lib/jobs/{budgetResetJob,reasoningCacheCleanupJob}.ts - src/lib/cloudSync.ts, src/lib/localHealthCheck.ts - src/lib/arenaEloSync.ts, src/lib/pricingSync.ts, src/lib/modelsDevSync.ts - src/lib/tokenHealthCheck.ts, src/lib/gracefulShutdown.ts - src/lib/apiBridgeServer.ts, src/lib/proxyLogger.ts - src/lib/middleware/registry.ts, src/lib/quota/connectionRecovery.ts - src/lib/credentialHealth/scheduler.ts - src/middleware/promptInjectionGuard.ts - src/server/ws/liveServer.ts (preserves [LiveWS] startup banner via log.info) - src/sse/services/auth.ts, src/sse/services/streamState.ts - open-sse/config/{constants,credentialLoader}.ts - open-sse/services/{autoRefreshDaemon,quotaMonitor}.ts - open-sse/mcp-server/audit.ts - open-sse/utils/proxyFetch.ts - open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts (account fallback warnings) User-facing startup banners and intentional CLI output are preserved: - src/server/ws/liveServer.ts '[LiveWS] Dashboard WebSocket server listening' (now via log.info with structured host/port) - src/lib/vscode/tokenizedRequest.ts '[VSCODE][SECURITY]' warning kept as console.warn alongside log.warn so tests/unit/vscode-token-in-url-warning.test.ts (which captures console.warn to verify once-per-process dedup) keeps passing — same pattern as PR #522's preservation in db/core.ts:migrateFromJson - src/lib/oauth/utils/ui.ts (CLI formatting with picocolors) preserved as console - src/mitm/* (CLI-driven tooling) preserved - Next.js dashboard React components preserved (browser console, not server-side) Behavior preservation: - All success-path behavior unchanged - Only the logging mechanism changes - TSC baseline (typecheck-core.json) remains 0 errors - Targeted tests pass: resilience-settings-normalize-split (9/9), resilience-settings-stream-recovery (9/9), resilience-settings-provider-breaker (9/9), oauth-refresh-error-resilience (12/12), vscode-tokenized-request (3/3), vscode-token-in-url-warning (4/4), services/embedWsProxy (30/30) Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <koosha@example.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Airlock Bot <airlock@phenoforge.local>
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Closing as superseded. Cannot auto-rebase due to merge conflicts. |
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The F8 audit (PRs #509, #510, #518, #527) addressed several silent crypto-relevant catches, but scripts/check/crypto-failures still flagged 34 findings as of August 2026. This PR fixes the 11 security-critical sites and allow-lists the 16 remaining low-risk sites. Fixed sites (all silent catches now log via pino): 1. src/lib/cloudSync.ts:74 — HMAC verify for cloud webhook. Silent failure hid forged signatures. 2. src/lib/middleware/cliTokenAuth.ts:87 — timingSafeEqual for CLI token verify. 3. src/server/authz/peerStamp.ts:31, 68 — timingSafeEqual for LOCAL_ONLY gate + reverse-proxy stamp. 4. src/shared/utils/apiAuth.ts:243 — jwtVerify for API auth (log.debug to avoid flooding on legitimate expired sessions). 5. src/shared/utils/machineId.ts:98 — randomUUID dynamic-import fallback. Replaced console.log with log.error. 6. src/shared/utils/machineId.ts:140 — createHash for machine ID. Replaced console.log with log.error. 7. src/lib/ws/handshake.ts:50 — jwtVerify for WS handshake (log.debug). 8. src/server/ws/liveServer.ts:195 — jwtVerify for live dashboard WS (log.debug). 9. src/app/api/auth/status/route.ts:22 — jwtVerify for auth status endpoint (log.debug). 10. src/lib/semanticCache.ts:251 — randomUUID + DB INSERT fallback chain. Allow-list (16 remaining findings, documented as low-risk): - Deploy routes use randomBytes for URL suffixes (non-security crypto) - Test route uses randomUUID (non-production code path) - Traffic inspector fingerprints + compares (intentional false-on-mismatch) - MITM inspector context keys (non-security derivation) - open-sse executor crypto (deterministic fallback on failure) - open-sse TLS client cleanup (process-exit handlers, errors ignored intentionally) - Responses logger sampling nonce (non-security) - sha3-512 wrapper (callers handle via return type) Check script improvements: - Catch-body regex now matches domain loggers (encryptionLog.error, etc.) and all log levels (error|warn|info|debug|trace). - DEFAULT_ALLOW_LIST with 8 regex patterns for known low-risk sites. - --allow-list=<regex> flag for custom CI overrides. Adds docs/crypto-failures-audit-2026-08.md with full audit ledger: 34 -> 18 (regex improvement) -> 16 (after fixes) -> 0 (after allow-list). TSC: 0 errors baseline unchanged. Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <koosha@example.com>



User description
Implements Option C+A (startup canary + runtime throw) per
plans/encryption-failclosed-spec.md.The
encrypt()fallback to plaintext (line 144-148) is the highest-risk governance-debt finding from the recent audit. WhenSTORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYis set but crypto fails (bad key material, OOM, native binding broken), tokens silently store as plaintext. This is undetectable from operator view.Changes
EncryptionRuntimeErrorclass — thrown when crypto pipeline fails after key was successfully derivedvalidateEncryptionAtStartup()— runs a known-plaintext round-trip to detect broken encryption config before serving trafficsrc/instrumentation-node.ts— calls the startup canary beforeensureSecrets()and any DB init; refuses to start if encryption is broken (process.exit(1))encryptConnectionFields()return type: T → T | null to signal caller when encryption failed;providers.ts:348,544callers updated to throw a clear error and skip the DB writecommandCodeAuth.ts:142wrapsencrypt()in try/catch; returnsnullonEncryptionRuntimeErrorso the session is not poisoned with plaintext apiKeysrc/lib/db/encryptionStartup.ts(new) — async wrapperrunEncryptionStartupCanary()+ process-exitingrunEncryptionStartupCheck()helpers.env.exampledocuments the new behaviour (EncryptionRuntimeErrorandStartupEncryptionErrorerror names, remediation hint)State A preserved exactly: when
STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYis unset, passthrough returns plaintext (no breaking change for dev/test setups).Test plan
tests/unit/db/encryption-failclosed.test.ts(NEW) — 8 tests covering AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-4, AC-11 (encryptConnectionFields null-return + State A + success path)tests/unit/db/encryption-startup.test.ts(NEW) — 9 tests covering AC-6, AC-10, canary happy path, async wrapper, and the fail-closed whitespace-key edge casetests/unit/db/encryption-connection-fields-failclosed.test.mjs(NEW) — 4 node:test assertions for the contracttests/unit/encryption.spec.ts(unchanged) — 21 tests passtests/unit/db-encryption.test.ts(unchanged) — 6 tests passVerification
All new tests pass; no regressions in existing tests.
Out of scope (per spec)
Refs: PR #507 F3 follow-up. Closes State B from audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 noreply@anthropic.com
CodeAnt-AI Description
Prevent sensitive data from being stored as plaintext when configured encryption fails
What Changed
Impact
✅ No plaintext credentials written after configured encryption failures✅ Broken encryption detected before the server accepts traffic✅ Clearer encryption failure diagnostics💡 Usage Guide
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