diff --git a/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/builder.rs b/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/builder.rs index 3efaacd303..b7d5b8c3c1 100644 --- a/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/builder.rs +++ b/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/builder.rs @@ -656,16 +656,23 @@ impl HarmonyBuilder { }; // Extract text from content parts. `Refusal` is losslessly - // representable as text and is preserved verbatim. Image / - // file parts are currently dropped (R1/R2/R3 will implement - // full media handling). + // representable as text and is preserved verbatim (R3 only + // allows refusals on assistant-role messages; other roles + // are rejected at the router entry via + // `responses::content_parts::validate_harmony_responses_input`). + // Image / file parts are rejected by that same validator + // before reaching this builder — the `None` arms below are + // a defensive fallback so a future caller that skips the + // validator does not silently corrupt the prompt. let text_parts: Vec = content .iter() .filter_map(|part| match part { ResponseContentPart::OutputText { text, .. } => Some(text.clone()), ResponseContentPart::InputText { text } => Some(text.clone()), ResponseContentPart::Refusal { refusal } => Some(refusal.clone()), - // R1/R2/R3 will implement full media handling + // Unreachable in practice: the Responses router + // validator rejects these before dispatch. Kept + // as a defensive fallback. ResponseContentPart::InputImage { .. } | ResponseContentPart::InputFile { .. } => None, }) @@ -815,15 +822,19 @@ impl HarmonyBuilder { StringOrContentParts::Array(parts) => { // Extract text from content parts. `Refusal` is // losslessly representable as text and is preserved - // verbatim. Image / file parts are currently dropped - // (R1/R2/R3 will implement full media handling). + // verbatim. Image / file parts are rejected at the + // router entry by + // `responses::content_parts::validate_harmony_responses_input`; + // the `None` arms below are a defensive fallback + // so a future caller that skips the validator + // cannot silently corrupt the prompt. parts .iter() .filter_map(|part| match part { ResponseContentPart::OutputText { text, .. } => Some(text.clone()), ResponseContentPart::InputText { text } => Some(text.clone()), ResponseContentPart::Refusal { refusal } => Some(refusal.clone()), - // R1/R2/R3 will implement full media handling + // Unreachable in practice; see note above. ResponseContentPart::InputImage { .. } | ResponseContentPart::InputFile { .. } => None, }) diff --git a/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/content_parts.rs b/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/content_parts.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b81a3bdca7 --- /dev/null +++ b/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/content_parts.rs @@ -0,0 +1,765 @@ +//! Harmony Responses content-part validation (R3). +//! +//! The harmony Responses pipeline builds gpt-oss prompt tokens directly via +//! [`openai_harmony`]; unlike the regular gRPC Responses path, it never +//! converts to Chat Completions, so the shared multimodal wire in +//! [`crate::routers::grpc::multimodal`] is *not* reachable from this router. +//! The Chat harmony path in `harmony/stages/request_building.rs` explicitly +//! passes `None` for multimodal on every backend, which matches the fact +//! that gpt-oss was not trained against image/file tokens at the +//! `<|message|>` level. +//! +//! Prior to R3 the harmony builder silently dropped `InputImage`, +//! `InputFile`, and (indirectly) `Refusal` content parts when rendering the +//! harmony prompt (see the `None` arms at `builder.rs` circa the pre-R3 +//! `parse_response_item_to_harmony_message` / `SimpleInputMessage` paths). +//! Silent data loss on multimodal prompts is a much worse failure mode +//! than a clear 400: the caller believes the model saw their image, the +//! model responds from text context alone, and the discrepancy is +//! invisible at every observable layer. +//! +//! R3 upgrades that silent drop into an explicit `400 unsupported_content` +//! at the router entry point so callers get the same P1 parity R1/R2 give +//! on their respective surfaces. This module is the single source of +//! truth for the rejection policy — both the non-streaming and streaming +//! entry points in this directory call [`validate_harmony_responses_input`] +//! before any pipeline dispatch. +//! +//! Scope of rejection (per R3 task spec): +//! +//! - `InputImage` on a user/system/developer/simple message → 400 +//! `unsupported_content`. Applies regardless of whether the payload +//! references `file_id`, `image_url` (absolute or `data:` URL). Harmony +//! cannot forward the image to a backend capable of consuming it. +//! - `InputFile` on any fresh input message → 400 `unsupported_content`. +//! The error code specialises on `file_data` payloads whose magic bytes +//! match `%PDF-`: those return the PDF-specific "pending R4" message so +//! the caller understands it is a known gap, not a generic rejection. +//! - `Refusal` on a *non-assistant* role → 400 `unsupported_content`. On +//! `assistant` roles the part is a legitimate replay of a prior model +//! refusal (the P2-refined assistant-message variant) and is left alone +//! for the builder to render as text — rejecting it there would break +//! multi-turn conversations that faithfully echo the prior assistant +//! output. +//! +//! Text-only parts (`InputText`, `OutputText`) and assistant-role +//! `Refusal` replays pass through untouched; the builder already renders +//! them correctly. PDF text extraction itself remains Task R4 and is +//! explicitly out of scope here. + +use axum::response::Response; +use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64_STANDARD, Engine as _}; +use openai_protocol::responses::{ + ResponseContentPart, ResponseInput, ResponseInputOutputItem, ResponsesRequest, + StringOrContentParts, +}; + +use crate::routers::error; + +/// Magic-byte prefix for PDF files (`%PDF-`). PDFs may include a small +/// leading BOM or whitespace but the spec requires the `%PDF-` token +/// within the first 1024 bytes; we only sniff the decoded prefix of the +/// content-part payload here, which is sufficient to catch the common +/// case where a PDF is base64-encoded without additional wrapping. +const PDF_MAGIC: &[u8] = b"%PDF-"; + +/// Validate that a ResponsesRequest's `input` contains only content +/// parts the harmony Responses router can faithfully render. +/// +/// Returns `Ok(())` when the request is safe to dispatch, or a +/// `400 unsupported_content` response otherwise. The error message is +/// deliberately descriptive so callers can distinguish the rejection +/// reason (image, file, PDF, refusal, file_id) at the HTTP layer. +/// +/// # Two-phase invocation +/// +/// The non-streaming and streaming entry points call this validator at +/// **two** points on every request: +/// +/// 1. On the raw `request` as submitted by the caller, before any +/// history merge. Fresh-input issues surface as the caller's fault +/// rather than appearing to come from the stored chain. +/// 2. On the merged `current_request` produced by +/// `load_previous_messages`. Stored threads may contain image/file +/// content parts that were persisted by a sibling router supporting +/// multimodal (notably R1's OpenAI-compat passthrough); replaying +/// such a thread through the harmony backend would otherwise hit +/// the same silent-drop regression this validator exists to close. +/// +/// The validator's assistant-role-refusal exception means legitimate +/// multi-turn output replay passes through the second phase unchanged +/// — only non-assistant image/file/refusal parts in history are +/// rejected. Both phases run the same code so the policy stays +/// single-source. +#[expect( + clippy::result_large_err, + reason = "axum Response is the standard error type on the router-entry boundary; \ + matches the rest of the harmony Responses entry points" +)] +pub(super) fn validate_harmony_responses_input(request: &ResponsesRequest) -> Result<(), Response> { + let items = match &request.input { + ResponseInput::Text(_) => return Ok(()), + ResponseInput::Items(items) => items, + }; + + for item in items { + match item { + ResponseInputOutputItem::Message { role, content, .. } => { + validate_content_parts(role.as_str(), content)?; + } + ResponseInputOutputItem::SimpleInputMessage { + role, + content: StringOrContentParts::Array(parts), + .. + } => { + validate_content_parts(role.as_str(), parts)?; + } + // The `StringOrContentParts::String` variant has no + // content parts to inspect; and non-message items + // (function calls, reasoning, tool outputs, etc.) never + // carry `ResponseContentPart` today so there is nothing + // to reject here. The harmony builder handles unsupported + // item variants with its own `Unsupported input item type` + // errors at the prep stage. + _ => {} + } + } + + Ok(()) +} + +/// Apply the rejection policy to a single message's content-parts list. +#[expect( + clippy::result_large_err, + reason = "axum Response is the standard error type on the router-entry boundary; \ + matches the rest of the harmony Responses entry points" +)] +fn validate_content_parts(role: &str, parts: &[ResponseContentPart]) -> Result<(), Response> { + for part in parts { + match part { + ResponseContentPart::InputText { .. } | ResponseContentPart::OutputText { .. } => { + // Text parts — the builder already renders these. + } + ResponseContentPart::InputImage { + image_url, file_id, .. + } => { + // file_id is always unsupported (no Files API backend in + // harmony gRPC mode). image_url (absolute or data URL) is + // also unsupported because the harmony pipeline does not + // thread multimodal bytes to the backend — the chat + // harmony path itself passes `None` for multimodal. See + // `harmony/stages/request_building.rs` for the + // corresponding dispatch code. + let detail = if file_id.is_some() { + "input_image content parts with file_id are not supported on the harmony Responses \ + backend (no Files API resolver in gRPC mode)" + } else if let Some(url) = image_url { + if is_data_url(url) { + "input_image content parts with a data: URL are not supported on the harmony \ + Responses backend (the gpt-oss pipeline has no multimodal wire)" + } else { + "input_image content parts with absolute image_url are not supported on the \ + harmony Responses backend (the gpt-oss pipeline has no multimodal wire)" + } + } else { + "input_image content parts are not supported on the harmony Responses backend \ + (the gpt-oss pipeline has no multimodal wire)" + }; + return Err(unsupported(detail)); + } + ResponseContentPart::InputFile { + file_data, + file_id, + file_url, + .. + } => { + // `file_data` PDF payloads get the R4-specific message + // so callers can correlate a known gap instead of a + // blanket rejection. We only sniff magic bytes on the + // decoded prefix (spec-shaped `data:application/pdf;...` + // prefixes may or may not be present — the magic bytes + // are authoritative). + if let Some(data) = file_data.as_deref() { + if looks_like_pdf(data) { + return Err(unsupported( + "input_file content parts carrying PDF data (magic bytes `%PDF-`) are \ + not yet supported on the harmony Responses backend. PDF text \ + extraction is pending R4.", + )); + } + return Err(unsupported( + "input_file content parts with file_data are not supported on the harmony \ + Responses backend", + )); + } + if file_id.is_some() { + return Err(unsupported( + "input_file content parts with file_id are not supported on the harmony \ + Responses backend (no Files API resolver in gRPC mode)", + )); + } + if file_url.is_some() { + return Err(unsupported( + "input_file content parts with file_url are not supported on the harmony \ + Responses backend", + )); + } + // Defense in depth: `ResponseContentPart::InputFile` + // declares `file_data`, `file_id`, and `file_url` as + // individually optional (see `crates/protocols/src/ + // responses.rs`), so in principle an attachment could + // carry only `detail` / `filename` metadata with no + // content source at all. Protocol-level input + // validation does not currently enforce + // "at-least-one-source", so this arm is reachable via + // a crafted request. Rejecting it here keeps the + // validator exhaustive and avoids a silent-accept hole + // in case upstream validation is relaxed. + return Err(unsupported( + "input_file content parts are not supported on the harmony Responses backend", + )); + } + ResponseContentPart::Refusal { .. } => { + // Only assistant-role replays are allowed — those + // legitimately echo a prior model refusal in multi-turn + // history. Any other role carrying a refusal is a new + // input that the harmony backend cannot consume. + if role != "assistant" { + return Err(unsupported( + "refusal content parts are only allowed on assistant-role messages \ + (e.g. replaying a prior response); other roles cannot carry refusals \ + on the harmony Responses backend", + )); + } + } + } + } + + Ok(()) +} + +/// Detect a `data:` URL prefix. Matches `data:` case-insensitively to +/// mirror RFC 2397 permissiveness without pulling in a dedicated parser. +fn is_data_url(url: &str) -> bool { + url.len() >= 5 && url.as_bytes()[..5].eq_ignore_ascii_case(b"data:") +} + +/// Number of base64 characters that decode to at least [`PDF_MAGIC`]'s +/// length (5 bytes). base64 encodes 3 bytes per 4 chars, so 8 chars +/// decode to 6 bytes — the smallest multiple-of-4 window that still +/// covers the magic-byte prefix. Sniffing only this window avoids the +/// DOS-adjacent case where a 500 MB rejected `file_data` would otherwise +/// be fully base64-decoded just to check its leading bytes (see +/// `max_payload_size` default in `model_gateway/src/config/types.rs`). +const PDF_SNIFF_BASE64_LEN: usize = 8; +/// Decoded buffer size needed for [`PDF_SNIFF_BASE64_LEN`] base64 +/// characters. base64 decodes 4 input chars to 3 output bytes. +const PDF_SNIFF_DECODED_LEN: usize = PDF_SNIFF_BASE64_LEN / 4 * 3; + +/// Return `true` if the decoded prefix of `file_data` contains the PDF +/// magic bytes `%PDF-`. Accepts either a raw base64 payload or a +/// `data:;base64,` wrapper for robustness against +/// clients that send the latter in a `file_data` field. +/// +/// Only decodes [`PDF_SNIFF_BASE64_LEN`] base64 chars into a fixed-size +/// stack buffer; the full payload is never materialized. This matters +/// because the router's default `max_payload_size` permits multi-hundred +/// megabyte `file_data` inputs that would otherwise be fully decoded +/// just to be rejected. +fn looks_like_pdf(file_data: &str) -> bool { + let payload = strip_data_url_prefix(file_data).trim_start(); + let Some(prefix) = payload.get(..PDF_SNIFF_BASE64_LEN) else { + // Input shorter than the sniff window — safe to fall through + // to the generic "file_data unsupported" message. An 8-byte + // `file_data` payload can't be a real PDF anyway. + return false; + }; + let mut decoded = [0u8; PDF_SNIFF_DECODED_LEN]; + let Ok(len) = BASE64_STANDARD.decode_slice(prefix.as_bytes(), &mut decoded) else { + // Malformed base64 is a separate rejection kind; fall through + // so callers see the generic "file_data unsupported" message. + return false; + }; + decoded[..len].starts_with(PDF_MAGIC) +} + +/// Strip a `data:;base64,` prefix from `input` if present, returning +/// the remainder; otherwise return the input unchanged. Case-insensitive +/// on the `;base64,` separator to stay consistent with [`is_data_url`], +/// which is case-insensitive on the `data:` scheme per RFC 2397 §3; without +/// this, a payload like `data:application/pdf;Base64,JVBERi...` would pass +/// the data-URL gate but miss the strip, falling through to the generic +/// "file_data unsupported" message instead of the PDF-specific R4 message. +fn strip_data_url_prefix(input: &str) -> &str { + if !is_data_url(input) { + return input; + } + match find_base64_separator(input) { + Some(idx) => &input[idx + ";base64,".len()..], + // `data:,` (non-base64) is not something we can + // meaningfully magic-byte sniff; return the full input so the + // caller falls through to the generic file-unsupported path. + None => input, + } +} + +/// Locate the `;base64,` separator inside a data URL, matching +/// case-insensitively. Uses a byte-window walk (no allocation) bounded +/// to the first [`DATA_URL_HEADER_SCAN_LIMIT`] bytes so the hot path +/// stays allocation- *and* CPU-free even on adversarial large payloads: +/// a malformed `data:` string without an early separator would otherwise +/// force a full linear scan over hundreds of megabytes (the router +/// permits up to `max_payload_size` in +/// `model_gateway/src/config/types.rs`), which would be a CPU-sink for +/// what is otherwise a fast-path 400 rejection. +fn find_base64_separator(input: &str) -> Option { + const NEEDLE: &[u8] = b";base64,"; + let header = input + .as_bytes() + .get(..DATA_URL_HEADER_SCAN_LIMIT.min(input.len()))?; + header + .windows(NEEDLE.len()) + .position(|window| window.eq_ignore_ascii_case(NEEDLE)) +} + +/// Upper bound on how many leading bytes we scan for a `;base64,` +/// separator in a `data:` URL. RFC 2397 data-URL headers carry at most +/// a MIME type plus a handful of parameters (`charset`, `boundary`, +/// etc.); 256 bytes is comfortably larger than any realistic header and +/// small enough that the scan is O(1) regardless of the payload size +/// behind it. +const DATA_URL_HEADER_SCAN_LIMIT: usize = 256; + +/// Build the standard `400 unsupported_content` response used by every +/// rejection branch in this module. +fn unsupported(message: &str) -> Response { + error::bad_request("unsupported_content", message.to_string()) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + //! Unit coverage for R3. These tests lock in the rejection policy and + //! assert every branch of the content-part taxonomy the harmony + //! backend cannot execute — so the silent-drop regression that R3 + //! fixed cannot quietly come back. + + use axum::{body::to_bytes, http::StatusCode}; + use openai_protocol::{ + common::Detail, + responses::{ + FileDetail, ResponseContentPart, ResponseInput, ResponseInputOutputItem, + ResponsesRequest, StringOrContentParts, + }, + }; + use serde_json::Value; + + use super::*; + use crate::routers::error::HEADER_X_SMG_ERROR_CODE; + + /// Extract the JSON error message body from a validation error + /// response. Tests use this instead of only checking status + + /// `X-SMG-Error-Code` so that PDF-specific and generic rejections + /// are distinguishable at the message-body level — otherwise both + /// shapes satisfy the same status/code assertion and the + /// R4-specific path would be untested. + async fn error_message(response: Response) -> String { + let (_parts, body) = response.into_parts(); + let bytes = to_bytes(body, usize::MAX) + .await + .expect("error body fits in memory"); + let value: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).expect("error body is always valid JSON"); + value + .get("error") + .and_then(|e| e.get("message")) + .and_then(|m| m.as_str()) + .map(str::to_owned) + .expect("error.message is always present on a bad_request response") + } + + fn request_with_items(items: Vec) -> ResponsesRequest { + ResponsesRequest { + model: "gpt-oss".to_string(), + input: ResponseInput::Items(items), + ..Default::default() + } + } + + fn user_message(content: Vec) -> ResponseInputOutputItem { + ResponseInputOutputItem::Message { + id: "msg_test".to_string(), + role: "user".to_string(), + content, + status: Some("completed".to_string()), + phase: None, + } + } + + fn assistant_message(content: Vec) -> ResponseInputOutputItem { + ResponseInputOutputItem::Message { + id: "msg_test_asst".to_string(), + role: "assistant".to_string(), + content, + status: Some("completed".to_string()), + phase: None, + } + } + + fn assert_is_unsupported(response: Response) { + assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let header = response + .headers() + .get(HEADER_X_SMG_ERROR_CODE) + .expect("error code header is always set"); + assert_eq!(header.to_str().unwrap(), "unsupported_content"); + } + + #[test] + fn text_only_input_is_accepted() { + // Baseline: `ResponseInput::Text` never carries non-text parts + // so it must always validate. Guards against accidental + // overreach in the validator. + let request = ResponsesRequest { + model: "gpt-oss".to_string(), + input: ResponseInput::Text("hello".to_string()), + ..Default::default() + }; + validate_harmony_responses_input(&request).expect("text-only request must pass"); + } + + #[test] + fn pure_input_text_items_are_accepted() { + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputText { + text: "Describe the weather.".to_string(), + }])]); + validate_harmony_responses_input(&request).expect("InputText must pass"); + } + + #[test] + fn input_image_data_url_is_rejected() { + // R3 scope item: InputImage with a `data:` URL. The pre-R3 + // builder dropped this silently; R3 mandates a 400. + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputImage { + detail: Some(Detail::Auto), + file_id: None, + image_url: Some("".to_string()), + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("data-URL images must be rejected"); + assert_is_unsupported(err); + } + + #[test] + fn input_image_absolute_url_is_rejected() { + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputImage { + detail: None, + file_id: None, + image_url: Some("https://example.com/dog.jpg".to_string()), + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("absolute-URL images must be rejected"); + assert_is_unsupported(err); + } + + #[test] + fn input_image_file_id_is_rejected() { + // R3 scope item: file_id is always unsupported in gRPC mode + // (no Files API resolver). + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputImage { + detail: None, + file_id: Some("file-abc".to_string()), + image_url: None, + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("file_id images must be rejected"); + assert_is_unsupported(err); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn input_file_pdf_magic_bytes_are_rejected_with_r4_message() { + // `%PDF-1.4\n` base64-encodes to `JVBERi0xLjQK`. Asserts the + // PDF-specific error path so callers know the gap is tracked + // under R4 rather than a blanket rejection. We assert on the + // message body (not just status/code) so the PDF-specific + // branch is distinguishable from a generic file-data rejection. + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputFile { + detail: Some(FileDetail::High), + file_data: Some("JVBERi0xLjQK".to_string()), + file_id: None, + file_url: None, + filename: Some("report.pdf".to_string()), + }])]); + let err = + validate_harmony_responses_input(&request).expect_err("PDF file_data must be rejected"); + assert_eq!(err.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + assert_eq!( + err.headers() + .get(HEADER_X_SMG_ERROR_CODE) + .and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok()), + Some("unsupported_content"), + ); + let message = error_message(err).await; + assert!( + message.contains("PDF") && message.contains("R4"), + "PDF rejections must cite R4 so callers can correlate the paused task; got: {message}" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn input_file_non_pdf_file_data_is_rejected() { + // A JPEG magic-byte prefix (FFD8FFE0 ... base64 `/9j/4A==`) is + // not a PDF; it must still be rejected because the harmony + // pipeline cannot route it — but *not* with the R4 message. + // Asserts the generic file-data branch is taken so we do not + // misdirect clients to the paused R4 task. + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputFile { + detail: None, + file_data: Some("/9j/4AAQSkZJRg==".to_string()), + file_id: None, + file_url: None, + filename: Some("photo.jpg".to_string()), + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("JPEG file_data must be rejected"); + let message = error_message(err).await; + assert!( + !message.contains("R4"), + "non-PDF file_data must not cite R4; got: {message}" + ); + assert!( + message.contains("file_data"), + "generic file-data rejections must mention file_data; got: {message}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn input_file_file_url_is_rejected() { + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputFile { + detail: None, + file_data: None, + file_id: None, + file_url: Some("https://example.com/report.pdf".to_string()), + filename: None, + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("file_url attachments must be rejected"); + assert_is_unsupported(err); + } + + #[test] + fn input_file_file_id_is_rejected() { + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputFile { + detail: None, + file_data: None, + file_id: Some("file-abc".to_string()), + file_url: None, + filename: None, + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("file_id attachments must be rejected"); + assert_is_unsupported(err); + } + + #[test] + fn refusal_on_user_role_is_rejected() { + // Refusals on user/system/developer messages are nonsensical + // inputs for the harmony pipeline. R3 rejects them explicitly + // instead of letting the builder silently fold the text into + // the prompt. + let request = request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::Refusal { + refusal: "I cannot process that request.".to_string(), + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("user-role refusals must be rejected"); + assert_is_unsupported(err); + } + + #[test] + fn refusal_on_assistant_role_is_accepted() { + // Assistant-role replays legitimately carry a prior refusal + // when the client rehydrates a multi-turn conversation. The + // builder already renders them correctly as text, so R3 must + // not regress this. + let request = request_with_items(vec![assistant_message(vec![ + ResponseContentPart::Refusal { + refusal: "I cannot process that request.".to_string(), + }, + ])]); + validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect("assistant-role refusals must still be accepted for multi-turn replay"); + } + + #[test] + fn simple_input_message_with_content_parts_is_validated() { + // SimpleInputMessage uses the `StringOrContentParts::Array` + // shape; the validator must descend into it symmetrically with + // the `Message` case. Regression guard: before R3 the builder + // silently dropped images on both variants. + let request = request_with_items(vec![ResponseInputOutputItem::SimpleInputMessage { + content: StringOrContentParts::Array(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputImage { + detail: None, + file_id: None, + image_url: Some("https://example.com/cat.jpg".to_string()), + }]), + role: "user".to_string(), + r#type: None, + phase: None, + }]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("SimpleInputMessage.Array images must be rejected"); + assert_is_unsupported(err); + } + + #[test] + fn simple_input_message_string_variant_is_accepted() { + // Sibling of the Array case above; must not regress the bare + // `StringOrContentParts::String` path. + let request = request_with_items(vec![ResponseInputOutputItem::SimpleInputMessage { + content: StringOrContentParts::String("Describe the weather.".to_string()), + role: "user".to_string(), + r#type: None, + phase: None, + }]); + validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect("SimpleInputMessage.String must pass unchanged"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn data_url_prefix_pdf_magic_still_rejected_with_r4_message() { + // Robustness: if a client wraps the base64 payload in a + // `data:application/pdf;base64,` envelope inside `file_data` + // (non-canonical but observed in the wild), the magic-byte + // sniff must still catch it so the caller sees the R4-specific + // message rather than a generic rejection. + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputFile { + detail: None, + file_data: Some("data:application/pdf;base64,JVBERi0xLjQK".to_string()), + file_id: None, + file_url: None, + filename: None, + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("data-URL-wrapped PDF file_data must be rejected"); + let message = error_message(err).await; + assert!( + message.contains("PDF") && message.contains("R4"), + "data-URL-wrapped PDF must reach the R4-specific message; got: {message}" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn data_url_prefix_is_case_insensitive_on_base64_separator() { + // `is_data_url` matches `data:` case-insensitively, so + // `strip_data_url_prefix` must match `;base64,` with the same + // flexibility. Before the R3 follow-up both `Data:` and + // `;Base64,` would skip the strip, mis-routing the request into + // the generic "file_data unsupported" path instead of the + // PDF-specific R4 message. + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputFile { + detail: None, + file_data: Some("Data:application/pdf;Base64,JVBERi0xLjQK".to_string()), + file_id: None, + file_url: None, + filename: None, + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("mixed-case data-URL wrapper must still reach the PDF sniffer"); + let message = error_message(err).await; + assert!( + message.contains("PDF") && message.contains("R4"), + "mixed-case data-URL wrapper must reach the R4-specific message; got: {message}" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pdf_sniff_decodes_only_magic_prefix_not_full_payload() { + // Regression guard for the bounded-decode path: a large PDF + // `file_data` must still route to the R4-specific message + // without the validator materializing the entire payload. We + // construct a payload whose first 6 bytes base64-decode to + // `%PDF-1` and pad the remainder with a long run of `A`s; the + // prefix-only decoder reaches the magic bytes before looking + // at anything beyond the first 8 base64 chars. + // + // `%PDF-1` → base64 `JVBERi0x` (the canonical PDF header). + let mut payload = String::from("JVBERi0x"); + payload.push_str(&"A".repeat(65_536)); + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputFile { + detail: None, + file_data: Some(payload), + file_id: None, + file_url: None, + filename: None, + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("large PDF file_data must still be rejected with the R4 message"); + let message = error_message(err).await; + assert!( + message.contains("PDF") && message.contains("R4"), + "bounded-decode path must still emit the R4-specific message; got: {message}" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn data_url_separator_scan_is_bounded_to_header_region() { + // Adversarial case: a `data:` payload without an early + // `;base64,` separator must not force a full linear scan over + // a multi-megabyte body. We construct a `data:` string with an + // oversize MIME header region and no separator, then assert + // the request is still rejected quickly (no panic, no timeout). + // + // This is a behavioral guard — the absence of a separator + // means the PDF sniffer falls through to the generic + // file-data rejection — but it locks in the + // `DATA_URL_HEADER_SCAN_LIMIT` cap so a future relaxation + // cannot quietly reintroduce the O(n) scan. + let mut payload = String::from("data:application/octet-stream;"); + payload.push_str(&"x".repeat(65_536)); // far beyond the header cap + payload.push_str(",JVBERi0x"); // PDF magic in payload, no ;base64, + let request = + request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::InputFile { + detail: None, + file_data: Some(payload), + file_id: None, + file_url: None, + filename: None, + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("adversarial data-URL without early separator must still be rejected"); + // Generic file-data branch — the PDF sniffer couldn't decode + // because the strip failed, which is the desired behavior + // (fast rejection over DoS-adjacent full-string walk). + let message = error_message(err).await; + assert!( + !message.contains("R4"), + "bounded scan must not claim PDF identification when the separator is beyond the cap; got: {message}" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn refusal_role_rejection_cites_assistant_exception() { + // The non-assistant refusal branch has a distinct + // human-readable message; lock it in so future refactors do + // not regress the rationale the caller sees. + let request = request_with_items(vec![user_message(vec![ResponseContentPart::Refusal { + refusal: "I cannot process that.".to_string(), + }])]); + let err = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) + .expect_err("user-role refusals must be rejected"); + let message = error_message(err).await; + assert!( + message.contains("refusal") && message.contains("assistant"), + "refusal rejection must name the assistant-role exception; got: {message}" + ); + } +} diff --git a/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/mod.rs b/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/mod.rs index fa537ffcdb..8d173f0b7c 100644 --- a/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/mod.rs +++ b/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/mod.rs @@ -17,8 +17,11 @@ //! - `streaming` - Streaming entry point and tool loop //! - `execution` - MCP tool execution logic //! - `common` - Shared helpers and state tracking +//! - `content_parts` - R3 input content-part validation (reject +//! image/file/refusal parts the harmony backend cannot render) pub(crate) mod common; +pub(crate) mod content_parts; pub(crate) mod execution; pub(crate) mod non_streaming; pub(crate) mod streaming; diff --git a/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/non_streaming.rs b/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/non_streaming.rs index aa240a6c94..8c01b36b23 100644 --- a/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/non_streaming.rs +++ b/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/non_streaming.rs @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ use super::{ build_next_request_with_tools, inject_mcp_metadata, load_previous_messages, strip_image_generation_from_request_tools, McpCallTracking, }, + content_parts::validate_harmony_responses_input, execution::{convert_mcp_tools_to_response_tools, execute_mcp_tools, ToolResult}, }; use crate::{ @@ -56,12 +57,32 @@ pub(crate) async fn serve_harmony_responses( request: ResponsesRequest, tenant_request_meta: TenantRequestMeta, ) -> Result { + // R3: reject image/file/refusal content parts up-front. The harmony + // pipeline renders prompts via `openai_harmony` and has no + // multimodal wire to the backend (chat harmony sends `None` for + // multimodal in request_building), so silently dropping these + // parts would lose data invisibly. Validate the caller's original + // input *before* we merge persisted history via + // `load_previous_messages` so fresh-input issues are reported as + // the caller's problem rather than appearing to come from the + // stored chain. + validate_harmony_responses_input(&request)?; + // Clone request for persistence let original_request = request.clone(); // Load previous conversation history if previous_response_id is set let current_request = load_previous_messages(ctx, request).await?; + // R3: re-validate after history merge. Stored threads may contain + // image/file content parts persisted by a sibling router that + // *does* support multimodal (e.g. the OpenAI-compat passthrough); + // replaying such a thread through the harmony backend would hit + // the same silent-drop regression this validator exists to close. + // The validator accepts assistant-role refusal replays, so + // legitimate multi-turn history passes through unchanged. + validate_harmony_responses_input(¤t_request)?; + // Check MCP connection and get whether MCP tools are present let (has_mcp_tools, mcp_servers) = ensure_mcp_connection(&ctx.mcp_orchestrator, current_request.tools.as_deref()).await?; diff --git a/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/streaming.rs b/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/streaming.rs index 3f7c209869..2f4146bf11 100644 --- a/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/streaming.rs +++ b/model_gateway/src/routers/grpc/harmony/responses/streaming.rs @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ use super::{ build_next_request_with_tools, load_previous_messages, strip_image_generation_from_request_tools, McpCallTracking, }, + content_parts::validate_harmony_responses_input, execution::{convert_mcp_tools_to_response_tools, execute_mcp_tools}, }; use crate::{ @@ -46,12 +47,33 @@ pub(crate) async fn serve_harmony_responses_stream( request: ResponsesRequest, tenant_request_meta: TenantRequestMeta, ) -> Response { + // R3: reject image/file/refusal content parts up-front. Same + // rationale as the non-streaming entry point — harmony has no + // multimodal wire and we must not silently drop those parts. + // Rejection happens *before* history load and SSE-channel setup so + // callers receive a plain HTTP 400 instead of an SSE stream that + // immediately closes. + if let Err(err_response) = validate_harmony_responses_input(&request) { + return err_response; + } + // Load previous conversation history if previous_response_id is set let current_request = match load_previous_messages(ctx, request.clone()).await { Ok(req) => req, Err(err_response) => return err_response, }; + // R3: re-validate after history merge. Stored threads may contain + // image/file content parts persisted by a sibling router that + // *does* support multimodal (e.g. the OpenAI-compat passthrough); + // replaying such a thread through the harmony backend would hit + // the same silent-drop regression this validator exists to close. + // The validator accepts assistant-role refusal replays, so + // legitimate multi-turn history passes through unchanged. + if let Err(err_response) = validate_harmony_responses_input(¤t_request) { + return err_response; + } + // Check MCP connection BEFORE starting stream and get whether MCP tools are present let (has_mcp_tools, mcp_servers) = match ensure_mcp_connection( &ctx.mcp_orchestrator,