ec: validate that a point before deriving keys

This update checks to make sure that the public key passed in to
ECDH is a point that actually exists on the curve. This is
important to prevent a twist attack that can be used to reveal
the private key of a party in an ECDH operation over a number of
occurances.

For more details on the attack see this blog post:
https://github.com/christianlundkvist/blog/blob/master/2020_05_26_secp256k1_twist_attacks/secp256k1_twist_attacks.md

CVE: CVE-2020-28498

Author: kdenhartog

lib/elliptic/ec/key.js

@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ KeyPair.prototype._importPublic = function _importPublic(key, enc) {
 
 // ECDH
 KeyPair.prototype.derive = function derive(pub) {
+  if(!pub.validate()) {
+    assert(pub.validate(), 'public point not validated');
+  }
   return pub.mul(this.priv).getX();
 };
 

test/ecdh-test.js

@@ -27,3 +27,17 @@ describe('ECDH', function() {
   test('ed25519');
   test('secp256k1');
 });
+
+describe('ECDH twist attack', () => {
+  it('should be able to prevent a twist attack for secp256k1', () => {
+    var bobEcdh = new elliptic.ec('secp256k1');
+    var malloryEcdh = new elliptic.ec('secp256k1');
+    var bob = bobEcdh.genKeyPair();
+    // This is a bad point that shouldn't be able to be passed to derive.
+    // If a bad point can be passed it's possible to perform a twist attack.
+    var mallory = malloryEcdh.keyFromPublic({ x: 14, y: 16 });
+    assert.throws(function () {
+      bob.derive(mallory.getPublic());
+    });
+  });
+});