From ebb04c9566a757b22ca4851576a02ed5d716d823 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "copilot-swe-agent[bot]" <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 21:40:11 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Initial plan


From 6ad4c49c1fd7eef17c2b4685fc595c956a988462 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "copilot-swe-agent[bot]" <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 21:43:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] docs: add runner doctor A24

---
 .github/agents/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md           | 2 ++
 .github/workflows/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md        | 1 +
 .github/workflows/shared/self-hosted-failure-modes.md | 2 ++
 scripts/ci/self-hosted-runner-doctor-workflow.test.ts | 6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.github/agents/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md b/.github/agents/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
index 82adea231..cfa0af1f0 100644
--- a/.github/agents/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
+++ b/.github/agents/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ Establish these facts before matching a failure mode:
 | A21 | `awf-agent` fails to start with `runc create failed: ... mkdirat /var/lib/docker/overlay2/<layer-id>/merged/tmp/awf-init: read-only file system` (or equivalent for `/tmp/awf-runner-bin`) when a `filesystem.allowWrite` policy narrows `/tmp` to read-only; most reliably reproduced on ARC/DinD split-filesystem topologies using `--docker-host-path-prefix` | runc creates missing bind mountpoints with `mkdirat` against whichever bind already covers the destination. AWF control-plane mountpoints (`/tmp/awf-init`, `/tmp/awf-runner-bin`) were nested under the user-narrowable `/tmp` bind, so narrowing `/tmp` to `ro` blocked nested mountpoint creation and failed startup with `EROFS`. `/tmp/awf-lib` was helper-copy staging rather than a nested mountpoint; narrowing `/tmp` could silently prevent those copies. On ARC/DinD with a `/tmp`-rooted `--docker-host-path-prefix`, shared-prefix detection also misclassified AWF workDir-derived binds as daemon-only and failed closed. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7679, merged 2026-08-24):** init-signal moved to `/run/awf-init`; a new `planNestedMountpoints()`/`ensureNestedMountpoints()` pass pre-creates mountpoints that would land inside read-only covers (or fails closed); `isSharedDockerHostPathPrefix` now treats only the literal `/tmp` prefix as shared for ARC/DinD detection; legacy `/tmp/awf-init` compatibility binds remain for older pinned agent images; and `/tmp/awf-lib` helper staging (one-shot token protection library, Claude API key helper, `gh` CLI proxy wrapper, CA bundles, runner shims) moved to `/run/awf-lib`, eliminating silent degradation under `filesystem.allowWrite`. Startup now fails closed if the one-shot token library cannot be staged or if CLI proxying is enabled but the `gh` wrapper cannot be installed. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7679. | Check `awf --version` for github/gh-aw-firewall#7679; inspect startup logs for `mkdirat ... read-only file system` with active `filesystem.allowWrite`; inspect entrypoint logs for `[entrypoint][WARN] Could not copy one-shot-token library to /tmp/awf-lib` — on older AWF this confirms the silent-degradation mode; on ARC/DinD verify whether `--docker-host-path-prefix` is exactly `/tmp` (shared) vs. daemon-only (for example `/host`) | github/gh-aw-firewall#7678, github/gh-aw-firewall#7679, github/gh-aw-firewall#7681, github/gh-aw-firewall#7728 |
 | A22 | `arc-dind` topology fails to start with Docker rejecting the compose `cap_drop` list: `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment: "CAP_SYS_MODULE"` (or similar) on hosts, such as Talos Linux, that trim capabilities from the container capability bounding set | `src/services/squid-service.ts` and `src/services/agent-service.ts` hardcoded `cap_drop` lists (`NET_RAW`, `SYS_ADMIN`, `SYS_PTRACE`, `SYS_MODULE`, `MKNOD`, `AUDIT_WRITE`, `SETFCAP` for Squid; a similar list for the agent) for both the Squid and agent containers with no filtering against what the host/daemon's capability bounding set actually supports, so hosts with a trimmed bounding set (for example Talos `gha-runner-scale-set` with `docker:29-dind`) can never satisfy Docker's compose validation | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7795, merged 2026-08-28):** `cap_drop` is now filtered against the effective host capability bounding set (read daemon-side from `/proc/self/status` `CapBnd` via a privileged probe container) before writing `docker-compose.yml`; capabilities already absent from the bounding set are silently omitted from `cap_drop` (a safe no-op, since a capability that can't be granted can't be exploited either). Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7795. | `getHostCapabilityBoundingSet()` (`src/capability-filter.ts:78-89`) runs `docker run --rm --privileged --network=none alpine:latest cat /proc/self/status` against the daemon and decodes `CapBnd`; reproduce with `docker compose up` on a host missing `CAP_SYS_MODULE` from the bounding set — pre-fix this fails with `invalid CapDrop`, post-fix compose starts normally | github/gh-aw#56127, github/gh-aw-firewall#7788, github/gh-aw-firewall#7795 |
 | A23 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set, `docker compose up` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (also seen for `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) | `filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` (`src/services/optional-services.ts`) is meant to drop the bogus AWF-owned chroot-home mount that the DinD daemon can't resolve, but it compared already-prefixed mount sources (from `buildAgentVolumes()`, which applies `--docker-host-path-prefix` as its final step) against the *raw, unprefixed* `config.workDir`/`effectiveHome`. Once a host-path prefix is set — always true on real ARC/DinD — the comparison silently stopped matching, so the bogus chroot-home mount survived filtering and Docker tried to create a `.npmrc` credential-hiding overlay mountpoint inside a path the daemon couldn't write to (EROFS). Distinct from A20 (which was about legitimate caller-supplied home mounts being dropped); A23 is the inverse case — the *bogus* mount not being dropped. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7998, merged 2026-09-02):** extracted `prefixHostPath()` in `src/services/host-path-prefix.ts` from `translateBindMountHostPath()` so bare paths can be prefixed consistently; `filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` now prefixes `config.workDir`/`effectiveHome` before comparing against mount sources, restoring correct detection of daemon-invisible mounts. The existing safe fallback (`dropUnbackedHostHomeOverlays`, warn + skip masking) now engages correctly instead of silently failing; explicit writable `--mount` for the home root still preserves credential masking. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7998. | Reproduce with `runnerTopology: 'arc-dind'` + `dockerHostPathPrefix` set (e.g. `/host`) and inspect generated compose for a `.npmrc`/`.docker/config.json`/`.composer/auth.json` `/dev/null` overlay mountpoint targeting an unprefixed `effectiveHome`/`workDir` path; on unpatched AWF, `docker compose up` fails with the EROFS mounting error above | github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#7994, github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 |
+| A24 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind`, `docker compose up -d --pull never` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to rootfs at ".../gh-aw/home/.npmrc": create mountpoint for .../.npmrc mount: ... openat .npmrc: read-only file system` — distinct from A23 in that it persists even after github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), specifically when the home mount target already exists as a real, genuinely read-only file/dir on the ARC/DinD-staged filesystem | `pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` (`src/services/agent-volumes/credential-hiding.ts`) decided whether a `/dev/null` credential mask could be mounted purely from the *declared* compose bind mode (`ro`/`rw`), never checking the real filesystem when the mode was `rw`. AWF's own home-directory mount is declared `rw`, but under `--docker-host-path-prefix` it can resolve to a directory that is genuinely read-only on the runner's staged filesystem; Docker doesn't remount that case read-only inside the container (unlike a declared `ro` bind), so it touches the real host path directly when creating a missing mountpoint and hits `EROFS`, crashing the agent container before it starts. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#8086, merged 2026-09-04):** an overlay whose mountpoint already exists is always kept (mounting over an existing path succeeds regardless of declared mode or real writability); a missing mountpoint under a declared-`ro` bind is still always dropped; a missing mountpoint under a declared-`rw` bind is now probed against the real filesystem (walking up to the nearest existing ancestor, mirroring how Docker creates missing intermediate directories) and the overlay is dropped if that real directory isn't writable. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#8086. | Reproduce with a `chmod`-based real read-only home directory containing an existing credential file (e.g. `.npmrc`) under `runner.topology: arc-dind` + `--docker-host-path-prefix`; on unpatched AWF (even with github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 applied) `docker compose up` fails with the EROFS mounting error above; on patched AWF the overlay is skipped/kept correctly and the agent starts | github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#8076, github/gh-aw-firewall#8086 |
 
 ## Category B — Self-hosted runners
 
@@ -401,6 +402,7 @@ Establish these facts before matching a failure mode:
 | `error connecting to productionresultssa*.blob.core.windows.net` from `gh run download`/artifact ZIP fetch in `--network-isolation` mode | B26 (mcpg stopped auto-following the artifact redirect; cli-proxy had no route to Azure Blob storage; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7635 with scoped Squid ACL keyed to cli-proxy's fixed IP) |
 | `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment` | A22 (host capability bounding set trimmed below AWF's hardcoded `cap_drop` list, e.g. Talos; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7795) |
 | `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (or `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) on `arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set | A23 (`filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` compared prefixed mount sources against unprefixed `workDir`/`effectiveHome`, so the bogus chroot-home mount wasn't dropped; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7998) |
+| `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), where the target home path already exists as a real read-only file | A24 (`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` only checked declared bind mode, never real filesystem writability for `rw`-declared covers; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8086) |
 | `a network with name awf-net exists but was not created for project` | B27 (orphaned fixed-name `awf-net` from a prior run on a persistent self-hosted runner; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7817) |
 | TLS/certificate verification failure from api-proxy against a custom `--openai-api-target`/`--anthropic-api-target` internal endpoint using a private/corporate CA | B28 (api-proxy sidecar had no custom CA trust extension point; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7816 with `apiProxy.caCert`/`--api-proxy-ca-cert`) |
 | `context-rebuild circuit breaker tripped` together with a failed `cd` into the expected workspace path | B29 (container-workdir not bind-mounted into the chroot; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8021) |
diff --git a/.github/workflows/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md b/.github/workflows/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
index 295d2642b..d54422b20 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
+++ b/.github/workflows/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ Prefer the narrowest match. Examples:
 - `mkdirat ... : read-only file system` at agent container startup while a `filesystem.allowWrite` policy is active (not the `chroot.binariesSourcePath`-specific A12 case) → A21; `[entrypoint][WARN] Could not copy one-shot-token library to /tmp/awf-lib` followed by `Token protection will be disabled` → A21 (silent security-feature degradation under `filesystem.allowWrite`, fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7679)
 - `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment` → A22 (host capability bounding set trimmed below AWF's hardcoded `cap_drop` list, e.g. Talos; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7795)
 - `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (or `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) on `arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set → A23 (a surviving prefixed `${workDir}-chroot-home:/host$HOME` mount is paired with `/dev/null:/host$HOME/<credential>:ro` overlays because prefixed sources were compared with unprefixed `workDir`/`effectiveHome`; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7998)
+- `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), where the target home path already exists as a real read-only file → A24 (`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` only checked declared bind mode, never real filesystem writability for `rw`-declared covers; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8086)
 - `a network with name awf-net exists but was not created for project` → B27 (orphaned fixed-name `awf-net` from a prior run on a persistent self-hosted runner; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7817)
 - TLS/certificate verification failure from api-proxy against a custom `--openai-api-target`/`--anthropic-api-target` internal endpoint using a private/corporate CA → B28 (api-proxy sidecar had no custom CA trust extension point; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7816 with `apiProxy.caCert`/`--api-proxy-ca-cert`)
 - `context-rebuild circuit breaker tripped` together with a failed `cd` into the expected workspace path → B29 (container-workdir not bind-mounted into the chroot; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8021)
diff --git a/.github/workflows/shared/self-hosted-failure-modes.md b/.github/workflows/shared/self-hosted-failure-modes.md
index 20538ddf4..85d837d45 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/shared/self-hosted-failure-modes.md
+++ b/.github/workflows/shared/self-hosted-failure-modes.md
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Establish these facts before matching a failure mode:
 | A21 | `awf-agent` fails to start with `runc create failed: ... mkdirat /var/lib/docker/overlay2/<layer-id>/merged/tmp/awf-init: read-only file system` (or equivalent for `/tmp/awf-runner-bin`) when a `filesystem.allowWrite` policy narrows `/tmp` to read-only; most reliably reproduced on ARC/DinD split-filesystem topologies using `--docker-host-path-prefix` | runc creates missing bind mountpoints with `mkdirat` against whichever bind already covers the destination. AWF control-plane mountpoints (`/tmp/awf-init`, `/tmp/awf-runner-bin`) were nested under the user-narrowable `/tmp` bind, so narrowing `/tmp` to `ro` blocked nested mountpoint creation and failed startup with `EROFS`. `/tmp/awf-lib` was helper-copy staging rather than a nested mountpoint; narrowing `/tmp` could silently prevent those copies. On ARC/DinD with a `/tmp`-rooted `--docker-host-path-prefix`, shared-prefix detection also misclassified AWF workDir-derived binds as daemon-only and failed closed. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7679, merged 2026-08-24):** init-signal moved to `/run/awf-init`; a new `planNestedMountpoints()`/`ensureNestedMountpoints()` pass pre-creates mountpoints that would land inside read-only covers (or fails closed); `isSharedDockerHostPathPrefix` now treats only the literal `/tmp` prefix as shared for ARC/DinD detection; legacy `/tmp/awf-init` compatibility binds remain for older pinned agent images; and `/tmp/awf-lib` helper staging (one-shot token protection library, Claude API key helper, `gh` CLI proxy wrapper, CA bundles, runner shims) moved to `/run/awf-lib`, eliminating silent degradation under `filesystem.allowWrite`. Startup now fails closed if the one-shot token library cannot be staged or if CLI proxying is enabled but the `gh` wrapper cannot be installed. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7679. | Check `awf --version` for github/gh-aw-firewall#7679; inspect startup logs for `mkdirat ... read-only file system` with active `filesystem.allowWrite`; inspect entrypoint logs for `[entrypoint][WARN] Could not copy one-shot-token library to /tmp/awf-lib` — on older AWF this confirms the silent-degradation mode; on ARC/DinD verify whether `--docker-host-path-prefix` is exactly `/tmp` (shared) vs. daemon-only (for example `/host`) | github/gh-aw-firewall#7678, github/gh-aw-firewall#7679, github/gh-aw-firewall#7681, github/gh-aw-firewall#7728 |
 | A22 | `arc-dind` topology fails to start with Docker rejecting the compose `cap_drop` list: `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment: "CAP_SYS_MODULE"` (or similar) on hosts, such as Talos Linux, that trim capabilities from the container capability bounding set | `src/services/squid-service.ts` and `src/services/agent-service.ts` hardcoded `cap_drop` lists (`NET_RAW`, `SYS_ADMIN`, `SYS_PTRACE`, `SYS_MODULE`, `MKNOD`, `AUDIT_WRITE`, `SETFCAP` for Squid; a similar list for the agent) for both the Squid and agent containers with no filtering against what the host/daemon's capability bounding set actually supports, so hosts with a trimmed bounding set (for example Talos `gha-runner-scale-set` with `docker:29-dind`) can never satisfy Docker's compose validation | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7795, merged 2026-08-28):** `cap_drop` is now filtered against the effective host capability bounding set (read daemon-side from `/proc/self/status` `CapBnd` via a privileged probe container) before writing `docker-compose.yml`; capabilities already absent from the bounding set are silently omitted from `cap_drop` (a safe no-op, since a capability that can't be granted can't be exploited either). Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7795. | `getHostCapabilityBoundingSet()` (`src/capability-filter.ts:78-89`) runs `docker run --rm --privileged --network=none alpine:latest cat /proc/self/status` against the daemon and decodes `CapBnd`; reproduce with `docker compose up` on a host missing `CAP_SYS_MODULE` from the bounding set — pre-fix this fails with `invalid CapDrop`, post-fix compose starts normally | github/gh-aw#56127, github/gh-aw-firewall#7788, github/gh-aw-firewall#7795 |
 | A23 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set, `docker compose up` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (also seen for `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) | `filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` (`src/services/optional-services.ts`) is meant to drop the bogus AWF-owned chroot-home mount that the DinD daemon can't resolve, but it compared already-prefixed mount sources (from `buildAgentVolumes()`, which applies `--docker-host-path-prefix` as its final step) against the *raw, unprefixed* `config.workDir`/`effectiveHome`. Once a host-path prefix is set — always true on real ARC/DinD — the comparison silently stopped matching, so the bogus chroot-home mount survived filtering and Docker tried to create a `.npmrc` credential-hiding overlay mountpoint inside a path the daemon couldn't write to (EROFS). Distinct from A20 (which was about legitimate caller-supplied home mounts being dropped); A23 is the inverse case — the *bogus* mount not being dropped. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7998, merged 2026-09-02):** extracted `prefixHostPath()` in `src/services/host-path-prefix.ts` from `translateBindMountHostPath()` so bare paths can be prefixed consistently; `filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` now prefixes `config.workDir`/`effectiveHome` before comparing against mount sources, restoring correct detection of daemon-invisible mounts. The existing safe fallback (`dropUnbackedHostHomeOverlays`, warn + skip masking) now engages correctly instead of silently failing; explicit writable `--mount` for the home root still preserves credential masking. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7998. | Reproduce with `runnerTopology: 'arc-dind'` + `dockerHostPathPrefix` set (e.g. `/host`) and inspect generated compose for a surviving prefixed `${workDir}-chroot-home:/host$HOME` mount together with `/dev/null:/host$HOME/<credential>:ro` overlays; on unpatched AWF, `docker compose up` fails with the EROFS mounting error above | github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#7994, github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 |
+| A24 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind`, `docker compose up -d --pull never` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to rootfs at ".../gh-aw/home/.npmrc": create mountpoint for .../.npmrc mount: ... openat .npmrc: read-only file system` — distinct from A23 in that it persists even after github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), specifically when the home mount target already exists as a real, genuinely read-only file/dir on the ARC/DinD-staged filesystem | `pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` (`src/services/agent-volumes/credential-hiding.ts`) decided whether a `/dev/null` credential mask could be mounted purely from the *declared* compose bind mode (`ro`/`rw`), never checking the real filesystem when the mode was `rw`. AWF's own home-directory mount is declared `rw`, but under `--docker-host-path-prefix` it can resolve to a directory that is genuinely read-only on the runner's staged filesystem; Docker doesn't remount that case read-only inside the container (unlike a declared `ro` bind), so it touches the real host path directly when creating a missing mountpoint and hits `EROFS`, crashing the agent container before it starts. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#8086, merged 2026-09-04):** an overlay whose mountpoint already exists is always kept (mounting over an existing path succeeds regardless of declared mode or real writability); a missing mountpoint under a declared-`ro` bind is still always dropped; a missing mountpoint under a declared-`rw` bind is now probed against the real filesystem (walking up to the nearest existing ancestor, mirroring how Docker creates missing intermediate directories) and the overlay is dropped if that real directory isn't writable. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#8086. | Reproduce with a `chmod`-based real read-only home directory containing an existing credential file (e.g. `.npmrc`) under `runner.topology: arc-dind` + `--docker-host-path-prefix`; on unpatched AWF (even with github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 applied) `docker compose up` fails with the EROFS mounting error above; on patched AWF the overlay is skipped/kept correctly and the agent starts | github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#8076, github/gh-aw-firewall#8086 |
 
 ## Category B — Self-hosted runners
 
@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ Establish these facts before matching a failure mode:
 | `error connecting to productionresultssa*.blob.core.windows.net` from `gh run download`/artifact ZIP fetch in `--network-isolation` mode | B26 (mcpg stopped auto-following the artifact redirect; cli-proxy had no route to Azure blob storage; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7635 with scoped Squid ACL keyed to cli-proxy's fixed IP) |
 | `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment` | A22 (host capability bounding set trimmed below AWF's hardcoded `cap_drop` list, e.g. Talos; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7795) |
 | `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (or `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) on `arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set | A23 (`filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` compared prefixed mount sources against unprefixed `workDir`/`effectiveHome`, so the bogus chroot-home mount wasn't dropped; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7998) |
+| `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), where the target home path already exists as a real read-only file | A24 (`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` only checked declared bind mode, never real filesystem writability for `rw`-declared covers; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8086) |
 | `a network with name awf-net exists but was not created for project` | B27 (orphaned fixed-name `awf-net` from a prior run on a persistent self-hosted runner; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7817) |
 | TLS/certificate verification failure from api-proxy against a custom `--openai-api-target`/`--anthropic-api-target` internal endpoint using a private/corporate CA | B28 (api-proxy sidecar had no custom CA trust extension point; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7816 with `apiProxy.caCert`/`--api-proxy-ca-cert`) |
 | `spawn /usr/local/bin/copilot ENOENT` specifically on a tool-cache **hit** (`GITHUB_PATH` already set by the installer) | B23 (gh-aw's `activate_cached_copilot_bin()` skips the `/usr/local/bin/copilot` wrapper on cache hits while the compiler harness spawns that hardcoded path; AWF-side fixed via `ensure_usr_local_bin_shims()`/`prepare_usr_local_bin_overlay()` in github/gh-aw-firewall#7245; durable upstream fix still tracked in github/gh-aw-firewall#7130, open) |
diff --git a/scripts/ci/self-hosted-runner-doctor-workflow.test.ts b/scripts/ci/self-hosted-runner-doctor-workflow.test.ts
index a4b047f96..21a826ed2 100644
--- a/scripts/ci/self-hosted-runner-doctor-workflow.test.ts
+++ b/scripts/ci/self-hosted-runner-doctor-workflow.test.ts
@@ -120,6 +120,11 @@ describe('self-hosted runner doctor workflow config', () => {
       expect(content).toContain('github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#7994, github/gh-aw-firewall#7998');
       expect(content).toContain('| `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (or `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) on `arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set | A23');
       expect(content).toContain('surviving prefixed `${workDir}-chroot-home:/host$HOME` mount');
+      // A24 new failure mode (real read-only ARC/DinD home with credential overlay)
+      expect(content).toContain('| A24 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind`, `docker compose up -d --pull never` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to rootfs at ".../gh-aw/home/.npmrc": create mountpoint for .../.npmrc mount: ... openat .npmrc: read-only file system`');
+      expect(content).toContain('`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` (`src/services/agent-volumes/credential-hiding.ts`)');
+      expect(content).toContain('github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#8076, github/gh-aw-firewall#8086');
+      expect(content).toContain('| `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23\'s fix), where the target home path already exists as a real read-only file | A24');
       // B23 update: PR #7245 fixes the AWF-side gap
       expect(content).toContain('**Fixed on the AWF side (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7245, merged 2026-08-11):**');
       expect(content).toContain('`ensure_usr_local_bin_shims()`');
@@ -190,6 +195,7 @@ describe('self-hosted runner doctor workflow config', () => {
     expect(source).toContain('- `awf-agent` fails to start under `runner.topology: arc-dind` (runc cannot create the `/dev/null` credential-hiding overlay mountpoints under `/host$HOME`), or the entrypoint aborts with `mkdir -p /host$HOME/.m2` failing under `set -e` → A20 (sysroot filter dropped every mount targeting `/host$HOME`, including a caller-supplied writable home; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7244)');
     expect(source).toContain('- `mkdirat ... : read-only file system` at agent container startup while a `filesystem.allowWrite` policy is active (not the `chroot.binariesSourcePath`-specific A12 case) → A21; `[entrypoint][WARN] Could not copy one-shot-token library to /tmp/awf-lib` followed by `Token protection will be disabled` → A21');
     expect(source).toContain('- `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment` → A22');
+    expect(source).toContain('- `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23\'s fix), where the target home path already exists as a real read-only file → A24');
     expect(source).toContain('- `a network with name awf-net exists but was not created for project` → B27');
     expect(source).toContain('- TLS/certificate verification failure from api-proxy against a custom `--openai-api-target`/`--anthropic-api-target` internal endpoint using a private/corporate CA → B28 (api-proxy sidecar had no custom CA trust extension point; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7816 with `apiProxy.caCert`/`--api-proxy-ca-cert`)');
     expect(source).toContain('- `context-rebuild circuit breaker tripped` together with a failed `cd` into the expected workspace path → B29');

From 16ca44a3ab9c16587d78a0a0df88c40b361c5e00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "copilot-swe-agent[bot]" <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 22:35:17 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] docs: correct runner doctor A24 trigger

---
 .github/agents/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md           | 4 ++--
 .github/workflows/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md        | 2 +-
 .github/workflows/shared/self-hosted-failure-modes.md | 4 ++--
 scripts/ci/self-hosted-runner-doctor-workflow.test.ts | 4 ++--
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/.github/agents/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md b/.github/agents/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
index cfa0af1f0..00b825f0a 100644
--- a/.github/agents/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
+++ b/.github/agents/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ Establish these facts before matching a failure mode:
 | A21 | `awf-agent` fails to start with `runc create failed: ... mkdirat /var/lib/docker/overlay2/<layer-id>/merged/tmp/awf-init: read-only file system` (or equivalent for `/tmp/awf-runner-bin`) when a `filesystem.allowWrite` policy narrows `/tmp` to read-only; most reliably reproduced on ARC/DinD split-filesystem topologies using `--docker-host-path-prefix` | runc creates missing bind mountpoints with `mkdirat` against whichever bind already covers the destination. AWF control-plane mountpoints (`/tmp/awf-init`, `/tmp/awf-runner-bin`) were nested under the user-narrowable `/tmp` bind, so narrowing `/tmp` to `ro` blocked nested mountpoint creation and failed startup with `EROFS`. `/tmp/awf-lib` was helper-copy staging rather than a nested mountpoint; narrowing `/tmp` could silently prevent those copies. On ARC/DinD with a `/tmp`-rooted `--docker-host-path-prefix`, shared-prefix detection also misclassified AWF workDir-derived binds as daemon-only and failed closed. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7679, merged 2026-08-24):** init-signal moved to `/run/awf-init`; a new `planNestedMountpoints()`/`ensureNestedMountpoints()` pass pre-creates mountpoints that would land inside read-only covers (or fails closed); `isSharedDockerHostPathPrefix` now treats only the literal `/tmp` prefix as shared for ARC/DinD detection; legacy `/tmp/awf-init` compatibility binds remain for older pinned agent images; and `/tmp/awf-lib` helper staging (one-shot token protection library, Claude API key helper, `gh` CLI proxy wrapper, CA bundles, runner shims) moved to `/run/awf-lib`, eliminating silent degradation under `filesystem.allowWrite`. Startup now fails closed if the one-shot token library cannot be staged or if CLI proxying is enabled but the `gh` wrapper cannot be installed. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7679. | Check `awf --version` for github/gh-aw-firewall#7679; inspect startup logs for `mkdirat ... read-only file system` with active `filesystem.allowWrite`; inspect entrypoint logs for `[entrypoint][WARN] Could not copy one-shot-token library to /tmp/awf-lib` — on older AWF this confirms the silent-degradation mode; on ARC/DinD verify whether `--docker-host-path-prefix` is exactly `/tmp` (shared) vs. daemon-only (for example `/host`) | github/gh-aw-firewall#7678, github/gh-aw-firewall#7679, github/gh-aw-firewall#7681, github/gh-aw-firewall#7728 |
 | A22 | `arc-dind` topology fails to start with Docker rejecting the compose `cap_drop` list: `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment: "CAP_SYS_MODULE"` (or similar) on hosts, such as Talos Linux, that trim capabilities from the container capability bounding set | `src/services/squid-service.ts` and `src/services/agent-service.ts` hardcoded `cap_drop` lists (`NET_RAW`, `SYS_ADMIN`, `SYS_PTRACE`, `SYS_MODULE`, `MKNOD`, `AUDIT_WRITE`, `SETFCAP` for Squid; a similar list for the agent) for both the Squid and agent containers with no filtering against what the host/daemon's capability bounding set actually supports, so hosts with a trimmed bounding set (for example Talos `gha-runner-scale-set` with `docker:29-dind`) can never satisfy Docker's compose validation | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7795, merged 2026-08-28):** `cap_drop` is now filtered against the effective host capability bounding set (read daemon-side from `/proc/self/status` `CapBnd` via a privileged probe container) before writing `docker-compose.yml`; capabilities already absent from the bounding set are silently omitted from `cap_drop` (a safe no-op, since a capability that can't be granted can't be exploited either). Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7795. | `getHostCapabilityBoundingSet()` (`src/capability-filter.ts:78-89`) runs `docker run --rm --privileged --network=none alpine:latest cat /proc/self/status` against the daemon and decodes `CapBnd`; reproduce with `docker compose up` on a host missing `CAP_SYS_MODULE` from the bounding set — pre-fix this fails with `invalid CapDrop`, post-fix compose starts normally | github/gh-aw#56127, github/gh-aw-firewall#7788, github/gh-aw-firewall#7795 |
 | A23 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set, `docker compose up` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (also seen for `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) | `filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` (`src/services/optional-services.ts`) is meant to drop the bogus AWF-owned chroot-home mount that the DinD daemon can't resolve, but it compared already-prefixed mount sources (from `buildAgentVolumes()`, which applies `--docker-host-path-prefix` as its final step) against the *raw, unprefixed* `config.workDir`/`effectiveHome`. Once a host-path prefix is set — always true on real ARC/DinD — the comparison silently stopped matching, so the bogus chroot-home mount survived filtering and Docker tried to create a `.npmrc` credential-hiding overlay mountpoint inside a path the daemon couldn't write to (EROFS). Distinct from A20 (which was about legitimate caller-supplied home mounts being dropped); A23 is the inverse case — the *bogus* mount not being dropped. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7998, merged 2026-09-02):** extracted `prefixHostPath()` in `src/services/host-path-prefix.ts` from `translateBindMountHostPath()` so bare paths can be prefixed consistently; `filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` now prefixes `config.workDir`/`effectiveHome` before comparing against mount sources, restoring correct detection of daemon-invisible mounts. The existing safe fallback (`dropUnbackedHostHomeOverlays`, warn + skip masking) now engages correctly instead of silently failing; explicit writable `--mount` for the home root still preserves credential masking. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7998. | Reproduce with `runnerTopology: 'arc-dind'` + `dockerHostPathPrefix` set (e.g. `/host`) and inspect generated compose for a `.npmrc`/`.docker/config.json`/`.composer/auth.json` `/dev/null` overlay mountpoint targeting an unprefixed `effectiveHome`/`workDir` path; on unpatched AWF, `docker compose up` fails with the EROFS mounting error above | github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#7994, github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 |
-| A24 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind`, `docker compose up -d --pull never` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to rootfs at ".../gh-aw/home/.npmrc": create mountpoint for .../.npmrc mount: ... openat .npmrc: read-only file system` — distinct from A23 in that it persists even after github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), specifically when the home mount target already exists as a real, genuinely read-only file/dir on the ARC/DinD-staged filesystem | `pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` (`src/services/agent-volumes/credential-hiding.ts`) decided whether a `/dev/null` credential mask could be mounted purely from the *declared* compose bind mode (`ro`/`rw`), never checking the real filesystem when the mode was `rw`. AWF's own home-directory mount is declared `rw`, but under `--docker-host-path-prefix` it can resolve to a directory that is genuinely read-only on the runner's staged filesystem; Docker doesn't remount that case read-only inside the container (unlike a declared `ro` bind), so it touches the real host path directly when creating a missing mountpoint and hits `EROFS`, crashing the agent container before it starts. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#8086, merged 2026-09-04):** an overlay whose mountpoint already exists is always kept (mounting over an existing path succeeds regardless of declared mode or real writability); a missing mountpoint under a declared-`ro` bind is still always dropped; a missing mountpoint under a declared-`rw` bind is now probed against the real filesystem (walking up to the nearest existing ancestor, mirroring how Docker creates missing intermediate directories) and the overlay is dropped if that real directory isn't writable. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#8086. | Reproduce with a `chmod`-based real read-only home directory containing an existing credential file (e.g. `.npmrc`) under `runner.topology: arc-dind` + `--docker-host-path-prefix`; on unpatched AWF (even with github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 applied) `docker compose up` fails with the EROFS mounting error above; on patched AWF the overlay is skipped/kept correctly and the agent starts | github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#8076, github/gh-aw-firewall#8086 |
+| A24 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind`, `docker compose up -d --pull never` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to rootfs at ".../gh-aw/home/.npmrc": create mountpoint for .../.npmrc mount: ... openat .npmrc: read-only file system` — distinct from A23 in that it persists even after github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), specifically when the credential mountpoint is missing under a declared-`rw` home bind whose real backing directory is genuinely read-only on the ARC/DinD-staged filesystem | `pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` (`src/services/agent-volumes/credential-hiding.ts`) decided whether a `/dev/null` credential mask could be mounted purely from the *declared* compose bind mode (`ro`/`rw`), never checking the real filesystem when the mode was `rw`. AWF's own home-directory mount is declared `rw`, but under `--docker-host-path-prefix` it can resolve to a directory that is genuinely read-only on the runner's staged filesystem; Docker doesn't remount that case read-only inside the container (unlike a declared `ro` bind), so it touches the real host path directly when creating a missing mountpoint and hits `EROFS`, crashing the agent container before it starts. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#8086, merged 2026-09-04):** an overlay whose mountpoint already exists is always kept (mounting over an existing path succeeds regardless of declared mode or real writability); a missing mountpoint under a declared-`ro` bind is still always dropped; a missing mountpoint under a declared-`rw` bind is now probed against the real filesystem (walking up to the nearest existing ancestor, mirroring how Docker creates missing intermediate directories) and the overlay is dropped if that real directory isn't writable. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#8086. | Reproduce with an absent credential path (for example, `.npmrc`) beneath a `chmod`-based real read-only home directory under `runner.topology: arc-dind` + `--docker-host-path-prefix`; on unpatched AWF (even with github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 applied) `docker compose up` fails with the EROFS mounting error above; on patched AWF the missing overlay is skipped and the agent starts. Existing credential paths remain mountable. | github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#8076, github/gh-aw-firewall#8086 |
 
 ## Category B — Self-hosted runners
 
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ Establish these facts before matching a failure mode:
 | `error connecting to productionresultssa*.blob.core.windows.net` from `gh run download`/artifact ZIP fetch in `--network-isolation` mode | B26 (mcpg stopped auto-following the artifact redirect; cli-proxy had no route to Azure Blob storage; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7635 with scoped Squid ACL keyed to cli-proxy's fixed IP) |
 | `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment` | A22 (host capability bounding set trimmed below AWF's hardcoded `cap_drop` list, e.g. Talos; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7795) |
 | `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (or `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) on `arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set | A23 (`filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` compared prefixed mount sources against unprefixed `workDir`/`effectiveHome`, so the bogus chroot-home mount wasn't dropped; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7998) |
-| `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), where the target home path already exists as a real read-only file | A24 (`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` only checked declared bind mode, never real filesystem writability for `rw`-declared covers; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8086) |
+| `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), where the credential mountpoint is missing under a declared-`rw` home bind backed by a genuinely read-only directory | A24 (`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` only checked declared bind mode, never real filesystem writability for `rw`-declared covers; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8086) |
 | `a network with name awf-net exists but was not created for project` | B27 (orphaned fixed-name `awf-net` from a prior run on a persistent self-hosted runner; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7817) |
 | TLS/certificate verification failure from api-proxy against a custom `--openai-api-target`/`--anthropic-api-target` internal endpoint using a private/corporate CA | B28 (api-proxy sidecar had no custom CA trust extension point; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7816 with `apiProxy.caCert`/`--api-proxy-ca-cert`) |
 | `context-rebuild circuit breaker tripped` together with a failed `cd` into the expected workspace path | B29 (container-workdir not bind-mounted into the chroot; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8021) |
diff --git a/.github/workflows/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md b/.github/workflows/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
index d54422b20..f1eb0eafa 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
+++ b/.github/workflows/self-hosted-runner-doctor.md
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ Prefer the narrowest match. Examples:
 - `mkdirat ... : read-only file system` at agent container startup while a `filesystem.allowWrite` policy is active (not the `chroot.binariesSourcePath`-specific A12 case) → A21; `[entrypoint][WARN] Could not copy one-shot-token library to /tmp/awf-lib` followed by `Token protection will be disabled` → A21 (silent security-feature degradation under `filesystem.allowWrite`, fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7679)
 - `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment` → A22 (host capability bounding set trimmed below AWF's hardcoded `cap_drop` list, e.g. Talos; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7795)
 - `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (or `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) on `arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set → A23 (a surviving prefixed `${workDir}-chroot-home:/host$HOME` mount is paired with `/dev/null:/host$HOME/<credential>:ro` overlays because prefixed sources were compared with unprefixed `workDir`/`effectiveHome`; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7998)
-- `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), where the target home path already exists as a real read-only file → A24 (`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` only checked declared bind mode, never real filesystem writability for `rw`-declared covers; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8086)
+- `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), where the credential mountpoint is missing under a declared-`rw` home bind backed by a genuinely read-only directory → A24 (`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` only checked declared bind mode, never real filesystem writability for `rw`-declared covers; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8086)
 - `a network with name awf-net exists but was not created for project` → B27 (orphaned fixed-name `awf-net` from a prior run on a persistent self-hosted runner; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7817)
 - TLS/certificate verification failure from api-proxy against a custom `--openai-api-target`/`--anthropic-api-target` internal endpoint using a private/corporate CA → B28 (api-proxy sidecar had no custom CA trust extension point; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7816 with `apiProxy.caCert`/`--api-proxy-ca-cert`)
 - `context-rebuild circuit breaker tripped` together with a failed `cd` into the expected workspace path → B29 (container-workdir not bind-mounted into the chroot; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8021)
diff --git a/.github/workflows/shared/self-hosted-failure-modes.md b/.github/workflows/shared/self-hosted-failure-modes.md
index 85d837d45..2f73bb56d 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/shared/self-hosted-failure-modes.md
+++ b/.github/workflows/shared/self-hosted-failure-modes.md
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Establish these facts before matching a failure mode:
 | A21 | `awf-agent` fails to start with `runc create failed: ... mkdirat /var/lib/docker/overlay2/<layer-id>/merged/tmp/awf-init: read-only file system` (or equivalent for `/tmp/awf-runner-bin`) when a `filesystem.allowWrite` policy narrows `/tmp` to read-only; most reliably reproduced on ARC/DinD split-filesystem topologies using `--docker-host-path-prefix` | runc creates missing bind mountpoints with `mkdirat` against whichever bind already covers the destination. AWF control-plane mountpoints (`/tmp/awf-init`, `/tmp/awf-runner-bin`) were nested under the user-narrowable `/tmp` bind, so narrowing `/tmp` to `ro` blocked nested mountpoint creation and failed startup with `EROFS`. `/tmp/awf-lib` was helper-copy staging rather than a nested mountpoint; narrowing `/tmp` could silently prevent those copies. On ARC/DinD with a `/tmp`-rooted `--docker-host-path-prefix`, shared-prefix detection also misclassified AWF workDir-derived binds as daemon-only and failed closed. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7679, merged 2026-08-24):** init-signal moved to `/run/awf-init`; a new `planNestedMountpoints()`/`ensureNestedMountpoints()` pass pre-creates mountpoints that would land inside read-only covers (or fails closed); `isSharedDockerHostPathPrefix` now treats only the literal `/tmp` prefix as shared for ARC/DinD detection; legacy `/tmp/awf-init` compatibility binds remain for older pinned agent images; and `/tmp/awf-lib` helper staging (one-shot token protection library, Claude API key helper, `gh` CLI proxy wrapper, CA bundles, runner shims) moved to `/run/awf-lib`, eliminating silent degradation under `filesystem.allowWrite`. Startup now fails closed if the one-shot token library cannot be staged or if CLI proxying is enabled but the `gh` wrapper cannot be installed. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7679. | Check `awf --version` for github/gh-aw-firewall#7679; inspect startup logs for `mkdirat ... read-only file system` with active `filesystem.allowWrite`; inspect entrypoint logs for `[entrypoint][WARN] Could not copy one-shot-token library to /tmp/awf-lib` — on older AWF this confirms the silent-degradation mode; on ARC/DinD verify whether `--docker-host-path-prefix` is exactly `/tmp` (shared) vs. daemon-only (for example `/host`) | github/gh-aw-firewall#7678, github/gh-aw-firewall#7679, github/gh-aw-firewall#7681, github/gh-aw-firewall#7728 |
 | A22 | `arc-dind` topology fails to start with Docker rejecting the compose `cap_drop` list: `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment: "CAP_SYS_MODULE"` (or similar) on hosts, such as Talos Linux, that trim capabilities from the container capability bounding set | `src/services/squid-service.ts` and `src/services/agent-service.ts` hardcoded `cap_drop` lists (`NET_RAW`, `SYS_ADMIN`, `SYS_PTRACE`, `SYS_MODULE`, `MKNOD`, `AUDIT_WRITE`, `SETFCAP` for Squid; a similar list for the agent) for both the Squid and agent containers with no filtering against what the host/daemon's capability bounding set actually supports, so hosts with a trimmed bounding set (for example Talos `gha-runner-scale-set` with `docker:29-dind`) can never satisfy Docker's compose validation | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7795, merged 2026-08-28):** `cap_drop` is now filtered against the effective host capability bounding set (read daemon-side from `/proc/self/status` `CapBnd` via a privileged probe container) before writing `docker-compose.yml`; capabilities already absent from the bounding set are silently omitted from `cap_drop` (a safe no-op, since a capability that can't be granted can't be exploited either). Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7795. | `getHostCapabilityBoundingSet()` (`src/capability-filter.ts:78-89`) runs `docker run --rm --privileged --network=none alpine:latest cat /proc/self/status` against the daemon and decodes `CapBnd`; reproduce with `docker compose up` on a host missing `CAP_SYS_MODULE` from the bounding set — pre-fix this fails with `invalid CapDrop`, post-fix compose starts normally | github/gh-aw#56127, github/gh-aw-firewall#7788, github/gh-aw-firewall#7795 |
 | A23 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set, `docker compose up` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (also seen for `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) | `filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` (`src/services/optional-services.ts`) is meant to drop the bogus AWF-owned chroot-home mount that the DinD daemon can't resolve, but it compared already-prefixed mount sources (from `buildAgentVolumes()`, which applies `--docker-host-path-prefix` as its final step) against the *raw, unprefixed* `config.workDir`/`effectiveHome`. Once a host-path prefix is set — always true on real ARC/DinD — the comparison silently stopped matching, so the bogus chroot-home mount survived filtering and Docker tried to create a `.npmrc` credential-hiding overlay mountpoint inside a path the daemon couldn't write to (EROFS). Distinct from A20 (which was about legitimate caller-supplied home mounts being dropped); A23 is the inverse case — the *bogus* mount not being dropped. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7998, merged 2026-09-02):** extracted `prefixHostPath()` in `src/services/host-path-prefix.ts` from `translateBindMountHostPath()` so bare paths can be prefixed consistently; `filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` now prefixes `config.workDir`/`effectiveHome` before comparing against mount sources, restoring correct detection of daemon-invisible mounts. The existing safe fallback (`dropUnbackedHostHomeOverlays`, warn + skip masking) now engages correctly instead of silently failing; explicit writable `--mount` for the home root still preserves credential masking. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#7998. | Reproduce with `runnerTopology: 'arc-dind'` + `dockerHostPathPrefix` set (e.g. `/host`) and inspect generated compose for a surviving prefixed `${workDir}-chroot-home:/host$HOME` mount together with `/dev/null:/host$HOME/<credential>:ro` overlays; on unpatched AWF, `docker compose up` fails with the EROFS mounting error above | github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#7994, github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 |
-| A24 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind`, `docker compose up -d --pull never` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to rootfs at ".../gh-aw/home/.npmrc": create mountpoint for .../.npmrc mount: ... openat .npmrc: read-only file system` — distinct from A23 in that it persists even after github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), specifically when the home mount target already exists as a real, genuinely read-only file/dir on the ARC/DinD-staged filesystem | `pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` (`src/services/agent-volumes/credential-hiding.ts`) decided whether a `/dev/null` credential mask could be mounted purely from the *declared* compose bind mode (`ro`/`rw`), never checking the real filesystem when the mode was `rw`. AWF's own home-directory mount is declared `rw`, but under `--docker-host-path-prefix` it can resolve to a directory that is genuinely read-only on the runner's staged filesystem; Docker doesn't remount that case read-only inside the container (unlike a declared `ro` bind), so it touches the real host path directly when creating a missing mountpoint and hits `EROFS`, crashing the agent container before it starts. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#8086, merged 2026-09-04):** an overlay whose mountpoint already exists is always kept (mounting over an existing path succeeds regardless of declared mode or real writability); a missing mountpoint under a declared-`ro` bind is still always dropped; a missing mountpoint under a declared-`rw` bind is now probed against the real filesystem (walking up to the nearest existing ancestor, mirroring how Docker creates missing intermediate directories) and the overlay is dropped if that real directory isn't writable. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#8086. | Reproduce with a `chmod`-based real read-only home directory containing an existing credential file (e.g. `.npmrc`) under `runner.topology: arc-dind` + `--docker-host-path-prefix`; on unpatched AWF (even with github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 applied) `docker compose up` fails with the EROFS mounting error above; on patched AWF the overlay is skipped/kept correctly and the agent starts | github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#8076, github/gh-aw-firewall#8086 |
+| A24 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind`, `docker compose up -d --pull never` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to rootfs at ".../gh-aw/home/.npmrc": create mountpoint for .../.npmrc mount: ... openat .npmrc: read-only file system` — distinct from A23 in that it persists even after github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), specifically when the credential mountpoint is missing under a declared-`rw` home bind whose real backing directory is genuinely read-only on the ARC/DinD-staged filesystem | `pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` (`src/services/agent-volumes/credential-hiding.ts`) decided whether a `/dev/null` credential mask could be mounted purely from the *declared* compose bind mode (`ro`/`rw`), never checking the real filesystem when the mode was `rw`. AWF's own home-directory mount is declared `rw`, but under `--docker-host-path-prefix` it can resolve to a directory that is genuinely read-only on the runner's staged filesystem; Docker doesn't remount that case read-only inside the container (unlike a declared `ro` bind), so it touches the real host path directly when creating a missing mountpoint and hits `EROFS`, crashing the agent container before it starts. | **Fixed in AWF (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#8086, merged 2026-09-04):** an overlay whose mountpoint already exists is always kept (mounting over an existing path succeeds regardless of declared mode or real writability); a missing mountpoint under a declared-`ro` bind is still always dropped; a missing mountpoint under a declared-`rw` bind is now probed against the real filesystem (walking up to the nearest existing ancestor, mirroring how Docker creates missing intermediate directories) and the overlay is dropped if that real directory isn't writable. Upgrade AWF to include github/gh-aw-firewall#8086. | Reproduce with an absent credential path (for example, `.npmrc`) beneath a `chmod`-based real read-only home directory under `runner.topology: arc-dind` + `--docker-host-path-prefix`; on unpatched AWF (even with github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 applied) `docker compose up` fails with the EROFS mounting error above; on patched AWF the missing overlay is skipped and the agent starts. Existing credential paths remain mountable. | github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#8076, github/gh-aw-firewall#8086 |
 
 ## Category B — Self-hosted runners
 
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ Establish these facts before matching a failure mode:
 | `error connecting to productionresultssa*.blob.core.windows.net` from `gh run download`/artifact ZIP fetch in `--network-isolation` mode | B26 (mcpg stopped auto-following the artifact redirect; cli-proxy had no route to Azure blob storage; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7635 with scoped Squid ACL keyed to cli-proxy's fixed IP) |
 | `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment` | A22 (host capability bounding set trimmed below AWF's hardcoded `cap_drop` list, e.g. Talos; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7795) |
 | `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../home/.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` (or `.docker/config.json`, `.composer/auth.json`) on `arc-dind` with `--docker-host-path-prefix` set | A23 (`filterAgentVolumesForSysroot()` compared prefixed mount sources against unprefixed `workDir`/`effectiveHome`, so the bogus chroot-home mount wasn't dropped; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7998) |
-| `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), where the target home path already exists as a real read-only file | A24 (`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` only checked declared bind mode, never real filesystem writability for `rw`-declared covers; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8086) |
+| `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23's fix), where the credential mountpoint is missing under a declared-`rw` home bind backed by a genuinely read-only directory | A24 (`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` only checked declared bind mode, never real filesystem writability for `rw`-declared covers; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#8086) |
 | `a network with name awf-net exists but was not created for project` | B27 (orphaned fixed-name `awf-net` from a prior run on a persistent self-hosted runner; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7817) |
 | TLS/certificate verification failure from api-proxy against a custom `--openai-api-target`/`--anthropic-api-target` internal endpoint using a private/corporate CA | B28 (api-proxy sidecar had no custom CA trust extension point; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7816 with `apiProxy.caCert`/`--api-proxy-ca-cert`) |
 | `spawn /usr/local/bin/copilot ENOENT` specifically on a tool-cache **hit** (`GITHUB_PATH` already set by the installer) | B23 (gh-aw's `activate_cached_copilot_bin()` skips the `/usr/local/bin/copilot` wrapper on cache hits while the compiler harness spawns that hardcoded path; AWF-side fixed via `ensure_usr_local_bin_shims()`/`prepare_usr_local_bin_overlay()` in github/gh-aw-firewall#7245; durable upstream fix still tracked in github/gh-aw-firewall#7130, open) |
diff --git a/scripts/ci/self-hosted-runner-doctor-workflow.test.ts b/scripts/ci/self-hosted-runner-doctor-workflow.test.ts
index 21a826ed2..fd3517b61 100644
--- a/scripts/ci/self-hosted-runner-doctor-workflow.test.ts
+++ b/scripts/ci/self-hosted-runner-doctor-workflow.test.ts
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ describe('self-hosted runner doctor workflow config', () => {
       expect(content).toContain('| A24 | On `runner.topology: arc-dind`, `docker compose up -d --pull never` fails with `error mounting "/dev/null" to rootfs at ".../gh-aw/home/.npmrc": create mountpoint for .../.npmrc mount: ... openat .npmrc: read-only file system`');
       expect(content).toContain('`pruneUnmountableCredentialOverlays` (`src/services/agent-volumes/credential-hiding.ts`)');
       expect(content).toContain('github/gh-aw#57468, github/gh-aw-firewall#8076, github/gh-aw-firewall#8086');
-      expect(content).toContain('| `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23\'s fix), where the target home path already exists as a real read-only file | A24');
+      expect(content).toContain('| `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23\'s fix), where the credential mountpoint is missing under a declared-`rw` home bind backed by a genuinely read-only directory | A24');
       // B23 update: PR #7245 fixes the AWF-side gap
       expect(content).toContain('**Fixed on the AWF side (PR github/gh-aw-firewall#7245, merged 2026-08-11):**');
       expect(content).toContain('`ensure_usr_local_bin_shims()`');
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ describe('self-hosted runner doctor workflow config', () => {
     expect(source).toContain('- `awf-agent` fails to start under `runner.topology: arc-dind` (runc cannot create the `/dev/null` credential-hiding overlay mountpoints under `/host$HOME`), or the entrypoint aborts with `mkdir -p /host$HOME/.m2` failing under `set -e` → A20 (sysroot filter dropped every mount targeting `/host$HOME`, including a caller-supplied writable home; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7244)');
     expect(source).toContain('- `mkdirat ... : read-only file system` at agent container startup while a `filesystem.allowWrite` policy is active (not the `chroot.binariesSourcePath`-specific A12 case) → A21; `[entrypoint][WARN] Could not copy one-shot-token library to /tmp/awf-lib` followed by `Token protection will be disabled` → A21');
     expect(source).toContain('- `invalid CapDrop: capability not supported by your kernel or not available in the current environment` → A22');
-    expect(source).toContain('- `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23\'s fix), where the target home path already exists as a real read-only file → A24');
+    expect(source).toContain('- `error mounting "/dev/null" to .../.npmrc: create mountpoint ...: read-only file system` on `arc-dind` persisting even after upgrading past github/gh-aw-firewall#7998 (A23\'s fix), where the credential mountpoint is missing under a declared-`rw` home bind backed by a genuinely read-only directory → A24');
     expect(source).toContain('- `a network with name awf-net exists but was not created for project` → B27');
     expect(source).toContain('- TLS/certificate verification failure from api-proxy against a custom `--openai-api-target`/`--anthropic-api-target` internal endpoint using a private/corporate CA → B28 (api-proxy sidecar had no custom CA trust extension point; fixed in github/gh-aw-firewall#7816 with `apiProxy.caCert`/`--api-proxy-ca-cert`)');
     expect(source).toContain('- `context-rebuild circuit breaker tripped` together with a failed `cd` into the expected workspace path → B29');