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Add ignored comms for /etc/shadow access #490

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merged 3 commits into from
Feb 23, 2025
Merged

Add ignored comms for /etc/shadow access #490

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93b4fc2
Add ignored comms for /etc/shadow access
slashben Feb 23, 2025
5c67c17
Checking it only if running without profile
slashben Feb 23, 2025
c92fdb0
Fixing malicious source
slashben Feb 23, 2025
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38 changes: 38 additions & 0 deletions pkg/ruleengine/v1/r0010_unexpected_sensitive_file_access.go
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -48,6 +48,37 @@ func CreateRuleR0010UnexpectedSensitiveFileAccess() *R0010UnexpectedSensitiveFil
}
}

var legitimateProcessNames = []string{
"systemd",
"sudo",
"passwd",
"chpasswd",
"useradd",
"usermod",
"chage",
"sshd",
"login",
"su",
"groupadd",
"groupmod",
"dpkg",
"rpm",
"ansible",
"puppet-agent",
"chef-client",
"vipw",
"pwck",
"grpck",
"nscd",
"cron",
"crond",
"pam",
"snap",
"apk",
"yum",
"dnf",
}

func (rule *R0010UnexpectedSensitiveFileAccess) SetParameters(parameters map[string]interface{}) {
rule.BaseRule.SetParameters(parameters)

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -102,6 +133,13 @@ func (rule *R0010UnexpectedSensitiveFileAccess) ProcessEvent(eventType utils.Eve
if err != nil {
return nil
}
} else {
// Running without application profile, to avoid false positives check if the process name is legitimate
for _, processName := range legitimateProcessNames {
if processName == openEvent.Comm {
return nil
}
}
}

if !utils.IsSensitivePath(openEvent.FullPath, rule.additionalPaths) {
Expand Down
26 changes: 25 additions & 1 deletion pkg/ruleengine/v1/r1000_exec_from_malicious_source.go
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -49,7 +49,21 @@ func (rule *R1000ExecFromMaliciousSource) ID() string {
return R1000ID
}

func (rule *R1000ExecFromMaliciousSource) ProcessEvent(eventType utils.EventType, event utils.K8sEvent, _ objectcache.ObjectCache) ruleengine.RuleFailure {
var whitelistedProcessesForMaliciousSource = []string{
"systemd",
"docker",
"containerd",
"snap-confine",
"nginx",
"apache2",
"bash",
"dash",
"sh",
"perl",
"supervisord",
}

func (rule *R1000ExecFromMaliciousSource) ProcessEvent(eventType utils.EventType, event utils.K8sEvent, objCache objectcache.ObjectCache) ruleengine.RuleFailure {
if eventType != utils.ExecveEventType {
return nil
}
Expand All @@ -61,6 +75,16 @@ func (rule *R1000ExecFromMaliciousSource) ProcessEvent(eventType utils.EventType

var maliciousExecPathPrefixes = []string{
"/dev/shm",
"/proc/self/fd",
}

if objCache == nil {
// Running without object cache, to avoid false positives check if the process name is legitimate
for _, processName := range whitelistedProcessesForMaliciousSource {
if processName == execEvent.Comm {
return nil
}
}
}

execPath := GetExecFullPathFromEvent(execEvent)
Expand Down
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