diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index 1a98e574c0..0e304cc209 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ require ( github.com/tidwall/sjson v1.2.5 github.com/vincent-petithory/dataurl v1.0.0 github.com/vmware/govmomi v0.45.1 - golang.org/x/net v0.48.0 + golang.org/x/net v0.56.0 golang.org/x/time v0.11.0 google.golang.org/grpc v1.79.3 k8s.io/api v0.35.1 @@ -393,16 +393,16 @@ require ( go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0 // indirect go.uber.org/zap v1.27.0 // indirect go4.org v0.0.0-20200104003542-c7e774b10ea0 // indirect - golang.org/x/crypto v0.46.0 + golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250103183323-7d7fa50e5329 golang.org/x/exp/typeparams v0.0.0-20241108190413-2d47ceb2692f // indirect - golang.org/x/mod v0.30.0 // indirect + golang.org/x/mod v0.37.0 // indirect golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.34.0 // indirect - golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0 - golang.org/x/sys v0.40.0 - golang.org/x/term v0.38.0 // indirect - golang.org/x/text v0.32.0 // indirect - golang.org/x/tools v0.39.0 // indirect + golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 + golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 + golang.org/x/term v0.45.0 // indirect + golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 // indirect + golang.org/x/tools v0.47.0 // indirect google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.10 // indirect gopkg.in/inf.v0 v0.9.1 // indirect gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0 diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index 3ad86611c5..8bba25d831 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -978,8 +978,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200728195943-123391ffb6de/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPh golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210921155107-089bfa567519/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc= golang.org/x/crypto v0.13.0/go.mod h1:y6Z2r+Rw4iayiXXAIxJIDAJ1zMW4yaTpebo8fPOliYc= golang.org/x/crypto v0.14.0/go.mod h1:MVFd36DqK4CsrnJYDkBA3VC4m2GkXAM0PvzMCn4JQf4= -golang.org/x/crypto v0.46.0 h1:cKRW/pmt1pKAfetfu+RCEvjvZkA9RimPbh7bhFjGVBU= -golang.org/x/crypto v0.46.0/go.mod h1:Evb/oLKmMraqjZ2iQTwDwvCtJkczlDuTmdJXoZVzqU0= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0 h1:YLIA59K4fiNzHzjnZt2tUJQjQtUWfWbeHBqKtk3eScw= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0/go.mod h1:KWL8ny2AZdGR2cWmzeHrp2azQPGogOv+HeQaVEXC2dk= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190121172915-509febef88a4/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250103183323-7d7fa50e5329 h1:9kj3STMvgqy3YA4VQXBrN7925ICMxD5wzMRcgA30588= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250103183323-7d7fa50e5329/go.mod h1:qj5a5QZpwLU2NLQudwIN5koi3beDhSAlJwa67PuM98c= @@ -1001,8 +1001,8 @@ golang.org/x/mod v0.8.0/go.mod h1:iBbtSCu2XBx23ZKBPSOrRkjjQPZFPuis4dIYUhu/chs= golang.org/x/mod v0.9.0/go.mod h1:iBbtSCu2XBx23ZKBPSOrRkjjQPZFPuis4dIYUhu/chs= golang.org/x/mod v0.12.0/go.mod h1:iBbtSCu2XBx23ZKBPSOrRkjjQPZFPuis4dIYUhu/chs= golang.org/x/mod v0.13.0/go.mod h1:hTbmBsO62+eylJbnUtE2MGJUyE7QWk4xUqPFrRgJ+7c= -golang.org/x/mod v0.30.0 h1:fDEXFVZ/fmCKProc/yAXXUijritrDzahmwwefnjoPFk= -golang.org/x/mod v0.30.0/go.mod h1:lAsf5O2EvJeSFMiBxXDki7sCgAxEUcZHXoXMKT4GJKc= +golang.org/x/mod v0.37.0 h1:vF1DjpVEshcIqoEaauuHebaLk1O1forxjxBaVn884JQ= +golang.org/x/mod v0.37.0/go.mod h1:m8S8VeM9r4dzDwjrKO0a1sZP3YjeMamRRlD+fmR2Q/0= golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180724234803-3673e40ba225/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4= golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180826012351-8a410e7b638d/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4= golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180906233101-161cd47e91fd/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4= @@ -1027,8 +1027,8 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.8.0/go.mod h1:QVkue5JL9kW//ek3r6jTKnTFis1tRmNAW2P1shuFdJc= golang.org/x/net v0.10.0/go.mod h1:0qNGK6F8kojg2nk9dLZ2mShWaEBan6FAoqfSigmmuDg= golang.org/x/net v0.15.0/go.mod h1:idbUs1IY1+zTqbi8yxTbhexhEEk5ur9LInksu6HrEpk= golang.org/x/net v0.16.0/go.mod h1:NxSsAGuq816PNPmqtQdLE42eU2Fs7NoRIZrHJAlaCOE= -golang.org/x/net v0.48.0 h1:zyQRTTrjc33Lhh0fBgT/H3oZq9WuvRR5gPC70xpDiQU= -golang.org/x/net v0.48.0/go.mod h1:+ndRgGjkh8FGtu1w1FGbEC31if4VrNVMuKTgcAAnQRY= +golang.org/x/net v0.56.0 h1:Rw8j/hFzGvJUZwNBXnAtf5sVDVt+65SK2C7IxCxZt5o= +golang.org/x/net v0.56.0/go.mod h1:D3Ku6r+V6JROoZK144D2XfMHFcMq/0zSfLelVTCFKec= golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20180821212333-d2e6202438be/go.mod h1:N/0e6XlmueqKjAGxoOufVs8QHGRruUQn6yWY3a++T0U= golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.34.0 h1:hqK/t4AKgbqWkdkcAeI8XLmbK+4m4G5YeQRrmiotGlw= golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.34.0/go.mod h1:lzm5WQJQwKZ3nwavOZ3IS5Aulzxi68dUSgRHujetwEA= @@ -1043,8 +1043,8 @@ golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20220722155255-886fb9371eb4/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJ golang.org/x/sync v0.1.0/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM= golang.org/x/sync v0.3.0/go.mod h1:FU7BRWz2tNW+3quACPkgCx/L+uEAv1htQ0V83Z9Rj+Y= golang.org/x/sync v0.4.0/go.mod h1:FU7BRWz2tNW+3quACPkgCx/L+uEAv1htQ0V83Z9Rj+Y= -golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0 h1:vV+1eWNmZ5geRlYjzm2adRgW2/mcpevXNg50YZtPCE4= -golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0/go.mod h1:9KTHXmSnoGruLpwFjVSX0lNNA75CykiMECbovNTZqGI= +golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek= +golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0= golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180830151530-49385e6e1522/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY= golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180909124046-d0be0721c37e/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY= golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190215142949-d0b11bdaac8a/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY= @@ -1076,8 +1076,8 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg= golang.org/x/sys v0.8.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg= golang.org/x/sys v0.12.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg= golang.org/x/sys v0.13.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg= -golang.org/x/sys v0.40.0 h1:DBZZqJ2Rkml6QMQsZywtnjnnGvHza6BTfYFWY9kjEWQ= -golang.org/x/sys v0.40.0/go.mod h1:OgkHotnGiDImocRcuBABYBEXf8A9a87e/uXjp9XT3ks= +golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs= +golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw= golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo= golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210927222741-03fcf44c2211/go.mod h1:jbD1KX2456YbFQfuXm/mYQcufACuNUgVhRMnK/tPxf8= golang.org/x/term v0.2.0/go.mod h1:TVmDHMZPmdnySmBfhjOoOdhjzdE1h4u1VwSiw2l1Nuc= @@ -1087,8 +1087,8 @@ golang.org/x/term v0.6.0/go.mod h1:m6U89DPEgQRMq3DNkDClhWw02AUbt2daBVO4cn4Hv9U= golang.org/x/term v0.8.0/go.mod h1:xPskH00ivmX89bAKVGSKKtLOWNx2+17Eiy94tnKShWo= golang.org/x/term v0.12.0/go.mod h1:owVbMEjm3cBLCHdkQu9b1opXd4ETQWc3BhuQGKgXgvU= golang.org/x/term v0.13.0/go.mod h1:LTmsnFJwVN6bCy1rVCoS+qHT1HhALEFxKncY3WNNh4U= -golang.org/x/term v0.38.0 h1:PQ5pkm/rLO6HnxFR7N2lJHOZX6Kez5Y1gDSJla6jo7Q= -golang.org/x/term v0.38.0/go.mod h1:bSEAKrOT1W+VSu9TSCMtoGEOUcKxOKgl3LE5QEF/xVg= +golang.org/x/term v0.45.0 h1:NwWyBmoJCbfTHpxrWoZ9C6/VxOf7ic219I8xZZFdrf0= +golang.org/x/term v0.45.0/go.mod h1:9aqxs0blBcrm/n0L9QW0aRVD+ktan8ssZromtqJC43w= golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ= golang.org/x/text v0.3.2/go.mod h1:bEr9sfX3Q8Zfm5fL9x+3itogRgK3+ptLWKqgva+5dAk= golang.org/x/text v0.3.3/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ= @@ -1100,8 +1100,8 @@ golang.org/x/text v0.7.0/go.mod h1:mrYo+phRRbMaCq/xk9113O4dZlRixOauAjOtrjsXDZ8= golang.org/x/text v0.8.0/go.mod h1:e1OnstbJyHTd6l/uOt8jFFHp6TRDWZR/bV3emEE/zU8= golang.org/x/text v0.9.0/go.mod h1:e1OnstbJyHTd6l/uOt8jFFHp6TRDWZR/bV3emEE/zU8= golang.org/x/text v0.13.0/go.mod h1:TvPlkZtksWOMsz7fbANvkp4WM8x/WCo/om8BMLbz+aE= -golang.org/x/text v0.32.0 h1:ZD01bjUt1FQ9WJ0ClOL5vxgxOI/sVCNgX1YtKwcY0mU= -golang.org/x/text v0.32.0/go.mod h1:o/rUWzghvpD5TXrTIBuJU77MTaN0ljMWE47kxGJQ7jY= +golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 h1:Ub2Z6/xjgF1WrYQz2nuITOEegKFtiIy+rieRJ5lHZKs= +golang.org/x/text v0.40.0/go.mod h1:hpnzDAfGV753zIKo+wk3u1bVKCGPbrnF7+7LBF/UHVY= golang.org/x/time v0.11.0 h1:/bpjEDfN9tkoN/ryeYHnv5hcMlc8ncjMcM4XBk5NWV0= golang.org/x/time v0.11.0/go.mod h1:CDIdPxbZBQxdj6cxyCIdrNogrJKMJ7pr37NYpMcMDSg= golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180828015842-6cd1fcedba52/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ= @@ -1133,8 +1133,8 @@ golang.org/x/tools v0.6.0/go.mod h1:Xwgl3UAJ/d3gWutnCtw505GrjyAbvKui8lOU390QaIU= golang.org/x/tools v0.7.0/go.mod h1:4pg6aUX35JBAogB10C9AtvVL+qowtN4pT3CGSQex14s= golang.org/x/tools v0.13.0/go.mod h1:HvlwmtVNQAhOuCjW7xxvovg8wbNq7LwfXh/k7wXUl58= golang.org/x/tools v0.14.0/go.mod h1:uYBEerGOWcJyEORxN+Ek8+TT266gXkNlHdJBwexUsBg= -golang.org/x/tools v0.39.0 h1:ik4ho21kwuQln40uelmciQPp9SipgNDdrafrYA4TmQQ= -golang.org/x/tools v0.39.0/go.mod h1:JnefbkDPyD8UU2kI5fuf8ZX4/yUeh9W877ZeBONxUqQ= +golang.org/x/tools v0.47.0 h1:7Kn5x/d1svx/PzryTsqeoZN4TZwqeH5pGWjefhLi/1Q= +golang.org/x/tools v0.47.0/go.mod h1:dFHnyTvFWY212G+h7ZY4Vsp/K3U4/7W9TyVaAul8uCA= golang.org/x/tools/go/expect v0.1.1-deprecated h1:jpBZDwmgPhXsKZC6WhL20P4b/wmnpsEAGHaNy0n/rJM= golang.org/x/tools/go/expect v0.1.1-deprecated/go.mod h1:eihoPOH+FgIqa3FpoTwguz/bVUSGBlGQU67vpBeOrBY= golang.org/x/tools/go/packages/packagestest v0.1.1-deprecated h1:1h2MnaIAIXISqTFKdENegdpAgUXz6NrPEsbIeWaBRvM= diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/argon2/argon2.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/argon2/argon2.go index 2b65ec91ac..57ab8371cb 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/argon2/argon2.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/argon2/argon2.go @@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ // It uses data-independent memory access, which is preferred for password // hashing and password-based key derivation. Argon2i requires more passes over // memory than Argon2id to protect from trade-off attacks. The recommended -// parameters (taken from [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]) for non-interactive operations are time=3 and to -// use the maximum available memory. +// parameters (taken from [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]) for non-interactive +// operations are time=3 and to use the maximum available memory. // // # Argon2id // @@ -26,11 +26,14 @@ // Argon2i and Argon2d. It uses data-independent memory access for the first // half of the first iteration over the memory and data-dependent memory access // for the rest. Argon2id is side-channel resistant and provides better brute- -// force cost savings due to time-memory tradeoffs than Argon2i. The recommended -// parameters for non-interactive operations (taken from [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]) are time=1 and to -// use the maximum available memory. +// force cost savings due to time-memory tradeoffs than Argon2i. [RFC 9106 +// Section 4] recommends time=1, memory=2*1024*1024 KiB (2 GiB), and threads=4 +// as the first recommended option. If much less memory is available, it +// recommends time=3, memory=64*1024 KiB (64 MiB), and threads=4 as the second +// recommended option. // // [argon2-specs.pdf]: https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2/blob/master/argon2-specs.pdf +// [RFC 9106 Section 4]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9106.html#section-4 // [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9106.html#section-7.3 package argon2 @@ -59,9 +62,9 @@ const ( // // key := argon2.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 3, 32*1024, 4, 32) // -// [RFC 9106 Section 7.3] recommends time=3, and memory=32*1024 as a sensible number. -// If using that amount of memory (32 MB) is not possible in some contexts then -// the time parameter can be increased to compensate. +// The example above uses time=3 and memory=32*1024. Argon2i generally +// requires more passes over memory than Argon2id. If in doubt, prefer IDKey +// and its Argon2id parameter recommendations. // // The time parameter specifies the number of passes over the memory and the // memory parameter specifies the size of the memory in KiB. For example @@ -69,8 +72,6 @@ const ( // adjusted to the number of available CPUs. The cost parameters should be // increased as memory latency and CPU parallelism increases. Remember to get a // good random salt. -// -// [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9106.html#section-7.3 func Key(password, salt []byte, time, memory uint32, threads uint8, keyLen uint32) []byte { return deriveKey(argon2i, password, salt, nil, nil, time, memory, threads, keyLen) } @@ -83,20 +84,20 @@ func Key(password, salt []byte, time, memory uint32, threads uint8, keyLen uint3 // For example, you can get a derived key for e.g. AES-256 (which needs a // 32-byte key) by doing: // -// key := argon2.IDKey([]byte("some password"), salt, 1, 64*1024, 4, 32) +// key := argon2.IDKey([]byte("some password"), salt, 1, 2*1024*1024, 4, 32) // -// [RFC 9106 Section 7.3] recommends time=1, and memory=64*1024 as a sensible number. -// If using that amount of memory (64 MB) is not possible in some contexts then -// the time parameter can be increased to compensate. +// The example above uses the first [RFC 9106 Section 4] recommended option. +// If much less memory is available, the second recommended option is time=3, +// memory=64*1024 KiB (64 MiB), and threads=4. // // The time parameter specifies the number of passes over the memory and the // memory parameter specifies the size of the memory in KiB. For example -// memory=64*1024 sets the memory cost to ~64 MB. The number of threads can be -// adjusted to the numbers of available CPUs. The cost parameters should be +// memory=2*1024*1024 sets the memory cost to ~2 GiB. The number of threads can +// be adjusted to the numbers of available CPUs. The cost parameters should be // increased as memory latency and CPU parallelism increases. Remember to get a // good random salt. // -// [RFC 9106 Section 7.3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9106.html#section-7.3 +// [RFC 9106 Section 4]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9106.html#section-4 func IDKey(password, salt []byte, time, memory uint32, threads uint8, keyLen uint32) []byte { return deriveKey(argon2id, password, salt, nil, nil, time, memory, threads, keyLen) } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/go125.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/go125.go deleted file mode 100644 index 67e990b7e1..0000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/go125.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2025 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -//go:build go1.25 - -package blake2b - -import "hash" - -var _ hash.XOF = (*xof)(nil) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf/hkdf.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf/hkdf.go index 3bee66294e..49f3a55820 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf/hkdf.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf/hkdf.go @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ package hkdf import ( + "crypto/hkdf" "crypto/hmac" "errors" "hash" @@ -24,15 +25,19 @@ import ( // Expand invocations and different context values. Most common scenarios, // including the generation of multiple keys, should use New instead. func Extract(hash func() hash.Hash, secret, salt []byte) []byte { - if salt == nil { - salt = make([]byte, hash().Size()) + // Use the stdlib Extract, which disables FIPS 140 enforcement of the HMAC + // key (which in HKDF is the salt). The only possible error is FIPS 140 + // enforcement of the hash, which had to panic under this API anyway. We + // don't use the stdlib Expand, because it switched to returning a []byte + // instead of an io.Reader, and Expand uses the HMAC key as a key. + out, err := hkdf.Extract(hash, secret, salt) + if err != nil { + panic(err) } - extractor := hmac.New(hash, salt) - extractor.Write(secret) - return extractor.Sum(nil) + return out } -type hkdf struct { +type hkdfReader struct { expander hash.Hash size int @@ -43,7 +48,7 @@ type hkdf struct { buf []byte } -func (f *hkdf) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { +func (f *hkdfReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { // Check whether enough data can be generated need := len(p) remains := len(f.buf) + int(255-f.counter+1)*f.size @@ -84,7 +89,7 @@ func (f *hkdf) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { // 3.3. Most common scenarios will want to use New instead. func Expand(hash func() hash.Hash, pseudorandomKey, info []byte) io.Reader { expander := hmac.New(hash, pseudorandomKey) - return &hkdf{expander, expander.Size(), info, 1, nil, nil} + return &hkdfReader{expander, expander.Size(), info, 1, nil, nil} } // New returns a Reader, from which keys can be read, using the given hash, diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor/armor.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor/armor.go index e664d127cb..453e4810c0 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor/armor.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor/armor.go @@ -5,11 +5,12 @@ // Package armor implements OpenPGP ASCII Armor, see RFC 4880. OpenPGP Armor is // very similar to PEM except that it has an additional CRC checksum. // -// Deprecated: this package is unmaintained except for security fixes. New -// applications should consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP -// for their specific task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP -// systems and need a maintained package, consider a community fork. -// See https://golang.org/issue/44226. +// Deprecated: this package is unsafe by design, and has numerous known security +// issues. It is not maintained, and should not be used. New applications should +// consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP for their specific +// task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP systems and need a +// maintained package, consider github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp, which +// is a maintained fork that aims to be a drop-in replacement for this package. package armor import ( diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors/errors.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors/errors.go index a328749471..2009e2acee 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors/errors.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors/errors.go @@ -4,11 +4,12 @@ // Package errors contains common error types for the OpenPGP packages. // -// Deprecated: this package is unmaintained except for security fixes. New -// applications should consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP -// for their specific task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP -// systems and need a maintained package, consider a community fork. -// See https://golang.org/issue/44226. +// Deprecated: this package is unsafe by design, and has numerous known security +// issues. It is not maintained, and should not be used. New applications should +// consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP for their specific +// task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP systems and need a +// maintained package, consider github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp, which +// is a maintained fork that aims to be a drop-in replacement for this package. package errors import ( diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go index a84a1a214e..5e3a25ad85 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go @@ -5,11 +5,12 @@ // Package packet implements parsing and serialization of OpenPGP packets, as // specified in RFC 4880. // -// Deprecated: this package is unmaintained except for security fixes. New -// applications should consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP -// for their specific task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP -// systems and need a maintained package, consider a community fork. -// See https://golang.org/issue/44226. +// Deprecated: this package is unsafe by design, and has numerous known security +// issues. It is not maintained, and should not be used. New applications should +// consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP for their specific +// task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP systems and need a +// maintained package, consider github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp, which +// is a maintained fork that aims to be a drop-in replacement for this package. package packet import ( diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/read.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/read.go index cff3db9196..28905a9073 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/read.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/read.go @@ -4,11 +4,12 @@ // Package openpgp implements high level operations on OpenPGP messages. // -// Deprecated: this package is unmaintained except for security fixes. New -// applications should consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP -// for their specific task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP -// systems and need a maintained package, consider a community fork. -// See https://golang.org/issue/44226. +// Deprecated: this package is unsafe by design, and has numerous known security +// issues. It is not maintained, and should not be used. New applications should +// consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP for their specific +// task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP systems and need a +// maintained package, consider github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp, which +// is a maintained fork that aims to be a drop-in replacement for this package. package openpgp import ( diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/s2k/s2k.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/s2k/s2k.go index 490cb633ce..b5fe4c1605 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/s2k/s2k.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/s2k/s2k.go @@ -5,11 +5,12 @@ // Package s2k implements the various OpenPGP string-to-key transforms as // specified in RFC 4800 section 3.7.1. // -// Deprecated: this package is unmaintained except for security fixes. New -// applications should consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP -// for their specific task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP -// systems and need a maintained package, consider a community fork. -// See https://golang.org/issue/44226. +// Deprecated: this package is unsafe by design, and has numerous known security +// issues. It is not maintained, and should not be used. New applications should +// consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP for their specific +// task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP systems and need a +// maintained package, consider github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp, which +// is a maintained fork that aims to be a drop-in replacement for this package. package s2k import ( diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2/pbkdf2.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2/pbkdf2.go index 28cd99c7f3..b332122033 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2/pbkdf2.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2/pbkdf2.go @@ -2,24 +2,17 @@ // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. -/* -Package pbkdf2 implements the key derivation function PBKDF2 as defined in RFC -2898 / PKCS #5 v2.0. - -A key derivation function is useful when encrypting data based on a password -or any other not-fully-random data. It uses a pseudorandom function to derive -a secure encryption key based on the password. - -While v2.0 of the standard defines only one pseudorandom function to use, -HMAC-SHA1, the drafted v2.1 specification allows use of all five FIPS Approved -Hash Functions SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 for HMAC. To -choose, you can pass the `New` functions from the different SHA packages to -pbkdf2.Key. -*/ +// Package pbkdf2 implements the key derivation function PBKDF2 as defined in +// RFC 8018 (PKCS #5 v2.1). +// +// This package is a wrapper for the PBKDF2 implementation in the +// [crypto/pbkdf2] package. It is [frozen] and is not accepting new features. +// +// [frozen]: https://go.dev/wiki/Frozen package pbkdf2 import ( - "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/pbkdf2" "hash" ) @@ -27,51 +20,11 @@ import ( // []byte of length keylen that can be used as cryptographic key. The key is // derived based on the method described as PBKDF2 with the HMAC variant using // the supplied hash function. -// -// For example, to use a HMAC-SHA-1 based PBKDF2 key derivation function, you -// can get a derived key for e.g. AES-256 (which needs a 32-byte key) by -// doing: -// -// dk := pbkdf2.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 4096, 32, sha1.New) -// -// Remember to get a good random salt. At least 8 bytes is recommended by the -// RFC. -// -// Using a higher iteration count will increase the cost of an exhaustive -// search but will also make derivation proportionally slower. func Key(password, salt []byte, iter, keyLen int, h func() hash.Hash) []byte { - prf := hmac.New(h, password) - hashLen := prf.Size() - numBlocks := (keyLen + hashLen - 1) / hashLen - - var buf [4]byte - dk := make([]byte, 0, numBlocks*hashLen) - U := make([]byte, hashLen) - for block := 1; block <= numBlocks; block++ { - // N.B.: || means concatenation, ^ means XOR - // for each block T_i = U_1 ^ U_2 ^ ... ^ U_iter - // U_1 = PRF(password, salt || uint(i)) - prf.Reset() - prf.Write(salt) - buf[0] = byte(block >> 24) - buf[1] = byte(block >> 16) - buf[2] = byte(block >> 8) - buf[3] = byte(block) - prf.Write(buf[:4]) - dk = prf.Sum(dk) - T := dk[len(dk)-hashLen:] - copy(U, T) - - // U_n = PRF(password, U_(n-1)) - for n := 2; n <= iter; n++ { - prf.Reset() - prf.Write(U) - U = U[:0] - U = prf.Sum(U) - for x := range U { - T[x] ^= U[x] - } - } + out, err := pbkdf2.Key(h, string(password), salt, iter, keyLen) + if err != nil { + // FIPS 140 enforcement, or an invalid key length. + panic(err) } - return dk[:keyLen] + return out } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/scrypt/scrypt.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/scrypt/scrypt.go index 76fa40fb20..b422b7d7fd 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/scrypt/scrypt.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/scrypt/scrypt.go @@ -196,6 +196,9 @@ func Key(password, salt []byte, N, r, p, keyLen int) ([]byte, error) { if N <= 1 || N&(N-1) != 0 { return nil, errors.New("scrypt: N must be > 1 and a power of 2") } + if r <= 0 || p <= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("scrypt: parameters must be > 0") + } if uint64(r)*uint64(p) >= 1<<30 || r > maxInt/128/p || r > maxInt/256 || N > maxInt/128/r { return nil, errors.New("scrypt: parameters are too large") } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go index 139fa31e1b..6f75d77ec1 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go @@ -348,6 +348,9 @@ func (c *CertChecker) CheckHostKey(addr string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) if cert.CertType != HostCert { return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate presented as a host key has type %d", cert.CertType) } + if c.IsHostAuthority == nil { + return errors.New("ssh: cannot verify certificate, IsHostAuthority not set") + } if !c.IsHostAuthority(cert.SignatureKey, addr) { return fmt.Errorf("ssh: no authorities for hostname: %v", addr) } @@ -375,6 +378,9 @@ func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permis if cert.CertType != UserCert { return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has type %d", cert.CertType) } + if c.IsUserAuthority == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: cannot verify certificate, IsUserAuthority not set") + } if !c.IsUserAuthority(cert.SignatureKey) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signed by unrecognized authority") } @@ -438,7 +444,17 @@ func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error { if before := int64(cert.ValidBefore); cert.ValidBefore != uint64(CertTimeInfinity) && (unixNow >= before || before < 0) { return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has expired") } - if err := cert.SignatureKey.Verify(cert.bytesForSigning(), cert.Signature); err != nil { + // Match OpenSSH: the SK user-presence flag is never enforced on a + // certificate's CA signature. OpenSSH calls sshkey_verify with + // detailsp==NULL in sshkey.c:cert_parse, so the UP/UV flags are + // not even extracted. The UP bit on a CA signature reflects the + // CA operator's presence at signing time, which has no bearing on + // whether the user being authenticated is present now; enforcing + // it here would only break interop with certificates issued by + // non-interactive SK CAs. skKeyWithoutUP is a no-op for non-SK + // keys (the common case). + caKey := skKeyWithoutUP(cert.SignatureKey) + if err := caKey.Verify(cert.bytesForSigning(), cert.Signature); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signature does not verify") } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go index cc0bb7ab64..afc9aef185 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import ( "io" "log" "sync" + "sync/atomic" ) const ( @@ -131,11 +132,17 @@ func (r RejectionReason) String() string { return fmt.Sprintf("unknown reason %d", int(r)) } -func min(a uint32, b int) uint32 { - if a < uint32(b) { - return a +// minPayloadSize returns min(limit, length) clamped to a uint32. It is used +// to compute the size of the next channel data packet from the remaining +// payload. The comparison is done in int64 because length is an int — on +// 64-bit systems len(data) can exceed 2^32, and a direct uint32(length) +// cast would silently truncate to 0 at every multiple of 2^32, causing +// WriteExtended's loop to spin without making progress. +func minPayloadSize(limit uint32, length int) uint32 { + if int64(length) > int64(limit) { + return limit } - return uint32(b) + return uint32(length) } type channelDirection uint8 @@ -177,6 +184,12 @@ type channel struct { // with WantReply=true outstanding. This lock is held by a // goroutine that has such an outgoing request pending. sentRequestMu sync.Mutex + // sentRequestPending is set to true while a SendRequest call with + // WantReply=true is in flight. handlePacket uses it as a gate: responses + // arriving while no request is pending are dropped to prevent a + // misbehaving peer from stalling the mux read loop by filling ch.msg + // with unsolicited channelRequestSuccess/Failure messages. + sentRequestPending atomic.Bool incomingRequests chan *Request @@ -251,7 +264,7 @@ func (ch *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err e ch.writeMu.Unlock() for len(data) > 0 { - space := min(ch.maxRemotePayload, len(data)) + space := minPayloadSize(ch.maxRemotePayload, len(data)) if space, err = ch.remoteWin.reserve(space); err != nil { return n, err } @@ -460,6 +473,18 @@ func (ch *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error { } ch.incomingRequests <- &req + case *channelRequestSuccessMsg, *channelRequestFailureMsg: + // Drop responses that arrive when no SendRequest is waiting, to + // prevent a malicious peer from filling ch.msg and stalling the + // mux read loop. The non-blocking send additionally protects the + // loop if a well-behaved caller is slow to read. + if !ch.sentRequestPending.Load() { + return nil + } + select { + case ch.msg <- msg: + default: + } default: ch.msg <- msg } @@ -530,7 +555,17 @@ func (ch *channel) Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error { Language: "en", } ch.decided = true - return ch.sendMessage(reject) + err := ch.sendMessage(reject) + + // Remove the channel from the mux to prevent memory leaks. + // Do not call ch.close() here: no goroutine holds a reference to a + // rejected channel's internal channels (msg, incomingRequests), so + // removing it from chanList is sufficient for GC. Calling close() + // would race with the mux loop goroutine (handlePacket or dropAll), + // causing a panic from closing an already-closed channel. + ch.mux.chanList.remove(ch.localId) + + return err } func (ch *channel) Read(data []byte) (int, error) { @@ -586,6 +621,27 @@ func (ch *channel) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (boo if wantReply { ch.sentRequestMu.Lock() defer ch.sentRequestMu.Unlock() + + // Open the gate so that responses arriving while this request is in + // flight are allowed to reach ch.msg. Responses arriving while no + // request is pending are dropped by handlePacket. + ch.sentRequestPending.Store(true) + defer ch.sentRequestPending.Store(false) + + // Drain any spurious responses that may have been buffered. This + // prevents a previously buffered unexpected response from being + // consumed instead of the actual response for this request. + drain: + for { + select { + case _, ok := <-ch.msg: + if !ok { + break drain + } + default: + break drain + } + } } msg := channelRequestMsg{ diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go index 7554ed57a9..48d0199545 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ func (c *gcmCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding) } - if int(padding+1) >= len(plain) { + if int(padding)+1 >= len(plain) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding) } plain = plain[1 : length-uint32(padding)] @@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ func (c *cbcCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader // Length of encrypted portion of the packet (header, payload, padding). // Enforce minimum padding and packet size. - encLength := maxUInt32(prefixLen+len(packet)+cbcMinPaddingSize, cbcMinPaddingSize) + encLength := maxUInt32(prefixLen+len(packet)+cbcMinPaddingSize, cbcMinPacketSize) // Enforce block size. encLength = (encLength + effectiveBlockSize - 1) / effectiveBlockSize * effectiveBlockSize diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go index 33079789bc..89f0def9f6 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go @@ -88,6 +88,32 @@ func NewClientConn(c net.Conn, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (Conn, <-chan return conn, conn.mux.incomingChannels, conn.mux.incomingRequests, nil } +// NewControlClientConn establishes an SSH connection over an OpenSSH +// ControlMaster socket c in proxy mode. +// +// Note that this package only implements the client side of the multiplexing +// protocol. The provided net.Conn must be a local, secure connection (such as a +// Unix domain socket) connected to an already-running OpenSSH process acting as +// the ControlMaster. +// +// WARNING: Because proxy mode bypasses the standard cryptographic handshake +// passing a standard network connection (e.g., TCP) will result in plaintext +// data leakage. +// +// The Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced or the connection +// will hang. +func NewControlClientConn(c net.Conn) (Conn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) { + conn := &connection{ + sshConn: sshConn{conn: c}, + } + var err error + if conn.transport, err = handshakeControlProxy(c); err != nil { + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: control proxy handshake failed: %w", err) + } + conn.mux = newMux(conn.transport) + return conn, conn.mux.incomingChannels, conn.mux.incomingRequests, nil +} + // clientHandshake performs the client side key exchange. See RFC 4253 Section // 7. func (c *connection) clientHandshake(dialAddress string, config *ClientConfig) error { @@ -197,6 +223,59 @@ type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error // the server. A BannerCallback receives the message sent by the remote server. type BannerCallback func(message string) error +// ClientAuthContext contains information about the current state of the +// authentication process, passed to [ClientAuthCallback]. +type ClientAuthContext struct { + // Metadata contains the connection metadata. + Metadata ConnMetadata + + // Algorithms contains the negotiated algorithms. + Algorithms NegotiatedAlgorithms + + // AllowedMethods lists the authentication methods currently accepted + // by the server. These are the protocol-level names defined in RFC 4252 + // such as "publickey", "password". + AllowedMethods []string + + // PartialSuccessMethods lists the authentication methods that have already + // succeeded, indicating a multi-step authentication flow. This list + // represents the exact sequence of partial successes and may contain + // duplicates if the same method succeeded multiple times. + PartialSuccessMethods []string + + // TriedMethods lists the methods that have already been attempted and + // failed during this session. This list represents the exact sequence of + // failures and may contain duplicates. This allows the callback to also + // track the number of failed attempts for a specific method. + TriedMethods []string +} + +// ClientAuthCallback is a hook invoked before each authentication attempt. It +// allows the client to dynamically select an authentication method based on the +// current context, server capabilities, or previous failures. +// +// The callback is invoked after the initial "none" authentication method, once +// the server's supported authentication methods are known. +// +// Return values: +// - (AuthMethod, nil): The client will attempt this specific method next. +// The returned method does NOT need to be present in [ClientConfig.Auth]. +// This allows for dynamic authentication strategies (e.g., prompting +// for a password only if public key auth fails). Callers should inspect +// [ClientAuthContext.TriedMethods] to avoid repeatedly returning the +// same failing method. +// - (nil, nil): The client selects from [ClientConfig.Auth] the first +// instance of a method that has not been tried yet, or aborts if none +// are left. If authentication is not successful, the callback is invoked +// again before the following attempt. +// - (nil, error): The authentication process is aborted immediately, +// causing the ongoing SSH handshake to fail with the provided error. +// +// To bound resource use, the client caps the total number of authentication +// attempts (failures and partial successes combined) at 64. If the cap is +// exceeded the handshake aborts with an error. +type ClientAuthCallback func(ctx *ClientAuthContext) (AuthMethod, error) + // A ClientConfig structure is used to configure a Client. It must not be // modified after having been passed to an SSH function. type ClientConfig struct { @@ -210,6 +289,9 @@ type ClientConfig struct { // Auth contains possible authentication methods to use with the // server. Only the first instance of a particular RFC 4252 method will // be used during authentication. + // + // If AuthCallback is set, these AuthMethod are only used if the + // callback returns nil. Auth []AuthMethod // HostKeyCallback is called during the cryptographic @@ -240,6 +322,9 @@ type ClientConfig struct { // // A Timeout of zero means no timeout. Timeout time.Duration + + // AuthCallback, if non-nil, is invoked before each authentication attempt. + AuthCallback ClientAuthCallback } // InsecureIgnoreHostKey returns a function that can be used for diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go index 3127e49903..60af2fc4dd 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go @@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ const ( authSuccess ) +// maxAuthClientTried bounds the total number of authentication attempts +// (failures and partial successes combined) the client makes before +// aborting the loop, to prevent unbounded growth when an AuthCallback +// keeps supplying methods. +const maxAuthClientTried = 64 + // clientAuthenticate authenticates with the remote server. See RFC 4252. func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error { // initiate user auth session @@ -67,32 +73,62 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error { // then any untried methods suggested by the server. var tried []string var lastMethods []string + var partialSuccess []string sessionID := c.transport.getSessionID() for auth := AuthMethod(new(noneAuth)); auth != nil; { ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand, extensions) if err != nil { // On disconnect, return error immediately - if _, ok := err.(*disconnectMsg); ok { + if _, isDisconnect := err.(*disconnectMsg); isDisconnect { return err } - // We return the error later if there is no other method left to - // try. + // We return the error later if there is no other method + // left to try. ok = authFailure } - if ok == authSuccess { - // success + + switch ok { + case authSuccess: return nil - } else if ok == authFailure { - if m := auth.method(); !slices.Contains(tried, m) { - tried = append(tried, m) - } + case authPartialSuccess: + partialSuccess = append(partialSuccess, auth.method()) + case authFailure: + tried = append(tried, auth.method()) } + if len(partialSuccess)+len(tried) > maxAuthClientTried { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: too many authentication attempts (%d), aborting", + len(partialSuccess)+len(tried)) + } + if methods == nil { methods = lastMethods } lastMethods = methods + // If AuthCallback is set it takes precedence: it picks the next + // AuthMethod dynamically. The returned method need not be in + // config.Auth. If the callback returns (nil, nil) we fall back to + // selecting the next untried method from config.Auth below; on + // (nil, error) the handshake aborts. + if config.AuthCallback != nil { + ctx := &ClientAuthContext{ + Metadata: c, + Algorithms: c.Algorithms(), + AllowedMethods: slices.Clone(methods), + PartialSuccessMethods: slices.Clone(partialSuccess), + TriedMethods: slices.Clone(tried), + } + altAuth, cbErr := config.AuthCallback(ctx) + if cbErr != nil { + return cbErr + } + if altAuth != nil { + auth = altAuth + continue + } + } + auth = nil findNext: @@ -274,10 +310,14 @@ func pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer Signer, extensions map[string][]byte) (MultiA } // Filter algorithms based on those supported by MultiAlgorithmSigner. + // Iterate over the signer's algorithms first to preserve its preference order. + supportedKeyAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) var keyAlgos []string - for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) { - if slices.Contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) { - keyAlgos = append(keyAlgos, algo) + for _, signerAlgo := range as.Algorithms() { + if idx := slices.IndexFunc(supportedKeyAlgos, func(algo string) bool { + return underlyingAlgo(algo) == signerAlgo + }); idx >= 0 { + keyAlgos = append(keyAlgos, supportedKeyAlgos[idx]) } } @@ -373,11 +413,11 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand return authFailure, nil, err } - // If authentication succeeds or the list of available methods does not - // contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any - // other keys. According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when - // additional authentication methods are required. - if success == authSuccess || !slices.Contains(methods, cb.method()) { + // If authentication succeeds or partially succeeds, return immediately + // so the caller can select the next auth method. According to RFC 4252 + // Section 7, if the server no longer lists "publickey" among its + // allowed methods, do not attempt to authenticate with any other keys. + if success == authSuccess || success == authPartialSuccess || !slices.Contains(methods, cb.method()) { return success, methods, err } } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go index 613a71a7b3..378f6407b5 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go @@ -91,9 +91,17 @@ func DiscardRequests(in <-chan *Request) { } } +// A connTransport represents the transport for a connection. +type connTransport interface { + packetConn + getAlgorithms() NegotiatedAlgorithms + getSessionID() []byte + waitSession() error +} + // A connection represents an incoming connection. type connection struct { - transport *handshakeTransport + transport connTransport sshConn // The connection protocol. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/control.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/control.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b14e4cafa --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/control.go @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" +) + +const ( + muxProtocolVersion = 4 + + muxMsgHello = 0x00000001 + muxCProxy = 0x1000000f + muxSProxy = 0x8000000f +) + +const controlProxyRequestID = 0 + +// handshakeControlProxy attempts to establish a transport connection with an +// OpenSSH ControlMaster socket in proxy mode. For details see: +// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.mux +func handshakeControlProxy(rw io.ReadWriteCloser) (connTransport, error) { + if err := controlProxyWritePacket(rw, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint32(muxMsgHello) + b.AddUint32(muxProtocolVersion) + }); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("mux hello write failed: %w", err) + } + if err := controlProxyWritePacket(rw, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint32(muxCProxy) + b.AddUint32(controlProxyRequestID) + }); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("mux client proxy write failed: %w", err) + } + + messageType, body, err := controlProxyReadMessage(rw) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("mux hello read failed: %w", err) + } + if messageType != muxMsgHello { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected hello response, got %v", messageType) + } + var v uint32 + if !body.ReadUint32(&v) { + return nil, errors.New("EOF reading mux protocol version") + } + if v != muxProtocolVersion { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("mux server has unsupported version %v", v) + } + messageType, body, err = controlProxyReadMessage(rw) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("mux server proxy read failed: %w", err) + } + if messageType != muxSProxy { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected server proxy response, got %v", messageType) + } + var reqID uint32 + if !body.ReadUint32(&reqID) { + return nil, errors.New("EOF reading request id") + } + if reqID != controlProxyRequestID { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected request id %v, got %v", controlProxyRequestID, reqID) + } + return &controlProxyTransport{rw}, nil +} + +// controlProxyTransport implements the connTransport interface for +// ControlMaster connections. Each controlMessage has zero length padding and +// no MAC. +type controlProxyTransport struct { + rw io.ReadWriteCloser +} + +func (p *controlProxyTransport) Close() error { + return p.rw.Close() +} + +func (p *controlProxyTransport) writePacket(controlMessage []byte) error { + return controlProxyWritePacket(p.rw, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8(0) // Padding length. + b.AddBytes(controlMessage) + }) +} + +func (p *controlProxyTransport) readPacket() ([]byte, error) { + buf, err := controlProxyReadPacket(p.rw) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: error reading control message: %w", err) + } + // Discard the padding length. + if len(buf) < 1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: EOF reading padding length") + } + if buf[0] != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: unexpected non-zero padding in control message") + } + return buf[1:], nil +} + +func (p *controlProxyTransport) getAlgorithms() NegotiatedAlgorithms { + return NegotiatedAlgorithms{} +} + +func (p *controlProxyTransport) getSessionID() []byte { + return nil +} + +func (p *controlProxyTransport) waitSession() error { + return nil +} + +func controlProxyWritePacket(w io.Writer, f cryptobyte.BuilderContinuation) error { + var buf []byte + b := cryptobyte.NewBuilder(buf) + b.AddUint32LengthPrefixed(f) + out, err := b.Bytes() + if err != nil { + return err + } + _, err = w.Write(out) + return err +} + +func controlProxyReadPacket(r io.Reader) (cryptobyte.String, error) { + var l uint32 + if err := binary.Read(r, binary.BigEndian, &l); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if l > maxPacket { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("message length %v exceeds maximum %v", l, maxPacket) + } + buf := make([]byte, l) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return buf, nil +} + +func controlProxyReadMessage(r io.Reader) (messageType uint32, body cryptobyte.String, err error) { + body, err = controlProxyReadPacket(r) + if err != nil { + return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading message body: %w", err) + } + if !body.ReadUint32(&messageType) { + return 0, nil, errors.New("EOF reading message type") + } + return messageType, body, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go index 5f7fdd8514..91b771c4ae 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import ( "io" "math/big" "slices" + "sync" "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" ) @@ -718,15 +719,9 @@ func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshak kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits, kexDHGexRequest.PreferredBits) } - var p *big.Int - // We hardcode sending Oakley Group 14 (2048 bits), Oakley Group 15 (3072 - // bits) or Oakley Group 16 (4096 bits), based on the requested max size. - if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < 3072 { - p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup14, 16) - } else if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < 4096 { - p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup15, 16) - } else { - p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup16, 16) + p, err := chooseDH(kexDHGexRequest) + if err != nil { + return nil, err } g := big.NewInt(2) @@ -805,3 +800,65 @@ func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshak Hash: gex.hashFunc, }, err } + +type dhKEXGroup struct { + size int + p *big.Int +} + +// supportedDHKEXGroups returns the DH groups the server is willing to offer +// for diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key exchanges. The list is built lazily +// on first use to keep the hex-to-big.Int parse out of package initialization. +var supportedDHKEXGroups = sync.OnceValue(func() []dhKEXGroup { + specs := []struct { + size int + hex string + }{ + {2048, oakleyGroup14}, + {3072, oakleyGroup15}, + {4096, oakleyGroup16}, + } + out := make([]dhKEXGroup, 0, len(specs)) + for _, s := range specs { + p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(s.hex, 16) + out = append(out, dhKEXGroup{size: s.size, p: p}) + } + return out +}) + +// chooseDH picks a DH group for the given client request, mirroring the +// algorithm used by OpenSSH's choose_dh in dh.c: prefer the smallest known +// group larger than or equal to the client's PreferredBits, and otherwise pick +// the largest group within the accepted [MinBits, MaxBits] range. +func chooseDH(req kexDHGexRequestMsg) (*big.Int, error) { + var best *big.Int + bestSize := 0 + wantBits := int(req.PreferredBits) + + for _, group := range supportedDHKEXGroups() { + if uint32(group.size) < req.MinBits || uint32(group.size) > req.MaxBits { + continue + } + + if bestSize == 0 { + best = group.p + bestSize = group.size + continue + } + + closerFromAbove := group.size >= wantBits && group.size < bestSize + closerFromBelow := group.size > bestSize && bestSize < wantBits + + if closerFromAbove || closerFromBelow { + best = group.p + bestSize = group.size + } + } + + if bestSize == 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: no suitable DH group found for request min: %d, preferred: %d, max: %d", + req.MinBits, req.PreferredBits, req.MaxBits) + } + + return best, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go index 47a07539d9..64377715e1 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err err case InsecureKeyAlgoDSA: return parseDSA(in) case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521: - return parseECDSA(in) + return parseECDSA(in, algo) case KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: return parseSKECDSA(in) case KeyAlgoED25519: @@ -182,14 +182,19 @@ func ParseKnownHosts(in []byte) (marker string, hosts []string, pubKey PublicKey } hosts := string(keyFields[0]) - // keyFields[1] contains the key type (e.g. “ssh-rsa”). - // However, that information is duplicated inside the - // base64-encoded key and so is ignored here. + // keyFields[1] contains the key type (e.g. "ssh-rsa"). This information + // is duplicated within the base64-encoded key blob. As OpenSSH's + // sshkey_read does, we verify that the declared key type matches the + // type embedded in the key blob. + wantType := string(keyFields[1]) key := bytes.Join(keyFields[2:], []byte(" ")) if pubKey, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(key); err != nil { return "", nil, nil, "", nil, err } + if pubKey.Type() != wantType { + return "", nil, nil, "", nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: known hosts key type mismatch: human-readable type %q, encoded type %q", wantType, pubKey.Type()) + } return marker, strings.Split(hosts, ","), pubKey, comment, rest, nil } @@ -228,10 +233,17 @@ func ParseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, options []str } if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil { - return out, comment, options, rest, nil - } else { - lastErr = err + // The first field contains the declared key type. As OpenSSH's + // sshkey_read does, we verify that it matches the type embedded in + // the key blob. Without this check, a single-token option (e.g. + // "restrict") appearing in the key type position could be silently + // discarded along with its intended effect. + if string(in[:i]) == out.Type() { + return out, comment, options, rest, nil + } + err = fmt.Errorf("ssh: authorized keys key type mismatch: human-readable type %q, encoded type %q", in[:i], out.Type()) } + lastErr = err // No key type recognised. Maybe there's an options field at // the beginning. @@ -271,11 +283,15 @@ func ParseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, options []str } if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil { - options = candidateOptions - return out, comment, options, rest, nil - } else { - lastErr = err + // As above, the declared key type (here following the options + // field) must match the type embedded in the key blob. + if string(in[:i]) == out.Type() { + options = candidateOptions + return out, comment, options, rest, nil + } + err = fmt.Errorf("ssh: authorized keys key type mismatch: human-readable type %q, encoded type %q", in[:i], out.Type()) } + lastErr = err in = rest continue @@ -469,6 +485,12 @@ func parseRSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { return nil, nil, err } + // 8192 bits is also the maximum RSA key size accepted by crypto/tls for + // signature verification: + // https://github.com/golang/go/blob/69801b25/src/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go#L1096 + if w.N.BitLen() > 8192 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: rsa modulus too large") + } if w.E.BitLen() > 24 { return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: exponent too large") } @@ -574,6 +596,24 @@ func checkDSAParams(param *dsa.Parameters) error { return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported DSA key size %d", l) } + // FIPS 186-2 specifies that Q must be exactly 160 bits. We must enforce + // this to prevent DoS attacks where an attacker sends a huge Q which makes + // verification slow. + if l := param.Q.BitLen(); l != 160 { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported DSA sub-prime size %d", l) + } + + // The generator G is an element of the group, so it must be strictly less + // than the modulus P. + if param.G.Cmp(param.P) >= 0 { + return errors.New("ssh: DSA generator larger than modulus") + } + + // G must be positive. + if param.G.Sign() <= 0 { + return errors.New("ssh: DSA generator must be positive") + } + return nil } @@ -596,6 +636,14 @@ func parseDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { return nil, nil, err } + // The public value Y must be a non-zero element of the group, i.e. + // strictly between 0 and P. crypto/dsa.Verify does not range-check Y, + // so we reject out-of-range values here to prevent a maliciously + // oversized Y from slowing verification. + if w.Y.Sign() <= 0 || w.Y.Cmp(w.P) >= 0 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: DSA public value Y out of range") + } + key := &dsaPublicKey{ Parameters: param, Y: w.Y, @@ -774,7 +822,7 @@ func supportedEllipticCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) bool { } // parseECDSA parses an ECDSA key according to RFC 5656, section 3.1. -func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { +func parseECDSA(in []byte, expectedType string) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { var w struct { Curve string KeyBytes []byte @@ -785,6 +833,12 @@ func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { return nil, nil, err } + actualType := "ecdsa-sha2-" + w.Curve + if expectedType != actualType { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm type mismatch: expected %q, found curve %q (type %q)", + expectedType, w.Curve, actualType) + } + key := new(ecdsa.PublicKey) switch w.Curve { @@ -869,11 +923,25 @@ type skFields struct { Counter uint32 } +// flagUserPresence is the "user present" bit (UP) in the SK signature +// flags, matching the FIDO CTAP2 authenticatorData UP flag. See +// openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f. +const flagUserPresence = 0x01 + +// errSKMissingUserPresence is returned by SK key Verify methods when +// the signature does not assert user presence and the key was not +// marked as no-touch-required. +var errSKMissingUserPresence = errors.New("ssh: signature missing required user presence flag") + type skECDSAPublicKey struct { // application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH. // see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details. application string ecdsa.PublicKey + // noTouchRequired, when true, disables the default user-presence + // check in Verify. It is set by skKeyWithoutUP on a clone of the + // key, never on an instance shared across authentication attempts. + noTouchRequired bool } func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Type() string { @@ -959,6 +1027,10 @@ func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { return err } + if skf.Flags&flagUserPresence == 0 && !k.noTouchRequired { + return errSKMissingUserPresence + } + blob := struct { ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` Flags byte @@ -992,6 +1064,10 @@ type skEd25519PublicKey struct { // see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details. application string ed25519.PublicKey + // noTouchRequired, when true, disables the default user-presence + // check in Verify. It is set by skKeyWithoutUP on a clone of the + // key, never on an instance shared across authentication attempts. + noTouchRequired bool } func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Type() string { @@ -1066,6 +1142,10 @@ func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { return err } + if skf.Flags&flagUserPresence == 0 && !k.noTouchRequired { + return errSKMissingUserPresence + } + blob := struct { ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` Flags byte @@ -1408,6 +1488,17 @@ func passphraseProtectedOpenSSHKey(passphrase []byte) openSSHDecryptFunc { return nil, err } + // OpenSSH does not impose an upper bound on the bcrypt round count + // stored in the key file, but bcrypt_pbkdf cost is linear in rounds: + // the default is 16, ssh-keygen lets users pick anything up to + // INT_MAX. Cap at 2048 (128x the default, a few seconds of CPU) so + // that an oversized value in the file cannot tie up the caller for + // months. + const maxRounds = 1 << 11 + if opts.Rounds > maxRounds { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: bcrypt KDF rounds %d exceed maximum %d", opts.Rounds, maxRounds) + } + k, err := bcrypt_pbkdf.Key(passphrase, []byte(opts.Salt), int(opts.Rounds), 32+16) if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -1577,10 +1668,28 @@ func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.Priv return nil, err } + // Mirror the validation done in parseRSA for public keys: cap the + // modulus at the same limit enforced by crypto/tls, reject oversized + // or invalid exponents, and additionally bound the prime factors to + // avoid the expensive CRT coefficient recomputation in pk.Precompute. + if key.N.BitLen() > 8192 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: rsa modulus too large") + } + if key.P.BitLen() > 4096 || key.Q.BitLen() > 4096 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: rsa prime too large") + } + if key.E.BitLen() > 24 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: exponent too large") + } + e := key.E.Int64() + if e < 3 || e&1 == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: incorrect exponent") + } + pk := &rsa.PrivateKey{ PublicKey: rsa.PublicKey{ N: key.N, - E: int(key.E.Int64()), + E: int(e), }, D: key.D, Primes: []*big.Int{key.P, key.Q}, diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go index ab22c3d38d..de86f71cf4 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go @@ -44,7 +44,16 @@ type disconnectMsg struct { } func (d *disconnectMsg) Error() string { - return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: disconnect, reason %d: %s", d.Reason, d.Message) + return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: disconnect, reason %d: %q", d.Reason, sanitizeString(d.Message)) +} + +func sanitizeString(s string) string { + return strings.Map(func(r rune) rune { + if r == '\t' || (r >= ' ' && r < 0x7f) { + return r + } + return -1 + }, s) } // See RFC 4253, section 7.1. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go index d2d24c635d..5775881c6a 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go @@ -91,9 +91,10 @@ type mux struct { incomingChannels chan NewChannel - globalSentMu sync.Mutex - globalResponses chan interface{} - incomingRequests chan *Request + globalSentMu sync.Mutex + globalSentPending atomic.Bool + globalResponses chan interface{} + incomingRequests chan *Request errCond *sync.Cond err error @@ -141,6 +142,27 @@ func (m *mux) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, [] if wantReply { m.globalSentMu.Lock() defer m.globalSentMu.Unlock() + + // Open the gate so that responses arriving while this request is in + // flight are allowed to reach globalResponses. Any response arriving + // while no request is pending is dropped by handleGlobalPacket. + m.globalSentPending.Store(true) + defer m.globalSentPending.Store(false) + + // Drain any spurious responses that may have been buffered. This prevents + // a previously buffered unexpected response from being consumed instead + // of the actual response for this request. + drain: + for { + select { + case _, ok := <-m.globalResponses: + if !ok { + break drain + } + default: + break drain + } + } } if err := m.sendMessage(globalRequestMsg{ @@ -267,7 +289,16 @@ func (m *mux) handleGlobalPacket(packet []byte) error { mux: m, } case *globalRequestSuccessMsg, *globalRequestFailureMsg: - m.globalResponses <- msg + // Drop responses that arrive when no SendRequest is waiting, to + // prevent a malicious peer from staging responses for a future + // caller. + if !m.globalSentPending.Load() { + return nil + } + select { + case m.globalResponses <- msg: + default: + } default: panic(fmt.Sprintf("not a global message %#v", msg)) } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go index 064dcbaf5a..3c0fcc953e 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go @@ -34,21 +34,29 @@ type Permissions struct { // or not supported. CriticalOptions map[string]string - // Extensions are extra functionality that the server may - // offer on authenticated connections. Lack of support for an - // extension does not preclude authenticating a user. Common - // extensions are "permit-agent-forwarding", - // "permit-X11-forwarding". The Go SSH library currently does - // not act on any extension, and it is up to server - // implementations to honor them. Extensions can be used to - // pass data from the authentication callbacks to the server - // application layer. + // Extensions are extra functionality that the server may offer on + // authenticated connections. Lack of support for an extension does not + // preclude authenticating a user. Common extensions are + // "permit-agent-forwarding", "permit-X11-forwarding". In general the Go + // SSH library does not act on extensions and it is up to server + // implementations to honor them; extensions can also be used to pass data + // from the authentication callbacks to the server application layer. + // + // The one extension acted upon by this library is "no-touch-required", + // which applies only to security-key public keys + // (sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com and sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com). + // When present, it waives the default requirement that SK signatures + // assert user presence (i.e. a physical touch of the authenticator) + // during signature verification. Extensions map[string]string // ExtraData allows to store user defined data. ExtraData map[any]any } +// GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes the server callbacks for gssapi-with-mic +// authentication. If either field is nil, gssapi-with-mic is considered not +// configured. type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct { // AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic // authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the @@ -63,6 +71,10 @@ type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct { Server GSSAPIServer } +func gssapiWithMICConfigured(config *GSSAPIWithMICConfig) bool { + return config != nil && config.AllowLogin != nil && config.Server != nil +} + // SendAuthBanner implements [ServerPreAuthConn]. func (s *connection) SendAuthBanner(msg string) error { return s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthBannerMsg{ @@ -84,6 +96,79 @@ type ServerPreAuthConn interface { SendAuthBanner(string) error } +// noTouchRequiredExtension is the extension name used by OpenSSH in +// authorized_keys options and certificate extensions to mark keys +// whose signatures do not need to assert user presence (touch). See +// ssh-keygen(1) and sshd(8). +const noTouchRequiredExtension = "no-touch-required" + +// noTouchAllowed reports whether the user presence requirement on +// SK signatures should be waived for this authentication attempt. The +// requirement is waived when the "no-touch-required" extension is +// present either in the Permissions returned by the auth callback +// (authorized_keys-level opt-out) or in the certificate's own +// Extensions (CA-level opt-out), matching OpenSSH behavior. OpenSSH +// reads the per-key opt-out only from cert Extensions and +// authorized_keys options (never from CriticalOptions); we follow the +// same rule. +func noTouchAllowed(pubKey PublicKey, perms *Permissions) bool { + if perms != nil { + if _, ok := perms.Extensions[noTouchRequiredExtension]; ok { + return true + } + } + if cert, ok := pubKey.(*Certificate); ok { + if _, ok := cert.Extensions[noTouchRequiredExtension]; ok { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// skKeyWithoutUP returns a PublicKey equivalent to pubKey but whose +// Verify accepts SK signatures with the user-presence flag clear. If +// pubKey is not (and does not wrap) an SK key, pubKey is returned +// unchanged. The returned value never mutates pubKey: for SK keys a +// shallow copy is made so that the noTouchRequired flag is set only on +// the clone. +// +// The implementation is iterative rather than recursive. When pubKey +// is a *Certificate we unwrap exactly one level to look at the inner +// key. The SSH cert format forbids Certificate.Key from being another +// Certificate (parseCert rejects it), but nothing stops callers from +// constructing such a value directly in Go; a recursive descent could +// otherwise be driven to unbounded depth by a hand-crafted or cyclic +// Certificate. A malformed input of that shape simply returns +// unchanged here. +func skKeyWithoutUP(pubKey PublicKey) PublicKey { + cert, isCert := pubKey.(*Certificate) + target := pubKey + if isCert { + target = cert.Key + } + var cloned PublicKey + switch k := target.(type) { + case *skECDSAPublicKey: + c := *k + c.noTouchRequired = true + cloned = &c + case *skEd25519PublicKey: + c := *k + c.noTouchRequired = true + cloned = &c + default: + // Not an SK key (or a pathological *Certificate wrapping + // another *Certificate): pubKey is already usable for Verify. + return pubKey + } + if !isCert { + return cloned + } + c := *cert + c.Key = cloned + return &c +} + // ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data. type ServerConfig struct { // Config contains configuration shared between client and server. @@ -242,8 +327,10 @@ func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) { type ServerConn struct { Conn - // If the succeeding authentication callback returned a - // non-nil Permissions pointer, it is stored here. + // If the succeeding authentication callback returned a non-nil Permissions + // pointer, it is stored here. These are the permissions from the final, + // successful authentication method. Permissions returned by callbacks that + // return PartialSuccessError are not preserved and must be nil. Permissions *Permissions } @@ -302,8 +389,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) } if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil && - config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil || - config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) { + config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && !gssapiWithMICConfigured(config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig) { return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false") } @@ -527,6 +613,15 @@ func (b *BannerError) Error() string { return b.Err.Error() } +// maxAuthServerAttempts caps the total number of SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST +// messages the server will process on a single connection, regardless of +// outcome (failure, partial success, public key query, or none). It is a +// backstop against clients that drive the authentication loop indefinitely +// without ever incurring a real failure — for example by repeatedly +// triggering PartialSuccessError or by spamming public key offer queries — +// neither of which increment the MaxAuthTries failure counter. +const maxAuthServerAttempts = 128 + func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { if config.PreAuthConnCallback != nil { config.PreAuthConnCallback(s) @@ -537,6 +632,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, err var perms *Permissions authFailures := 0 + authAttempts := 0 noneAuthCount := 0 var authErrs []error var calledBannerCallback bool @@ -565,6 +661,19 @@ userAuthLoop: return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs} } + if authAttempts >= maxAuthServerAttempts { + discMsg := &disconnectMsg{ + Reason: 2, + Message: "too many authentication attempts", + } + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + authErrs = append(authErrs, discMsg) + return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs} + } + authAttempts++ + var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg if packet, err := s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { if err == io.EOF { @@ -737,8 +846,15 @@ userAuthLoop: } signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algo, pubKeyData) - - if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil { + // pubKey is reused below for VerifiedPublicKeyCallback and + // must remain the key as presented by the client; derive a + // separate value for Verify that carries any applicable + // no-touch-required opt-out. + pubKeyForVerify := pubKey + if noTouchAllowed(pubKey, candidate.perms) { + pubKeyForVerify = skKeyWithoutUP(pubKey) + } + if err := pubKeyForVerify.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -750,9 +866,16 @@ userAuthLoop: // considered verified and the callback must not run. perms, authErr = config.VerifiedPublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey, perms, algo) } + if authErr == nil && perms != nil && perms.CriticalOptions != nil { + if saco := perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption]; saco != "" { + if err := checkSourceAddress(s.RemoteAddr(), saco); err != nil { + authErr = err + } + } + } } case "gssapi-with-mic": - if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil { + if !gssapiWithMICConfigured(authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig) { authErr = errors.New("ssh: gssapi-with-mic auth not configured") break } @@ -824,6 +947,13 @@ userAuthLoop: var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg if partialSuccess, ok := authErr.(*PartialSuccessError); ok { + // Permissions are not preserved between authentication steps. To + // avoid confusion about the final state of the connection, we + // disallow returning non-nil Permissions combined with + // PartialSuccessError. + if perms != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: permissions must be nil when returning PartialSuccessError") + } // After a partial success error we don't allow changing the user // name and execute the NoClientAuthCallback. partialSuccessReturned = true @@ -878,8 +1008,7 @@ userAuthLoop: if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil { failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive") } - if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil && - authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil { + if gssapiWithMICConfigured(authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig) { failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic") } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go index acef62259f..ac62955788 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go @@ -423,6 +423,9 @@ func (s *Session) wait(reqs <-chan *Request) error { for msg := range reqs { switch msg.Type { case "exit-status": + if len(msg.Payload) < 4 { + return errors.New("ssh: malformed exit-status request") + } wm.status = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(msg.Payload)) case "exit-signal": var sigval struct { diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/print.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/print.go index 2a0123d4b9..48dbd82aec 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/print.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/print.go @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ type printer struct { } // printf prints to the buffer. -func (p *printer) printf(format string, args ...interface{}) { +func (p *printer) printf(format string, args ...any) { fmt.Fprintf(p, format, args...) } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/read.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/read.go index f58de029ea..5b528c718e 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/read.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/read.go @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import ( "errors" "fmt" "os" + "slices" "strconv" "strings" "unicode" @@ -105,8 +106,7 @@ func (x *FileSyntax) addLine(hint Expr, tokens ...string) *Line { if hint == nil { // If no hint given, add to the last statement of the given type. Loop: - for i := len(x.Stmt) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { - stmt := x.Stmt[i] + for _, stmt := range slices.Backward(x.Stmt) { switch stmt := stmt.(type) { case *Line: if stmt.Token != nil && stmt.Token[0] == tokens[0] { @@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ func (in *input) readToken() { // Checked all punctuation. Must be identifier token. if c := in.peekRune(); !isIdent(c) { - in.Error(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected input character %#q", c)) + in.Error(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected input character %#q", rune(c))) } // Scan over identifier. @@ -718,9 +718,7 @@ func (in *input) assignComments() { } // Assign suffix comments to syntax immediately before. - for i := len(in.post) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { - x := in.post[i] - + for _, x := range slices.Backward(in.post) { start, end := x.Span() if debug { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "post %T :%d:%d #%d :%d:%d #%d\n", x, start.Line, start.LineRune, start.Byte, end.Line, end.LineRune, end.Byte) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/rule.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/rule.go index a86ee4fd82..9ab203b562 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/rule.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/modfile/rule.go @@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ func parseToFile(file string, data []byte, fix VersionFixer, strict bool) (parse } var GoVersionRE = lazyregexp.New(`^([1-9][0-9]*)\.(0|[1-9][0-9]*)(\.(0|[1-9][0-9]*))?([a-z]+[0-9]+)?$`) + var laxGoVersionRE = lazyregexp.New(`^v?(([1-9][0-9]*)\.(0|[1-9][0-9]*))([^0-9].*)$`) // Toolchains must be named beginning with `go1`, @@ -368,7 +369,7 @@ func (f *File) add(errs *ErrorList, block *LineBlock, line *Line, verb string, a Err: err, }) } - errorf := func(format string, args ...interface{}) { + errorf := func(format string, args ...any) { wrapError(fmt.Errorf(format, args...)) } @@ -574,7 +575,7 @@ func parseReplace(filename string, line *Line, verb string, args []string, fix V Err: err, } } - errorf := func(format string, args ...interface{}) *Error { + errorf := func(format string, args ...any) *Error { return wrapError(fmt.Errorf(format, args...)) } @@ -685,7 +686,7 @@ func (f *WorkFile) add(errs *ErrorList, line *Line, verb string, args []string, Err: err, }) } - errorf := func(format string, args ...interface{}) { + errorf := func(format string, args ...any) { wrapError(fmt.Errorf(format, args...)) } @@ -1272,6 +1273,17 @@ func (f *File) SetRequire(req []*Require) { // SetRequireSeparateIndirect will split it into a direct-only and indirect-only // block. This aids in the transition to separate blocks. func (f *File) SetRequireSeparateIndirect(req []*Require) { + f.setRequireSeparateIndirect(req, false) +} + +// SetRequireAtMostTwo is like SetRequireSeparateIndirect but it aggressively +// consolidates all requirements into at most two blocks (one direct, one indirect). +// It ignores existing blocks and comments when deciding where to place requirements. +func (f *File) SetRequireAtMostTwo(req []*Require) { + f.setRequireSeparateIndirect(req, true) +} + +func (f *File) setRequireSeparateIndirect(req []*Require, simplify bool) { // hasComments returns whether a line or block has comments // other than "indirect". hasComments := func(c Comments) bool { @@ -1304,6 +1316,17 @@ func (f *File) SetRequireSeparateIndirect(req []*Require) { } // Examine existing require lines and blocks. + need := make(map[string]*Require) + for _, r := range req { + need[r.Mod.Path] = r + } + lineIndirect := make(map[*Line]bool) + for _, r := range f.Require { + if n := need[r.Mod.Path]; n != nil { + lineIndirect[r.Syntax] = n.Indirect + } + } + var ( // We may insert new requirements into the last uncommented // direct-only and indirect-only blocks. We may also move requirements @@ -1321,7 +1344,9 @@ func (f *File) SetRequireSeparateIndirect(req []*Require) { // Track the block each requirement belongs to (if any) so we can // move them later. - lineToBlock = make(map[*Line]*LineBlock) + lineToBlock = make(map[*Line]*LineBlock) + directBlockComments []Comment + indirectBlockComments []Comment ) for i, stmt := range f.Syntax.Stmt { switch stmt := stmt.(type) { @@ -1364,6 +1389,24 @@ func (f *File) SetRequireSeparateIndirect(req []*Require) { if allIndirect { lastIndirectIndex = i } + if simplify { + anyDirect := false + for _, line := range stmt.Line { + if ind, ok := lineIndirect[line]; ok && !ind { + anyDirect = true + break + } + } + target := &directBlockComments + if !anyDirect && len(stmt.Line) > 0 { + target = &indirectBlockComments + } + if len(*target) > 0 && len(stmt.Comments.Before) > 0 { + *target = append(*target, Comment{Token: "//"}) + } + *target = append(*target, stmt.Comments.Before...) + stmt.Comments.Before = nil + } } } @@ -1422,6 +1465,15 @@ func (f *File) SetRequireSeparateIndirect(req []*Require) { lastIndirectBlock = ensureBlock(lastIndirectIndex) } + if simplify { + if len(directBlockComments) > 0 { + lastDirectBlock.Comments.Before = append(lastDirectBlock.Comments.Before, directBlockComments...) + } + if len(indirectBlockComments) > 0 { + lastIndirectBlock.Comments.Before = append(lastIndirectBlock.Comments.Before, indirectBlockComments...) + } + } + // Delete requirements we don't want anymore. // Update versions and indirect comments on requirements we want to keep. // If a requirement is in last{Direct,Indirect}Block with the wrong @@ -1430,10 +1482,6 @@ func (f *File) SetRequireSeparateIndirect(req []*Require) { // correct block. // // Some blocks may be empty after this. Cleanup will remove them. - need := make(map[string]*Require) - for _, r := range req { - need[r.Mod.Path] = r - } have := make(map[string]*Require) for _, r := range f.Require { path := r.Mod.Path @@ -1446,10 +1494,10 @@ func (f *File) SetRequireSeparateIndirect(req []*Require) { r.setVersion(need[path].Mod.Version) r.setIndirect(need[path].Indirect) if need[path].Indirect && - (oneFlatUncommentedBlock || lineToBlock[r.Syntax] == lastDirectBlock) { + (simplify || oneFlatUncommentedBlock || lineToBlock[r.Syntax] == lastDirectBlock) { moveReq(r, lastIndirectBlock) } else if !need[path].Indirect && - (oneFlatUncommentedBlock || lineToBlock[r.Syntax] == lastIndirectBlock) { + (simplify || oneFlatUncommentedBlock || lineToBlock[r.Syntax] == lastIndirectBlock) { moveReq(r, lastDirectBlock) } } @@ -1594,7 +1642,7 @@ func (f *File) AddRetract(vi VersionInterval, rationale string) error { r.Syntax = f.Syntax.addLine(nil, "retract", "[", AutoQuote(vi.Low), ",", AutoQuote(vi.High), "]") } if rationale != "" { - for _, line := range strings.Split(rationale, "\n") { + for line := range strings.SplitSeq(rationale, "\n") { com := Comment{Token: "// " + line} r.Syntax.Comment().Before = append(r.Syntax.Comment().Before, com) } @@ -1736,8 +1784,7 @@ func removeDups(syntax *FileSyntax, exclude *[]*Exclude, replace *[]*Replace, to // Remove duplicate replacements. // Later replacements take priority over earlier ones. haveReplace := make(map[module.Version]bool) - for i := len(*replace) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { - x := (*replace)[i] + for _, x := range slices.Backward(*replace) { if haveReplace[x.Old] { kill[x.Syntax] = true continue diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/module/module.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/module/module.go index 9d3955bd73..739c13f48f 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/module/module.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/module/module.go @@ -802,8 +802,8 @@ func MatchPrefixPatterns(globs, target string) bool { for globs != "" { // Extract next non-empty glob in comma-separated list. var glob string - if i := strings.Index(globs, ","); i >= 0 { - glob, globs = globs[:i], globs[i+1:] + if before, after, ok := strings.Cut(globs, ","); ok { + glob, globs = before, after } else { glob, globs = globs, "" } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/entity.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/entity.go index b628880a01..4e8d5d55f2 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/entity.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/entity.go @@ -2156,9 +2156,8 @@ var entity = map[string]rune{ // HTML entities that are two unicode codepoints. var entity2 = map[string][2]rune{ - // TODO(nigeltao): Handle replacements that are wider than their names. - // "nLt;": {'\u226A', '\u20D2'}, - // "nGt;": {'\u226B', '\u20D2'}, + "nLt;": {'\u226A', '\u20D2'}, + "nGt;": {'\u226B', '\u20D2'}, "NotEqualTilde;": {'\u2242', '\u0338'}, "NotGreaterFullEqual;": {'\u2267', '\u0338'}, "NotGreaterGreater;": {'\u226B', '\u0338'}, diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/escape.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/escape.go index 12f2273706..df3edc5b12 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/escape.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/escape.go @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package html import ( "bytes" + "slices" "strings" "unicode/utf8" ) @@ -50,25 +51,24 @@ var replacementTable = [...]rune{ // 0x0D->'\u000D' is a no-op. } -// unescapeEntity reads an entity like "<" from b[src:] and writes the -// corresponding "<" to b[dst:], returning the incremented dst and src cursors. -// Precondition: b[src] == '&' && dst <= src. -// attribute should be true if parsing an attribute value. -func unescapeEntity(b []byte, dst, src int, attribute bool) (dst1, src1 int) { +// unescapeEntity attempts to consume a character reference from s[src:], +// returning the rune, potential second rune, and number of bytes consumed +// (which indicates the length of the character reference). It is assumed that +// the first byte of s is '&'. attribute should be true if parsing an attribute +// value. +func unescapeEntity(s []byte, attribute bool) (rune, rune, int) { // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/syntax.html#consume-a-character-reference // i starts at 1 because we already know that s[0] == '&'. - i, s := 1, b[src:] + i := 1 if len(s) <= 1 { - b[dst] = b[src] - return dst + 1, src + 1 + return '&', 0, 1 } if s[i] == '#' { - if len(s) <= 3 { // We need to have at least "&#.". - b[dst] = b[src] - return dst + 1, src + 1 + if len(s) <= 2 { // We need to have at least "&#". + return '&', 0, 1 } i++ c := s[i] @@ -78,34 +78,43 @@ func unescapeEntity(b []byte, dst, src int, attribute bool) (dst1, src1 int) { i++ } + i0 := i x := '\x00' for i < len(s) { c = s[i] - i++ + var d rune + var mult rune if hex { + mult = 16 if '0' <= c && c <= '9' { - x = 16*x + rune(c) - '0' - continue + d = rune(c) - '0' } else if 'a' <= c && c <= 'f' { - x = 16*x + rune(c) - 'a' + 10 - continue + d = rune(c) - 'a' + 10 } else if 'A' <= c && c <= 'F' { - x = 16*x + rune(c) - 'A' + 10 - continue + d = rune(c) - 'A' + 10 + } else { + break + } + } else { + mult = 10 + if '0' <= c && c <= '9' { + d = rune(c) - '0' + } else { + break } - } else if '0' <= c && c <= '9' { - x = 10*x + rune(c) - '0' - continue } - if c != ';' { - i-- + if x <= 0x10FFFF { + x = mult*x + d } - break + i++ + } + + if i == i0 { // No characters matched. + return '&', 0, 1 } - if i <= 3 { // No characters matched. - b[dst] = b[src] - return dst + 1, src + 1 + if i < len(s) && s[i] == ';' { + i++ } if 0x80 <= x && x <= 0x9F { @@ -116,7 +125,7 @@ func unescapeEntity(b []byte, dst, src int, attribute bool) (dst1, src1 int) { x = '\uFFFD' } - return dst + utf8.EncodeRune(b[dst:], x), src + i + return x, 0, i } // Consume the maximum number of characters possible, with the @@ -141,10 +150,9 @@ func unescapeEntity(b []byte, dst, src int, attribute bool) (dst1, src1 int) { } else if attribute && entityName[len(entityName)-1] != ';' && len(s) > i && s[i] == '=' { // No-op. } else if x := entity[entityName]; x != 0 { - return dst + utf8.EncodeRune(b[dst:], x), src + i + return x, 0, i } else if x := entity2[entityName]; x[0] != 0 { - dst1 := dst + utf8.EncodeRune(b[dst:], x[0]) - return dst1 + utf8.EncodeRune(b[dst1:], x[1]), src + i + return x[0], x[1], i } else if !attribute { maxLen := len(entityName) - 1 if maxLen > longestEntityWithoutSemicolon { @@ -152,35 +160,67 @@ func unescapeEntity(b []byte, dst, src int, attribute bool) (dst1, src1 int) { } for j := maxLen; j > 1; j-- { if x := entity[entityName[:j]]; x != 0 { - return dst + utf8.EncodeRune(b[dst:], x), src + j + 1 + return x, 0, j + 1 } } } - dst1, src1 = dst+i, src+i - copy(b[dst:dst1], b[src:src1]) - return dst1, src1 + return '&', 0, 1 } -// unescape unescapes b's entities in-place, so that "a<b" becomes "a entityNameLen { + if reusingB { + out = slices.Clone(out) + reusingB = false } - return b[0:dst] + out = slices.Grow(out, replLen) + } + out = utf8.AppendRune(out, r1) + if r2 != 0 { + out = utf8.AppendRune(out, r2) } + + src += entityNameLen } - return b + + return out } // lower lower-cases the A-Z bytes in b in-place, so that "aBc" becomes "abc". diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/foreign.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/foreign.go index e8515d8e88..65d01d1ed9 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/foreign.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/foreign.go @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ func adjustForeignAttributes(aa []Attribute) { } switch a.Key { case "xlink:actuate", "xlink:arcrole", "xlink:href", "xlink:role", "xlink:show", - "xlink:title", "xlink:type", "xml:base", "xml:lang", "xml:space", "xmlns:xlink": + "xlink:title", "xlink:type", "xml:lang", "xml:space", "xmlns:xlink": j := strings.Index(a.Key, ":") aa[i].Namespace = a.Key[:j] aa[i].Key = a.Key[j+1:] diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/iter.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/iter.go index 54be8fd30f..349ef73e64 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/iter.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/iter.go @@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. -//go:build go1.23 - package html import "iter" diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/node.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/node.go index 77741a1950..253e4679c7 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/node.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/node.go @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import ( // A NodeType is the type of a Node. type NodeType uint32 +//go:generate stringer -type NodeType const ( ErrorNode NodeType = iota TextNode diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/nodetype_string.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/nodetype_string.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8253af4915 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/nodetype_string.go @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// Code generated by "stringer -type NodeType"; DO NOT EDIT. + +package html + +import "strconv" + +func _() { + // An "invalid array index" compiler error signifies that the constant values have changed. + // Re-run the stringer command to generate them again. + var x [1]struct{} + _ = x[ErrorNode-0] + _ = x[TextNode-1] + _ = x[DocumentNode-2] + _ = x[ElementNode-3] + _ = x[CommentNode-4] + _ = x[DoctypeNode-5] + _ = x[RawNode-6] + _ = x[scopeMarkerNode-7] +} + +const _NodeType_name = "ErrorNodeTextNodeDocumentNodeElementNodeCommentNodeDoctypeNodeRawNodescopeMarkerNode" + +var _NodeType_index = [...]uint8{0, 9, 17, 29, 40, 51, 62, 69, 84} + +func (i NodeType) String() string { + idx := int(i) - 0 + if i < 0 || idx >= len(_NodeType_index)-1 { + return "NodeType(" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(i), 10) + ")" + } + return _NodeType_name[_NodeType_index[idx]:_NodeType_index[idx+1]] +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/parse.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/parse.go index 88fc0056a3..165b6108d4 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/parse.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/parse.go @@ -5,9 +5,11 @@ package html import ( + "cmp" "errors" "fmt" "io" + "slices" "strings" a "golang.org/x/net/html/atom" @@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ func (p *parser) top() *Node { // Stop tags for use in popUntil. These come from section 12.2.4.2. var ( defaultScopeStopTags = map[string][]a.Atom{ - "": {a.Applet, a.Caption, a.Html, a.Table, a.Td, a.Th, a.Marquee, a.Object, a.Template}, + "": {a.Applet, a.Caption, a.Html, a.Table, a.Td, a.Th, a.Marquee, a.Object, a.Template, a.Select}, "math": {a.AnnotationXml, a.Mi, a.Mn, a.Mo, a.Ms, a.Mtext}, "svg": {a.Desc, a.ForeignObject, a.Title}, } @@ -76,7 +78,6 @@ const ( tableScope tableRowScope tableBodyScope - selectScope ) // popUntil pops the stack of open elements at the highest element whose tag @@ -131,10 +132,6 @@ func (p *parser) indexOfElementInScope(s scope, matchTags ...a.Atom) int { if tagAtom == a.Html || tagAtom == a.Table || tagAtom == a.Template { return -1 } - case selectScope: - if tagAtom != a.Optgroup && tagAtom != a.Option { - return -1 - } default: panic(fmt.Sprintf("html: internal error: indexOfElementInScope unknown scope: %d", s)) } @@ -328,6 +325,14 @@ func (p *parser) addText(text string) { }) } +func attrCompare(a, b Attribute) int { + return cmp.Or( + cmp.Compare(a.Namespace, b.Namespace), + cmp.Compare(a.Key, b.Key), + cmp.Compare(a.Val, b.Val), + ) +} + // addElement adds a child element based on the current token. func (p *parser) addElement() { p.addChild(&Node{ @@ -343,6 +348,10 @@ func (p *parser) addFormattingElement() { tagAtom, attr := p.tok.DataAtom, p.tok.Attr p.addElement() + // In order to optimize the search, we need the attributes to be sorted, so we + // can just use slices.Equal. + slices.SortFunc(attr, attrCompare) + // Implement the Noah's Ark clause, but with three per family instead of two. identicalElements := 0 findIdenticalElements: @@ -360,19 +369,7 @@ findIdenticalElements: if n.DataAtom != tagAtom { continue } - if len(n.Attr) != len(attr) { - continue - } - compareAttributes: - for _, t0 := range n.Attr { - for _, t1 := range attr { - if t0.Key == t1.Key && t0.Namespace == t1.Namespace && t0.Val == t1.Val { - // Found a match for this attribute, continue with the next attribute. - continue compareAttributes - } - } - // If we get here, there is no attribute that matches a. - // Therefore the element is not identical to the new one. + if !slices.Equal(n.Attr, attr) { continue findIdenticalElements } @@ -382,7 +379,11 @@ findIdenticalElements: } } - p.afe = append(p.afe, p.top()) + // Sort the attributes to optimize future identical-element searches. + top := p.top() + slices.SortFunc(top.Attr, attrCompare) + + p.afe = append(p.afe, top) } // Section 12.2.4.3. @@ -454,21 +455,6 @@ func (p *parser) resetInsertionMode() { } switch n.DataAtom { - case a.Select: - if !last { - for ancestor, first := n, p.oe[0]; ancestor != first; { - ancestor = p.oe[p.oe.index(ancestor)-1] - switch ancestor.DataAtom { - case a.Template: - p.im = inSelectIM - return - case a.Table: - p.im = inSelectInTableIM - return - } - } - } - p.im = inSelectIM case a.Td, a.Th: // TODO: remove this divergence from the HTML5 spec. // @@ -996,7 +982,10 @@ func inBodyIM(p *parser) bool { p.popUntil(buttonScope, a.P) p.addElement() case a.Button: - p.popUntil(defaultScope, a.Button) + if p.elementInScope(defaultScope, a.Button) { + p.generateImpliedEndTags() + p.popUntil(defaultScope, a.Button) + } p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements() p.addElement() p.framesetOK = false @@ -1034,7 +1023,18 @@ func inBodyIM(p *parser) bool { p.framesetOK = false p.im = inTableIM return true - case a.Area, a.Br, a.Embed, a.Img, a.Input, a.Keygen, a.Wbr: + case a.Area, a.Br, a.Embed, a.Img, a.Keygen, a.Wbr: + p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements() + p.addElement() + p.oe.pop() + p.acknowledgeSelfClosingTag() + p.framesetOK = false + case a.Input: + if p.fragment && p.context.DataAtom == a.Select { + // Ignore the token. + return true + } + p.popUntil(defaultScope, a.Select) p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements() p.addElement() p.oe.pop() @@ -1055,7 +1055,13 @@ func inBodyIM(p *parser) bool { p.oe.pop() p.acknowledgeSelfClosingTag() case a.Hr: - p.popUntil(buttonScope, a.P) + if p.elementInScope(buttonScope, a.P) { + p.generateImpliedEndTags("p") + p.popUntil(defaultScope, a.P) + } + if p.elementInScope(defaultScope, a.Select) { + p.generateImpliedEndTags() + } p.addElement() p.oe.pop() p.acknowledgeSelfClosingTag() @@ -1089,13 +1095,30 @@ func inBodyIM(p *parser) bool { // Don't let the tokenizer go into raw text mode when scripting is disabled. p.tokenizer.NextIsNotRawText() case a.Select: + if p.fragment && p.context.DataAtom == a.Select { + // Ignore the token. + return true + } else if p.popUntil(defaultScope, a.Select) { + return true + } p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements() p.addElement() p.framesetOK = false - p.im = inSelectIM return true - case a.Optgroup, a.Option: - if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option { + case a.Option: + if p.elementInScope(defaultScope, a.Select) { + p.generateImpliedEndTags("optgroup") + // If oe has option element in scope, parse error? + } else if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option { + p.oe.pop() + } + p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements() + p.addElement() + case a.Optgroup: + if p.elementInScope(defaultScope, a.Select) { + p.generateImpliedEndTags() + // If oe has option or optgroup element in scope, parse error? + } else if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option { p.oe.pop() } p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements() @@ -1143,7 +1166,12 @@ func inBodyIM(p *parser) bool { return false } return true - case a.Address, a.Article, a.Aside, a.Blockquote, a.Button, a.Center, a.Details, a.Dialog, a.Dir, a.Div, a.Dl, a.Fieldset, a.Figcaption, a.Figure, a.Footer, a.Header, a.Hgroup, a.Listing, a.Main, a.Menu, a.Nav, a.Ol, a.Pre, a.Search, a.Section, a.Summary, a.Ul: + case a.Address, a.Article, a.Aside, a.Blockquote, a.Button, a.Center, a.Details, a.Dialog, a.Dir, a.Div, a.Dl, a.Fieldset, a.Figcaption, a.Figure, a.Footer, a.Header, a.Hgroup, a.Listing, a.Main, a.Menu, a.Nav, a.Ol, a.Pre, a.Search, a.Section, a.Select, a.Summary, a.Ul: + if !p.elementInScope(defaultScope, p.tok.DataAtom) { + // Ignore the token. + return true + } + p.generateImpliedEndTags() p.popUntil(defaultScope, p.tok.DataAtom) case a.Form: if p.oe.contains(a.Template) { @@ -1372,8 +1400,6 @@ func (p *parser) inBodyEndTagFormatting(tagAtom a.Atom, tagName string) { } // inBodyEndTagOther performs the "any other end tag" algorithm for inBodyIM. -// "Any other end tag" handling from 12.2.6.5 The rules for parsing tokens in foreign content -// https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/syntax.html#parsing-main-inforeign func (p *parser) inBodyEndTagOther(tagAtom a.Atom, tagName string) { for i := len(p.oe) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { // Two element nodes have the same tag if they have the same Data (a @@ -1383,7 +1409,7 @@ func (p *parser) inBodyEndTagOther(tagAtom a.Atom, tagName string) { // Uncommon (custom) tags get a zero DataAtom. // // The if condition here is equivalent to (p.oe[i].Data == tagName). - if (p.oe[i].DataAtom == tagAtom) && + if p.oe[i].Namespace == "" && (p.oe[i].DataAtom == tagAtom) && ((tagAtom != 0) || (p.oe[i].Data == tagName)) { p.oe = p.oe[:i] break @@ -1484,17 +1510,6 @@ func inTableIM(p *parser) bool { } p.addElement() p.form = p.oe.pop() - case a.Select: - p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements() - switch p.top().DataAtom { - case a.Table, a.Tbody, a.Tfoot, a.Thead, a.Tr: - p.fosterParenting = true - } - p.addElement() - p.fosterParenting = false - p.framesetOK = false - p.im = inSelectInTableIM - return true } case EndTagToken: switch p.tok.DataAtom { @@ -1543,12 +1558,6 @@ func inCaptionIM(p *parser) bool { p.clearActiveFormattingElements() p.im = inTableIM return false - case a.Select: - p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements() - p.addElement() - p.framesetOK = false - p.im = inSelectInTableIM - return true } case EndTagToken: switch p.tok.DataAtom { @@ -1758,12 +1767,6 @@ func inCellIM(p *parser) bool { } // Ignore the token. return true - case a.Select: - p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements() - p.addElement() - p.framesetOK = false - p.im = inSelectInTableIM - return true } case EndTagToken: switch p.tok.DataAtom { @@ -1794,118 +1797,6 @@ func inCellIM(p *parser) bool { return inBodyIM(p) } -// Section 12.2.6.4.16. -func inSelectIM(p *parser) bool { - switch p.tok.Type { - case TextToken: - p.addText(strings.Replace(p.tok.Data, "\x00", "", -1)) - case StartTagToken: - switch p.tok.DataAtom { - case a.Html: - return inBodyIM(p) - case a.Option: - if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option { - p.oe.pop() - } - p.addElement() - case a.Optgroup: - if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option { - p.oe.pop() - } - if p.top().DataAtom == a.Optgroup { - p.oe.pop() - } - p.addElement() - case a.Select: - if !p.popUntil(selectScope, a.Select) { - // Ignore the token. - return true - } - p.resetInsertionMode() - case a.Input, a.Keygen, a.Textarea: - if p.elementInScope(selectScope, a.Select) { - p.parseImpliedToken(EndTagToken, a.Select, a.Select.String()) - return false - } - // In order to properly ignore