[BULK PR] Tracking: Zip Slip #16
Comments
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/zeroturnaround__zt-zip
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/jbake-org__jbake
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/apache__commons-compress
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/jitsi__jitsi-videobridge-openfire-plugin
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/robertdeocampojr__jspringbot-selenium-extension
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/pysambrero__revenge_studio
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/dscalzi__ZipExtractor
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/ibi-group__datatools-server
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/jboss__jboss-common-core
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/Comcast__pantry
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/lebonq__modpack_updater
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/perye__dokit
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/simpligility__android-maven-plugin
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/perye__dokit
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/lilin409546297__spring-source
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
This was referenced Jul 29, 2022
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/marytts__marytts
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/lucacampanella__corda-flows-doc-builder
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/infowangxin__springmvc
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/dojo__dwb
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/lutfialquraan__literatum-lutfi
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/jenkinsci__blueocean-maven-plugin
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/simpligility__android-maven-plugin
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/simpligility__android-maven-plugin
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/infowangxin__springmvc
that referenced
this issue
Jul 29, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/inspire-software__yes-cart
that referenced
this issue
Nov 4, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/Jahia__jahia
that referenced
this issue
Nov 4, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/igniterealtime__Openfire
that referenced
this issue
Nov 4, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/igniterealtime__Openfire
that referenced
this issue
Nov 4, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
This was referenced Nov 4, 2022
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/wildfly__wildfly-core
that referenced
this issue
Nov 4, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/VIDA-NYU__ache
that referenced
this issue
Nov 4, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
|
Your bot / rewrite cannot detect existing protection for zipslip properly |
|
Can you provide an example of what it's missing, it looks for standard mitigations, but I agree it's not perfect. |
innokenty
pushed a commit
to innokenty/swing-file-browser
that referenced
this issue
Nov 11, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/apache__flink-table-store
that referenced
this issue
Nov 18, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
JLLeitschuh
added a commit
to BulkSecurityGeneratorProjectV2/marklogic__marklogic-data-hub
that referenced
this issue
Nov 18, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
stoicflame
pushed a commit
to stoicflame/enunciate
that referenced
this issue
Dec 30, 2022
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
dotasek
added a commit
to HL7/kindling
that referenced
this issue
Jan 18, 2023
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Grahame Grieve <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: dotasek <[email protected]>
reckart
added a commit
to apache/uima-uimaj-io-jsoncas
that referenced
this issue
Feb 26, 2023
Issue #18: Fix Zip Slip Vulnerability in test code This change does one of two things. This change either 1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip. OR 2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`. For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`. The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory. It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object. For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`; however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`. Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Severity: High CVSSS: 7.4 Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip) Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]> Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16 Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Richard Eckart de Castilho <[email protected]>
tevans78
pushed a commit
to tevans78/testng
that referenced
this issue
Feb 27, 2023
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
tevans78
pushed a commit
to tevans78/testng
that referenced
this issue
Feb 27, 2023
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
suubi-joshua
pushed a commit
to suubi-joshua/openmrs-core
that referenced
this issue
Mar 15, 2023
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
slachiewicz
pushed a commit
to apache/maven-wagon
that referenced
this issue
Apr 8, 2023
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
prashil-g
pushed a commit
to prashil-g/testng-7.5
that referenced
this issue
Apr 25, 2023
vuln-fix: Zip Slip Vulnerability
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
krmahadevan
pushed a commit
to testng-team/testng
that referenced
this issue
Apr 26, 2023
vuln-fix: Zip Slip Vulnerability
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
mawensen
pushed a commit
to mawensen/HRAdmin-Backend
that referenced
this issue
Jan 26, 2024
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
caiwei-ebay
pushed a commit
to eBay/mTracker
that referenced
this issue
Mar 4, 2024
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
caiwei-ebay
pushed a commit
to eBay/mTracker
that referenced
this issue
Mar 4, 2024
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
caiwei-ebay
pushed a commit
to eBay/mTracker
that referenced
this issue
Mar 4, 2024
This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.
This change does one of two things. This change either
1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]>
Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
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