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draft-zuniga-l2-addr-randomization-00.txt
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draft-zuniga-l2-addr-randomization-00.txt
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Network Working Group JC. Zuniga
Internet-Draft SIGFOX
Intended status: Informational CJ. Bernardos
Expires: November 19, 2018 UC3M
A. Andersdotter
article19
May 18, 2018
Layer-2 address randomization
draft-zuniga-l2-addr-randomization-00
Abstract
Internet privacy is a serious concern nowadays. Users' activity
leaves a vast digital footprint, communications are not always
properly secured and location can be easily tracked. This document
focuses on this last point, which is mainly caused by the use of IEEE
Layer-2 immutable addresses, and the implications of that on upper
layers, specially on IPv6 addresses. Randomization of the addresses
used at Layer-2 is a simple, but promising, solution to mitigate the
location privacy issues.
We report on existing support of address randomization by the
different operating systems, and also on the conclusions obtained
from conducting several trials during two IETF and one IEEE 802
standards meetings. Based on the obtained results we can conclude
that address randomization is a feasible solution to the Layer-2
privacy problem, but there needs to be other mechanisms used at
higher layers to make the most benefit from it and minimize the
service disruptions it may cause.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 19, 2018.
Zuniga, et al. Expires November 19, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft L2 addr randomization May 2018
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Problem statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Layer-2 address randomization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7. Developments in 802 (802.11aq) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
Nowadays, Internet privacy is becoming a huge concern, as more and
more devices are getting directly (e.g., via cellular or Wi-Fi) or
indirectly (e.g., via a smartphone using Bluetooth) connected to the
Internet. This ubiquitous connectivity, together with not very
secure protocol stacks and the lack of proper education about privacy
make it very easy to track/monitor the location of users and/or
eavesdrop their activity. This is due to many factors, such as the
vast digital footprint that users leave on the Internet (e.g.,
sharing information on social networks, cookies used by browsers and
servers to provide a better navigation experience, connectivity logs
that allow tracking of a user's Layer-2 (L2) or Layer-3 (L3) address,
web trackers, etc.) and/or the weak (or even null in some cases)
authentication and encryption mechanisms used to secure
communications.
Zuniga, et al. Expires November 19, 2018 [Page 2]
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This privacy concern [wifi_internet_privacy] affects all layers of
the protocol stack, from the lower ones involved in the actual access
to the network (e.g., the Layer-2/Layer-3 addresses can be used to
obtain the location of a user) to the applications, especially when
browsing or using social networks (e.g., cookies can be used to find
out the identity of a user accessing a particular site).
This document focuses on the privacy threats at the network
connectivity level, namely at the Layer-2 and Layer-3 of the protocol
stack, but focusing especially on the issues related to the use of
permanent Layer-2 addresses and the potential advatages gained from
randomizing them.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The following terms are used in this document:
XXX:
YYY:
3. Problem statement
TBD.
4. Layer-2 address randomization
TBD.
5. Tools
TBD.
6. Evaluation
TBD.
7. Developments in 802 (802.11aq)
TBD.
Zuniga, et al. Expires November 19, 2018 [Page 3]
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8. IANA Considerations
N/A.
9. Security Considerations
TBD.
10. Acknowledgments
TBD.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
11.2. Informative References
[wifi_internet_privacy]
Bernardos, CJ., Zuniga, JC., and P. O'Hanlon, "Wi-Fi
Internet Connectivity and Privacy: Hiding your tracks on
the wireless Internet", Standards for Communications and
Networking (CSCN), 2015 IEEE Conference on , October 2015.
Authors' Addresses
Juan Carlos Zuniga
SIGFOX
425 rue Jean Rostand
Labege 31670
France
Email: [email protected]
URI: http://www.sigfox.com/
Zuniga, et al. Expires November 19, 2018 [Page 4]
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Carlos J. Bernardos
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Av. Universidad, 30
Leganes, Madrid 28911
Spain
Phone: +34 91624 6236
Email: [email protected]
URI: http://www.it.uc3m.es/cjbc/
Amelia Andersdotter
article19
Email: [email protected]
Zuniga, et al. Expires November 19, 2018 [Page 5]