x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation

Enable the previously added mitigation for VMscape. Add the cmdline
vmscape={off|ibpb|force} and sysfs reporting.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Author: pa1gupta

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -586,6 +586,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsa
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/vmscape
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <[email protected]>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -3829,6 +3829,7 @@
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
+					       vmscape=off [X86]
 
 				Exceptions:
 					       This does not have any effect on
@@ -8041,6 +8042,16 @@
 	vmpoff=		[KNL,S390] Perform z/VM CP command after power off.
 			Format: <command>
 
+	vmscape=	[X86] Controls mitigation for VMscape attacks.
+			VMscape attacks can leak information from a userspace
+			hypervisor to a guest via speculative side-channels.
+
+			off		- disable the mitigation
+			ibpb		- use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
+					  (IBPB) mitigation (default)
+			force		- force vulnerability detection even on
+					  unaffected processors
+
 	vsyscall=	[X86-64,EARLY]
 			Controls the behavior of vsyscalls (i.e. calls to
 			fixed addresses of 0xffffffffff600x00 from legacy

arch/x86/Kconfig

@@ -2701,6 +2701,15 @@ config MITIGATION_TSA
 	  security vulnerability on AMD CPUs which can lead to forwarding of
 	  invalid info to subsequent instructions and thus can affect their
 	  timing and thereby cause a leakage.
+
+config MITIGATION_VMSCAPE
+	bool "Mitigate VMSCAPE"
+	depends on KVM
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for VMSCAPE attacks. VMSCAPE is a hardware security
+	  vulnerability on Intel and AMD CPUs that may allow a guest to do
+	  Spectre v2 style attacks on userspace hypervisor.
 endif
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ static void __init its_update_mitigation(void);
 static void __init its_apply_mitigation(void);
 static void __init tsa_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init tsa_apply_mitigation(void);
+static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -270,6 +273,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 	its_select_mitigation();
 	bhi_select_mitigation();
 	tsa_select_mitigation();
+	vmscape_select_mitigation();
 
 	/*
 	 * After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
@@ -301,6 +305,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 	bhi_update_mitigation();
 	/* srso_update_mitigation() depends on retbleed_update_mitigation(). */
 	srso_update_mitigation();
+	vmscape_update_mitigation();
 
 	spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
 	spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();
@@ -318,6 +323,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 	its_apply_mitigation();
 	bhi_apply_mitigation();
 	tsa_apply_mitigation();
+	vmscape_apply_mitigation();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3322,6 +3328,77 @@ static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void)
 	}
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"VMSCAPE: " fmt
+
+enum vmscape_mitigations {
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE,
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER,
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
+};
+
+static const char * const vmscape_strings[] = {
+	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE]		= "Vulnerable",
+	/* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO] */
+	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER]	= "Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace",
+	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT]	= "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT",
+};
+
+static enum vmscape_mitigations vmscape_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMSCAPE) ? VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO : VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
+
+static int __init vmscape_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) {
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+	} else {
+		pr_err("Ignoring unknown vmscape=%s option.\n", str);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("vmscape", vmscape_parse_cmdline);
+
+static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off() ||
+	    !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE) ||
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
+}
+
+static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE))
+		return;
+
+	if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ||
+	    srso_mitigation == SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT)
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+
+	pr_info("%s\n", vmscape_strings[vmscape_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER)
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER);
+}
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
 
@@ -3570,6 +3647,11 @@ static ssize_t tsa_show_state(char *buf)
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", tsa_strings[tsa_mitigation]);
 }
 
+static ssize_t vmscape_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", vmscape_strings[vmscape_mitigation]);
+}
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
@@ -3636,6 +3718,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_TSA:
 		return tsa_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_VMSCAPE:
+		return vmscape_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -3727,6 +3812,11 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_tsa(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *bu
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TSA);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_vmscape(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
+}
 #endif
 
 void __warn_thunk(void)

drivers/base/cpu.c

@@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(ghostwrite);
 CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(old_microcode);
 CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(indirect_target_selection);
 CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(tsa);
+CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(vmscape);
 
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
@@ -622,6 +623,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(ghostwrite, 0444, cpu_show_ghostwrite, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(old_microcode, 0444, cpu_show_old_microcode, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(indirect_target_selection, 0444, cpu_show_indirect_target_selection, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(tsa, 0444, cpu_show_tsa, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(vmscape, 0444, cpu_show_vmscape, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -642,6 +644,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_old_microcode.attr,
 	&dev_attr_indirect_target_selection.attr,
 	&dev_attr_tsa.attr,
+	&dev_attr_vmscape.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 

include/linux/cpu.h

@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_old_microcode(struct device *dev,
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_indirect_target_selection(struct device *dev,
 						  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_tsa(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_vmscape(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,