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BSIP 76: Threshold for price feeds through voting
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BSIP: 0076 | ||
Title: Threshold for price feeds through voting | ||
Authors: Abit More | ||
Status: Draft | ||
Type: Informational | ||
Created: 2019-09-25 | ||
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# Abstract | ||
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This BSIP defines a process to influence the pegging status of committee-owned smartcoins through poll voting. | ||
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# Motivation | ||
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In order to maintain the peg of the smartcoins, smartcoins holders now have the right to be always | ||
possible to buy collateral at a "fair" price. For committee-owned smartcoins, the collateral is BTS. | ||
However, when the BTS token is being dumped in Centralized Exchanges with fake volume and even fake supply, | ||
the value of the token is distorted, thus, forcing BTS token holders who have their BTS token trapped in | ||
debt positions as collateral to sell their collateral at the distorted price via margin calls or | ||
force-settlements is unfair. | ||
The same situation applies to non-committee-owned smart coins as well. | ||
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Smartcoins are products of the BitShares platform, their rules are defined by the platform | ||
for the benefit of the platform and the BTS token holders. | ||
If a product brings more harm than benefit to the platform, its rules need to be optimized, | ||
under extreme conditions, the product needs to be halted. | ||
For smartcoins, when the cost to maintain the peg is too high to afford, it's time to give up the peg. | ||
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# Rationale | ||
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Ideally a smartcoin owner should be able to define a set of conditions about when to give up the peg | ||
and how to de-peg, but it needs time to design and implement. Before the final solution got worked out, | ||
it's up to the price feed producers to execute the will for the asset owner on whether to maintain | ||
the peg at a given point and how to de-peg. For committee-owned smartcoins, the owner is actually | ||
all BTS holders who could express their will by voting, the price feed producers are the active witnesses. | ||
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# Specification | ||
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The BTS token holders define a threshold, if the market trading price of BTS is below the threshold, | ||
witnesses should feed the threshold but not the market trading price, thus would effectively break | ||
the peg as intended. When the market trading price of BTS is above the threshold, witnesses should | ||
feed the market trading price, so the peg will be restored automatically. The mechanism is similar to | ||
the Global-Settlement Protection mechanism as described in [BSIP 58](bsip-0058.md). | ||
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Changes to the threshold will be decided on individual committee-owned smartcoins by voting, each time | ||
one change is issued 2 poll worker proposals will be created standing FOR and AGAINST the change. | ||
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For example, to decide whether to change the price feed threshold of bitCNY to 0.2 CNY each BTS, | ||
2 poll worker proposals will be created for voting: | ||
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Poll-BSIP**-Change bitCNY feed threshold [from the previous value when applicable] to 0.2 CNY per BTS | ||
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Poll-BSIP**-Not change bitCNY feed threshold [from the previous value when applicable] to 0.2 CNY per BTS | ||
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If the voting confirm the change, committee will announce the change at least 3 days before the change | ||
is implemented by witnesses. | ||
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# Discussion | ||
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Some people think it's the debt position holders' responsibility to always maintain their | ||
collateral ratio to a fair level. However, when the collateral's price can drop to zero due to | ||
unfair manipulation, it's not possible to always maintain a good CR. | ||
Higher or lower, there is a point that the peg would break. | ||
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This BSIP may negatively impact smartcoin holders since their holdings will likely devalue when | ||
the voted point is met, which would likely be worse than before. | ||
Businesses built on top of the smartcoins may be impacted. | ||
Reputation of smartcoins as well as the BitShares brand may be impacted. | ||
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Discussions about changing the threshold to what value is not in the scope of this BSIP. | ||
The values should be carefully selected to comply with the market status and to mitigate potential risks. | ||
Voters will need to evaluate each setting that is proposed in a BSIP poll. | ||
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A new feature that allows an asset owner to directly set, update or unset the threshold will | ||
be described in a new BSIP. It's not in the scope of this BSIP. | ||
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# Non-Technical Summary | ||
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It is important to define a process for the BTS token holders to decide to change | ||
pegging status of committee-owned smartcoins through voting. | ||
This can currently be achieved with the technical options that are available to | ||
the price feed producers aka witnesses. | ||
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# See Also | ||
* https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=29635.0 | ||
* https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=29633.0 | ||
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# Copyright | ||
This document is placed in the public domain. |