Releases: lestrrat-go/jwx
Releases · lestrrat-go/jwx
v2.0.17
v2.0.17 20 Nov 2023
[Bug Fixes]
* [jws] Previously, `jws.UnregisterSigner` did not remove the previous signer instance when
the signer was registered and unregistered multiple times (#1016). This has been fixed.
[New Features]
* [jwe] (EXPERIMENTAL) `jwe.WithCEK` has been added to extract the content encryption key (CEK) from the Decrypt operation.
* [jwe] (EXPERIMENTAL) `jwe.EncryptStatic` has been added to encrypt content using a static CEK.
Using static CEKs has serious security implications, and you should not use
this unless you completely understand the risks involved.
v2.0.16
v2.0.16 31 Oct 2023
[Security]
* [jws] ECDSA signature verification requires us to check if the signature
is of the desired length of bytes, but this check that used to exist before
had been removed in #65, resulting in certain malformed signatures to pass
verification.
One of the ways this could happen if R is a 31 byte integer and S is 32 byte integer,
both containing the correct signature values, but R is not zero-padded.
Correct = R: [ 0 , ... ] (32 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)
Wrong = R: [ ... ] (31 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)
In order for this check to pass, you would still need to have all 63 bytes
populated with the correct signature. The only modification a bad actor
may be able to do is to add one more byte at the end, in which case the
first 32 bytes (including what would have been S's first byte) is used for R,
and S would contain the rest. But this will only result in the verification to
fail. Therefore this in itself should not pose any security risk, albeit
allowing some illegally formated messages to be verified.
* [jwk] `jwk.Key` objects now have a `Validate()` method to validate the data
stored in the keys. However, this still does not necessarily mean that the key's
are valid for use in cryptographic operations. If `Validate()` is successful,
it only means that the keys are in the right _format_, including the presence
of required fields and that certain fields have proper length, etc.
[New Features]
* [jws] Added `jws.WithValidateKey()` to force calling `key.Validate()` before
signing or verification.
* [jws] `jws.Sign()` now returns a special type of error that can hold the
individual errors from the signers. The stringification is still the same
as before to preserve backwards compatibility.
* [jwk] Added `jwk.IsKeyValidationError` that checks if an error is an error
from `key.Validate()`.
[Bug Fixes]
* [jwt] `jwt.ParseInsecure()` was running verification if you provided a key
via `jwt.WithKey()` or `jwt.WithKeySet()` (#1007)
v2.0.15
v2.0.15 19 20 Oct 2023
[Bug fixes]
* [jws] jws.Sign() now properly check for valid algorithm / key type pair when
the key implements crypto.Signer. This was caused by the fact that when
jws.WithKey() accepted keys that implemented crypto.Signer, there really
is no way to robustly check what algorithm the crypto.Signer implements.
The code has now been modified to check for KNOWN key types, i.e. those
that are defined in Go standard library, and those that are defined in
this library. For example, now calling jws.Sign() with jws.WithKey(jwa.RS256, ecdsaKey)
where ecdsaKey is either an instance of *ecdsa.PrivateKey or jwk.ECDSAPrivateKey
will produce an error.
However, if you use a separate library that wraps some KMS library which implements
crypto.Signer, this same check will not be performed due to the fact that
it is an unknown library to us. And there's no way to query a crypto.Signer
for its algorithm family.
v2.0.14
v2.0.14 17 Oct 2023
[New Features]
* [jwk] jwk.IsPrivateKey(), as well as jwk.AsymmetricKey has been added.
The function can be used to tell if a jwk.Key is a private key of an
asymmetric key pair.
[Security]
* golang.org/x/crypto has been updated to 0.14.0. The update contains a fix for HTTP/2
rapid reset DoS vulnerability, which some security scanning softwares may flag.
However, do note that this library is NOT affected by the issue, as it does not have
the capability to serve as an HTTP/2 server. This is included in this release
document so that users will be able to tell why this library may be flagged
when/if their scanning software do so.
v2.0.13
v2.0.13 26 Sep 2023
[New Features]
* [jwk] jwk.Equal has been added. Please note that this is equivalent to
comparing the keys' thumbprints, therefore it does NOT take in consideration
non-essential fields.
[Miscellaneous]
* Various documentation fixes and additions.
v2.0.12
[SECURITY] v2.0.11
v2.0.11 - 14 Jun 2023
[Security]
* Potential Padding Oracle Attack Vulnerability and Timing Attack Vulnerability
for JWE AES-CBC encrypted payloads affecting all v2 releases up to v2.0.10,
all v1 releases up to v1.2.25, and all v0 releases up to v0.9.2 have been reported by
@shogo82148.
Please note that v0 versions will NOT receive fixes.
This release fixes these vulnerabilities for the v2 series.
[SECURITY] v1.2.26
v1.2.26 - 14 Jun 2023
[Security]
* Potential Padding Oracle Attack Vulnerability and Timing Attack Vulnerability
for JWE AES-CBC encrypted payloads affecting all v2 releases up to v2.0.10,
all v1 releases up to v1.2.25, and all v0 releases up to v0.9.2 have been reported by
@shogo82148.
Please note that v0 versions will NOT receive fixes.
This release fixes these vulnerabilities for the v1 series.
v2.0.10
v2.0.10 - 12 Jun 2023
[New Features]
* [jwe] (EXPERIMENTAL) Added `jwe.KeyEncrypter` and `jwe.KeyDecrypter` interfaces
that works in similar ways as how `crypto.Signer` works for signature
generation and verification. It can act as the interface for your encryption/decryption
keys that are for example stored in an hardware device.
This feature is labeled experimental because the API for the above interfaces have not
been battle tested, and may need to changed yet. Please be aware that until the API
is deemed stable, you may have to adapat our code to these possible changes,
_even_ during minor version upgrades of this library.
[Bug fixes]
* Registering JWS signers/verifiers did not work since v2.0.0, because the
way we handle algorithm names changed in 2aa98ce6884187180a7145b73da78c859dd46c84.
(We previously thought that this would be checked by the example code, but it
apparently failed to flag us properly)
The logic behind managing the internal database has been fixed, and
`jws.RegisterSigner` and `jws.RegisterVerifier` now properly hooks into the new
`jwa.RegisterSignatureAlgorithm` to automatically register new algorithm names
(#910, #911)
[Miscellaneous]
* Added limited support for github.com/segmentio/asm/base64. Compile your code
with the `jwx_asmbase64` build tag. This feature is EXPERIMENTAL.
Through limited testing, the use of a faster base64 library provide 1~5% increase
in throughput on average. It might make more difference if the input/output is large.
If you care about this performance improvement, you should probably enable
`goccy` JSON parser as well, by specifying `jwx_goccy,jwx_asmbase64` in your build call.
* Slightly changed the way global variables underneath `jwk.Fetch` are initialized and
configured. `jwk.Fetch` creates an object that spawns wokers to fetch JWKS when it's
first called.
You can now also use `jwk.SetGlobalFetcher()` to set a fetcher object which you can
control.
v2.0.9
v2.0.9 - 21 Mar 2023
[Security Fixes]
* Updated use of golang.org/x/crypto to v0.7.0
[Bug fixes]
* Emitted PEM file for EC private key types used the wrong PEM armor (#875)
[Miscellaneous]
* Banners for generated files have been modified to allow tools to pick them up (#867)
* Remove unused variables around ReadFileOption (#866)
* Fix test failures
* Support bazel out of the box
* Now you can create JWS messages using `{"alg":"none"}`, by calling `jws.Sign()`
with `jws.WithInsecureNoSignature()` option. (#888, #890).
Note that there is no way to call
`jws.Verify()` while allowing `{"alg":"none"}` as you wouldn't be _verifying_
the message if we allowed the "none" algorithm. `jws.Parse()` will parse such
messages witout verification.
`jwt` also allows you to sign using alg="none", but there's no symmetrical
way to verify such messages.