6.5: mm patches #2

Rasenkai · 2023-09-23T13:03:37Z

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What watermark boosting does is preemptively fire up kswapd to free memory when there hasn't been an allocation failure. It does this by increasing kswapd's high watermark goal and then firing up kswapd. The reason why this causes freezes is because, with the increased high watermark goal, kswapd will steal memory from processes that need it in order to make forward progress. These processes will, in turn, try to allocate memory again, which will cause kswapd to steal necessary pages from those processes again, in a positive feedback loop known as page thrashing. When page thrashing occurs, your system is essentially livelocked until the necessary forward progress can be made to stop processes from trying to continuously allocate memory and trigger kswapd to steal it back. This problem already occurs with kswapd *without* watermark boosting, but it's usually only encountered on machines with a small amount of memory and/or a slow CPU. Watermark boosting just makes the existing problem worse enough to notice on higher spec'd machines. Disable watermark boosting by default since it's a total dumpster fire. I can't imagine why anyone would want to explicitly enable it, but the option is there in case someone does. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

Keeping kswapd running when all the failed allocations that invoked it are satisfied incurs a high overhead due to unnecessary page eviction and writeback, as well as spurious VM pressure events to various registered shrinkers. When kswapd doesn't need to work to make an allocation succeed anymore, stop it prematurely to save resources. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

The page allocator wakes all kswapds in an allocation context's allowed nodemask in the slow path, so it doesn't make sense to have the kswapd- waiter count per each NUMA node. Instead, it should be a global counter to stop all kswapds when there are no failed allocation requests. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

Throttled direct reclaimers will wake up kswapd and wait for kswapd to satisfy their page allocation request, even when the failed allocation lacks the __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag in its gfp mask. As a result, kswapd may think that there are no waiters and thus exit prematurely, causing throttled direct reclaimers lacking __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM to stall on waiting for kswapd to wake them up. Incrementing the kswapd_waiters counter when such direct reclaimers become throttled fixes the problem. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

On-demand compaction works fine assuming that you don't have a need to spam the page allocator nonstop for large order page allocations. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

There is noticeable scheduling latency and heavy zone lock contention stemming from rmqueue_bulk's single hold of the zone lock while doing its work, as seen with the preemptoff tracer. There's no actual need for rmqueue_bulk() to hold the zone lock the entire time; it only does so for supposed efficiency. As such, we can relax the zone lock and even reschedule when IRQs are enabled in order to keep the scheduling delays and zone lock contention at bay. Forward progress is still guaranteed, as the zone lock can only be relaxed after page removal. With this change, rmqueue_bulk() no longer appears as a serious offender in the preemptoff tracer, and system latency is noticeably improved. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

Allocating pages with __get_free_page is slower than going through the slab allocator to grab free pages out from a pool. These are the results from running the code at the bottom of this message: [ 1.278602] speedtest: __get_free_page: 9 us [ 1.278606] speedtest: kmalloc: 4 us [ 1.278609] speedtest: kmem_cache_alloc: 4 us [ 1.278611] speedtest: vmalloc: 13 us kmalloc and kmem_cache_alloc (which is what kmalloc uses for common sizes behind the scenes) are the fastest choices. Use kmalloc to speed up sg list allocation. This is the code used to produce the above measurements: static int speedtest(void *data) { static const struct sched_param sched_max_rt_prio = { .sched_priority = MAX_RT_PRIO - 1 }; volatile s64 ctotal = 0, gtotal = 0, ktotal = 0, vtotal = 0; struct kmem_cache *page_pool; int i, j, trials = 1000; volatile ktime_t start; void *ptr[100]; sched_setscheduler_nocheck(current, SCHED_FIFO, &sched_max_rt_prio); page_pool = kmem_cache_create("pages", PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); for (i = 0; i < trials; i++) { start = ktime_get(); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) while (!(ptr[j] = kmem_cache_alloc(page_pool, GFP_KERNEL))); ctotal += ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), start); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) kmem_cache_free(page_pool, ptr[j]); start = ktime_get(); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) while (!(ptr[j] = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL))); gtotal += ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), start); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) free_page((unsigned long)ptr[j]); start = ktime_get(); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) while (!(ptr[j] = __kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL))); ktotal += ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), start); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) kfree(ptr[j]); start = ktime_get(); *ptr = vmalloc(ARRAY_SIZE(ptr) * PAGE_SIZE); vtotal += ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), start); vfree(*ptr); } kmem_cache_destroy(page_pool); printk("%s: __get_free_page: %lld us\n", __func__, gtotal / trials); printk("%s: __kmalloc: %lld us\n", __func__, ktotal / trials); printk("%s: kmem_cache_alloc: %lld us\n", __func__, ctotal / trials); printk("%s: vmalloc: %lld us\n", __func__, vtotal / trials); complete(data); return 0; } static int __init start_test(void) { DECLARE_COMPLETION_ONSTACK(done); BUG_ON(IS_ERR(kthread_run(speedtest, &done, "malloc_test"))); wait_for_completion(&done); return 0; } late_initcall(start_test); Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

The RCU read lock isn't necessary in list_lru_count_one() when the condition that requires RCU (CONFIG_MEMCG && !CONFIG_SLOB) isn't met. The highly-frequent RCU lock and unlock adds measurable overhead to the shrink_slab() path when it isn't needed. As such, we can simply omit the RCU read lock in this case to improve performance. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kazuki Hashimoto <[email protected]>

… delayed items When running delayed items we are holding a delayed node's mutex and then we will attempt to modify a subvolume btree to insert/update/delete the delayed items. However if have an error during the insertions for example, btrfs_insert_delayed_items() may return with a path that has locked extent buffers (a leaf at the very least), and then we attempt to release the delayed node at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(), which requires taking the delayed node's mutex, causing an ABBA type of deadlock. This was reported by syzbot and the lockdep splat is the following: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.2/13257 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88801835c0c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475 [inline] lock_release+0x36f/0x9d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5781 up_write+0x79/0x580 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625 btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline] btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x179/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:239 search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1986 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x2511/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2230 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4376 btrfs_insert_delayed_item fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 [inline] btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xd24/0x2410 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111 __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1db/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153 flush_space+0x269/0xe70 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:723 btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x106/0x350 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1078 process_one_work+0x92c/0x12c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2600 worker_thread+0xa63/0x1210 kernel/workqueue.c:2751 kthread+0x2b8/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276 btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988 vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline] vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline] do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline] __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline] __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline] __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by syz-executor.2/13257: #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: spin_unlock include/linux/spinlock.h:391 [inline] #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xb87/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:287 #1: ffff88802c1ee398 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xbb2/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #2: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 13257 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276 btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988 vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline] vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline] do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline] __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline] __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline] __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f3ad047cae9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 (...) RSP: 002b:00007f3ad12510c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3ad059bf80 RCX: 00007f3ad047cae9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f3ad04c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f3ad059bf80 R15: 00007ffe56af92f8 </TASK> ------------[ cut here ]------------ Fix this by releasing the path before releasing the delayed node in the error path at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(). Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ CC: [email protected] # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

The following warning was reported when running "./test_progs -a link_api -a linked_list" on a RISC-V QEMU VM: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 261 at kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:342 bpf_mem_refill Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) CPU: 3 PID: 261 Comm: test_progs- ... 6.5.0-rc5-01743-gdcb152bb8328 #2 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) epc : bpf_mem_refill+0x1fc/0x206 ra : irq_work_single+0x68/0x70 epc : ffffffff801b1bc4 ra : ffffffff8015fe84 sp : ff2000000001be20 gp : ffffffff82d26138 tp : ff6000008477a800 t0 : 0000000000046600 t1 : ffffffff812b6ddc t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ff2000000001be70 s1 : ff5ffffffffe8998 a0 : ff5ffffffffe8998 a1 : ff600003fef4b000 a2 : 000000000000003f a3 : ffffffff80008250 a4 : 0000000000000060 a5 : 0000000000000080 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000735049 s2 : ff5ffffffffe8998 s3 : 0000000000000022 s4 : 0000000000001000 s5 : 0000000000000007 s6 : ff5ffffffffe8570 s7 : ffffffff82d6bd30 s8 : 000000000000003f s9 : ffffffff82d2c5e8 s10: 000000000000ffff s11: ffffffff82d2c5d8 t3 : ffffffff81ea8f28 t4 : 0000000000000000 t5 : ff6000008fd28278 t6 : 0000000000040000 [<ffffffff801b1bc4>] bpf_mem_refill+0x1fc/0x206 [<ffffffff8015fe84>] irq_work_single+0x68/0x70 [<ffffffff8015feb4>] irq_work_run_list+0x28/0x36 [<ffffffff8015fefa>] irq_work_run+0x38/0x66 [<ffffffff8000828a>] handle_IPI+0x3a/0xb4 [<ffffffff800a5c3a>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0xa4/0x1f8 [<ffffffff8009fafa>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36 [<ffffffff800ae570>] ipi_mux_process+0xac/0xfa [<ffffffff8000a8ea>] sbi_ipi_handle+0x2e/0x88 [<ffffffff8009fafa>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36 [<ffffffff807ee70e>] riscv_intc_irq+0x36/0x4e [<ffffffff812b5d3a>] handle_riscv_irq+0x54/0x86 [<ffffffff812b6904>] do_irq+0x66/0x98 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The warning is due to WARN_ON_ONCE(tgt->unit_size != c->unit_size) in free_bulk(). The direct reason is that a object is allocated and freed by bpf_mem_caches with different unit_size. The root cause is that KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE is 64 and there is no 96-bytes slab cache in the specific VM. When linked_list test allocates a 72-bytes object through bpf_obj_new(), bpf_global_ma will allocate it from a bpf_mem_cache with 96-bytes unit_size, but this bpf_mem_cache is backed by 128-bytes slab cache. When the object is freed, bpf_mem_free() uses ksize() to choose the corresponding bpf_mem_cache. Because the object is allocated from 128-bytes slab cache, ksize() returns 128, bpf_mem_free() chooses a 128-bytes bpf_mem_cache to free the object and triggers the warning. A similar warning will also be reported when using CONFIG_SLAB instead of CONFIG_SLUB in a x86-64 kernel. Because CONFIG_SLUB defines KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE as 8 but CONFIG_SLAB defines KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE as 32. An alternative fix is to use kmalloc_size_round() in bpf_mem_alloc() to choose a bpf_mem_cache which has the same unit_size with the backing slab cache, but it may introduce performance degradation, so fix the warning by adjusting the indexes in size_index according to the value of KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE just like setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table() does. Fixes: 822fb26 ("bpf: Add a hint to allocated objects.") Reported-by: Björn Töpel <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

Hou Tao says: ==================== Fix the unmatched unit_size of bpf_mem_cache From: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Hi, The patchset aims to fix the reported warning [0] when the unit_size of bpf_mem_cache is mismatched with the object size of underly slab-cache. Patch #1 fixes the warning by adjusting size_index according to the value of KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE, so bpf_mem_cache with unit_size which is smaller than KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE or is not aligned with KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE will be redirected to bpf_mem_cache with bigger unit_size. Patch #2 doesn't do prefill for these redirected bpf_mem_cache to save memory. Patch #3 adds further error check in bpf_mem_alloc_init() to ensure the unit_size and object_size are always matched and to prevent potential issues due to the mismatch. Please see individual patches for more details. And comments are always welcome. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

macb_set_tx_clk() is called under a spinlock but itself calls clk_set_rate() which can sleep. This results in: | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580 | pps pps1: new PPS source ptp1 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 40, name: kworker/u4:3 | preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 | RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 | 4 locks held by kworker/u4:3/40: | #0: ffff000003409148 | macb ff0c000.ethernet: gem-ptp-timer ptp clock registered. | ((wq_completion)events_power_efficient){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c | #1: ffff8000833cbdd8 ((work_completion)(&pl->resolve)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c | #2: ffff000004f01578 (&pl->state_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phylink_resolve+0x44/0x4e8 | #3: ffff000004f06f50 (&bp->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: macb_mac_link_up+0x40/0x2ac | irq event stamp: 113998 | hardirqs last enabled at (113997): [<ffff800080e8503c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x64 | hardirqs last disabled at (113998): [<ffff800080e84478>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xac/0xc8 | softirqs last enabled at (113608): [<ffff800080010630>] __do_softirq+0x430/0x4e4 | softirqs last disabled at (113597): [<ffff80008001614c>] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c | CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 6.5.0-11717-g9355ce8b2f50-dirty torvalds#368 | Hardware name: ... ZynqMP ... (DT) | Workqueue: events_power_efficient phylink_resolve | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0x98/0xf0 | show_stack+0x18/0x24 | dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xac | dump_stack+0x18/0x24 | __might_resched+0x144/0x24c | __might_sleep+0x48/0x98 | __mutex_lock+0x58/0x7b0 | mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 | clk_prepare_lock+0x4c/0xa8 | clk_set_rate+0x24/0x8c | macb_mac_link_up+0x25c/0x2ac | phylink_resolve+0x178/0x4e8 | process_one_work+0x1ec/0x51c | worker_thread+0x1ec/0x3e4 | kthread+0x120/0x124 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 The obvious fix is to move the call to macb_set_tx_clk() out of the protected area. This seems safe as rx and tx are both disabled anyway at this point. It is however not entirely clear what the spinlock shall protect. It could be the read-modify-write access to the NCFGR register, but this is accessed in macb_set_rx_mode() and macb_set_rxcsum_feature() as well without holding the spinlock. It could also be the register accesses done in mog_init_rings() or macb_init_buffers(), but again these functions are called without holding the spinlock in macb_hresp_error_task(). The locking seems fishy in this driver and it might deserve another look before this patch is applied. Fixes: 633e98a ("net: macb: use resolved link config in mac_link_up()") Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

After commit 50f3034 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit"), removing the igb module could hang or crash (depending on the machine) when the module has been loaded with the max_vfs parameter set to some value != 0. In case of one test machine with a dual port 82580, this hang occurred: [ 232.480687] igb 0000:41:00.1: removed PHC on enp65s0f1 [ 233.093257] igb 0000:41:00.1: IOV Disabled [ 233.329969] pcieport 0000:40:01.0: AER: Multiple Uncorrected (Non-Fatal) err0 [ 233.340302] igb 0000:41:00.0: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fata) [ 233.352248] igb 0000:41:00.0: device [8086:1516] error status/mask=00100000 [ 233.361088] igb 0000:41:00.0: [20] UnsupReq (First) [ 233.368183] igb 0000:41:00.0: AER: TLP Header: 40000001 0000040f cdbfc00c c [ 233.376846] igb 0000:41:00.1: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fata) [ 233.388779] igb 0000:41:00.1: device [8086:1516] error status/mask=00100000 [ 233.397629] igb 0000:41:00.1: [20] UnsupReq (First) [ 233.404736] igb 0000:41:00.1: AER: TLP Header: 40000001 0000040f cdbfc00c c [ 233.538214] pci 0000:41:00.1: AER: can't recover (no error_detected callback) [ 233.538401] igb 0000:41:00.0: removed PHC on enp65s0f0 [ 233.546197] pcieport 0000:40:01.0: AER: device recovery failed [ 234.157244] igb 0000:41:00.0: IOV Disabled [ 371.619705] INFO: task irq/35-aerdrv:257 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 371.627489] Not tainted 6.4.0-dirty #2 [ 371.632257] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this. [ 371.641000] task:irq/35-aerdrv state:D stack:0 pid:257 ppid:2 f0 [ 371.650330] Call Trace: [ 371.653061] <TASK> [ 371.655407] __schedule+0x20e/0x660 [ 371.659313] schedule+0x5a/0xd0 [ 371.662824] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x11/0x20 [ 371.667983] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x372/0x6c0 [ 371.673237] ? __pfx_aer_root_reset+0x10/0x10 [ 371.678105] report_error_detected+0x25/0x1c0 [ 371.682974] ? __pfx_report_normal_detected+0x10/0x10 [ 371.688618] pci_walk_bus+0x72/0x90 [ 371.692519] pcie_do_recovery+0xb2/0x330 [ 371.696899] aer_process_err_devices+0x117/0x170 [ 371.702055] aer_isr+0x1c0/0x1e0 [ 371.705661] ? __set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x54/0xa0 [ 371.710723] ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 371.715496] irq_thread_fn+0x20/0x60 [ 371.719491] irq_thread+0xe6/0x1b0 [ 371.723291] ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10 [ 371.728255] ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 371.732731] kthread+0xe2/0x110 [ 371.736243] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 371.740430] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 [ 371.744428] </TASK> The reproducer was a simple script: #!/bin/sh for i in `seq 1 5`; do modprobe -rv igb modprobe -v igb max_vfs=1 sleep 1 modprobe -rv igb done It turned out that this could only be reproduce on 82580 (quad and dual-port), but not on 82576, i350 and i210. Further debugging showed that igb_enable_sriov()'s call to pci_enable_sriov() is failing, because dev->is_physfn is 0 on 82580. Prior to commit 50f3034 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit"), igb_enable_sriov() jumped into the "err_out" cleanup branch. After this commit it only returned the error code. So the cleanup didn't take place, and the incorrect VF setup in the igb_adapter structure fooled the igb driver into assuming that VFs have been set up where no VF actually existed. Fix this problem by cleaning up again if pci_enable_sriov() fails. Fixes: 50f3034 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit") Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Fix an error detected by memory sanitizer: ``` ==4033==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x55fb0fbedfc7 in read_alias_info tools/perf/util/pmu.c:457:6 #1 0x55fb0fbea339 in check_info_data tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1434:2 #2 0x55fb0fbea339 in perf_pmu__check_alias tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1504:9 #3 0x55fb0fbdca85 in parse_events_add_pmu tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1429:32 #4 0x55fb0f965230 in parse_events_parse tools/perf/util/parse-events.y:299:6 #5 0x55fb0fbdf6b2 in parse_events__scanner tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1822:8 #6 0x55fb0fbdf8c1 in __parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:2094:8 torvalds#7 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41:9 torvalds#8 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in test_event tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2393:8 torvalds#9 0x55fb0fa8f458 in test__pmu_events tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2551:15 torvalds#10 0x55fb0fa6d93f in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:242:9 torvalds#11 0x55fb0fa6d93f in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:271:8 torvalds#12 0x55fb0fa6d082 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:442:5 torvalds#13 0x55fb0fa6d082 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:564:9 torvalds#14 0x55fb0f942720 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322:11 torvalds#15 0x55fb0f942486 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375:8 torvalds#16 0x55fb0f941dab in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419:2 torvalds#17 0x55fb0f941dab in main tools/perf/perf.c:535:3 ``` Fixes: 7b723db ("perf pmu: Be lazy about loading event info files from sysfs") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

Sebastian Andrzej Siewior says: ==================== net: hsr: Properly parse HSRv1 supervisor frames. this is a follow-up to https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ replacing https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ by grabing/ adding tags and reposting with a commit message plus a missing __packed to a struct (#2) plus extending the testsuite to sover HSRv1 which is what broke here (#3-#5). HSRv0 is (was) not affected. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Specific stress involving frequent CPU-hotplug operations, such as running rcutorture for example, may trigger the following message: NOHZ tick-stop error: local softirq work is pending, handler #2!!!" This happens in the CPU-down hotplug process, after CPUHP_AP_SMPBOOT_THREADS whose teardown callback parks ksoftirqd, and before the target CPU shuts down through CPUHP_AP_IDLE_DEAD. In this fragile intermediate state, softirqs waiting for threaded handling may be forever ignored and eventually reported by the idle task as in the above example. However some vectors are known to be safe as long as the corresponding subsystems have teardown callbacks handling the migration of their events. The above error message reports pending timers softirq although this vector can be considered as hotplug safe because the CPUHP_TIMERS_PREPARE teardown callback performs the necessary migration of timers after the death of the CPU. Hrtimers also have a similar hotplug handling. Therefore this error message, as far as (hr-)timers are concerned, can be considered spurious and the relevant softirq vectors can be marked as hotplug safe. Fixes: 0345691 ("tick/rcu: Stop allowing RCU_SOFTIRQ in idle") Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

…es_lock [ Upstream commit fb5a431 ] __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() calls into printk -> serial console output (qcom geni) and grabs port->lock under free_entries_lock spin lock, which is a reverse locking dependency chain as qcom_geni IRQ handler can call into dma-debug code and grab free_entries_lock under port->lock. Move __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() call out of free_entries_lock scope so that we don't acquire serial console's port->lock under it. Trimmed-down lockdep splat: The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (free_entries_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80 dma_entry_alloc+0x38/0x110 debug_dma_map_page+0x60/0xf8 dma_map_page_attrs+0x1e0/0x230 dma_map_single_attrs.constprop.0+0x6c/0xc8 geni_se_rx_dma_prep+0x40/0xcc qcom_geni_serial_isr+0x310/0x510 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x110/0x244 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x20/0x54 handle_irq_event+0x50/0x88 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa4/0xcc handle_irq_desc+0x28/0x40 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x24/0x30 gic_handle_irq+0xc4/0x148 do_interrupt_handler+0xa4/0xb0 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x64 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68 arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8 ____do_softirq+0x18/0x24 ... -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80 qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x184/0x1dc console_flush_all+0x344/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 register_console+0x230/0x38c uart_add_one_port+0x338/0x494 qcom_geni_serial_probe+0x390/0x424 platform_probe+0x70/0xc0 really_probe+0x148/0x280 __driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x114 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100 __device_attach_driver+0x64/0xdc bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd8 __device_attach+0xe4/0x140 device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x44/0xb0 device_add+0x538/0x668 of_device_add+0x44/0x50 of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x94/0xc8 of_platform_bus_create+0x270/0x304 of_platform_populate+0xac/0xc4 devm_of_platform_populate+0x60/0xac geni_se_probe+0x154/0x160 platform_probe+0x70/0xc0 ... -> #0 (console_owner){-...}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c lock_acquire+0x234/0x284 console_flush_all+0x330/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110 debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8 __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4 dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm] msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm] msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm] msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4 vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50 ... Chain exists of: console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> free_entries_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(free_entries_lock); lock(&port_lock_key); lock(free_entries_lock); lock(console_owner); *** DEADLOCK *** Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xb4/0xf0 show_stack+0x20/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x84 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_circular_bug+0x1cc/0x234 check_noncircular+0x78/0xac __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c lock_acquire+0x234/0x284 console_flush_all+0x330/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110 debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8 __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4 dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm] msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm] msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm] msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4 vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50 ... Reported-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Acked-by: Robin Murphy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 1a6a464 upstream. Specific stress involving frequent CPU-hotplug operations, such as running rcutorture for example, may trigger the following message: NOHZ tick-stop error: local softirq work is pending, handler #2!!!" This happens in the CPU-down hotplug process, after CPUHP_AP_SMPBOOT_THREADS whose teardown callback parks ksoftirqd, and before the target CPU shuts down through CPUHP_AP_IDLE_DEAD. In this fragile intermediate state, softirqs waiting for threaded handling may be forever ignored and eventually reported by the idle task as in the above example. However some vectors are known to be safe as long as the corresponding subsystems have teardown callbacks handling the migration of their events. The above error message reports pending timers softirq although this vector can be considered as hotplug safe because the CPUHP_TIMERS_PREPARE teardown callback performs the necessary migration of timers after the death of the CPU. Hrtimers also have a similar hotplug handling. Therefore this error message, as far as (hr-)timers are concerned, can be considered spurious and the relevant softirq vectors can be marked as hotplug safe. Fixes: 0345691 ("tick/rcu: Stop allowing RCU_SOFTIRQ in idle") Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the workqueue without holding the rb_lock. This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started. Lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock: [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900 [ 2785.343403 ] [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock: [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.347720 ] [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 2785.349003 ] [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 2785.350160 ] __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0 [ 2785.350962 ] delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.352044 ] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310 [ 2785.352879 ] worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 [ 2785.353636 ] kthread+0x28f/0x330 [ 2785.354370 ] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 2785.355135 ] [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 2785.356515 ] __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0 [ 2785.357349 ] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540 [ 2785.358121 ] __flush_work+0xe8/0x900 [ 2785.358852 ] __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0 [ 2785.359711 ] mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.360781 ] mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.361969 ] __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.362960 ] mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.363870 ] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 2785.364715 ] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 2785.365695 ] bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560 [ 2785.366525 ] device_del+0x492/0xb80 [ 2785.367276 ] mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.368615 ] mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.369934 ] mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.371292 ] devlink_reload+0x439/0x590 [ 2785.372075 ] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0 [ 2785.372973 ] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290 [ 2785.374011 ] genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0 [ 2785.374798 ] netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360 [ 2785.375612 ] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 2785.376295 ] netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710 [ 2785.377121 ] netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0 [ 2785.377926 ] sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 [ 2785.378668 ] __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290 [ 2785.379440 ] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 [ 2785.380255 ] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 2785.381031 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this: [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.383448 ] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 2785.383448 ] [ 2785.384544 ] CPU0 CPU1 [ 2785.385383 ] ---- ---- [ 2785.386193 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.386940 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.388327 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.389425 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.390414 ] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872: [ 2785.392341 ] #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 [ 2785.393630 ] #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0 [ 2785.395324 ] #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.397322 ] #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.399231 ] #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600 [ 2785.400864 ] #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>

The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] torvalds#7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] torvalds#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f torvalds#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a154f5f ] The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] torvalds#7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] torvalds#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f torvalds#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 374012b upstream. Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the workqueue without holding the rb_lock. This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started. Lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock: [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900 [ 2785.343403 ] [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock: [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.347720 ] [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 2785.349003 ] [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 2785.350160 ] __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0 [ 2785.350962 ] delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.352044 ] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310 [ 2785.352879 ] worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 [ 2785.353636 ] kthread+0x28f/0x330 [ 2785.354370 ] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 2785.355135 ] [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 2785.356515 ] __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0 [ 2785.357349 ] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540 [ 2785.358121 ] __flush_work+0xe8/0x900 [ 2785.358852 ] __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0 [ 2785.359711 ] mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.360781 ] mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.361969 ] __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.362960 ] mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.363870 ] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 2785.364715 ] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 2785.365695 ] bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560 [ 2785.366525 ] device_del+0x492/0xb80 [ 2785.367276 ] mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.368615 ] mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.369934 ] mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.371292 ] devlink_reload+0x439/0x590 [ 2785.372075 ] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0 [ 2785.372973 ] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290 [ 2785.374011 ] genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0 [ 2785.374798 ] netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360 [ 2785.375612 ] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 2785.376295 ] netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710 [ 2785.377121 ] netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0 [ 2785.377926 ] sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 [ 2785.378668 ] __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290 [ 2785.379440 ] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 [ 2785.380255 ] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 2785.381031 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this: [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.383448 ] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 2785.383448 ] [ 2785.384544 ] CPU0 CPU1 [ 2785.385383 ] ---- ---- [ 2785.386193 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.386940 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.388327 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.389425 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.390414 ] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872: [ 2785.392341 ] #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 [ 2785.393630 ] #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0 [ 2785.395324 ] #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.397322 ] #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.399231 ] #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600 [ 2785.400864 ] #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

The following panic can happen when mmap is called before the pmu add callback which sets the hardware counter index: this happens for example with the following command `perf record --no-bpf-event -n kill`. [ 99.461486] CPU: 1 PID: 1259 Comm: perf Tainted: G E 6.6.0-rc4ubuntu-defconfig #2 [ 99.461669] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 99.461748] epc : pmu_sbi_set_scounteren+0x42/0x44 [ 99.462337] ra : smp_call_function_many_cond+0x126/0x5b0 [ 99.462369] epc : ffffffff809f9d24 ra : ffffffff800f93e0 sp : ff60000082153aa0 [ 99.462407] gp : ffffffff82395c98 tp : ff6000009a218040 t0 : ff6000009ab3a4f0 [ 99.462425] t1 : 0000000000000004 t2 : 0000000000000100 s0 : ff60000082153ab0 [ 99.462459] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : ff60000098869528 a1 : 0000000000000000 [ 99.462473] a2 : 000000000000001f a3 : 0000000000f00000 a4 : fffffffffffffff8 [ 99.462488] a5 : 00000000000000cc a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000735049 [ 99.462502] s2 : 0000000000000001 s3 : ffffffff809f9ce2 s4 : ff60000098869528 [ 99.462516] s5 : 0000000000000002 s6 : 0000000000000004 s7 : 0000000000000001 [ 99.462530] s8 : ff600003fec98bc0 s9 : ffffffff826c5890 s10: ff600003fecfcde0 [ 99.462544] s11: ff600003fec98bc0 t3 : ffffffff819e2558 t4 : ff1c000004623840 [ 99.462557] t5 : 0000000000000901 t6 : ff6000008feeb890 [ 99.462570] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [ 99.462658] [<ffffffff809f9d24>] pmu_sbi_set_scounteren+0x42/0x44 [ 99.462979] Code: 1060 4785 97bb 00d7 8fd9 9073 1067 6422 0141 8082 (9002) 0013 [ 99.463335] Kernel BUG [#2] To circumvent this, try to enable userspace access to the hardware counter when it is selected in addition to when the event is mapped. And vice-versa when the event is stopped/unmapped. Fixes: cc4c07c ("drivers: perf: Implement perf event mmap support in the SBI backend") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>

…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.6, take #2 - Fix the handling of the phycal timer offset when FEAT_ECV and CNTPOFF_EL2 are implemented. - Restore the functionnality of Permission Indirection that was broken by the Fine Grained Trapping rework - Cleanup some PMU event sharing code

[ Upstream commit 4428399 ] The lt8912b driver, in its bridge detach function, calls drm_connector_unregister() and drm_connector_cleanup(). drm_connector_unregister() should be called only for connectors explicitly registered with drm_connector_register(), which is not the case in lt8912b. The driver's drm_connector_funcs.destroy hook is set to drm_connector_cleanup(). Thus the driver should not call either drm_connector_unregister() nor drm_connector_cleanup() in its lt8912_bridge_detach(), as they cause a crash on bridge detach: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000006 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000858f3000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0800000085918003, p4d=0800000085918003, pud=0800000085431003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: tidss(-) display_connector lontium_lt8912b tc358768 panel_lvds panel_simple drm_dma_helper drm_kms_helper drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks CPU: 3 PID: 462 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W 6.5.0-rc2+ #2 Hardware name: Toradex Verdin AM62 on Verdin Development Board (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : drm_connector_cleanup+0x78/0x2d4 [drm] lr : lt8912_bridge_detach+0x54/0x6c [lontium_lt8912b] sp : ffff800082ed3a90 x29: ffff800082ed3a90 x28: ffff0000040c1940 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: dead000000000122 x24: dead000000000122 x23: dead000000000100 x22: ffff000003fb6388 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff000003fb6260 x18: fffffffffffe56e8 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0010000000000000 x15: 0000000000000038 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800081914b48 x12: 000000000000040e x11: 000000000000015a x10: ffff80008196ebb8 x9 : ffff800081914b48 x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff0000040c1940 x6 : ffff80007aa649d0 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff80008159e008 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: drm_connector_cleanup+0x78/0x2d4 [drm] lt8912_bridge_detach+0x54/0x6c [lontium_lt8912b] drm_bridge_detach+0x44/0x84 [drm] drm_encoder_cleanup+0x40/0xb8 [drm] drmm_encoder_alloc_release+0x1c/0x30 [drm] drm_managed_release+0xac/0x148 [drm] drm_dev_put.part.0+0x88/0xb8 [drm] devm_drm_dev_init_release+0x14/0x24 [drm] devm_action_release+0x14/0x20 release_nodes+0x5c/0x90 devres_release_all+0x8c/0xe0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x18/0x68 device_release_driver_internal+0x208/0x23c driver_detach+0x4c/0x94 bus_remove_driver+0x70/0xf4 driver_unregister+0x30/0x60 platform_driver_unregister+0x14/0x20 tidss_platform_driver_exit+0x18/0xb2c [tidss] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1a0/0x2b4 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x60/0x10c do_el0_svc_compat+0x1c/0x40 el0_svc_compat+0x40/0xac el0t_32_sync_handler+0xb0/0x138 el0t_32_sync+0x194/0x198 Code: 9104a276 f2fbd5b7 aa0203e1 91008af8 (f85c0420) Fixes: 30e2ae9 ("drm/bridge: Introduce LT8912B DSI to HDMI bridge") Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Robert Foss <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Robert Foss <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ] Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write, nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw, C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency, C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency, C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX. ``` ==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98 READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0 #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12 #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6 #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9 #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31 #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18 #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3 #6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5 torvalds#7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2 torvalds#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3 torvalds#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11 torvalds#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8 torvalds#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2 torvalds#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3 ``` The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1 results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately overflows when any member is accessed. Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ede72dc ] Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory leak with an address sanitizer build: ``` $ perf stat -e '*:o/' true event syntax error: '*:o/' \___ parser error Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>] -e, --event <event> event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events ================================================================= ==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49 #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338 #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464 #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822 #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094 #6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279 torvalds#7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251 torvalds#8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351 torvalds#9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539 torvalds#10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654 torvalds#11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501 torvalds#12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322 torvalds#13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375 torvalds#14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419 torvalds#15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). ``` Fix by adding the missing destructor. Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: He Kuang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

This allows it to break the following circular locking dependency. Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ====================================================== Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10 Not tainted Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ------------------------------------------------------ Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: wireplumber/2236 is trying to acquire lock: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca5320da18 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: but task is already holding lock: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: which lock already depends on the new lock. Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #3 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #2 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_inth_allow+0x2c/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x181/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #1 (&event->refs_lock#4){....}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x37/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #0 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: other info that might help us debug this: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Chain exists of: &fctx->lock --> &device->intr.lock --> &event->list_lock#2 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Possible unsafe locking scenario: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU0 CPU1 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ---- ---- Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&event->list_lock#2); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&device->intr.lock); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&event->list_lock#2); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&fctx->lock); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: *** DEADLOCK *** Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 2 locks held by wireplumber/2236: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: #0: ffff8fca53177bf8 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_intr+0x29/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: #1: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: stack backtrace: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU: 6 PID: 2236 Comm: wireplumber Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Call Trace: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: <TASK> Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: check_noncircular+0xe2/0x110 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7fb66174d700 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Code: c1 e2 05 29 ca 8d 0c 10 0f be 07 84 c0 75 eb 89 c8 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa e9 d7 0f fc ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 <f3> 0f 1e fa e9 c7 0f fc> Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffdd3c48438 EFLAGS: 00000206 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RAX: 000055bb758763c0 RBX: 000055bb758752c0 RCX: 00000000000028b0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RDX: 000055bb758752c0 RSI: 000055bb75887490 RDI: 000055bb75862950 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RBP: 00007ffdd3c48490 R08: 000055bb75873b10 R09: 0000000000000001 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 000055bb7587f000 R12: 000055bb75887490 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R13: 000055bb757f6280 R14: 000055bb758875c0 R15: 000055bb757f6280 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: </TASK> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]> Tested-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]

[ Upstream commit 265f3ed ] All callers of work_on_cpu() share the same lock class key for all the functions queued. As a result the workqueue related locking scenario for a function A may be spuriously accounted as an inversion against the locking scenario of function B such as in the following model: long A(void *arg) { mutex_lock(&mutex); mutex_unlock(&mutex); } long B(void *arg) { } void launchA(void) { work_on_cpu(0, A, NULL); } void launchB(void) { mutex_lock(&mutex); work_on_cpu(1, B, NULL); mutex_unlock(&mutex); } launchA and launchB running concurrently have no chance to deadlock. However the above can be reported by lockdep as a possible locking inversion because the works containing A() and B() are treated as belonging to the same locking class. The following shows an existing example of such a spurious lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.6.0-rc1-00065-g934ebd6e5359 #35409 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/0:1/9 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff9bc72f30 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: _cpu_down+0x57/0x2b0 but task is already holding lock: ffff9e3bc0057e60 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x216/0x500 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __flush_work+0x83/0x4e0 work_on_cpu+0x97/0xc0 rcu_nocb_cpu_offload+0x62/0xb0 rcu_nocb_toggle+0xd0/0x1d0 kthread+0xe6/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 -> #1 (rcu_state.barrier_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x81/0xc80 rcu_nocb_cpu_deoffload+0x38/0xb0 rcu_nocb_toggle+0x144/0x1d0 kthread+0xe6/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1538/0x2500 lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2a0 percpu_down_write+0x31/0x200 _cpu_down+0x57/0x2b0 __cpu_down_maps_locked+0x10/0x20 work_for_cpu_fn+0x15/0x20 process_scheduled_works+0x2a7/0x500 worker_thread+0x173/0x330 kthread+0xe6/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> rcu_state.barrier_mutex --> (work_completion)(&wfc.work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((work_completion)(&wfc.work)); lock(rcu_state.barrier_mutex); lock((work_completion)(&wfc.work)); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/0:1/9: #0: ffff900481068b38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x212/0x500 #1: ffff9e3bc0057e60 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x216/0x500 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-00065-g934ebd6e5359 #35409 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn Call Trace: rcu-torture: rcu_torture_read_exit: Start of episode <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 check_noncircular+0x132/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1538/0x2500 lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2a0 ? _cpu_down+0x57/0x2b0 percpu_down_write+0x31/0x200 ? _cpu_down+0x57/0x2b0 _cpu_down+0x57/0x2b0 __cpu_down_maps_locked+0x10/0x20 work_for_cpu_fn+0x15/0x20 process_scheduled_works+0x2a7/0x500 worker_thread+0x173/0x330 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe6/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK Fix this with providing one lock class key per work_on_cpu() caller. Reported-and-tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b816265 ] 5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") simplified code by using the for_each_of_range() iterator, but it broke PCI enumeration on Turris Omnia (and probably other mvebu targets). Issue #1: To determine range.flags, of_pci_range_parser_one() uses bus->get_flags(), which resolves to of_bus_pci_get_flags(), which already returns an IORESOURCE bit field, and NOT the original flags from the "ranges" resource. Then mvebu_get_tgt_attr() attempts the very same conversion again. Remove the misinterpretation of range.flags in mvebu_get_tgt_attr(), to restore the intended behavior. Issue #2: The driver needs target and attributes, which are encoded in the raw address values of the "/soc/pcie/ranges" resource. According to of_pci_range_parser_one(), the raw values are stored in range.bus_addr and range.parent_bus_addr, respectively. range.cpu_addr is a translated version of range.parent_bus_addr, and not relevant here. Use the correct range structure member, to extract target and attributes. This restores the intended behavior. Fixes: 5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") Reported-by: Jan Palus <[email protected]> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220479 Signed-off-by: Klaus Kudielka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Tested-by: Tony Dinh <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jan Palus <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

syzkaller has caught us red-handed once more, this time nesting regular spinlocks behind raw spinlocks: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.16.0-rc3-syzkaller-g7b8346bd9fce #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- syz.0.29/3743 is trying to lock: a3ff80008e2e9e18 (&xa->xa_lock#20){....}-{3:3}, at: vgic_put_irq+0xb4/0x190 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:137 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 3 locks held by syz.0.29/3743: #0: a3ff80008e2e90a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vgic_destroy+0x50/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:499 CachyOS#1: a3ff80008e2e9fa0 (&kvm->arch.config_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vgic_destroy+0x5c/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:500 CachyOS#2: 58f0000021be1428 (&vgic_cpu->ap_list_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: vgic_flush_pending_lpis+0x3c/0x31c arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:150 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3743 Comm: syz.0.29 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-syzkaller-g7b8346bd9fce #0 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C) __dump_stack+0x30/0x40 lib/dump_stack.c:94 dump_stack_lvl+0xd8/0x12c lib/dump_stack.c:120 dump_stack+0x1c/0x28 lib/dump_stack.c:129 print_lock_invalid_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4833 [inline] check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4905 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x978/0x299c kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5190 lock_acquire+0x14c/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x7c kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 vgic_put_irq+0xb4/0x190 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:137 vgic_flush_pending_lpis+0x24c/0x31c arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:158 __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy+0x44/0x500 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:455 kvm_vgic_destroy+0x100/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:505 kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x80/0x138 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:244 kvm_destroy_vm virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1308 [inline] kvm_put_kvm+0x800/0xff8 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1344 kvm_vm_release+0x58/0x78 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1367 __fput+0x4ac/0x980 fs/file_table.c:465 ____fput+0x20/0x58 fs/file_table.c:493 task_work_run+0x1bc/0x254 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] do_notify_resume+0x1b4/0x270 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:151 exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline] exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline] el0_svc+0xb4/0x160 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:768 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600 This is of course no good, but is at odds with how LPI refcounts are managed. Solve the locking mess by deferring the release of unreferenced LPIs after the ap_list_lock is released. Mark these to-be-released LPIs specially to avoid racing with vgic_put_irq() and causing a double-free. Since references can only be taken on LPIs with a nonzero refcount, extending the lifetime of freed LPIs is still safe. Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]>

…ostcopy When you run a KVM guest with vhost-net and migrate that guest to another host, and you immediately enable postcopy after starting the migration, there is a big chance that the network connection of the guest won't work anymore on the destination side after the migration. With a debug kernel v6.16.0, there is also a call trace that looks like this: FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing 881 CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 549 Comm: kworker/6:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0 torvalds#56 NONE Hardware name: IBM 3931 LA1 400 (LPAR) Workqueue: events irqfd_inject [kvm] Call Trace: [<00003173cbecc634>] dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x168 [<00003173cca69588>] handle_userfault+0xde8/0x1310 [<00003173cc756f0c>] handle_pte_fault+0x4fc/0x760 [<00003173cc759212>] __handle_mm_fault+0x452/0xa00 [<00003173cc7599ba>] handle_mm_fault+0x1fa/0x6a0 [<00003173cc73409a>] __get_user_pages+0x4aa/0xba0 [<00003173cc7349e8>] get_user_pages_remote+0x258/0x770 [<000031734be6f052>] get_map_page+0xe2/0x190 [kvm] [<000031734be6f910>] adapter_indicators_set+0x50/0x4a0 [kvm] [<000031734be7f674>] set_adapter_int+0xc4/0x170 [kvm] [<000031734be2f268>] kvm_set_irq+0x228/0x3f0 [kvm] [<000031734be27000>] irqfd_inject+0xd0/0x150 [kvm] [<00003173cc00c9ec>] process_one_work+0x87c/0x1490 [<00003173cc00dda6>] worker_thread+0x7a6/0x1010 [<00003173cc02dc36>] kthread+0x3b6/0x710 [<00003173cbed2f0c>] __ret_from_fork+0xdc/0x7f0 [<00003173cdd737ca>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 3 locks held by kworker/6:2/549: #0: 00000000800bc958 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7ee/0x1490 CachyOS#1: 000030f3d527fbd0 ((work_completion)(&irqfd->inject)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x81c/0x1490 CachyOS#2: 00000000f99862b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: get_map_page+0xa8/0x190 [kvm] The "FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing" indicates that handle_userfaultfd() saw a page fault request without ALLOW_RETRY flag set, hence userfaultfd cannot remotely resolve it (because the caller was asking for an immediate resolution, aka, FAULT_FLAG_NOWAIT, while remote faults can take time). With that, get_map_page() failed and the irq was lost. We should not be strictly in an atomic environment here and the worker should be sleepable (the call is done during an ioctl from userspace), so we can allow adapter_indicators_set() to just sleep waiting for the remote fault instead. Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-42486 Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]> [thuth: Assembled patch description and fixed some cosmetical issues] Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]> Fixes: f654706 ("KVM: s390/interrupt: do not pin adapter interrupt pages") [frankja: Added fixes tag] Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>

This attemps to fix possible UAFs caused by struct mgmt_pending being freed while still being processed like in the following trace, in order to fix mgmt_pending_valid is introduce and use to check if the mgmt_pending hasn't been removed from the pending list, on the complete callbacks it is used to check and in addtion remove the cmd from the list while holding mgmt_pending_lock to avoid TOCTOU problems since if the cmd is left on the list it can still be accessed and freed. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880709d4dc0 by task kworker/u11:0/55 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 55 Comm: kworker/u11:0 Not tainted 6.16.4 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16.4/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 12210: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4364 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269 mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296 __add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x130/0x200 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5247 add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x214/0x360 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5364 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1133 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x5c9/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 12221: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4648 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4847 mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline] mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257 __mgmt_power_off+0x169/0x350 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9444 hci_dev_close_sync+0x754/0x1330 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5290 hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:501 [inline] hci_dev_close+0x108/0x200 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:526 sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1192 sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1313 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: cf75ad8 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_SET_POWERED") Fixes: 2bd1b23 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_DISCOVERABLE to use cmd_sync") Fixes: f056a65 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_CONNECTABLE to use cmd_sync") Fixes: 3244845 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SSP") Fixes: d81a494 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LE") Fixes: b338d91 ("Bluetooth: Implement support for Mesh") Fixes: 6f6ff38 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME") Fixes: 71efbb0 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_PHY_CONFIGURATION") Fixes: b747a83 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Refactor add Adv Monitor") Fixes: abfeea4 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY") Fixes: 26ac4c5 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_ADVERTISING") Reported-by: cen zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

Ido Schimmel says: ==================== nexthop: Various fixes Patch #1 fixes a NPD that was recently reported by syzbot. Patch #2 fixes an issue in the existing FIB nexthop selftest. Patch #3 extends the selftest with test cases for the bug that was fixed in the first patch. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Check for an invalid length during LAUNCH_UPDATE at the start of snp_launch_update() instead of subtly relying on kvm_gmem_populate() to detect the bad state. Code that directly handles userspace input absolutely should sanitize those inputs; failure to do so is asking for bugs where KVM consumes an invalid "npages". Keep the check in gmem, but wrap it in a WARN to flag any bad usage by the caller. Note, this is technically an ABI change as KVM would previously allow a length of '0'. But allowing a length of '0' is nonsensical and creates pointless conundrums in KVM. E.g. an empty range is arguably neither private nor shared, but LAUNCH_UPDATE will fail if the starting gpa can't be made private. In practice, no known or well-behaved VMM passes a length of '0'. Note CachyOS#2, the PAGE_ALIGNED(params.len) check ensures that lengths between 1 and 4095 (inclusive) are also rejected, i.e. that KVM won't end up with npages=0 when doing "npages = params.len / PAGE_SIZE". Cc: Thomas Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: Michael Roth <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Don't emulate branch instructions, e.g. CALL/RET/JMP etc., that are affected by Shadow Stacks and/or Indirect Branch Tracking when said features are enabled in the guest, as fully emulating CET would require significant complexity for no practical benefit (KVM shouldn't need to emulate branch instructions on modern hosts). Simply doing nothing isn't an option as that would allow a malicious entity to subvert CET protections via the emulator. To detect instructions that are subject to IBT or affect IBT state, use the existing IsBranch flag along with the source operand type to detect indirect branches, and the existing NearBranch flag to detect far JMPs and CALLs, all of which are effectively indirect. Explicitly check for emulation of IRET, FAR RET (IMM), and SYSEXIT (the ret-like far branches) instead of adding another flag, e.g. IsRet, as it's unlikely the emulator will ever need to check for return-like instructions outside of this one specific flow. Use an allow-list instead of a deny-list because (a) it's a shorter list and (b) so that a missed entry gets a false positive, not a false negative (i.e. reject emulation instead of clobbering CET state). For Shadow Stacks, explicitly track instructions that directly affect the current SSP, as KVM's emulator doesn't have existing flags that can be used to precisely detect such instructions. Alternatively, the em_xxx() helpers could directly check for ShadowStack interactions, but using a dedicated flag is arguably easier to audit, and allows for handling both IBT and SHSTK in one fell swoop. Note! On far transfers, do NOT consult the current privilege level and instead treat SHSTK/IBT as being enabled if they're enabled for User *or* Supervisor mode. On inter-privilege level far transfers, SHSTK and IBT can be in play for the target privilege level, i.e. checking the current privilege could get a false negative, and KVM doesn't know the target privilege level until emulation gets under way. Note CachyOS#2, FAR JMP from 64-bit mode to compatibility mode interacts with the current SSP, but only to ensure SSP[63:32] == 0. Don't tag FAR JMP as SHSTK, which would be rather confusing and would result in FAR JMP being rejected unnecessarily the vast majority of the time (ignoring that it's unlikely to ever be emulated). A future commit will add the #GP(0) check for the specific FAR JMP scenario. Note CachyOS#3, task switches also modify SSP and so need to be rejected. That too will be addressed in a future commit. Suggested-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]> Originally-by: Yang Weijiang <[email protected]> Cc: Mathias Krause <[email protected]> Cc: John Allen <[email protected]> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events fails. Before: ``` $ perf test -vv 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: --- start --- test child forked, pid 1189568 Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/ ..after resolving event: software/config=0/ cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/ ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE) size 136 config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY) sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU read_format ID|LOST disabled 1 inherit 1 mmap 1 comm 1 enable_on_exec 1 task 1 sample_id_all 1 mmap2 1 comm_exec 1 ksymbol 1 bpf_event 1 { wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 perf_evlist__open: Permission denied ---- end(-2) ---- Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]' ---- unexpected signal (6) ---- iFailed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon #0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311 CachyOS#1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 CachyOS#2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44 CachyOS#3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27 CachyOS#4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81 CachyOS#5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226 CachyOS#6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344 torvalds#7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128 torvalds#8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545 torvalds#9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647 torvalds#10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849 torvalds#11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349 torvalds#12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 torvalds#13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448 torvalds#14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555 torvalds#15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 torvalds#16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 torvalds#17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1] 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED! ``` After: ``` $ perf test 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <[email protected]> Cc: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0b2cd50 ] generic/091 may fail, then it bisects to the bad commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page"). What will cause generic/091 to fail is something like below Testcase #1: 1. write 16k as compressed blocks 2. truncate to 12k 3. truncate to 20k 4. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as expected Script of Testcase #1 mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1 dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc sync truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3 od /mnt/f2fs/data umount /mnt/f2fs Analisys: in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed cluster, and zero page #3, in step 3), f2fs_setattr() will call f2fs_zero_post_eof_page() to drop all page cache post eof, includeing dirtied page #3, in step 4) when we read data from page #3, it will decompressed cluster and extra random data to page #3, finally, we hit the non-zeroed data post eof. However, the commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page") just let the issue be reproduced easily, w/o the commit, it can reproduce this bug w/ below Testcase #2: 1. write 16k as compressed blocks 2. truncate to 8k 3. truncate to 12k 4. truncate to 20k 5. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as expected Script of Testcase #2 mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1 dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc sync truncate -s $((8*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3 od /mnt/f2fs/data umount /mnt/f2fs Anlysis: in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed cluster, and zero page #2 and #3, in step 3), we will truncate page #3 in page cache, in step 4), expand file size, in step 5), hit random data post eof w/ the same reason in Testcase #1. Root Cause: In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), after we truncate partial data block on compressed cluster, all pages in cluster including the one post eof will be dirtied, after another tuncation, dirty page post eof will be dropped, however on-disk compressed cluster is still valid, it may include non-zero data post eof, result in exposing previous non-zero data post eof while reading. Fix: In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), let change as below to fix: - call filemap_write_and_wait_range() to flush dirty page - call truncate_pagecache() to drop pages or zero partial page post eof - call f2fs_do_truncate_blocks() to truncate non-compress cluster to last valid block Fixes: 3265d3d ("f2fs: support partial truncation on compressed inode") Reported-by: Jan Prusakowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 570f945 ] Lockdep gives a splat [1] when ser_hdl_work item is executed. It is scheduled at mac80211 workqueue via ieee80211_queue_work() and takes a wiphy lock inside. However, this workqueue can be flushed when e.g. closing the interface and wiphy lock is already taken in that case. Choosing wiphy_work_queue() for SER is likely not suitable. Back on to the global workqueue. [1]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.17.0-rc2 torvalds#17 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u32:1/61 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88811bc00768 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core] but task is already holding lock: ffffc9000048fd30 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7b5/0x1450 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: process_one_work+0x7c6/0x1450 worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00 kthread+0x313/0x640 ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}: touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x8e/0x180 __flush_workqueue+0x129/0x10d0 ieee80211_stop_device+0xa8/0x110 ieee80211_do_stop+0x14ce/0x2880 ieee80211_stop+0x13a/0x2c0 __dev_close_many+0x18f/0x510 __dev_change_flags+0x25f/0x670 netif_change_flags+0x7b/0x160 do_setlink.isra.0+0x1640/0x35d0 rtnl_newlink+0xd8c/0x1d30 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x700/0xb80 netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x350 netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x7a0 netlink_sendmsg+0x759/0xc20 ____sys_sendmsg+0x812/0xa00 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x180 __sys_sendmsg+0x11f/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x360 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x124c/0x1d20 lock_acquire+0x154/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0x17b/0x12f0 ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core] rtw89_ser_hdl_work+0x119/0x220 [rtw89_core] process_one_work+0x82d/0x1450 worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00 kthread+0x313/0x640 ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &rdev->wiphy.mtx --> (wq_completion)phy0 --> (work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)); lock((wq_completion)phy0); lock((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)); lock(&rdev->wiphy.mtx); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/u32:1/61: #0: ffff888103835148 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xefa/0x1450 #1: ffffc9000048fd30 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7b5/0x1450 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 61 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2 torvalds#17 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS edk2-20250523-14.fc42 05/23/2025 Workqueue: phy0 rtw89_ser_hdl_work [rtw89_core] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be check_noncircular+0x14c/0x170 __lock_acquire+0x124c/0x1d20 lock_acquire+0x154/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0x17b/0x12f0 ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core] rtw89_ser_hdl_work+0x119/0x220 [rtw89_core] process_one_work+0x82d/0x1450 worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00 kthread+0x313/0x640 ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: ebfc919 ("wifi: rtw89: add wiphy_lock() to work that isn't held wiphy_lock() yet") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit edf7e90 ] As JY reported in bugzilla [1], Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 pc : [0xffffffe51d249484] f2fs_is_cp_guaranteed+0x70/0x98 lr : [0xffffffe51d24adbc] f2fs_merge_page_bio+0x520/0x6d4 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 6790 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: P B W OE 6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 5f7701c9cbf727d1eebe77c89bbbeb3371e895e5 Tainted: [P]=PROPRIETARY_MODULE, [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-254:49) Call trace: f2fs_is_cp_guaranteed+0x70/0x98 f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x174/0x2f4 f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x214/0x81c f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x28c/0x764 f2fs_write_data_pages+0x78c/0xce4 do_writepages+0xe8/0x2fc __writeback_single_inode+0x4c/0x4b4 writeback_sb_inodes+0x314/0x540 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xa4/0xf4 wb_writeback+0x160/0x448 wb_workfn+0x2f0/0x5dc process_scheduled_works+0x1c8/0x458 worker_thread+0x334/0x3f0 kthread+0x118/0x1ac ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220575 The panic was caused by UAF issue w/ below race condition: kworker - writepages - f2fs_write_cache_pages - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page - f2fs_inplace_write_data - f2fs_merge_page_bio - add_inu_page : cache page #1 into bio & cache bio in io->bio_list - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page - f2fs_inplace_write_data - f2fs_merge_page_bio - add_inu_page : cache page #2 into bio which is linked in io->bio_list write - f2fs_write_begin : write page #1 - f2fs_folio_wait_writeback - f2fs_submit_merged_ipu_write - f2fs_submit_write_bio : submit bio which inclues page #1 and #2 software IRQ - f2fs_write_end_io - fscrypt_free_bounce_page : freed bounced page which belongs to page #2 - inc_page_count( , WB_DATA_TYPE(data_folio), false) : data_folio points to fio->encrypted_page the bounced page can be freed before accessing it in f2fs_is_cp_guarantee() It can reproduce w/ below testcase: Run below script in shell #1: for ((i=1;i>0;i++)) do xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/enc/file \ -c "pwrite 0 32k" -c "fdatasync" Run below script in shell #2: for ((i=1;i>0;i++)) do xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/enc/file \ -c "pwrite 0 32k" -c "fdatasync" So, in f2fs_merge_page_bio(), let's avoid using fio->encrypted_page after commit page into internal ipu cache. Fixes: 0b20fce ("f2fs: cache global IPU bio") Reported-by: JY <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev mutex if the device needs it. If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than lockdep can handle: unshare -n \ bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done' BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69: #0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work CachyOS#1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work CachyOS#2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net CachyOS#3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch CachyOS#4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify [..] Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices. Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd remain in locked state. Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we processed entire list without hitting the limit. Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Expand the prefault memory selftest to add a regression test for a KVM bug where KVM's retry logic would result in (breakable) deadlock due to the memslot deletion waiting on prefaulting to release SRCU, and prefaulting waiting on the memslot to fully disappear (KVM uses a two-step process to delete memslots, and KVM x86 retries page faults if a to-be-deleted, a.k.a. INVALID, memslot is encountered). To exercise concurrent memslot remove, spawn a second thread to initiate memslot removal at roughly the same time as prefaulting. Test memslot removal for all testcases, i.e. don't limit concurrent removal to only the success case. There are essentially three prefault scenarios (so far) that are of interest: 1. Success 2. ENOENT due to no memslot 3. EAGAIN due to INVALID memslot For all intents and purposes, #1 and #2 are mutually exclusive, or rather, easier to test via separate testcases since writing to non-existent memory is trivial. But for #3, making it mutually exclusive with #1 _or_ #2 is actually more complex than testing memslot removal for all scenarios. The only requirement to let memslot removal coexist with other scenarios is a way to guarantee a stable result, e.g. that the "no memslot" test observes ENOENT, not EAGAIN, for the final checks. So, rather than make memslot removal mutually exclusive with the ENOENT scenario, simply restore the memslot and retry prefaulting. For the "no memslot" case, KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY should be idempotent, i.e. should always fail with ENOENT regardless of how many times userspace attempts prefaulting. Pass in both the base GPA and the offset (instead of the "full" GPA) so that the worker can recreate the memslot. Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 48918ca ] The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events fails. Before: ``` $ perf test -vv 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: --- start --- test child forked, pid 1189568 Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/ ..after resolving event: software/config=0/ cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/ ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE) size 136 config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY) sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU read_format ID|LOST disabled 1 inherit 1 mmap 1 comm 1 enable_on_exec 1 task 1 sample_id_all 1 mmap2 1 comm_exec 1 ksymbol 1 bpf_event 1 { wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 perf_evlist__open: Permission denied ---- end(-2) ---- Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]' ---- unexpected signal (6) ---- iFailed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon #0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311 #1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44 #3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27 #4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81 #5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226 #6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344 torvalds#7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128 torvalds#8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545 torvalds#9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647 torvalds#10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849 torvalds#11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349 torvalds#12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 torvalds#13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448 torvalds#14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555 torvalds#15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 torvalds#16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 torvalds#17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1] 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED! ``` After: ``` $ perf test 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <[email protected]> Cc: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 0dccbc7 upstream. When running as an SNP or TDX guest under KVM, force the legacy PCI hole, i.e. memory between Top of Lower Usable DRAM and 4GiB, to be mapped as UC via a forced variable MTRR range. In most KVM-based setups, legacy devices such as the HPET and TPM are enumerated via ACPI. ACPI enumeration includes a Memory32Fixed entry, and optionally a SystemMemory descriptor for an OperationRegion, e.g. if the device needs to be accessed via a Control Method. If a SystemMemory entry is present, then the kernel's ACPI driver will auto-ioremap the region so that it can be accessed at will. However, the ACPI spec doesn't provide a way to enumerate the memory type of SystemMemory regions, i.e. there's no way to tell software that a region must be mapped as UC vs. WB, etc. As a result, Linux's ACPI driver always maps SystemMemory regions using ioremap_cache(), i.e. as WB on x86. The dedicated device drivers however, e.g. the HPET driver and TPM driver, want to map their associated memory as UC or WC, as accessing PCI devices using WB is unsupported. On bare metal and non-CoCO, the conflicting requirements "work" as firmware configures the PCI hole (and other device memory) to be UC in the MTRRs. So even though the ACPI mappings request WB, they are forced to UC- in the kernel's tracking due to the kernel properly handling the MTRR overrides, and thus are compatible with the drivers' requested WC/UC-. With force WB MTRRs on SNP and TDX guests, the ACPI mappings get their requested WB if the ACPI mappings are established before the dedicated driver code attempts to initialize the device. E.g. if acpi_init() runs before the corresponding device driver is probed, ACPI's WB mapping will "win", and result in the driver's ioremap() failing because the existing WB mapping isn't compatible with the requested WC/UC-. E.g. when a TPM is emulated by the hypervisor (ignoring the security implications of relying on what is allegedly an untrusted entity to store measurements), the TPM driver will request UC and fail: [ 1.730459] ioremap error for 0xfed40000-0xfed45000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 [ 1.732780] tpm_tis MSFT0101:00: probe with driver tpm_tis failed with error -12 Note, the '0x2' and '0x0' values refer to "enum page_cache_mode", not x86's memtypes (which frustratingly are an almost pure inversion; 2 == WB, 0 == UC). E.g. tracing mapping requests for TPM TIS yields: Mapping TPM TIS with req_type = 0 WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:530 memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 Modules linked in: CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.16.0-rc7+ #2 VOLUNTARY Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/29/2025 RIP: 0010:memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 __ioremap_caller+0x16d/0x3d0 ioremap_cache+0x17/0x30 x86_acpi_os_ioremap+0xe/0x20 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x1f3/0x240 acpi_os_map_memory+0xe/0x20 acpi_ex_system_memory_space_handler+0x273/0x440 acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x176/0x4c0 acpi_ex_access_region+0x2ad/0x530 acpi_ex_field_datum_io+0xa2/0x4f0 acpi_ex_extract_from_field+0x296/0x3e0 acpi_ex_read_data_from_field+0xd1/0x460 acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value+0x2ee/0x530 acpi_ex_resolve_to_value+0x1f2/0x540 acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0x11b/0x190 acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x456/0x960 acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x27a/0xa50 acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x226/0x600 acpi_ps_execute_method+0x172/0x3e0 acpi_ns_evaluate+0x175/0x5f0 acpi_evaluate_object+0x213/0x490 acpi_evaluate_integer+0x6d/0x140 acpi_bus_get_status+0x93/0x150 acpi_add_single_object+0x43a/0x7c0 acpi_bus_check_add+0x149/0x3a0 acpi_bus_check_add_1+0x16/0x30 acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x22c/0x360 acpi_walk_namespace+0x15c/0x170 acpi_bus_scan+0x1dd/0x200 acpi_scan_init+0xe5/0x2b0 acpi_init+0x264/0x5b0 do_one_initcall+0x5a/0x310 kernel_init_freeable+0x34f/0x4f0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x186/0x1b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> The above traces are from a Google-VMM based VM, but the same behavior happens with a QEMU based VM that is modified to add a SystemMemory range for the TPM TIS address space. The only reason this doesn't cause problems for HPET, which appears to require a SystemMemory region, is because HPET gets special treatment via x86_init.timers.timer_init(), and so gets a chance to create its UC- mapping before acpi_init() clobbers things. Disabling the early call to hpet_time_init() yields the same behavior for HPET: [ 0.318264] ioremap error for 0xfed00000-0xfed01000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 Hack around the ACPI gap by forcing the legacy PCI hole to UC when overriding the (virtual) MTRRs for CoCo guest, so that ioremap handling of MTRRs naturally kicks in and forces the ACPI mappings to be UC. Note, the requested/mapped memtype doesn't actually matter in terms of accessing the device. In practically every setup, legacy PCI devices are emulated by the hypervisor, and accesses are intercepted and handled as emulated MMIO, i.e. never access physical memory and thus don't have an effective memtype. Even in a theoretical setup where such devices are passed through by the host, i.e. point at real MMIO memory, it is KVM's (as the hypervisor) responsibility to force the memory to be WC/UC, e.g. via EPT memtype under TDX or real hardware MTRRs under SNP. Not doing so cannot work, and the hypervisor is highly motivated to do the right thing as letting the guest access hardware MMIO with WB would likely result in a variety of fatal #MCs. In other words, forcing the range to be UC is all about coercing the kernel's tracking into thinking that it has established UC mappings, so that the ioremap code doesn't reject mappings from e.g. the TPM driver and thus prevent the driver from loading and the device from functioning. Note #2, relying on guest firmware to handle this scenario, e.g. by setting virtual MTRRs and then consuming them in Linux, is not a viable option, as the virtual MTRR state is managed by the untrusted hypervisor, and because OVMF at least has stopped programming virtual MTRRs when running as a TDX guest. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Fixes: 8e690b8 ("x86/kvm: Override default caching mode for SEV-SNP and TDX") Cc: [email protected] Cc: Peter Gonda <[email protected]> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: Jürgen Groß <[email protected]> Cc: Korakit Seemakhupt <[email protected]> Cc: Jianxiong Gao <[email protected]> Cc: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Korakit Seemakhupt <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 0570327 upstream. Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 torvalds#7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 torvalds#8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 torvalds#9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 torvalds#10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7f0fddd ] Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev mutex if the device needs it. If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than lockdep can handle: unshare -n \ bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done' BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69: #0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net #3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch #4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify [..] Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices. Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd remain in locked state. Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we processed entire list without hitting the limit. Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ CachyOS#1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> CachyOS#2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> CachyOS#1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 CachyOS#1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 CachyOS#2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 CachyOS#3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 CachyOS#4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ CachyOS#1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit a91c809 upstream. The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 302a1f6 ] This attemps to fix possible UAFs caused by struct mgmt_pending being freed while still being processed like in the following trace, in order to fix mgmt_pending_valid is introduce and use to check if the mgmt_pending hasn't been removed from the pending list, on the complete callbacks it is used to check and in addtion remove the cmd from the list while holding mgmt_pending_lock to avoid TOCTOU problems since if the cmd is left on the list it can still be accessed and freed. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880709d4dc0 by task kworker/u11:0/55 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 55 Comm: kworker/u11:0 Not tainted 6.16.4 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16.4/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 12210: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4364 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269 mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296 __add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x130/0x200 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5247 add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x214/0x360 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5364 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1133 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x5c9/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 12221: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4648 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4847 mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline] mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257 __mgmt_power_off+0x169/0x350 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9444 hci_dev_close_sync+0x754/0x1330 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5290 hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:501 [inline] hci_dev_close+0x108/0x200 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:526 sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1192 sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1313 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: cf75ad8 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_SET_POWERED") Fixes: 2bd1b23 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_DISCOVERABLE to use cmd_sync") Fixes: f056a65 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_CONNECTABLE to use cmd_sync") Fixes: 3244845 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SSP") Fixes: d81a494 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LE") Fixes: b338d91 ("Bluetooth: Implement support for Mesh") Fixes: 6f6ff38 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME") Fixes: 71efbb0 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_PHY_CONFIGURATION") Fixes: b747a83 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Refactor add Adv Monitor") Fixes: abfeea4 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY") Fixes: 26ac4c5 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_ADVERTISING") Reported-by: cen zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

Michael Chan says: ==================== bnxt_en: Bug fixes Patches 1, 3, and 4 are bug fixes related to the FW log tracing driver coredump feature recently added in 6.13. Patch CachyOS#1 adds the necessary call to shutdown the FW logging DMA during PCI shutdown. Patch CachyOS#3 fixes a possible null pointer derefernce when using early versions of the FW with this feature. Patch CachyOS#4 adds the coredump header information unconditionally to make it more robust. Patch CachyOS#2 fixes a possible memory leak during PTP shutdown. Patch CachyOS#5 eliminates a dmesg warning when doing devlink reload. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>

When a connector is connected but inactive (e.g., disabled by desktop environments), pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg will be destroyed. Then, reading odm_combine_segments causes kernel NULL pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 26474 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.17.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy) e6a17af9ee6db7c63e9d90dbe5b28ccab67520c6 Hardware name: LENOVO 21Q4/LNVNB161216, BIOS PXCN25WW 03/27/2025 RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> seq_read_iter+0x125/0x490 ? __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18f/0x350 seq_read+0x12c/0x170 full_proxy_read+0x51/0x80 vfs_read+0xbc/0x390 ? __handle_mm_fault+0xa46/0xef0 ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ksys_read+0x73/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f44d4031687 Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00> RSP: 002b:00007ffdb4b5f0b0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f44d3f9f740 RCX: 00007f44d4031687 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f44d3f5e000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f44d3f5e000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000 </TASK> Modules linked in: tls tcp_diag inet_diag xt_mark ccm snd_hrtimer snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_midi snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device x> snd_hda_codec_atihdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib lenovo_wmi_helpers think_lmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_core kvm snd_compress uvcvideo sn> platform_profile joydev amd_pmc mousedev mac_hid sch_fq_codel uinput i2c_dev parport_pc ppdev lp parport nvme_fabrics loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables dm_cryp> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Fix this by checking pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg before dereferencing. Fixes: 07926ba ("drm/amd/display: Add debugfs interface for ODM combine info") Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mario Limoncello <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f19bbec) Cc: [email protected]

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.18, take CachyOS#2 - Fix check for local interrupts on riscv32 - Read HGEIP CSR on the correct cpu when checking for IMSIC interrupts - Remove automatic I/O mapping from kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region()

Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel. Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can crash itself, but not L1. Note CachyOS#2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit, but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0 check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks). Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode. Note CachyOS#3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM" specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long- form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the TDX-Module base specification. Cc: [email protected] Cc: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm654 fixes for 6.18, take CachyOS#2 * Core fixes - Fix trapping regression when no in-kernel irqchip is present ([email protected]) - Check host-provided, untrusted ranges and offsets in pKVM ([email protected]) ([email protected]) - Fix regression restoring the ID_PFR1_EL1 register ([email protected] - Fix vgic ITS locking issues when LPIs are not directly injected ([email protected]) * Test fixes - Correct target CPU programming in vgic_lpi_stress selftest ([email protected]) - Fix exposure of SCTLR2_EL2 and ZCR_EL2 in get-reg-list selftest (20251023-b4-kvm-arm64-get-reg-list-sctlr-el2-v1-1-088f88ff992a@kernel.org) (20251024-kvm-arm64-get-reg-list-zcr-el2-v1-1-0cd0ff75e22f@kernel.org) * Misc - Update Oliver's email address ([email protected])

[ Upstream commit 5d726c4 ] Following deadlock can be triggered easily by lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.17.0-rc3-00124-ga12c2658ced0 #1665 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ check/1334 is trying to acquire lock: ff1100011d9d0678 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180 but task is already holding lock: ff1100011d9d00e0 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}, at: del_gendisk+0xba/0x110 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}: blk_queue_enter+0x40b/0x470 blkg_conf_prep+0x7b/0x3c0 tg_set_limit+0x10a/0x3e0 cgroup_file_write+0xc6/0x420 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280 vfs_write+0x256/0x490 ksys_write+0x83/0x190 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40 wbt_init+0x17e/0x280 wbt_enable_default+0xe9/0x140 blk_register_queue+0x1da/0x2e0 __add_disk+0x38c/0x5d0 add_disk_fwnode+0x89/0x250 device_add_disk+0x18/0x30 virtblk_probe+0x13a3/0x1800 virtio_dev_probe+0x389/0x610 really_probe+0x136/0x620 __driver_probe_device+0xb3/0x230 driver_probe_device+0x2f/0xe0 __driver_attach+0x158/0x250 bus_for_each_dev+0xa9/0x130 driver_attach+0x26/0x40 bus_add_driver+0x178/0x3d0 driver_register+0x7d/0x1c0 __register_virtio_driver+0x2c/0x60 virtio_blk_init+0x6f/0xe0 do_one_initcall+0x94/0x540 kernel_init_freeable+0x56a/0x7b0 kernel_init+0x2b/0x270 ret_from_fork+0x268/0x4c0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1835/0x2940 lock_acquire+0xf9/0x450 __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40 blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180 __del_gendisk+0x226/0x690 del_gendisk+0xba/0x110 sd_remove+0x49/0xb0 [sd_mod] device_remove+0x87/0xb0 device_release_driver_internal+0x11e/0x230 device_release_driver+0x1a/0x30 bus_remove_device+0x14d/0x220 device_del+0x1e1/0x5a0 __scsi_remove_device+0x1ff/0x2f0 scsi_remove_device+0x37/0x60 sdev_store_delete+0x77/0x100 dev_attr_store+0x1f/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x65/0x90 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280 vfs_write+0x256/0x490 ksys_write+0x83/0x190 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &q->sysfs_lock --> &q->rq_qos_mutex --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); lock(&q->rq_qos_mutex); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); lock(&q->sysfs_lock); Root cause is that queue_usage_counter is grabbed with rq_qos_mutex held in blkg_conf_prep(), while queue should be freezed before rq_qos_mutex from other context. The blk_queue_enter() from blkg_conf_prep() is used to protect against policy deactivation, which is already protected with blkcg_mutex, hence convert blk_queue_enter() to blkcg_mutex to fix this problem. Meanwhile, consider that blkcg_mutex is held after queue is freezed from policy deactivation, also convert blkg_alloc() to use GFP_NOIO. Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 97bcc5b ] This patch fixes an issue where two different flows on the same RXq produce the same hash resulting in continuous flow overwrites. Flow #1: A packet for Flow #1 comes in, kernel calls the steering function. The driver gives back a filter id. The kernel saves this filter id in the selected slot. Later, the driver's service task checks if any filters have expired and then installs the rule for Flow #1. Flow #2: A packet for Flow #2 comes in. It goes through the same steps. But this time, the chosen slot is being used by Flow #1. The driver gives a new filter id and the kernel saves it in the same slot. When the driver's service task runs, it runs through all the flows, checks if Flow #1 should be expired, the kernel returns True as the slot has a different filter id, and then the driver installs the rule for Flow #2. Flow #1: Another packet for Flow #1 comes in. The same thing repeats. The slot is overwritten with a new filter id for Flow #1. This causes a repeated cycle of flow programming for missed packets, wasting CPU cycles while not improving performance. This problem happens at higher rates when the RPS table is small, but tests show it still happens even with 12,000 connections and an RPS size of 16K per queue (global table size = 144x16K = 64K). This patch prevents overwriting an rps_dev_flow entry if it is active. The intention is that it is better to do aRFS for the first flow instead of hurting all flows on the same hash. Without this, two (or more) flows on one RX queue with the same hash can keep overwriting each other. This causes the driver to reprogram the flow repeatedly. Changes: 1. Add a new 'hash' field to struct rps_dev_flow. 2. Add rps_flow_is_active(): a helper function to check if a flow is active or not, extracted from rps_may_expire_flow(). It is further simplified as per reviewer feedback. 3. In set_rps_cpu(): - Avoid overwriting by programming a new filter if: - The slot is not in use, or - The slot is in use but the flow is not active, or - The slot has an active flow with the same hash, but target CPU differs. - Save the hash in the rps_dev_flow entry. 4. rps_may_expire_flow(): Use earlier extracted rps_flow_is_active(). Testing & results: - Driver: ice (E810 NIC), Kernel: net-next - #CPUs = #RXq = 144 (1:1) - Number of flows: 12K - Eight RPS settings from 256 to 32768. Though RPS=256 is not ideal, it is still sufficient to cover 12K flows (256*144 rx-queues = 64K global table slots) - Global Table Size = 144 * RPS (effectively equal to 256 * RPS) - Each RPS test duration = 8 mins (org code) + 8 mins (new code). - Metrics captured on client Legend for following tables: Steer-C: #times ndo_rx_flow_steer() was Called by set_rps_cpu() Steer-L: #times ice_arfs_flow_steer() Looped over aRFS entries Add: #times driver actually programmed aRFS (ice_arfs_build_entry()) Del: #times driver deleted the flow (ice_arfs_del_flow_rules()) Units: K = 1,000 times, M = 1 million times |-------|---------|------| Org Code |---------|---------| | RPS | Latency | CPU | Add | Del | Steer-C | Steer-L | |-------|---------|------|--------|--------|---------|---------| | 256 | 227.0 | 93.2 | 1.6M | 1.6M | 121.7M | 267.6M | | 512 | 225.9 | 94.1 | 11.5M | 11.2M | 65.7M | 199.6M | | 1024 | 223.5 | 95.6 | 16.5M | 16.5M | 27.1M | 187.3M | | 2048 | 222.2 | 96.3 | 10.5M | 10.5M | 12.5M | 115.2M | | 4096 | 223.9 | 94.1 | 5.5M | 5.5M | 7.2M | 65.9M | | 8192 | 224.7 | 92.5 | 2.7M | 2.7M | 3.0M | 29.9M | | 16384 | 223.5 | 92.5 | 1.3M | 1.3M | 1.4M | 13.9M | | 32768 | 219.6 | 93.2 | 838.1K | 838.1K | 965.1K | 8.9M | |-------|---------|------| New Code |---------|---------| | 256 | 201.5 | 99.1 | 13.4K | 5.0K | 13.7K | 75.2K | | 512 | 202.5 | 98.2 | 11.2K | 5.9K | 11.2K | 55.5K | | 1024 | 207.3 | 93.9 | 11.5K | 9.7K | 11.5K | 59.6K | | 2048 | 207.5 | 96.7 | 11.8K | 11.1K | 15.5K | 79.3K | | 4096 | 206.9 | 96.6 | 11.8K | 11.7K | 11.8K | 63.2K | | 8192 | 205.8 | 96.7 | 11.9K | 11.8K | 11.9K | 63.9K | | 16384 | 200.9 | 98.2 | 11.9K | 11.9K | 11.9K | 64.2K | | 32768 | 202.5 | 98.0 | 11.9K | 11.9K | 11.9K | 64.2K | |-------|---------|------|--------|--------|---------|---------| Some observations: 1. Overall Latency improved: (1790.19-1634.94)/1790.19*100 = 8.67% 2. Overall CPU increased: (777.32-751.49)/751.45*100 = 3.44% 3. Flow Management (add/delete) remained almost constant at ~11K compared to values in millions. Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 6dd97ce upstream. When a connector is connected but inactive (e.g., disabled by desktop environments), pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg will be destroyed. Then, reading odm_combine_segments causes kernel NULL pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 26474 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.17.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy) e6a17af9ee6db7c63e9d90dbe5b28ccab67520c6 Hardware name: LENOVO 21Q4/LNVNB161216, BIOS PXCN25WW 03/27/2025 RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> seq_read_iter+0x125/0x490 ? __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18f/0x350 seq_read+0x12c/0x170 full_proxy_read+0x51/0x80 vfs_read+0xbc/0x390 ? __handle_mm_fault+0xa46/0xef0 ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ksys_read+0x73/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f44d4031687 Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00> RSP: 002b:00007ffdb4b5f0b0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f44d3f9f740 RCX: 00007f44d4031687 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f44d3f5e000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f44d3f5e000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000 </TASK> Modules linked in: tls tcp_diag inet_diag xt_mark ccm snd_hrtimer snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_midi snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device x> snd_hda_codec_atihdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib lenovo_wmi_helpers think_lmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_core kvm snd_compress uvcvideo sn> platform_profile joydev amd_pmc mousedev mac_hid sch_fq_codel uinput i2c_dev parport_pc ppdev lp parport nvme_fabrics loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables dm_cryp> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Fix this by checking pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg before dereferencing. Fixes: 07926ba ("drm/amd/display: Add debugfs interface for ODM combine info") Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mario Limoncello <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f19bbec) Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

When freeing indexed arrays, the corresponding free function should be called for each entry of the indexed array. For example, for for 'struct tc_act_attrs' 'tc_act_attrs_free(...)' needs to be called for each entry. Previously, memory leaks were reported when enabling the ASAN analyzer. ================================================================= ==874==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67 CachyOS#1 0x55c98db048af in tc_act_attrs_set_options_vlan_parms ../generated/tc-user.h:2813 CachyOS#2 0x55c98db048af in main ./linux/tools/net/ynl/samples/tc-filter-add.c:71 Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67 CachyOS#1 0x55c98db04a93 in tc_act_attrs_set_options_vlan_parms ../generated/tc-user.h:2813 CachyOS#2 0x55c98db04a93 in main ./linux/tools/net/ynl/samples/tc-filter-add.c:74 Direct leak of 10 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67 CachyOS#1 0x55c98db0527d in tc_act_attrs_set_kind ../generated/tc-user.h:1622 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 58 byte(s) leaked in 4 allocation(s). The following diff illustrates the changes introduced compared to the previous version of the code. void tc_flower_attrs_free(struct tc_flower_attrs *obj) { + unsigned int i; + free(obj->indev); + for (i = 0; i < obj->_count.act; i++) + tc_act_attrs_free(&obj->act[i]); free(obj->act); free(obj->key_eth_dst); free(obj->key_eth_dst_mask); Signed-off-by: Zahari Doychev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

kerneltoast added 8 commits September 23, 2023 18:32

mm: Disable proactive compaction by default

2e3cb1a

On-demand compaction works fine assuming that you don't have a need to spam the page allocator nonstop for large order page allocations. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

ptr1337 merged commit ec3dcef into CachyOS:6.5/cachy Sep 23, 2023

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6.5: mm patches #2

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Rasenkai commented Sep 23, 2023

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6.5: mm patches #2

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Rasenkai commented Sep 23, 2023

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