Skip to content

Commit aa0dca9

Browse files
bchaliosroypat
authored andcommitted
iovec: fix kani proof for write_volatile_at
IoVecBufferMut type now uses IovDeque as its backing memory. IovDeque is performing a custom memory allocation, using memfd_create() and a combination of mmap() calls in order to provide a memory layout where the iovec objects stored in the IovDeque will always be in consecutive memory. kani doesn't really get along with these system calls, which breaks our proof for IoVecBufferMut::write_volatile_at. Substitute memory allocation and deallocation with plain calls to std::alloc::(de)alloc when we run kani proofs. Also provide a stub for IovDeque::push_back to provide the same memory layout invariants. Co-authored-by: Babis Chalios <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Egor Lazarchuk <[email protected]>
1 parent 87e0b4b commit aa0dca9

File tree

2 files changed

+68
-4
lines changed

2 files changed

+68
-4
lines changed

src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/iov_deque.rs

+3-3
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ pub enum IovDequeError {
7171
// so making a slice out of them does not require any copies.
7272
#[derive(Debug)]
7373
pub struct IovDeque {
74-
iov: *mut libc::iovec,
75-
start: u16,
76-
len: u16,
74+
pub iov: *mut libc::iovec,
75+
pub start: u16,
76+
pub len: u16,
7777
}
7878

7979
// SAFETY: This is `Send`. We hold sole ownership of the underlying buffer.

src/vmm/src/devices/virtio/iovec.rs

+65-1
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -796,6 +796,7 @@ mod tests {
796796
}
797797

798798
#[cfg(kani)]
799+
#[allow(dead_code)] // Avoid warning when using stubs
799800
mod verification {
800801
use std::mem::ManuallyDrop;
801802

@@ -804,7 +805,9 @@ mod verification {
804805
use vm_memory::VolatileSlice;
805806

806807
use super::{IoVecBuffer, IoVecBufferMut};
808+
use crate::arch::PAGE_SIZE;
807809
use crate::devices::virtio::iov_deque::IovDeque;
810+
use crate::devices::virtio::queue::FIRECRACKER_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE;
808811

809812
// Maximum memory size to use for our buffers. For the time being 1KB.
810813
const GUEST_MEMORY_SIZE: usize = 1 << 10;
@@ -816,6 +819,50 @@ mod verification {
816819
// >= 1.
817820
const MAX_DESC_LENGTH: usize = 4;
818821

822+
mod stubs {
823+
use super::*;
824+
825+
/// This is a stub for the `IovDeque::push_back` method.
826+
///
827+
/// `IovDeque` relies on a special allocation of two pages of virtual memory, where both of
828+
/// these point to the same underlying physical page. This way, the contents of the first
829+
/// page of virtual memory are automatically mirrored in the second virtual page. We do
830+
/// that in order to always have the elements that are currently in the ring buffer in
831+
/// consecutive (virtual) memory.
832+
///
833+
/// To build this particular memory layout we create a new `memfd` object, allocate memory
834+
/// with `mmap` and call `mmap` again to make sure both pages point to the page allocated
835+
/// via the `memfd` object. These ffi calls make kani complain, so here we mock the
836+
/// `IovDeque` object memory with a normal memory allocation of two pages worth of data.
837+
///
838+
/// This stub helps imitate the effect of mirroring without all the elaborate memory
839+
/// allocation trick.
840+
pub fn push_back(deque: &mut IovDeque, iov: iovec) {
841+
// This should NEVER happen, since our ring buffer is as big as the maximum queue size.
842+
// We also check for the sanity of the VirtIO queues, in queue.rs, which means that if
843+
// we ever try to add something in a full ring buffer, there is an internal
844+
// bug in the device emulation logic. Panic here because the device is
845+
// hopelessly broken.
846+
assert!(
847+
!deque.is_full(),
848+
"The number of `iovec` objects is bigger than the available space"
849+
);
850+
851+
let offset = (deque.start + deque.len) as usize;
852+
let mirror = if offset >= FIRECRACKER_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE as usize {
853+
offset - FIRECRACKER_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE as usize
854+
} else {
855+
offset + FIRECRACKER_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE as usize
856+
};
857+
858+
// SAFETY: self.iov is a valid pointer and `self.start + self.len` is within range (we
859+
// asserted before that the buffer is not full).
860+
unsafe { deque.iov.add(offset).write_volatile(iov) };
861+
unsafe { deque.iov.add(mirror).write_volatile(iov) };
862+
deque.len += 1;
863+
}
864+
}
865+
819866
fn create_iovecs(mem: *mut u8, size: usize, nr_descs: usize) -> (Vec<iovec>, u32) {
820867
let mut vecs: Vec<iovec> = Vec::with_capacity(nr_descs);
821868
let mut len = 0u32;
@@ -846,8 +893,23 @@ mod verification {
846893
}
847894
}
848895

896+
fn create_iov_deque() -> IovDeque {
897+
// SAFETY: safe because the layout has non-zero size
898+
let mem = unsafe {
899+
std::alloc::alloc(std::alloc::Layout::from_size_align_unchecked(
900+
2 * PAGE_SIZE,
901+
PAGE_SIZE,
902+
))
903+
};
904+
IovDeque {
905+
iov: mem.cast(),
906+
start: kani::any_where(|&start| start < FIRECRACKER_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE),
907+
len: 0,
908+
}
909+
}
910+
849911
fn create_iovecs_mut(mem: *mut u8, size: usize, nr_descs: usize) -> (IovDeque, u32) {
850-
let mut vecs = IovDeque::new().unwrap();
912+
let mut vecs = create_iov_deque();
851913
let mut len = 0u32;
852914
for _ in 0..nr_descs {
853915
// The `IoVecBufferMut` constructors ensure that the memory region described by every
@@ -956,6 +1018,7 @@ mod verification {
9561018
#[kani::proof]
9571019
#[kani::unwind(5)]
9581020
#[kani::solver(cadical)]
1021+
#[kani::stub(IovDeque::push_back, stubs::push_back)]
9591022
fn verify_write_to_iovec() {
9601023
for nr_descs in 0..MAX_DESC_LENGTH {
9611024
let mut iov_mut = IoVecBufferMut::any_of_length(nr_descs);
@@ -984,6 +1047,7 @@ mod verification {
9841047
.unwrap(),
9851048
buf.len().min(iov_mut.len().saturating_sub(offset) as usize)
9861049
);
1050+
std::mem::forget(iov_mut.vecs);
9871051
}
9881052
}
9891053
}

0 commit comments

Comments
 (0)