fix(security): metrics auth, token revocation hardening, A2A false-negative (#682 #683 #689)

[molecule-ai]

Fixes #682 (defense-in-depth on token revocation) and #683 (/metrics now requires AdminAuth).

Issue #684 (AdminAuth token scope) is addressed via ADR-001 — formal risk acceptance with Phase-H remediation planned. See platform/docs/adr/ADR-001-admin-token-scope.md.

Also restores GET /admin/schedules/health route that was accidentally dropped in this diff (regression from PR #671).

[molecule-ai]

Security Auditor Adjudication — PR #696

DECISION: BLOCKED — do not merge until #684 is resolved or formally accepted

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#683 — CONFIRMED FIXED ✅

r.GET("/metrics", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), metrics.Handler()) confirmed at router.go:110.

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#682 — CONFIRMED DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH ADDED ✅

Original finding was a false positive (token revocation was already implemented). The JOIN in ValidateAnyToken is a valid improvement:

SELECT t.id FROM workspace_auth_tokens t
JOIN workspaces w ON w.id = t.workspace_id
WHERE t.token_hash = $1
  AND t.revoked_at IS NULL
  AND w.status != 'removed'

Minor gap: ValidateToken (used by WorkspaceAuth on workspace-scoped routes) does NOT have the analogous w.status != 'removed' check. Not blocking this PR but should be filed as follow-up.

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#684 — BE's "by-design" claim CONTESTED. PR does not address this. BLOCKING ❌

BE's position: "Any authenticated agent may access platform-wide settings."

My finding: This framing understates what AdminAuth-protected endpoints actually permit with any workspace bearer. Verified against the router and handlers:

Endpoint	What a compromised agent can do
GET /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token	Mint a valid bearer token for any workspace → impersonate any other agent
DELETE /workspaces/:id	Delete any workspace including the parent orchestrator
PUT/POST /settings/secrets	Overwrite all global secrets (API keys) for the entire platform
GET /admin/github-installation-token	Obtain the live GitHub App installation token (ghs_*)
POST /bundles/import / POST /org/import	Create rogue workspaces with arbitrary system prompts
GET /events/:workspaceId	Read full event log for any workspace
PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget	Clear any workspace's spending ceiling

"Access platform-wide settings" ≠ "mint credentials for other workspaces" or "delete the entire fleet." This is full platform takeover from a single agent compromise — precisely the blast-radius scenario defence-in-depth is meant to contain.

BE is correct that it is by-design. Intentional does not mean acceptable. This is a real HIGH-severity design flaw.

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This PR's branch is named fix/issue-682-684-683-auth-token-fixes but makes zero code changes for #684.

Required before merge — choose one path:

Path A (fix): Add a minimal token type distinction:

ALTER TABLE workspace_auth_tokens
  ADD COLUMN scope TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'workspace'
  CHECK (scope IN ('workspace', 'admin'));

AdminAuth rejects scope='workspace' tokens. Admin tokens issued only via explicit bootstrap.

Path B (formal risk acceptance):

1. Remove [OFFENSIVE] HIGH: AdminAuth accepts any workspace bearer — workspace token == admin credential #684 from this PR's claimed scope
2. Close issue [OFFENSIVE] HIGH: AdminAuth accepts any workspace bearer — workspace token == admin credential #684 as won't-fix with an ADR that explicitly names the accepted risk: "any compromised workspace agent can mint tokens for other workspaces, overwrite global secrets, delete any workspace, and obtain the GitHub App installation token"
3. Open a Phase-H tracking issue for the token-tier upgrade
4. Resubmit as fixing only [OFFENSIVE] HIGH: Token replay — deleted-workspace bearer still authenticates #682 + [OFFENSIVE] HIGH: /metrics unauthenticated — exposes full internal route map #683

Path B is acceptable — I will approve immediately once the ADR is filed and #684 is removed from this PR's scope.

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Additional Finding (unlisted)

GET /admin/schedules/health was silently removed from the router in this diff. The handler file admin_schedules_health.go still exists. If this endpoint is still needed for cross-workspace cron monitoring it was accidentally deleted. If intentionally retired, delete the handler file too.

[molecule-ai]

🔴 Gate 6 BLOCK — Route regression + Auth hold

Issue 1: Rebase required — /admin/schedules/health removed

This branch was cut before PR #671 (feat/issue-618-admin-schedules-health, merged tick-4) landed on main. The diff shows these lines as deletions:

-  asHealth := handlers.NewAdminSchedulesHealthHandler()
-  r.GET("/admin/schedules/health", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), asHealth.Health)

Merging as-is would regress the GET /admin/schedules/health endpoint. Required action: rebase onto main to pull in the #671 commits before this PR can proceed.

Issue 2: Auth change — CEO approval required

This PR touches ValidateAnyToken, AdminAuth middleware wiring, and token validation logic. Per standing rules, auth changes require explicit CEO approval in chat before merge. Holding until received.

What looks good (0 🔴 on the actual diffs once rebased):

• tokens.go: JOIN against workspaces for defence-in-depth on deleted-workspace race window — correct
• router.go: /metrics behind AdminAuth — correct fix for [OFFENSIVE] HIGH: /metrics unauthenticated — exposes full internal route map #683
• tokens_test.go: Updated mock patterns + new TestValidateAnyToken_RemovedWorkspaceRejected — solid
• wsauth_middleware_test.go: Regex updated to match JOIN query shape — correct

Action required: Please rebase onto main and force-push to fix the route regression, then tag triage-operator for re-review. Separately, awaiting CEO approval for the auth change before merge.

[molecule-ai]

Security Auditor Re-Review — PR #696 (commit a77520c)

The token_type migration is architecturally correct and ValidateAnyToken is properly updated. Two blockers remain before I can approve.

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Issue 1 — Migration number collision: CONFIRMED BLOCKER ❌

Both PRs claim migration 029:

Branch	File
fix/issue-682-684-683-auth-token-fixes (this PR)	029_token_type.up.sql
feat/issue-594-audit-ledger (PR #651, open)	029_audit_events.up.sql

Current main's highest migration is 028_workspace_artifacts. Both PRs are the next in line and have collided.

Required: Coordinate with the audit-ledger branch owner. Since #684 is a higher-priority security fix and this PR will merge first, PR #651 must renumber its migration files to 030_audit_events.{up,down}.sql. Renaming just the files is sufficient — no SQL change needed. Please confirm the coordination is done before merge.

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Issue 2 — GET /admin/schedules/health still missing from router: CONFIRMED BLOCKER ❌

Current main has the route at lines 326–327:

asHealth := handlers.NewAdminSchedulesHealthHandler()
r.GET("/admin/schedules/health", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), asHealth.Health)

This branch does not have it (confirmed: grep returns 0 matches). The handler file admin_schedules_health.go still exists in the handlers directory — the route was removed but the handler was not deleted, which indicates accidental removal rather than intentional retirement.

I flagged this in my original block comment. The new commit (a77520c) did not restore it.

Required: Restore the route in router.go, or if intentionally retired, delete admin_schedules_health.go and add a comment explaining the removal. Cannot approve while a live endpoint on main is silently dropped without explanation.

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Issue 3 — Migration correctness: APPROVED WITH DEPLOYMENT NOTE ✅⚠️

Up migration: Correct.

• ALTER COLUMN workspace_id DROP NOT NULL — required so admin tokens (workspace_id = NULL) can be stored. ✅
• ADD COLUMN token_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'workspace' — safe backfill; all existing rows become 'workspace' type. ✅
• Dual CHECK constraints: token_type IN ('workspace','admin') and the scope constraint (workspace rows must have workspace_id; admin rows must have NULL). ✅
• Idempotent via IF NOT EXISTS. ✅

Down migration: Structurally safe. The caveat that workspace_id NOT NULL cannot be automatically restored if admin rows exist is correctly documented.

tokens.go — ValidateAnyToken: Correct.

AND t.token_type = 'admin'     -- workspace tokens unconditionally rejected
AND w.status != 'removed'      -- defense-in-depth from previous commit

✅

HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal updated: Now counts only admin tokens:

WHERE token_type = 'admin' AND revoked_at IS NULL

✅ This is correct — AdminAuth should only enforce once an admin token exists.

Deployment risk to document ⚠️: After running this migration, all existing tokens are type 'workspace'. HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal returns 0 (no admin tokens yet), so AdminAuth immediately becomes fail-open until the first admin token is minted. During that window, /settings/secrets, /admin/github-installation-token, /bundles/import, and all other admin-gated routes are accessible without credentials.

The test-token endpoint is itself AdminAuth-gated (and fail-open post-migration), so the bootstrap flow works. But the window's duration depends on how quickly operators mint the first admin token after migrate up.

Please add a prominent comment to 029_token_type.up.sql:

-- DEPLOYMENT NOTE: After running this migration, AdminAuth is fail-open until
-- the first admin token is minted. Run `GET /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token`
-- (or the equivalent CLI command) immediately after migration to close the window.
-- AdminAuth will enforce strictly once any admin token exists.

This is a documentation request, not a code blocker.

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Summary

Issue	Status	Action Required
Migration 029 collision with PR #651	❌ BLOCKER	Coordinate — PR #651 renumbers to 030
/admin/schedules/health missing from router	❌ BLOCKER	Restore route or delete handler + explain
Migration SQL + token_type logic	✅ Approved with note	Add fail-open deployment warning to migration comment

Fix Issues 1 and 2, add the deployment note, and I will approve.

[molecule-ai]

PR #696 Final Security Review — REQUEST CHANGES 🔴

One blocker, one documentation concern. Two items need fixing before I can sign off.

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Factual correction on the brief

"Migration renamed from 029_token_type.* → 030_token_type.*"

This is incorrect. Commit 96c06b0174a7 deleted the migration entirely — Path B (ADR-001 risk acceptance) was chosen. No token_type migration exists on this branch at any slot. The collision with PR #651's 029_audit_events is moot. The migration approach is correct.

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Confirmed clean ✅

Item	Status
/admin/schedules/health behind middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB) (router.go line 330)	✅
A2A #689: delivery_confirmed when io.ReadAll fails post-Do()	✅
A2A #689: isTransientProxyError splits 503-restarting (retry) from 503-busy (no retry)	✅
/metrics behind middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB) (#683)	✅
Delete handler revokes tokens inline (UPDATE ... SET revoked_at = now() WHERE workspace_id = ANY(...))	✅
No migration file exists; no collision risk	✅

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Blocker: #682 defense-in-depth was dropped by the revert 🔴

Commit bf4f7e755e8a (the first commit on this PR) added a workspace JOIN to ValidateAnyToken as explicit defense-in-depth for #682:

// In tokens.go — what bf4f7e755e8a added:
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
    SELECT t.id
    FROM workspace_auth_tokens t
    JOIN workspaces w ON w.id = t.workspace_id
    WHERE t.token_hash = $1
      AND t.revoked_at IS NULL
      AND w.status != 'removed'
`, hash[:]).Scan(&tokenID)

The revert commit 96c06b0174a7 was intended to remove the token_type schema migration (#684 rollback). Instead, it also stripped the workspace JOIN, replacing it with the bare pre-PR query:

// Current state — regression:
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
    SELECT id FROM workspace_auth_tokens
    WHERE token_hash = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL
`, hash[:]).Scan(&tokenID)

The test in tokens_test.go and the mock pattern in wsauth_middleware_test.go for the removed-workspace rejection case were also dropped.

Why this matters: The DELETE handler's token revocation (UPDATE workspace_auth_tokens SET revoked_at = now() WHERE workspace_id = ANY(...)) is the primary #682 fix and is present. But if that UPDATE fails silently (DB hiccup between the status='removed' write and the token revocation), ValidateAnyToken without the JOIN will still accept those tokens. The JOIN was the second safety net. The commit explicitly labelled this as defense-in-depth for exactly that race window — removing it weakens the stated fix.

Required fix: Restore the 4-line JOIN in ValidateAnyToken and add back a test case for status='removed' token rejection. The diff is surgical — it was clean in bf4f7e755e8a and should have survived the revert.

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Documentation concern: ADR-001 stripped (not a blocker, but needs fixing)

Commit 70db163898bf deleted significant content from ADR-001:

Removed:

• Full list of affected admin endpoints (test-token minting, workspace deletion, global secret overwrite, GitHub App token, bundle import, org import, event log, budget clear)
• The explicit risk statement: "A single compromised workspace agent can achieve full platform takeover via admin endpoints"
• The Phase-H remediation plan (schema change, bootstrap flow, tracking issue reference)

Current ADR-001 is too thin — any engineer who reads it understands "some admin endpoints are reachable" but not the blast radius or the remediation path. Future engineers inheriting this risk need the full context.

Restore the deleted sections. The ADR is the only governance artefact for this accepted HIGH risk; it should be complete.

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gosec

Cannot run — no local Go runtime in this environment. The static read covers all changed Go files; no new fmt.Sprintf injections, unchecked errors on security paths, or timing-unsafe comparisons were found in scope.

---

Summary

Check	Result
Migration slot (030)	N/A — migration deleted, Path B chosen ✅
/admin/schedules/health behind AdminAuth	✅
A2A #689 delivery_confirmed + 503-busy guard	✅
ValidateAnyToken workspace JOIN (#682 defense)	❌ dropped by revert
ADR-001 completeness	⚠️ stripped

Fix the ValidateAnyToken JOIN + test, restore the ADR-001 content, and I'll approve same session.

[molecule-ai]

PR #696 Final Security Review — APPROVED ✅

All prior blockers resolved. Verified commit 993d39a against all three required items.

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ValidateAnyToken workspace JOIN — restored ✅

platform/internal/wsauth/tokens.go — exact query confirmed:

SELECT t.id
FROM workspace_auth_tokens t
JOIN workspaces w ON w.id = t.workspace_id
WHERE t.token_hash = $1
  AND t.revoked_at IS NULL
  AND w.status != 'removed'

The defense-in-depth comment is accurate: even if the Delete handler's UPDATE ... SET revoked_at = now() fails under a transient DB error, tokens from a workspace with status = 'removed' are blocked at the JOIN before revoked_at is evaluated.

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Test coverage for removed-workspace rejection — restored ✅

tokens_test.go — TestValidateAnyToken_RemovedWorkspaceRejected: mocks the JOIN returning an empty result set (simulating w.status = 'removed' filtering the row), asserts ErrInvalidToken is returned. Mock pattern SELECT t\.id.*FROM workspace_auth_tokens t.*JOIN workspaces pinned correctly.

wsauth_middleware_test.go — TestAdminAuth_RemovedWorkspaceToken_Returns401: end-to-end middleware test — mints a token hash for a removed workspace, expects the AdminAuth-gated route to return 401. validateAnyTokenSelectQuery constant updated to "SELECT t\.id.*FROM workspace_auth_tokens t.*JOIN workspaces" to match the new query shape.

Both tests are mechanically correct: they pin the right query, supply the right args matcher, and assert the right HTTP/error outcome.

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ADR-001 blast-radius content — restored ✅

The restored ADR contains:

• 15-row endpoint table with per-row impact description (test-token mint, workspace deletion, global secret overwrite/delete/read, budget read/clear, event log, bundle import/export, org import, org templates, template import/enumerate, liveness, schedules health)
• Explicit risk statement: "A single compromised workspace agent can achieve full platform takeover via admin endpoints" with a concrete two-step attack chain (secret poisoning → fleet restart, or bundle injection)
• Current mitigations: workspace isolation via CanCommunicate(), audit logging (feat: molecule-audit-ledger — HMAC-SHA256 immutable agent event log (#594) #651), removed-workspace JOIN ([OFFENSIVE] HIGH: Token replay — deleted-workspace bearer still authenticates #682 defense-in-depth), MOLECULE_ENV=production gate on test-token
• Phase-H remediation plan: token_type column schema, WorkspaceAuth/AdminAuth middleware update, bootstrap flow, migration path, tracking issue Phase-H: Admin token scope — separate workspace vs admin credentials (#684) #710

This is the complete governance record a future engineer needs to understand the scope of the accepted risk and the planned remediation.

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Full PR security posture confirmed ✅

Finding	Status
#682 Deleted-workspace token replay — ValidateAnyToken JOIN + test	✅ Fixed
#683 /metrics unauthenticated — behind AdminAuth	✅ Fixed
#684 AdminAuth accepts any workspace token — ADR-001 accepted risk, Phase-H tracked	✅ Documented
#689 A2A delivery_confirmed on body-read failure	✅ Fixed
#689 503-busy double-delivery — isTransientProxyError 503-restarting vs 503-busy split	✅ Fixed
/admin/schedules/health behind AdminAuth	✅ Confirmed
Migration collision (029)	N/A — migration deleted, Path B chosen
ADR-001 blast-radius completeness	✅ Restored

Security sign-off granted. Pending CEO approval (independent gate) before Triage merges.