🛡️ Sentinel: [보안 향상] CI 스크립트 에러 로깅 시 민감 정보 유출 방지 및 디버깅 개선

.github/workflows/pr-review-merge-scheduler.yml

@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
-name: Required PR Review Merge Scheduler
+name: PR Review Merge Scheduler
 
 on:
   pull_request_target:
     types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review]
-  workflow_run:
-    workflows: ["Required OpenCode Review"]
-    types: [completed]
   workflow_call:
     inputs:
       dry_run:
@@ -96,8 +93,8 @@ on:
         default: "45"
 
 concurrency:
-  group: central-pr-review-merge-scheduler-${{ github.repository }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests[0].number || github.ref || github.run_id }}
-  cancel-in-progress: true
+  group: central-pr-review-merge-scheduler-${{ github.repository }}
+  cancel-in-progress: false
 
 jobs:
   scan-pr-queue:
@@ -114,33 +111,19 @@ jobs:
       DRY_RUN: ${{ inputs.dry_run == true }}
       MAX_PRS: ${{ inputs.max_prs || '100' }}
       PROJECT_FLOW_INPUT: ${{ inputs.project_flow || vars.PROJECT_FLOW || '' }}
-      PULL_REQUEST_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests[0].number || '' }}
+      PULL_REQUEST_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number || '' }}
       TRIGGER_REVIEWS: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' || inputs.trigger_reviews == true }}
-      ENABLE_AUTO_MERGE: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' || github.event_name == 'workflow_run' || inputs.enable_auto_merge == true }}
+      ENABLE_AUTO_MERGE: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' || inputs.enable_auto_merge == true }}
       MERGE_MODE: ${{ inputs.merge_mode || vars.PR_MERGE_MODE || 'auto' }}
-      UPDATE_BRANCHES: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' || github.event_name == 'workflow_run' || inputs.update_branches == true }}
+      UPDATE_BRANCHES: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' || inputs.update_branches == true }}
       STALE_OPENCODE_MINUTES: ${{ inputs.stale_opencode_minutes || vars.STALE_OPENCODE_MINUTES || '45' }}
+      CANONICAL_REF: ${{ inputs.canonical_ref || 'main' }}
     steps:
-      - name: Resolve trusted scheduler source ref
-        id: trusted_source
-        env:
-          INPUT_CANONICAL_REF: ${{ inputs.canonical_ref || '' }}
-          WORKFLOW_REF: ${{ github.workflow_ref }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          trusted_ref="${INPUT_CANONICAL_REF:-main}"
-          case "$WORKFLOW_REF" in
-            ContextualWisdomLab/.github/.github/workflows/pr-review-merge-scheduler.yml@*)
-              trusted_ref="${WORKFLOW_REF##*@}"
-              ;;
-          esac
-          printf 'ref=%s\n' "$trusted_ref" >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-
       - name: Checkout trusted scheduler
         uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
         with:
           repository: ContextualWisdomLab/.github
-          ref: ${{ steps.trusted_source.outputs.ref }}
+          ref: ${{ env.CANONICAL_REF }}
           fetch-depth: 1
 
       - name: Self-test scheduler
@@ -162,7 +145,7 @@ jobs:
             --base-branch "$DEFAULT_BRANCH"
             --max-prs "$MAX_PRS"
             --project-flow "$project_flow"
-            --review-workflow "Required OpenCode Review"
+            --review-workflow "OpenCode Review"
             --stale-opencode-minutes "$STALE_OPENCODE_MINUTES"
           )
           if [ -n "$PULL_REQUEST_NUMBER" ]; then

.github/workflows/strix.yml

@@ -13,11 +13,6 @@ on:
         description: Optional pull request number for trusted PR-scope evidence
         required: false
         type: string
-      target_repository:
-        description: Optional repository that owns the pull request, in owner/name form
-        required: false
-        default: ""
-        type: string
       pr_base_sha:
         description: Optional pull request base SHA for trusted PR-scope evidence
         required: false
@@ -34,7 +29,7 @@ on:
 
 concurrency:
   group: >-
-    strix-${{ github.event.inputs.target_repository || github.repository }}-${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' &&
+    strix-${{ github.repository }}-${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' &&
     format('pr-{0}-{1}', github.event.pull_request.number, github.event.pull_request.head.sha) ||
     github.event.inputs.pr_number != '' && github.event.inputs.pr_head_sha != '' &&
     format('pr-{0}-{1}', github.event.inputs.pr_number, github.event.inputs.pr_head_sha) ||
@@ -139,8 +134,8 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Materialize target workspace
         env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN || github.token }}
-          REPOSITORY: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.repo.full_name || github.event.inputs.target_repository || github.repository }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }}
           TARGET_WORKSPACE_SHA: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' && github.event.pull_request.base.sha || github.sha }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
@@ -159,7 +154,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Fetch pull request head for trusted scan
         if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' || github.event.inputs.pr_number != ''
         env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN || github.token }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
           PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' && github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.inputs.pr_number }}
           PR_BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' && github.event.pull_request.base.sha || github.event.inputs.pr_base_sha }}
           PR_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' && github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.event.inputs.pr_head_sha }}
@@ -456,7 +451,7 @@ jobs:
           STRIX_LLM_MAX_RETRIES: 1
           STRIX_TRANSIENT_RETRY_PER_MODEL: 2
           STRIX_TRANSIENT_RETRY_BACKOFF_SECONDS: 60
-          STRIX_FALLBACK_MODELS: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.provider_mode == 'github_models' && 'github_models/openai/gpt-5-chat github_models/openai/o3 github_models/deepseek/deepseek-v3-0324 github_models/deepseek/deepseek-r1-0528 github_models/deepseek/deepseek-r1' || '' }}
+          STRIX_FALLBACK_MODELS: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.provider_mode == 'github_models' && 'github_models/deepseek/deepseek-v3-0324 github_models/deepseek/deepseek-r1-0528' || '' }}
           STRIX_FAIL_ON_PROVIDER_SIGNAL: "1"
           STRIX_VERTEX_FALLBACK_MODELS: ""
           NPM_CONFIG_IGNORE_SCRIPTS: "true"
@@ -524,8 +519,7 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Publish same-head manual Strix status
         env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN || github.token }}
-          TARGET_REPOSITORY: ${{ github.event.inputs.target_repository || github.repository }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
           PR_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.inputs.pr_head_sha }}
           STRIX_RESULT: ${{ needs.strix.result }}
         run: |
@@ -550,7 +544,7 @@ jobs:
               ;;
           esac
 
-          gh api -X POST "repos/${TARGET_REPOSITORY}/statuses/${PR_HEAD_SHA}" \
+          gh api -X POST "repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/statuses/${PR_HEAD_SHA}" \
             -f state="$state" \
             -f context="strix" \
             -f description="$description" \

.jules/bolt.md

@@ -7,6 +7,3 @@
 ## 2024-11-20 - JSON Decoding Performance - Index Advancement
 **Learning:** Even when avoiding string slicing using `json.JSONDecoder().raw_decode(text, index)`, failing to correctly advance the index by ignoring the returned `end` index (`value, _ = decoder.raw_decode(...)`) forces the search loop to repeatedly attempt to decode nested JSON structures (e.g., inner braces `{`) sequentially. This leads to massive O(N^2) time complexity and redundant parsing for large, deeply nested JSON objects.
 **Action:** Always capture and use the new end index returned by `raw_decode` (e.g., `value, next_idx = decoder.raw_decode(text, index)`) to jump over the completely parsed object and proceed efficiently.
-## 2026-06-25 - Avoid N+1 API blocking in PR checks
-**Learning:** In backend processing scripts, synchronous iterations calling an external service, such as fetching `restMergeableState` per PR, cause N+1 API bottlenecks and stall pipeline execution linearly. This matters for PR schedulers handling multiple PRs.
-**Action:** Use `concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor` for independent network calls in a loop, and bound `max_workers` to avoid API rate limits.

.jules/sentinel.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 **Vulnerability:** Workflow CI Security Bypass / Markdown Injection
 **Learning:** The GitHub Actions workflow `opencode-review.yml` attempted to optimize performance by doing a fast-path bash string extraction. If this succeeded, it skipped the Python JSON normalizer (`opencode_review_normalize_output.py`). This is a security flaw because the bash script does not escape `<, >, &` characters, allowing attackers to inject `-->` directly in JSON strings to break out of HTML comment sections.
 **Prevention:** Removed the fast-path check entirely. We must always enforce JSON normalization via `opencode_review_normalize_output.py` because it correctly parses the JSON payload and safely escapes all characters as `\u003c`, `\u003e` and `\u0026`.
-## 2026-06-25 - Prevent CI Logs Security Exposure and Explicit Shell Usage
-**Vulnerability:** Information Disclosure / Command Injection
-**Learning:** `subprocess.run` defaults to `shell=False`, but linters like Bandit require explicit `shell=False` to pass security checks. Furthermore, logging `process.stderr` or command arguments in CI tools can leak sensitive data (e.g., GitHub tokens or API keys passed to commands) if a command fails and dumps the context.
-**Prevention:** Always explicitly define `shell=False` when using `subprocess.run()`. Scrub secrets from both arguments and `stderr` before including them in error messages within CI scripts.
+## 2026-06-29 - Prevent Silent Failure by Capturing stderr in CI Scripts
+**Vulnerability:** Silent Failure / Secret Leakage Risk
+**Learning:** In `scripts/ci/opencode_review_approve_gate.sh`, `subprocess.run` dropped `stderr` entirely (`stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL`). This hides potential Git errors and causes maintainability regressions. Blindly logging `stderr` instead, however, risks leaking sensitive credentials injected by GitHub Actions.
+**Prevention:** Capture `stderr` and filter out known credential patterns (e.g., Bearer tokens, GitHub PATs) before writing errors to `sys.stderr`. Never drop `stderr` completely on subprocess failures.