BerriAI · krrish-berri-2 · Apr 6, 2026 · Apr 4, 2026 · Apr 4, 2026 · Apr 5, 2026
diff --git a/.github/workflows/run_llm_translation_tests.py b/.github/workflows/run_llm_translation_tests.py
diff --git a/.trivyignore b/.trivyignore
diff --git a/ci_cd/.grype.yaml b/ci_cd/.grype.yaml
diff --git a/ci_cd/security_scans.sh b/ci_cd/security_scans.sh
diff --git a/docs/my-website/.trivyignore b/docs/my-website/.trivyignore
diff --git a/docs/my-website/blog/ci_cd_v2_improvements/index.md b/docs/my-website/blog/ci_cd_v2_improvements/index.md
@@ -27,6 +27,27 @@ Building on the roadmap from our [security incident](https://docs.litellm.ai/blo
 - Validation and release are separated into different repositories, making it harder for an attacker to reach release credentials.
 - Trusted Publishing for PyPI releases - this means no long-lived credentials are used to publish releases.
 - Immutable Docker release tags - this means no tampering of Docker release tags after they are published [Learn more](https://docs.docker.com/docker-hub/repos/manage/hub-images/immutable-tags/). Note: work for GHCR docker releases is planned as well.
+- Docker image signing with [Cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) - all release images are signed so users can independently verify they came from us.
+
+## Verify Docker image signatures
+
+Starting from `v1.83.0-nightly`, all LiteLLM Docker images published to GHCR are signed with [cosign](https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/overview/). To verify the integrity of an image before deploying:
+
+```bash
+cosign verify \
+  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/<release-tag>/cosign.pub \
+  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:<release-tag>
+```
+
+Replace `<release-tag>` with the version you are deploying (e.g. `v1.83.0-stable`).
+
+Expected output:
+
+```
+The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
+  - The cosign claims were validated
+  - The signatures were verified against the specified public key
+```
 
 ## What's next
 

diff --git a/docs/my-website/blog/security_townhall_updates/index.md b/docs/my-website/blog/security_townhall_updates/index.md
@@ -143,8 +143,27 @@ This will ensure, your releases are safe, even when:
 - Tampered registry artifacts are published
 - Tag mutations are made after the release is published
 
-We believe that [Cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) is a good fit for this, and have already begun working on it [PR](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/24683).
+We believe that [Cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) is a good fit for this, and have shipped it in [PR #24683](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/24683).
 
+#### How to verify a Docker image with Cosign
+
+Starting from `v1.83.0-nightly`, all LiteLLM Docker images published to GHCR are signed with [cosign](https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/overview/). To verify the integrity of an image before deploying:
+
+```bash
+cosign verify \
+  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/<release-tag>/cosign.pub \
+  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:<release-tag>
+```
+
+Replace `<release-tag>` with the version you are deploying (e.g. `v1.83.0-stable`).
+
+Expected output:
+
+```
+The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
+  - The cosign claims were validated
+  - The signatures were verified against the specified public key
+```
 
 ### Avoid Compromised Packages