diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 0a31333c..ea741176 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Built in Go for performance and simplicity, llama-swap has zero dependencies and
 
 - ✅ Easy to deploy and configure: one binary, one configuration file. no external dependencies
 - ✅ On-demand model switching
-- ✅ Use any local OpenAI compatible server (llama.cpp, vllm, tabbyAPI, etc)
+- ✅ Use any local OpenAI compatible server (llama.cpp, vllm, tabbyAPI, etc.)
   - future proof, upgrade your inference servers at any time.
 - ✅ OpenAI API supported endpoints:
   - `v1/completions`
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ llama-swap can be installed in multiple ways
 
 ### Docker Install ([download images](https://github.com/mostlygeek/llama-swap/pkgs/container/llama-swap))
 
-Nightly container images with llama-swap and llama-server are built for multiple platforms (cuda, vulkan, intel, etc).
+Nightly container images with llama-swap and llama-server are built for multiple platforms (cuda, vulkan, intel, etc.) including [non-root variants with improved security](docs/container-security.md).
 
 ```shell
 $ docker pull ghcr.io/mostlygeek/llama-swap:cuda
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ docker pull ghcr.io/mostlygeek/llama-swap:musa
 # tagged llama-swap, platform and llama-server version images
 docker pull ghcr.io/mostlygeek/llama-swap:v166-cuda-b6795
 
+# non-root cuda
+docker pull ghcr.io/mostlygeek/llama-swap:cuda-non-root
+
 ```
 
 </details>
diff --git a/docs/container-security.md b/docs/container-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d5584795
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/container-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+## Container Security
+
+For convenience, the default container images use the **root** user within the container. This permits simplified access to host resources including volume mounts and hardware devices under `/dev/dri` (_for Vulkan support_). But this can widen the attack surface to privilege escalation exploits.
+
+Alternative images, tagged as `non-root`, are also available. For example, `llama-swap:cpu-non-root` uses the unprivileged **app** user by default. Depending on deployment requirements, additional configuration may be necessary to ensure that the container retains access to required hosts resources. This might entail customizing host filesystem permissions/ownership appropriately or injecting host group membership into the container.
+
+Docker offers a [system-wide option enabling user namespace remapping](https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/userns-remap/) to accommodate situations were a **root** container user is required but also mentions that _"The best way to prevent privilege-escalation attacks from within a container is to configure your container's applications to run as unprivileged users."_ Podman offers similar capability, per-container, to [set UID/GID mapping in a new user namespace](https://docs.podman.io/en/latest/markdown/podman-run.1.html#set-uid-gid-mapping-in-a-new-user-namespace).
+
+The Large Language Model (_LLM/AI_) ecosystem is rapidly evolving and [serious security vulnerabilities have surfaced in the past](https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/security-pickle). These alternative _non-root_ images could reduce the impact of future unknown problems. However, proper planning and configuration is recommended to utilize them.