diff --git a/.plans/config-integrity-watchdog.md b/.plans/config-integrity-watchdog.md
index 9a103d74cbf3f..682217d8ebf4d 100644
--- a/.plans/config-integrity-watchdog.md
+++ b/.plans/config-integrity-watchdog.md
@@ -34,3 +34,15 @@ Replace mutable sidecar with git-backed append-only integrity log stored in the
 - Changing the canonical model ID (requires user decision)
 - Config integrity for non-config files
 - 1Password integration (future enhancement)
+
+## Outcome
+
+**Shipped:** 2026-07-02 — PR #67 (merged `38d8fdb`)
+
+All 8 issues above are complete. The mutable `.sha256` sidecar is replaced end-to-end:
+
+- `skills/devops/config-integrity-watchdog/` ships `seal.py`, `verify.py`, `restore.py`, and shared `config_integrity.py` core
+- `hermes config seal/verify/restore` CLI commands wired in `hermes_cli/config_integrity_cli.py`
+- 50 tests (29 skill-level + 21 CLI integration) all pass
+- Config Integrity Watchdog cron job (MacBook Pro, `fbe11786e4d1`) confirmed calling `hermes config verify` — verified 2026-07-02
+- `restore_deepseek_config.py` confirmed absent from all machines — fully retired
diff --git a/docs/plans/2026-07-02-scanner-watchdog-conflict-resolution.md b/docs/plans/2026-07-02-scanner-watchdog-conflict-resolution.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..07d24d472f3a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/plans/2026-07-02-scanner-watchdog-conflict-resolution.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Scanner / Watchdog Conflict Resolution — Session Archive
+
+**Date:** 2026-07-02
+**Trigger:** Slack question: "Why did the Config Integrity Watchdog 'fix' the config — and how did it know the fix was correct?"
+
+**Goal:** Diagnose and fix a two-cron-job conflict where `free-model-scanner-am` legitimately updated `model.default` and `Config Integrity Watchdog` treated the change as tampering and reverted it. Harden config integrity end-to-end so authorized changes are never flagged.
+
+**Architecture:** Two-layer fix — (1) make authorized writes self-sealing so the watchdog never sees a mismatch after a legitimate change; (2) replace the mutable `.sha256` sidecar with a git-backed integrity log so the fingerprint itself cannot be silently overwritten.
+
+---
+
+## Root cause
+
+`free-model-scanner-am` wrote `config.yaml` via `save_config()`, which did not seal the SHA256 sidecar atomically. The watchdog ran in the TOCTOU window between write and seal, saw a digest mismatch, and reverted the config. Neither job was buggy in isolation — the conflict was architectural.
+
+## What shipped
+
+| PR | Title | What it fixed |
+|---|---|---|
+| #52 | fix(backup): reseal config after quick snapshot restore | Snapshot restores left seal stale; added reseal call and included `.sha256` in `_QUICK_STATE_FILES` |
+| #57 | feat(config): interprocess lock + config integrity API | `save_config()` now holds an exclusive OS file lock and atomically seals the sidecar; 17 new tests |
+| #65 | feat(skills): auto-deploy skill scripts + UGW health check fix | `deploy_skill_scripts()` in `skills_sync.py` copies `skill/scripts/*.py` → `~/.hermes/scripts/` on every startup; fixed UGW script that was reading the wrong JSON key (`"report"` → `"gateway_state"`) |
+| #66 | docs(agents): document config integrity seal API and skill scripts auto-deploy | AGENTS.md — config seal API section + skill script auto-deploy note |
+| #68 | docs(agents): update config integrity section for git-backed seal system | AGENTS.md updated to document `hermes config seal/verify/restore`, the new skill, env vars, and guidance to use CLI commands (not low-level helpers) in new automation |
+
+PR #67 (git-backed watchdog, shipped independently by user same day) is tracked in `.plans/config-integrity-watchdog.md`.
+
+## Key decisions
+
+- **Self-sealing writes**: `save_config()` acquires `config_write_lock()` (fcntl.flock / msvcrt.locking), writes atomically, seals — all inside one exclusive lock. External readers use `config_read_lock()` (shared lock) before checking integrity.
+- **No re-entrancy deadlock**: `restore_config()` holds the write lock and calls `_write_config_to_disk()` directly — never re-enters `save_config()`.
+- **Sidecar vs git-backed**: SHA256 sidecar remains the internal mechanism for `save_config()`; git-backed log (`config_integrity.jsonl`) is the external verification tool for cron jobs and watchdogs.
+- **Skill script auto-deploy**: `deploy_skill_scripts()` runs on every `sync_skills()` call — no manual copy step for `scripts/*.py` files.
+
+## Verified closed
+
+- Config Integrity Watchdog cron job (`fbe11786e4d1`) on MacBook Pro confirmed using `hermes config verify` — verified 2026-07-02
+- `restore_deepseek_config.py` confirmed absent from all machines
+- MacBook Air: no watchdog cron job configured (intentional — single-machine deployment)
+- All session branches deleted, `main` clean at `17766db`