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Example Packet Captures

The following captures are based on executing the test tool and illustrate the root cause of the vulnerabilities. In all captures the Wi-Fi network being used has SSID testnetwork with password abcdefgh.

Note that the captures were made on the same network card that was injecting packets (with hardware encryption disabled). On Linux, injected packets are shown twice in a network capture. First it shows the frame as injected by userspace (the test tool will always set the Has Seqnum and Order in the radiotap header). After the frame was sent, the Linux kernel echoes the actual transmitted frame a second time. This second frame for instance contains the bitrate that was used to send the frame and whether an acknowledgement was received in response.

A-MSDU attacks

Mixed key attacks

  • ping_I_F_BE_AE-fromap.pcapng: used command was ping I,F,BE,AE --ap. Frame 170 contains the first fragment encrypted under TK e4e41ad934f5caa7ff0064ad96609c2f and frame 180 contains the second fragment encrypted under TK 1f38eee5960fb9d9d77e566c4b18008d. The ping reply is shown in frame 185.

Cache attacks

  • ping_I_E_R_E-fromclient.pcapng: used command was ping I,E,R,E. Frame 69 contains the first fragment encrypted under TK dda31c8516b9d92581fc17e4a8f1b47b. Frame 72 and 74 shows that the client is reassociating. Frame 98 contains the second fragment encrypted under TK b4d1a94a4d126dbd39ec3557969f430b. The ping reply is contained in frame 101.

  • ping_I_E_R_E__full-recon-fromclient.pcapng: used command was ping I,E,R,E --full-recon. Frame 63 contains the first fragmented encrypted under TK 7911b7173daf49c898fa42119232885e. Frame 66 shows the deauthentication frame, and frames 67 and 71 show that the client is authenticating and reassociating. Frame 107 contains the second fragment encrypted under TK 292184b9c862a4b640d4c920aba35a48. The ping reply is contained in frame 110.

Non-consecutive PNs attack

  • ping_I_E_E___inc_pn_2-fromap.pcapng: used command was ping I,E,E --inc-pn 2 --ap. Frame 130 contains the first fragment with CCMP Packet Number 0x101 and frame 132 contains the second fragment with CCMP Packet Number 0x103.

Mixed plain/encrypt attack

  • linux-plain-fromap.pcapng: used command was linux-plain --ap. Frame 79 contains the first legitimate encrypted fragment, frame 81 contains the second legitimate encrypted fragment but with a different sequence number, frame 83 contains the injected plaintext second fragment (with the same sequence number as the first fragment). The ping reply is in frame 94.

  • ping_I_E_P-fromclient.pcapng: used command was ping I,E,P. Frame 51 contains the encrypted first fragment, frame 54 the plaintext second fragment, and frame 57 the encrypted ping reply.

  • ping_I_P-fromclient.pcapng: used command was ping I,P. Frame 59 contains the injected plaintext ping request and frame 62 contains the encrypted ping reply.

Broadcast fragment attack

  • ping_D_BP___bcast_ra-fromap.pcapng: used command was ping D,BP --bcast-ra --ap. Frame 21 contains the attack packet. Capture ping_D_BP___bcast_ra-onclient.pcap shows the result on the target device (Samsung i9305) where frame 13 contains the injected ping request.

A-MSDU EAPOL attack

  • eapol-amsdu_BP-fromap.pcapng: used command was eapol-amsdu BP --ap. Frame 43 contains the injected ping packet. Capture eapol-amsdu_BP-onclient.pcapng shows the result on the target device (Pixel 4 XL) where frame 4 contains the injected ping request. Note that frame 3 is an invalid packet that is a side-effect of the attack (it's the content of the first A-MSDU subframe whose purpose was to make the packet look like an EAPOL handshake message).

AP forwards EAPOL attack

  • eapol-inject-fromclient.pcapng: used command was eapol-inject 7e:1e:cd:49:9f:c6. Frame 39 contained the inject EAPOL packet sent from client 64:70:02:2f:d7:67 in plaintext before this client authenticated. The AP forwards this EAPOL towards the destination client 7e:1e:cd:49:9f:c6 as an encrypted frame in frame 50 (we confirmed on the destination with Wireshark that this indeed is the forwarded packet).

No fragmentation support attack

  • ping_I_D_E-fromap.pcapng: used command was ping I,D,E --ap. Frame 51 contains the full ping request in the second fragment of a Wi-Fi frame (no other fragment is sent). Frame 58 contains the ping response from the vulnerable device.