fix: π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix SSH command injection - #73
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Code Review SummaryStatus: No Issues Found | Recommendation: Merge Files Reviewed (2 files)
Reviewed by nemotron-3-super-120b-a12b-20230311:free Β· 228,439 tokens |
π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Command Injection in SSH Remote Execution where
child_process.execwas evaluating local shell metacharacters from concatenated command arguments.π― Impact: Local execution of arbitrary commands on the system running the CLI/agent.
π§ Fix: Replaced
execwithexecFileand passed SSH arguments as an array, bypassing local shell parsing.β Verification: Tested via the control-plane test suite and verified manually by executing payload-injected shell commands (
test-exec-inject2.ts), confirming thatexecFileprevented the evaluation of shell control characters.Signed-off-by: Jules jules@example.com
PR created automatically by Jules for task 10595898645822387383 started by @Hardonian