feat(calendar): protect per-user connection creation - #197
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Buyer/security outcome
Advance #129 with the first authenticated connection-creation application boundary for per-user calendar credentials. Trusted LifeOS workspace/user authority must own the connection; provider callback/body data must never select tenant ownership.
Test-first state
The first branch commit is intentionally RED.
calendar-connection-create.test.tsdefines the required ordering and compensation contract before production implementation exists: credential material is stored before durable metadata; persistence receives only opaque handles plus trusted workspace/user ownership; returned evidence excludes tokens/secret handles; partial secret-store and metadata failures trigger cleanup; malformed provider results are rejected before credentials are stored.Bounded implementation target
TrustedCalendarUserContext;This slice does not claim a concrete KMS adapter, OAuth state/PKCE, refresh single-flight, provider revocation cleanup, discovery/selection, scoped sync, or retirement of the current deployment-wide provider token. Those remain follow-on #129 work.
Refs #129, #21.