Wave B Auditor — proof bundle integrity report

[Ghenghis]

Summary

Independent third-party audit of the proof-bundle infrastructure end-to-end. Verdict: GREEN.

• Built a fresh bundle with HERMES3D_PROOF_KEY=auditor-key bash scripts/build-bundle.sh: 05_truth_proof/bundles/ea909e8c5ae4-20260430T125728Z.zip (sha256 b25a5faa37e6…, 5533 bytes).
• Wrote 04_testing/wave-b-reports/auditor_verify.py — an independent verifier that does NOT call conformance_runner.py. Reimplements the canonical-JSON HMAC-SHA256, file-hash walk, ledger cross-ref scan, forbidden-extras diff, and git cat-file -e commit binding from scratch.
• Five positive checks (a–e) all PASS.
• Three negative tests in temp dirs all PASS (i.e. the tampered bundle was rejected with the expected, specific error):
  • manifest tampered + sig replaced with forged HMAC -> signature mismatch
  • manifest-listed file removed -> file integrity: 1 missing
  • smuggled extra file added -> forbidden extras: ['smuggled.txt']
• Cross-checked against conformance_runner.py --bundle: agrees.

Recommendations (non-blocking)

• Port the "forbidden extras" check (d) into conformance_runner.verify_bundle. Currently it does not reject zip entries absent from manifest.files; smuggled files would slip past --bundle mode. The auditor catches them.
• Re-run audit against a richer post-acceptance bundle to exercise the | proof_envelope rows in evidence_ledger.md.

Artifacts

• 04_testing/wave-b-reports/auditor-20260430T125917Z.md — report
• 04_testing/wave-b-reports/auditor_verify.py — independent verifier
• 04_testing/wave-b-reports/negative_tests.py — adversarial harness

No proof-bundle code was modified. Tampered bundles were created in %TEMP% and never committed or pushed.

Test plan

• Positive: independent verifier all PASS
• Positive: conformance_runner.py --bundle agrees
• Negative: tamper + wrong key resign rejected
• Negative: removed manifest-listed file rejected
• Negative: smuggled extra file rejected

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ℹ️ Review info

⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: defaults

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro

Run ID: c015c2e2-9f83-4c61-9c6a-10afa414e6bd

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between ea909e8 and ca44cca.

📒 Files selected for processing (3)

• 04_testing/wave-b-reports/auditor-20260430T125917Z.md
• 04_testing/wave-b-reports/auditor_verify.py
• 04_testing/wave-b-reports/negative_tests.py

✨ Finishing Touches

🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)

• Create PR with unit tests
• Commit unit tests in branch feat/wave-b-auditor

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[gemini-code-assist]

Code Review

This pull request introduces the Wave B Auditor report and its associated verification infrastructure, including an independent auditor script and a negative testing harness. The review feedback highlights several robustness improvements: handling missing manifest files in the auditor script to prevent crashes, adding command-line argument validation to the testing script, and utilizing a context manager for temporary directory management to ensure proper cleanup during failures.

[gemini-code-assist]

The script will crash with a KeyError if manifest.json or manifest.sig are missing from the zip file. It's safer to check for their existence in names before attempting to read them, allowing the function to return a structured error report instead of an unhandled exception.

Suggested change

	manifest = json.loads(zf.read("manifest.json").decode("utf-8"))
	sig = json.loads(zf.read("manifest.sig").decode("utf-8"))
	if "manifest.json" not in names or "manifest.sig" not in names:
	if "manifest.json" not in names: result["errors"].append("manifest.json missing")
	if "manifest.sig" not in names: result["errors"].append("manifest.sig missing")
	result["ok"] = False
	return result
	manifest = json.loads(zf.read("manifest.json").decode("utf-8"))
	sig = json.loads(zf.read("manifest.sig").decode("utf-8"))

[gemini-code-assist]

The script lacks validation for command-line arguments. Running it without the required arguments will result in an IndexError. Adding a simple check with a usage message improves robustness.

Suggested change

	src = Path(sys.argv[1])
	key = sys.argv[2]
	if len(sys.argv) < 3:
	print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <bundle_zip> <key>", file=sys.stderr)
	return 2
	src = Path(sys.argv[1])
	key = sys.argv[2]

[gemini-code-assist]

Using tempfile.mkdtemp with manual cleanup is prone to leaving temporary directories behind if the script crashes or is interrupted. Using tempfile.TemporaryDirectory as a context manager ensures the directory is cleaned up automatically regardless of how the script exits.