fix(provision): share Docker+SaaS prepare path so both mint workspace secrets (RFC #2312) - #2366
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… secrets (RFC #2312) Root cause of 2026-04-30 silent-503 chat-upload bug: provisionWorkspaceCP (SaaS) skipped issueAndInjectInboundSecret while provisionWorkspaceOpts (Docker) called it. Every prod SaaS workspace provisioned with NULL platform_inbound_secret → upload returned 503 with the v2-enrollment message on every attempt. Structural fix: - Extract prepareProvisionContext (secrets load, env mutators, preflight, cfg build), mintWorkspaceSecrets (auth_token + platform_inbound_secret), markProvisionFailed (broadcast + DB update) into workspace_provision_shared.go - Refactor both provision modes to call the shared helpers - Add provisionAbort struct so the missing-env failure class can carry its structured "missing" payload through the shared abort path - Unify last_sample_error: previously the decrypt-fail path skipped it while others set it; users now see every failure class in the UI Drift prevention: - AST gate TestProvisionFunctions_AllCallMintWorkspaceSecrets asserts every function in the provisionFunctions set calls mintWorkspaceSecrets at least once (same shape as the audit-coverage gate from #335). New provision paths must either call mint or be added to provisionExemptFunctions with a one-line justification - Behavioral test TestMintWorkspaceSecrets_PersistsInboundSecretInSaaSMode pins the contract: SaaS mode MUST persist platform_inbound_secret to the DB column even though it skips file injection Existing-workspace recovery (chat_files.go lazy-heal): - Upload + Download handlers detect NULL platform_inbound_secret and call IssuePlatformInboundSecret inline, returning 503 with retry_after_seconds=30 - Self-heals workspaces that were provisioned before this fix without requiring destructive reprovision Tests: full handlers + workspace-server module green; AST gate verified to fire red on deliberate violation (commented-out mint call surfaces the exact function name + actionable remediation message). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…#2367) Closes #2367. TeamHandler.Expand provisioned child workspaces by directly calling h.provisioner.Start, skipping mintWorkspaceSecrets and every other preflight (secrets load, env mutators, identity injection, missing-env, empty-config-volume auto-recover). Children shipped with NULL platform_inbound_secret + never-issued auth_token — same drift class as the SaaS bug just fixed in PR #2366, found while exercising a stronger gate against this package. Fix: - TeamHandler now holds *WorkspaceHandler. Expand delegates each child provision to wh.provisionWorkspace, picking up the shared prepare/mint/preflight pipeline automatically. Future provision-time steps go in ONE place and team-expand inherits them. - prepareProvisionContext gains PARENT_ID env injection sourced from payload.ParentID (which Expand now populates). This preserves the signal workspace/coordinator.py reads on startup, without threading env through provisioner.WorkspaceConfig manually. - NewTeamHandler signature gains *WorkspaceHandler; router passes it. Gate upgrade: - TestProvisionFunctions_AllCallMintWorkspaceSecrets is now behavior-based: it walks every FuncDecl in the package and flags any function that calls h.provisioner.Start or h.cpProv.Start without also calling mintWorkspaceSecrets. Drift-resistant by construction — a future provision function with any name still trips the gate. - Replaces the name-list version from PR #2366. The name list missed Expand precisely because Expand wasn't named provision*; the behavior-based detector caught it spontaneously when prototyped. Tests: full workspace-server module green; gate previously verified to fire red on Expand pre-fix and on deliberate mintWorkspaceSecrets removal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…2366/#588) The merge queue used hard-coded limit=50 on list endpoints, silently truncating enumeration when more than 50 open PRs or status checks exist. This meant newer PRs could be invisible to the queue, and PRs with >50 status contexts would have incomplete check evaluation. Changes: - Add api_paginated() helper that loops through pages until a partial page is returned (indicating end of collection). - list_queued_issues() and list_candidate_issues() now use pagination to enumerate ALL open PRs, not just the first 50. - get_combined_status() /statuses enrichment now paginates to capture all status checks beyond the 50-entry cap. All 52 gitea-merge-queue tests pass. Refs: molecule-core#2366/#588, PM dispatch 01eaa317.
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Serialized merge by gitea-merge-queue after current-main, genuine approvals, and required CI checks were green.
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Summary
Root cause of 2026-04-30 silent-503 chat-upload bug:
provisionWorkspaceCP(SaaS) skippedissueAndInjectInboundSecretwhileprovisionWorkspaceOpts(Docker) called it. Every prod SaaS workspace shipped withNULL platform_inbound_secret→ upload returned 503 with the v2-enrollment message on every attempt.Structural fix — extract the mode-agnostic prepare/mint/markFailed helpers into
workspace_provision_shared.goso both modes call exactly the same prelude. Adding a future provision-time setup step now goes in ONE place and both modes pick it up automatically.What's shared
prepareProvisionContext— secrets load (global+workspace), env mutators, identity injection, missing-env preflight, cfg buildmintWorkspaceSecrets—auth_token+platform_inbound_secret(load-bearing for chat upload + every/internalendpoint)markProvisionFailed— broadcastWORKSPACE_PROVISION_FAILED+ persistlast_sample_errorWhat stays mode-specific
provisioner.Startwith local Docker, thenWriteFilesToContainerfor the/configsvolumecpProv.Start(CP launches EC2), persist returnedinstance_id, defer.auth_token+.platform_inbound_secretdelivery to the workspace's first/registry/registerresponseDrift prevention
TestProvisionFunctions_AllCallMintWorkspaceSecrets— AST gate that walks everyprovision*function in the package and asserts it callsmintWorkspaceSecrets. Same shape as the audit-coverage gate from fix(security): scope PausePollersForToken to requesting workspace (#329) #335. New provision paths must call mint or be added toprovisionExemptFunctionswith a one-line justificationTestMintWorkspaceSecrets_PersistsInboundSecretInSaaSMode— behavioral test that pins the contract: SaaS mode MUST persistplatform_inbound_secretto the DB column even though it skips Docker file injectionExisting-workspace recovery (lazy-heal)
chat_files.goUpload + Download handlers detectNULL platform_inbound_secretand callIssuePlatformInboundSecretinline, returning 503 withretry_after_seconds=30. Self-heals workspaces that were provisioned before this fix without requiring a destructive reprovision.Test plan
go build ./...cleango test ./...all green (full workspace-server module)TestProvisionWorkspace_NoInternalErrorsInBroadcastandTestProvisionWorkspaceCP_NoInternalErrorsInBroadcaststill pin the F1086/[QA] err.Error() leaks in workspace_provision.go and plugins_install_pipeline.go #1206 redaction invariantplatform_inbound_secretrow is NOT NULL, confirm chat upload returns 200🤖 Generated with Claude Code