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#132 introduced BIP-32 derivation for threshold key shares. As the initial chain code we use a hash of the full verifying key. Is this secure? Is there a better way to do it?
One option is to use the rid value that is built as a kind of a shared secret during KeyInit. Would such double-purpose usage be secure?
Also, could rid be used to support hardened derivation somehow?
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
#132 introduced BIP-32 derivation for threshold key shares. As the initial chain code we use a hash of the full verifying key. Is this secure? Is there a better way to do it?
One option is to use the
rid
value that is built as a kind of a shared secret during KeyInit. Would such double-purpose usage be secure?Also, could
rid
be used to support hardened derivation somehow?The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: