diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-virtual-assest-mining.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-virtual-assest-mining.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64b87afe --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-24-virtual-assest-mining.md @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Virtual Asset Mining +author: Allison Owen and Aaron Arnold +date : 2023-08-24 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/jMGIEAV.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Typologies, Risks and Responses" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_This paper, intended for policymakers and those with compliance obligations, seeks to broaden the discussions of risk around cryptocurrency by providing a typology of risks related to cryptocurrency mining._ + + + +The rise in digital assets’ popularity over the last decade has attracted its fair share of illicit actors. Prized for their ease of use and perceived relative anonymity, digital assets such as Bitcoin have become targets for sanctions evaders, criminal enterprises, narcotraffickers and terrorist networks. North Korea, for example, has stolen billions of dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency in the past five years, in part to fund its WMD programme. Consequently, regulatory, monitoring and enforcement agencies have had to set their sights on addressing the often overlooked space between traditional finance and cryptocurrency. Despite modest progress addressing key vulnerabilities that cryptocurrency creates for global finance, the dynamic and rapidly changing nature of digital assets requires new thought about risk and sources of risk. + +One increasingly difficult problem for regulatory and monitoring authorities is how to address and mitigate risks associated with cryptocurrency mining (the processes used to verify transactions). Unlike traditional cryptocurrency exchanges, mining typically falls outside the scope of anti-money-laundering (AML) regulatory authorities and can provide illicit actors with a stream of nearly anonymous – and possibly unlimited – revenue. Unfortunately, discussions on how to best mitigate these risks is largely absent from broader policy discussions on regulating and monitoring digital assets. + +This paper, intended for policymakers and those with compliance obligations, seeks to broaden the discussions of risk around cryptocurrency by providing a typology of risks related to cryptocurrency mining. The objective is not to provide an all-encompassing snapshot of cryptocurrency mining activities, but to offer a general framework for policymakers to consider and mitigate a range of risks that may not be immediately apparent. The paper also places the described typologies within the context of recent or emerging regulatory and enforcement actions, to highlight gaps and challenges. + +The paper concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at mitigating risks and addressing regulatory and monitoring shortfalls in relation to cryptocurrency mining, consistent with global AML standards. These include, for example, modifying registration requirements for commercial and remote mining enterprises so that they fall under the purview of regulatory frameworks, despite outstanding questions over custody of cryptocurrency. + +It is abundantly clear that illicit actors have focused in on the usefulness of cryptocurrency, and it is quite likely that cryptocurrency will feature in financial crime for decades to come. Given the uniqueness, novelty and rapidly evolving nature of the digital assets industry, however, it is critically important that policymakers continue to think outside the box, re-examine previously held assumptions about the nature of risks associated with cryptocurrency – including mining – and continuously adapt regulatory and monitoring frameworks in response to emerging risks. + + +### INTRODUCTION + +What was once considered a fringe, novel technology, virtual assets – that is, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin – now have a global market capitalisation of more than $1 trillion. The sheer scale and scope of the cryptocurrency industry, paired with regulation and monitoring challenges, have created, over the past decade, opportunities for illicit state and non-state actors to facilitate financial crimes, including sanctions evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing, among others, using cryptocurrencies. + +In 2018, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international organisation responsible for setting anti-money-laundering (AML) and counterterrorist-finance (CTF) standards, set about addressing threats posed by digital assets to the international financial system. However, despite the introduction of several new requirements, including a requirement for virtual asset service providers (VASPs) to be “regulated for (anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism) AML/CTF purposes, and licensed or registered, and subject to effective systems for monitoring … or supervision”, key vulnerabilities and gaps remain. + +One of these gaps is cryptocurrency mining, which is generally not covered by AML rules and regulations. Mining cryptocurrency is the process by which users verify the accuracy of transactions on a blockchain and are subsequently rewarded for their efforts with newly minted cryptocurrency. Due to the fundamental design of this decentralised process, little in the way of information is available to national authorities on who has “mined” cryptocurrency. + +Because there is very little in the way of transparency on miners, mining has attracted illicit actors ranging from narcotics traffickers to sanctions evaders such as North Korea. In 2019, for example, a report by the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea found that the country engaged in mining cryptocurrencies to generate revenue for its military programmes. + +This paper offers jurisdictions a typology of laundering through cryptocurrency mining. The objective is to increase overall awareness of money-laundering and proliferation-finance risks posed by mining, as well as guidance on how to best address these threats from a legal and regulatory perspective. Although this paper is not meant to be comprehensive, it aims to expand on these identified threats so that jurisdictions can detect vulnerabilities in their financial systems and form risk mitigation strategies. + +The paper first outlines general financial crime risks associated with cryptocurrency mining that have occurred since Bitcoin’s start. Next, it presents a typology of cryptocurrency mining risks, designed to illustrate how illicit actors can take advantage of existing and emerging mining to facilitate money laundering and proliferation financing. Finally, the paper concludes with an analysis of the legal and regulatory challenges to responding to mining risks, and their implications. + +___`Mining has attracted illicit actors ranging from narcotics traffickers to sanctions evaders`___ + +#### METHODOLOGY + +The typologies outlined in this paper are based on a series of semi-structured interviews with public and private stakeholders, including representatives of VASPs, blockchain analytics companies, compliance specialists and academics. + +These interviews, along with a review of relevant news articles, guidance released by international organisations and other law enforcement and regulatory actions, have helped to inform case studies and risk mitigation strategies. + + +### UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOCURRENCY MINING RISKS + +The FATF defines virtual assets as “a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded, or transferred, and can be used for payment or investment purposes”. Bitcoin, for example, one of the most recognised and earliest virtual assets, was first conceptualised in 2008 as a decentralised currency – that is, free of a central monetary authority. + +A decentralised digital currency, however, faces a significant hurdle: without a central authority, how can users be assured that the record of transactions is complete and accurate? To solve this problem, Bitcoin and other similar types of cryptocurrencies use a “proof-of-work” model to validate and record transactions on a blockchain. + +The blockchain, or ledger, consists of blocks of transactions linked together. In a proof-of-work model, a user, referred to as a cryptocurrency miner, employs computer processing power (or “work”) to solve a computationally complex mathematical problem that effectively ensures transactions are accurate and in the correct order – that is, that each new block is linked to the previous one. + +This work, however, is not free. To incentivise users to keep the ledger accurate, miners are rewarded with cryptocurrency (such as Bitcoin). Miners compete against other miners to be the first to solve the complex problem and the first miner to do so is permitted to record the next block of transactions. Figure 1 illustrates how new blocks of transactions are added to a given blockchain that uses a “proof-of-work” model. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/oxR5fQ4.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: Proof-of-Work Model.__ Note: An individual uses their computer processing power to solve complex mathematical problems, resulting in transaction verification on the blockchain. Source: Author generated._ + +Importantly, mining increases the overall supply of cryptocurrency. Minting new cryptocurrency through mining, however, creates several pernicious problems from a financial crime perspective. Namely, newly minted cryptocurrency is not easily linked to an individual. Because of this, mining cryptocurrency is an attractive target for enterprising criminal organisations, sanctions evaders and those looking to avoid law enforcement and intelligence agencies. + +In 2019, for example, an investigation by Brazil’s Department of Narcotics uncovered a cryptocurrency mining operation as part of a drug enforcement investigation, shining a light on how criminal organisations are adapting to digital currencies. Similarly, in Argentina, there have been reports of crime associated with illicitly obtaining cryptocurrency mining equipment, either to launder funds or to make money from reselling the equipment at a lower price. + +North Korea’s brazen cyber attacks against cryptocurrency businesses and applications, which have netted the country billions of dollars in cryptocurrency, are now well known. According to a 2019 UN report, North Korea has also been involved in mining cryptocurrency since at least May 2017. In February 2020, a cyber-security firm found that North Korea’s mining activity had increased at least tenfold since May 2019, based on an analysis of a North Korea-linked IP address. + +While converting stolen cryptocurrency to fiat currency requires a multi-step laundering process that runs the risk of detection, mining, on the other hand, has the potential to generate a nearly anonymous revenue stream. The ability to generate practically decoupled revenue is an enticing lure to illicit activity. Indeed, as illustrated in the next section, there has been a significant increase in the scale and scope of illicit activity targeting the cryptocurrency mining process. + +The mining industry, however, is not static. Much like virtual currency, mining encompasses rapidly changing and dynamic technologies. To better understand how illicit actors can exploit mining, the next section provides a series of typologies and case studies. + + +### KEY CRYPTOCURRENCY MINING TYPOLOGIES + +This section describes a range of available cryptocurrency mining typologies, which includes cryptojacking and remote mining. These methods pose a challenge to law enforcement and regulatory authorities because they involve an individual receiving newly minted cryptocurrency that is not tied to previous transactions, thus making user identification more difficult. Such coins can then be converted to fiat currency without detection of a criminal link on the blockchain. The fourth typology in this section focuses on cryptocurrencies that use a “proof-of-stake” transaction verification model. Although this model does not provide a viable laundering mechanism, it is a method that illicit actors can use to generate revenue. + +#### TYPOLOGY 1: CRYPTOJACKING + +Due to the steep costs of specialised equipment, or sometimes a lack of access to stable internet or power grids, criminals have turned to cryptojacking – the process of hijacking another user’s computer processing power to mine cryptocurrency without their knowledge. + +In 2014, for example, a researcher used supercomputers funded by the US National Science Foundation (NSF – an independent federal government agency) to mine Bitcoin, resulting in his suspension from working with the US government. According to an audit report, “the researcher misused over $150,000 in NSF-supported computer usage at two universities to generate Bitcoins valued between $8,000 and $10,000”. Later, from 2017 to 2021, this illicit revenue generation method grew in popularity as demand and price for cryptocurrency increased. + +Browser-based cryptojacking, or “drive-by mining”, likewise grew in popularity. The process involves embedding malicious code in a website, which allows the website owner to use visitors’ computer processing power to mine cryptocurrency. While there are legitimate reasons a website owner may include web-based mining on a website – such as generating revenue for a charity – criminal enterprises, extremists or even sanctions evaders can exploit the same method to generate revenue. + +In 2018, for example, a neo-Nazi militant group known as the Order of Dawn allowed supporters to mine Monero to generate revenue for its volunteer army. The group’s website is shown in Figure 2. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/dnh7zwk.png) +_▲ __Figure 2: Order of Dawn and Cryptocurrency Mining.__ Source: [Counter Extremism Project, “Far-Right European Terrorist Group Crowdfunding Cryptocurrency”, 28 April 2018](https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/far-right-european-terrorist-group-crowdfunding-cryptocurrency)._ + +Cryptojacking can also occur on a larger scale by rerouting unwitting users’ computer processing power to a mining “pool”, which functions as an aggregator for computer processing power. This method has the potential to create a nearly anonymous revenue stream for an illicit actor. Alternatively, it is also possible to target and hijack resources from cryptocurrency mining pools. In 2014, a hacker gained access to a Canadian internet provider and rerouted traffic from a legitimate pool to a malicious pool, which netted nearly US$84,000 worth of Bitcoin. + +Cryptojacking has similarly caught the attention of North Korea. One of the first reported cases of North Korea-linked criminal activity associated with cryptojacking occurred in 2017, when cyber-criminals hacked a South Korean company’s server to illicitly mine Monero. North Korea was able to mine nearly 70 Monero coins, worth approximately $25,000 at the time. + +North Korea is also alleged to have employed malware to infect computers to mine Monero. According to a 2019 UN report, analysts were able to trace the mined Monero back to servers located at Kim Il Sung University. + +#### TYPOLOGY 2: COMMERCIAL MINING FACILITIES + +Large-scale mining operations have become a lucrative business in recent years, and although the exact number of commercial mining facilities worldwide is unknown, the scale and scope of the industry can be estimated by the demand that such facilities place on power grids. A 2022 report by the US Office of Science and Technology Policy, which coordinates interagency science and technology policy efforts, found that commercial mining facilities are on the rise, estimating that the “total global estimated electricity usage for blockchains that support crypto-assets in 2022 falls into a range of 120 to 240 billion kWh per year”. While such estimates can fluctuate considerably according to demand within cryptocurrency markets, this nonetheless highlights the sheer magnitude of such operations, which at times has accounted for nearly 1% of global energy consumption. + +Mining facilities also have the capability to provide illicit actors with a substantial and relatively anonymous revenue stream. Mined cryptocurrency can be moved across jurisdictions through peer-to-peer transactions and potentially converted to fiat currency at cryptocurrency businesses worldwide. + +The capital costs of such ventures can, however, be high. Specialised equipment, such as application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), can cost anywhere from thousands to tens of thousands of US dollars. In at least one case, illicit actors have used the crypto-mining process to launder other ill-gotten gains, as shown in the following case study. + +> #### `Box 1: Case Study: Bitcoin Mining Centres and Crime` + +> _`In 2016, Spanish police and tax authorities arrested 30 individuals suspected of laundering illicit proceeds via Bitcoin mining centres. The authorities seized Bitcoin mining centres that they suspected were being used by a large criminal network to launder funds. The amount of funds laundered through the operation is unknown.`_ + +> _Sources: [Dev Odedra and Chris Gschwend, “On the Periphery: Financial Crime Risks in Cryptocurrency Mining”, KYC360, 13 July 2020](https://kyc360.riskscreen.com/article/on-the-periphery-financial-crime-risks-in-cryptocurrency-mining/); Reuters, “Spain Arrests 30 Suspected of Laundering Money in Bitcoin Centres”, 25 May 2016._ + +___`State actors have also focused on large-scale mining facilities`___ + +Figure 3 provides a notional summary of how criminal networks could feasibly invest in mining equipment that can ultimately provide revenue that is decoupled from any illicit activity. + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/ZTAKq9J.png) +_▲ __Figure 3: Mining as a Laundry Service.__ Note: A criminal uses illicit funds to purchase or rent a mining “rig”. In return, they receive clean cryptocurrency and can transfer funds across jurisdictions or convert them to fiat currency at exchanges with limited detection. By contrast, on regulated cryptocurrency exchanges, the criminal in question would still face the need to surpass controls during the customer onboarding procedure. Source: Author generated._ + +In addition to criminal networks, state actors have also focused on large-scale mining facilities, requesting that the proceeds be sold to a central bank. Iran, for example, used this technique to generate revenue while under sanctions, according to several blockchain analytics firms. Furthermore, the head of Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization has said that the country’s central bank had made a proposal for how Iran can “use the cryptocurrencies produced internally or cryptocurrencies purchased by companies such as the private sector” for the import of goods. Similarly, although the full extent of North Korea’s mining operations is unknown, its 2020 efforts to mine Monero demonstrate, at a minimum, an interest in conducting mining operations on a larger scale. + +Of course, there are several elements necessary for a successful commercial operation and, therefore, the extent of this financial crime risk will vary among jurisdictions. First and foremost is whether there is access to stable and cheap power. According to the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, mining farm operators generally choose locations with lower electricity costs to optimise profit. In addition to cheap power, commercial facilities also require stable access to the internet that can accommodate transferring data at high speeds. Climate can also play a role. Mining is preferred in regions with low temperatures, which can help operators avoid substantial cooling costs. + +As demand for cryptocurrency has increased, many states have considered and enacted policies to attract the crypto-mining industry. One such example is Transnistria, an unrecognised republic situated between Ukraine and Moldova. The unrecognised breakaway state adopted legislation in 2018 to legalise cryptocurrency mining and created incentives to attract parts of the industry. In addition to offering cheap, stable energy, Transnistria also allows entrepreneurs to set up a mining facility without needing to register as a local company. + +#### TYPOLOGY 3: REMOTE MINING + +The rising costs of specialised mining equipment, as well as the need for cheap power and stable internet infrastructure, have prompted the formation of businesses that host mining equipment on behalf of customers. + +Remote mining presents a particularly thorny problem when it comes to combating financial crime. Operators of remote mining services may be unaware of their client’s identity or whether they are acting on behalf of a third party, as they are often located in different jurisdictions. This could mean that a remote mining service could unwittingly facilitate sanctions evasion or other types of illicit activity. + +Host mining facilities, for example, allow remote customers to purchase mining rigs hosted on their property. The overhead costs for a hosting service typically comprise electricity and maintenance costs, including the setup of the mining equipment. Once the rig is operating, all earnings are directly transferred to the wallet that the customer has listed – whether their own or a third party’s. + +One host mining facility, Bitriver, fell onto the US sanctions list in 2022. BitRiver and its subsidiaries were alleged to have aided Russia in monetising its natural resources by leveraging the country’s cheap energy to mine cryptocurrency. Prior to unilateral sanctions, BitRiver created a cryptocurrency known as the BTR Token. Holders of the coin receive an equivalent amount of electricity power for their hosted mining equipment and can submit tokens once a month to pay up to 10% of the bill. + +In a similar manner, host mining facilities typically allow a portion of the electricity costs to be paid in cryptocurrency, which could provide avenues for criminal organisations and sanctions evaders to launder the proceeds of crime. It would be quite feasible for a representative operating on behalf of a sanctioned country to pay for electricity costs with illicit funds, and in return receive mined cryptocurrency decoupled from any criminal link. Notably, if traceable cryptocurrency is used to pay for a portion of the mining fees, investigators can still track the funds to the business that accepted the illicit funds. However, the facility may be based in a jurisdiction that is not cooperative. + +Some commercial mining facilities also offer cloud-based mining services, whereby users can lease equipment and computer time. Some of the primary cloud-based mining services allow payment in cryptocurrency and for the receiving cryptocurrency address to be changed after purchase. The benefit of using such services is that it can help reduce long-term costs, including investments in expensive equipment, as well as provide a solution to those in jurisdictions with geographic, energy, legal or other limitations on mining. Like host mining, the user does not need to be physically located in the jurisdiction to reap the rewards of mining. + +If information is needed, it is likely that the cloud-based mining service would keep a database of cryptocurrency addresses used by the customer. However, depending on whether the service obtains custody of the funds, it can be unclear to investigators where the funds then move to, when looking at on-chain activity. This form of laundering is outlined in the following case study of a North Korea-linked cyber group. + +> #### `Box 2: Case Study: North Korea and Cloud Mining Services` + +> _`In March 2023, Mandiant, a US cyber security firm, released a report on the cryptocurrency laundering methods of APT43, a North Korea-linked cyber group. According to Mandiant, APT43 likely uses hash rental (the rental of a set amount of computing power to mine cryptocurrency) and cloud-based mining services as a method of laundering funds. The process of laundering via hash rental and cloud-based mining services allows for the buyer’s original payments and the mined cryptocurrency to be decoupled.`_ + +> _Source: [Fred Plan et al., “APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations”, Mandiant, 29 March 2023](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt43-north-korea-cybercrime-espionage), p.7._ + +___`The user does not need to be in the jurisdiction to reap the rewards`___ + +Another cloud mining model involves peer-to-peer marketplaces that allow payments in cryptocurrency. For these services, the buyer can mine using the seller’s computer processing power. Of course, this can also create problems – especially from a transparency perspective. Operators of cloud mining services such as these generally have, for example, no insights into their users’ activities. + +#### TYPOLOGY 4: PROOF-OF-STAKE MODEL + +Whereas a proof-of-work model requires miners to solve computationally complex problems to verify the accuracy of a blockchain and record new transactions, the proof-of-stake model requires validators to “stake” their own cryptocurrency as collateral to verify transactions. To confirm a transaction, the blockchain network randomly selects a validator based on the number of coins the user has staked. + +![image04](https://i.imgur.com/jtDBZWU.png) +_▲ __Figure 4: Proof-of-Stake Model.__ Note: An individual stakes their own funds and, when chosen, will verify transactions on the blockchain. Source: Author generated._ + +Overall, proof-of-stake mining is less energy- and resource-intensive than a proof-of-work model. For these reasons, it may be more attractive to illicit actors. North Korea, for example, has a large stock of cryptocurrency from its various hacks over the past five years that the country could feasibly stake – effectively allowing it to “earn interest” on its illicit hacking operations. + +Recently, Ethereum, a blockchain-enabled platform that allows smart contracts, shifted its economic model from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake to reduce environmental impact. For many illicit actors, this move could prove a boost to revenue generation. A recent report by Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs noted that while North Korea has not previously mined Ether, the shift to a proof-of-stake model may prove more attractive for revenue generation. + +Staking coins, along with cryptojacking, commercial mining facilities and remote mining, represent avenues for criminals to circumvent regulations or take advantage of a lack of oversight. Despite the difficulty of identifying users behind the transaction verification process, the public and private sectors can take steps to mitigate potential risks. + + +### REGULATORY RESPONSE, IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS + +The preceding analysis of key crypto-mining typologies – cryptojacking, commercial mining, remote mining and staking – shows that, despite global interest in regulating digital assets, significant risks to the global financial system remain. In most cases, crypto mining does not fall within the purview of financial supervisors or AML frameworks. The following section addresses some of these legal and regulatory challenges, as well as their implications. + +Currently, only a handful of countries have addressed cryptocurrency mining within their sectoral risk assessments. Moreover, of those that have attempted to tackle mining, regulatory approaches have varied considerably. In some jurisdictions, for example, legislation explicitly states that cryptocurrency mining activity is outside the scope of AML rules and regulations, while in other jurisdictions, miners are subject to licensing and registration requirements. + +#### REGULATORY APPROACHES + +Among the many challenges is the fact that cryptocurrency mining businesses do not generally retain custody of the mined cryptocurrency. This means they do not generally fit into the category of financial institutions that fall under the purview of the FATF. + +From the perspective of the FATF, “natural or legal persons that solely engage in the operation of a VA [virtual assets] network and do not engage in or facilitate any of the activities or operations of a VASP on behalf of their customers … are not VASPs”, even if those activities are undertaken as part of their business. Examples provided by the FATF of activities that would not in themselves qualify an entity to be considered a VASP include: + +- Offering customers internet network services and infrastructure. + +- Providing computing resources (“cloud services and creating, validating, and broadcasting blocks of transactions”). + +___`China banned mining outright in 2021`___ + +Similarly, the report notes that those that do not fall under the definition of a VASP include “validators … whose functions are only validating transactions and cloud service providers whose functions are only offering the operation of infrastructure”. + +To provide further clarification on these requirements, countries have taken steps to release guidance on crypto mining. However, in the US, for example, little has been done in the way of modernising AML rules and regulations related to crypto mining. Current guidance, put forward by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the key agency responsible for countering money laundering in the US, is now nearly a decade old. + +This guidance, unfortunately, does not take into account crypto-mining businesses, noting that “to the extent that a user mines Bitcoin and uses the Bitcoin solely for the user’s own purposes and not for the benefit of another, the user is not an MSB [money service business] under FinCEN’s regulations”. Thus, a crypto-mining company is typically not considered an MSB, and as such is not required to implement AML rules and regulations, such as know-your-customer procedures and record-keeping requirements, which are commonplace at banks. + +Some countries have taken drastically different approaches. China, for example, banned mining outright in 2021. Prior to the ban, nearly 50% of global Bitcoin mining occurred in China. In response to the new restrictions, cryptocurrency mining companies relocated to other jurisdictions, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran and the US. Despite the ban, however, an analysis of hash rates, which can be a proxy for measuring total levels of mining, indicate that there are still mining operations in mainland China. + +The following subsections offer recommendations that countries should consider to restrict abuse of this type of activity. + +_Consider the Risk_ + +The overall lack of rules around businesses that offer crypto-mining services poses a problem for securing the international financial system against illicit actors. The typologies outlined in this paper detail various methods that criminal networks and sanctions evaders can exploit to generate relatively “clean” streams of revenue – that is, revenue not linked to a specific criminal group or individual or prohibited activity. + +Given the risks posed to the international financial system, states should, at a minimum, consider their relative risk exposure to crypto mining from a cyber security standpoint, and identify associated risk with businesses within the industry. This includes understanding the scale and scope of mining-centric businesses within their jurisdiction, which is not always straightforward – especially if there are no registration or licensing requirements. At a minimum, countries should include their crypto-mining industries within national risk assessments.42 To aid with understanding risk and mitigation strategies, operators of crypto-mining enterprises should be included in domestic public–private partnerships centred on cryptocurrency. + +Jurisdictions should be especially concerned if sanctions evasion or other types of illicit financial activity have previously been associated with their jurisdiction. It is important to note that countries have an obligation to implement and enforce international sanctions. In the case of North Korea, for example, states are required to prevent the provision of financial services or economic resources to North Korea. While crypto-mining services may not fit neatly within the definition of a “financial service”, they are nonetheless an economic resource that North Korea could exploit to support its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme. + +_Understand Regional Risk_ + +Another factor countries should consider is regional risk exposure. There could be negative spillover effects from neighbouring jurisdictions that incentivise crypto-mining businesses, such as by offering cheap energy or establishing free trade zones with favourable crypto-mining laws. For example, a country with little or no crypto-mining activity but active cryptocurrency exchanges may face significant risks from illicit actors mining in one region and cashing out in another. + +_Collect and Verify Beneficial Ownership Information_ + +Countries need to identify and verify individuals who have ownership and control of crypto-mining facilities located in their jurisdictions. As shown in the second section, illicit actors can exploit such facilities for laundering or sanctions evasion purposes, so it is critical to identify who is behind operations. + +The FATF outlines that countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of corporate vehicles for criminal purposes by: + +- Understanding the risk associated with legal arrangements. + +- Making legal persons and legal arrangements sufficiently transparent. + +- Requiring corporate vehicles to provide accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information to competent authorities in a timely fashion. + +Furthermore, to detect large-scale mining facilities that are not registered as businesses, law enforcement can look at spikes in energy consumption, as the proof-of-work mining process requires a substantial amount of energy. + +_Require Customer Identification and Verification_ + +Countries should also consider modifying registration requirements for commercial and remote mining enterprises. At a minimum, regulatory authorities should require these companies to retain customer identifying information for law enforcement purposes. + +While most types of crypto-mining activities would not meet the definition of a VASP, and thus not be subject to AML rules and regulations, collection of customer information by remote crypto-mining businesses is highly recommended. By undertaking the following checks on remote clients when establishing business relations these facilities can ensure sanctions compliance: + +- Recording the full name, date of birth, nationality and address of the customer. + +- Verifying the information provided to ensure the use of official government identification documents. + +- Keeping a record of cryptocurrency addresses used by the customer to receive generated funds. + +If illicitly obtained funds are linked to the remote crypto-mining business, holding this customer information will aid in law enforcement investigations. Furthermore, these facilities need to ensure they do not accept funds from sanctioned entities by screening customer information against relevant sanctions lists. + + +### CONCLUSION + +Criminal networks and state actors have both used crypto mining to generate nearly anonymous streams of revenue. While the scale and scope of these illicit operations is largely unknown, the risk posed to the international financial system is clear. + +In a rapidly evolving industry, new innovations also bring new opportunities for illicit actors to exploit, and governments are failing to recognise risks associated with mining. To mitigate the risks that mining can generate, it will be important for governments to think outside traditional AML frameworks. Defining a crypto-mining company as an MSB, for example, may be akin to trying to place a square peg in a round hole. Instead, identification of beneficial ownership and recording client information will likely prove more useful for identifying illicit activity. + +--- + +__Allison Owen__ is an Associate Fellow at RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies. Her primary research projects focus on the policy and security dimensions of cryptocurrency and new payment methods. Allison leads RUSI’s work on cryptocurrency and counter-proliferation finance, focusing on North Korea’s use of crypto to evade sanctions, and provides guidance for the private and public sector to understand and mitigate associated threats. + +__Aaron Arnold__ is a Senior Associate Fellow with the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI, where his work focuses on sanctions and proliferation financing. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-building-up-the-brics.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-building-up-the-brics.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c27f6317 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-25-building-up-the-brics.md @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Building Up The BRICS +author: Neil Melvin +date : 2023-08-25 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/cvk5dyU.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "An Emerging Counter-West Order?" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_While it is too early to declare the end of the US-led liberal international system and the rise of a BRICS-led counterweight, the Johannesburg summit highlights that the West is increasingly confronted by a multipolar world in which its position and the idea of a single global order are being overtly challenged._ + + + +This week’s BRICS summit in Johannesburg – bringing together Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa for the first in-person gathering since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic – has seen the usual denunciations of the US and the liberal order which have characterised most of the organisation’s previous gatherings. Russian President Vladimir Putin, attending virtually as he faces an international arrest warrant for war crimes, was quick to blame Western countries for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, stating that “it was the desire to maintain their hegemony in the world, the desire of some countries to maintain this hegemony that led to the severe crisis in Ukraine”. + +Challenging the US and “the West” has been par for the course for BRICS gatherings in recent years. Originally conceived by Goldman Sachs as a way to capture the economic rise of a diverse group of countries (the BRICS together represent about 40% of the world’s population and a quarter of global GDP), the BRIC acquired a geopolitical significance when Russia took the initiative to convene the four initial member countries in 2009, with South Africa joining in 2011 (adding the S in BRICS). + +Since the fanfare around its creation, the BRICS has often seemed more to be muddling along than mounting a systemic challenge to the Western-led international order. While China’s meteoric rise has underpinned the BRICS’s growing share of the world economy, the countries in the group have experienced wide disparities in economic performance. At times, there have also been significant tensions between its members, notably in 2020–21 when China and India were involved in fierce border skirmishes. Amid numerous declarations over the past decade and a half, the bloc’s only tangible accomplishment has been the launching of an international development finance arm, headquartered in Shanghai. + +This week’s annual summit produced much of the rhetoric that has led many observers to accuse the BRICS of being merely a talking shop, but the meeting also highlighted how Russia’s war against Ukraine and the growing confrontation between the US and China are injecting a new political impulse into the organisation. Rising geopolitical tensions have brought to the fore the question of how the rest of the world – notably the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America – is aligning with existing and emerging world powers. The BRICS countries, prompted by China and Russia, are now looking to seize this moment to expand the grouping of non-Western states and to fashion it as an alternative to the US-led political and economic institutions. + + +### Challenging the Mighty Dollar + +Amid the increased competition for influence and access in the “Global South”, ahead of the summit there was talk of promoting global “de-dollarisation”, and earlier this year Brazil even floated the idea of a BRICS currency. Dethroning the dollar’s dominance is seen as a key element of building a new global economic order, not least since a number of BRICS countries have been vulnerable to Western economic sanctions. + +___`Expansion is viewed in Beijing and Moscow as necessary in order to give the grouping a harder geopolitical edge and to challenge what they characterise as the US-led, unipolar world`___ + +While such ideas currently appear overly ambitious and were not formally on the summit agenda, the BRICS group nevertheless reaffirmed its commitment to expand options for using local currencies for trade between bloc members. Since launching its war against Ukraine, Russia has shifted much of its trade to the renminbi, which now accounts for 16% of its export payments. The BRICS bank recently issued its first rand bond in South Africa, and it is planning to issue its first Indian rupee bond by October. President Lula da Silva of Brazil recently asked: “Why does Brazil need the dollar to trade with China or Argentina? We can trade in our currency”, and he has suggested that the BRICS bank is a more just economic institution than US-led institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. + + +### The Rise of the Pluriverse? + +While the Johannesburg summit will provide further momentum to economic coordination among the BRICS, headlines before and after the summit were dominated by efforts led by China and Russia to promote expansion of the bloc’s membership. This is viewed in Beijing and Moscow as necessary in order to give the grouping a harder geopolitical edge, as a means to challenge what they characterise as the US-led, unipolar world. + +For China, an expanding BRICS would present a vehicle for its more “inclusive” worldview, and building up the organisation is viewed as providing a counterweight to the G7 and G20. The Johannesburg summit has been presented by the Chinese state media as building a “pluriversal” world – “a world that is more multipolar, more inclusive, just, equitable, a world that respects the potential and contributions of all countries to human progress”. This suggests that China may be complementing its approach of trying to outcompete the US within existing international institutions by forging something new and more Sino-centric. + +South Africa, the summit host, supports expansion and invited representatives of dozens of other countries to attend the Johannesburg meeting. Speaking ahead of the summit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa declared: “An expanded BRICS will represent a diverse group of nations with different political systems that share a common desire to have a more balanced global order”. Concluding the summit, Ramaphosa announced that in a first wave of expansion, six countries had been invited to join the bloc as full members from 1 January 2024: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. + +The announcement marked an important victory for China and Russia since India and Brazil had previously expressed caution over expanding the bloc. India is wary of China’s potential dominance and of adopting measures that give Beijing a larger international platform for pursuing its ambitions. Brazil is keen to ensure that its influence is not diluted and that it does not find itself being forced to choose sides in the struggle between the US and China and Russia. Ultimately, both were persuaded to support the expansion policy by the inclusion of their “strategic partners” – Argentina for Brazil and the countries of the Gulf for India – in the list of countries invited to join, and an agreement that future expansion would be based on consensus. + +Speaking following the conclusion of the summit, China’s President Xi Jinping stated that “This membership expansion is historic”, while Putin observed that “The adoption of the guiding principles in the expansion of BRICS will ensure that the role and importance of BRICS in the world will continue to grow”. Putin announced that the next summit would be hosted by Russia in Kazan, and that he would promote a broadening of the grouping’s agenda to include transport, healthcare, science, and cultural issues. + +___`While expansion will further the BRICS’ diversity, it will also import more bilateral tensions into the grouping, such as the difficult relationship between Iran and the Gulf states`___ + +The decision on expansion and further progress on advancing the role of the members’ currencies were significant steps forward for the BRICS countries. Expansion is being presented as a major geopolitical step forward, bringing in key countries in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. For Russia and China, the inclusion of the fiercely anti-Western Iran is seen as a major victory in their efforts to forge a more coherent anti-West grouping to rival the US-led alliance system. + + +### Evolution Rather than Revolution in Johannesburg + +The war in Ukraine has brought into stark relief the competition for influence and support around the world, and there is strong interest among the BRICS countries in positioning themselves as the champions of “the Global South”. The opportunity to join the BRICS will be viewed positively by many states, especially given the access it will provide to China and to major emerging economies. + +In a world of intensifying competition, there is also a desire in many countries to use new opportunities in the international system, such as the BRICS, to hedge against the West and enhance their bargaining power. South Africa said that more than 40 countries have expressed interest in joining the BRICS and 22 have formally requested to be admitted. The upbeat assessment of the expansion of the grouping and its broadening ambitions clouds, however, the major challenges that this agenda will bring to the organisation. + +Even as a group of five states, the BRICS represents a diverse set of countries more united by what they don’t like – not being able to sit at the international top table – than by a coherent view of their position in the global order or what an alternative global order should look like. The BRICS began as a grouping to limit the “unipolar” moment of US pre-eminence and to promote multipolarity, and there is little appetite in Delhi and Brasilia to transform the organisation into a vehicle of bipolar confrontation with the West. While expansion will further the BRICS’ diversity, it will also import more bilateral tensions into the grouping, such as the difficult relationship between Iran and the Gulf states. + +To date, the BRICS has provided a useful platform for emerging states to rail against the injustice of a world order that they felt did not properly include their interests and voices. Expansion is attractive as it will bring in more countries that feel short-changed or excluded by the existing order and strengthen the BRICS as a non-aligned forum. But China and Russia – and now Iran – have bigger ambitions to transform the grouping into a bloc as part of a counter-West project. This will involve moving beyond rhetoric and creating an organisation that can actually deliver an alternative order, tackle major economic problems of development in just ways, and create consensus among states that have deep-seated bilateral disputes with each other. + +This is a tall order, and the reality is that while many countries will welcome being part of a grouping that offers an alternative to US-led institutions, few are keen to join an anti-Western geopolitical bloc led by Russia and China. The Johannesburg summit is likely to be remembered as an important moment that reinforced trends toward multipolarity and increased pressure to reform the existing international order’s key institutions. Further expansion of the BRICS is likely to strengthen these trends, but the BRICS still looks far away from becoming the nucleus of a counter-West political movement. + +--- + +__Neil Melvin__ is Director International Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His current research is focused on emerging international security dynamics in key regions around the world, notably Europe and Eurasia, the Gulf and Middle East, East Africa and the Horn, and the Indo-Pacific. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-29-furthering-global-britain.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-29-furthering-global-britain.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..654cffdd --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-08-29-furthering-global-britain.md @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Furthering Global Britain? +author: Simon Rynn, et al. +date : 2023-08-29 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/ricOgn4.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_This paper provides background on recent UK policy towards East Africa, summarises research findings and offers recommendations for the UK government with relevance both to the region and to an integrated foreign policy globally._ + + + +Since 2016, successive British governments have sought to emphasise that a post-Brexit UK would be outward looking, collaborative and influential. A series of speeches and policy statements stressed that the UK would pursue future prosperity through overseas engagements built upon investments in diplomacy, trade, defence and development aid. In March 2021, the UK government published its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, reiterating these themes and referencing Eastern Africa as a part of the world where the UK would increase its engagement, with explicit references to Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. + +A RUSI research project, “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa”, has examined whether, and how, the UK has leveraged international development, defence and diplomatic investments as envisaged. For the four above-mentioned countries, the project analysed the UK’s core engagements from 2015 to 2022. Through key informant interviews and literature analysis, it identified factors that helped or hindered the UK in pursuing an integrated and collaborative foreign policy approach, and tested perceptions of the UK. The effects of major structural changes to UK foreign policy since 2015 were also studied, notably reducing the overseas aid budget, merging two ministries to create the new Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), and leaving the EU. + +This paper provides background on recent UK policy towards the region, summarising the project’s research findings, and offers recommendations for the UK government with relevance both to the region and to an integrated foreign policy globally. The key findings are as follows: + +- In the face of volatility, the UK has had to adapt its approach towards the region numerous times since 2015. Actions include reallocating funding towards drought relief, suspending cooperation during conflict and political upheaval (Sudan), condemning reported war crimes (Ethiopia), bolstering stabilisation efforts in the wake of new military offensives (Somalia) and providing support to mitigate electoral instability (Kenya and Somalia). + +- Despite inconsistent levels of political leadership, the UK contributed to relatively successful outcomes across the four case study countries. However, these are not sufficient (or necessarily sustainable) in isolation and continue to face important constraints and challenges. + +- Attempts by UK officials to better integrate defence, international development and diplomatic work have made progress. + +- While the abolition of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is regretted by some UK regional partners, the unplanned creation of the FCDO shows early promise. + +- The UK retains a good reputation in the region for the calibre of its diplomats and development and defence experts, and has broadly maintained staffing levels in the region, despite budget cuts. + +- The UK is reasonably well regarded as a development, defence and diplomatic actor across the region. However, despite this, a range of middle and great powers increasingly offer alternative forms of support to East African governments, which contributes to perceptions of declining UK influence. + +- The UK has established relationships and partnerships with a variety of actors. It often operates effectively through ad hoc groupings of bilateral and multilateral networks in the region and globally, bolstered by envoys and technical specialists. + +- Between 2019 and 2021, the UK bilateral aid budget was reduced by around 50% across the region. External relationships suffered, as funding decisions were arrived at iteratively and were not always well communicated. + +- Brexit did not significantly impair the UK’s operational effectiveness in the region, but alongside other factors it probably contributed to a perception of declining influence. + +- UK strategies at the country level were sometimes unclear, overly broad or outpaced by contextual changes. The lack of a regional strategy also remains a significant gap, given the transnational nature of the opportunities and challenges facing Eastern Africa. + +The research raises important questions concerning the nature of UK–Africa relations and the role of aid, development and defence engagement within an integrated foreign policy. Various recommendations are offered in this paper, spanning operational and strategic levels. These include building on lessons from the DFID–Foreign & Commonwealth Office merger to ensure the FCDO’s capabilities fully support integrated ways of working; better aligning mission priorities across the Gulf and Eastern Africa; and bolstering cooperation between special envoys and embassy-level staff. Explicit change management processes must be used to guide further organisational reform. More broadly, the UK should advocate for a clearer mandate when it comes to ad hoc groups such as the Quint and the Quad; centre long-term, sustainable engagement; and communicate the scope, scale and mechanics of continuing UK–EU cooperation to help defuse perceptions of an isolated, post-Brexit foreign policy, particularly to local audiences. + +Perhaps most importantly in a world of increased geopolitical rivalry, the UK needs to clarify its positioning towards Africa. Policy statements in favour of “integration” or “partnerships”, while useful, do not in themselves constitute effective strategy. With a contracting resource base, positive results may become harder to demonstrate in an increasingly competitive, transactional environment. African governments also now have a wider array of potential partners and greater leverage in shaping foreign engagement. As a result, the UK will need to market its added value towards Africa very clearly. As a first step, a two-way dialogue should be established with African partners at government and societal level to discuss shared priorities and ways of working. + + +### Introduction + +Since 2016, successive British governments have emphasised that a post-Brexit UK would be outward looking, collaborative and influential. They portrayed the UK as pursuing future prosperity through overseas engagements built upon investments in diplomacy, trade, defence and development aid. Following this trend, the UK government published an ambitious policy document, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR21) in March 2021, expressing similar sentiments about the UK’s role in the world while pointing to the challenge of increased geopolitical competition. Greater connectivity was promised between UK diplomacy, defence, trade and international development, alongside the UK working with like-minded governments towards shared goals of prosperity, democracy and security. East Africa, an area of longstanding UK interest, was among the regions prioritised for engagement, with explicit references to Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. + +A RUSI research project “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa” has examined whether, and how, the UK has leveraged international development, defence and diplomatic investments as envisaged. For the four above-mentioned countries, the project analysed the UK’s core engagements from 2015 to 2022, identifying factors that helped or hindered its pursuit of an integrated and collaborative foreign policy approach, as well as testing perceptions of the UK. The effects of major structural changes to UK foreign policy since 2015 were also studied, notably reducing the overseas aid budget, merging two ministries to create the new Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), and leaving the EU. + +This paper provides background on recent UK policy towards the region, summarising the project’s research findings, and offers recommendations for the UK government with relevance both to East Africa and to an integrated foreign policy globally. + +#### Methodology + +The research methodology consisted of a review of selected policy literature and 182 semi-structured expert interviews carried out from mid-2021 to early 2023. + +__Literature Review__ + +A review was undertaken of official data and policy documents from government departments (principally the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the FCDO and the now-defunct Department for International Development (DFID)); parliamentary committees and regulatory bodies (for example, the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee); associated funding platforms (for example, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), the Prosperity Fund, the Newton Fund and the Global Challenges Research Fund); and public entities such as the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI). Papers were analysed for key themes, sectoral engagement and expenditure that the UK continually or repeatedly adopted in its engagement in Eastern Africa. Data on UK aid, defence and diplomatic engagement in the four focal countries from 2015 to 2022 was used as a reference point to identify UK policy objectives and trends over time. + +__Interviews__ + +Through semi-structured interviews, the team identified a number of key outcomes that the UK has sought to achieve in each of the focus countries, and which were informative in terms of the overarching research objectives. A range of actors who are familiar with UK engagement were then interviewed to understand the nature and significance of the UK contribution and the factors that had enabled or constrained engagement. A total of 182 interviews were carried out between September 2021 and January 2023, with a substantial number of them based in Eastern Africa. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/fLo96q6.png) +_▲ __Table 1: Interview Breakdown.__ Source: Author generated._ + +This is the final paper in a series of publications stemming from this project, which includes a paper that lays out the project methodology and greater detail on UK investments across the region, and four country case studies focusing on the UK’s work in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. + + +### I. Background + +#### Policy Context + +The term “Global Britain” was first used by Prime Minister Theresa May as shorthand for an outward-looking, collaborative and influential agenda. Dramatic events and policy changes were to follow. Under the subsequent leadership of Prime Minister Boris Johnson, a new government department, the FCDO, was announced in June 2020, merging the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and DFID. Declared without prior planning, the process led to substantial and repeated rounds of restructuring. + +In November 2020, the UK official development assistance (ODA) budget was also cut, from 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) to 0.5%: a significant shift given that the UK had acquired a reputation overseas as a strong and generous aid donor since the 1990s. Some commentators lamented the end of the UK’s role as a global “development superpower”, claiming a loss of status and damage to partnerships and British influence. This stood in contrast to a well-publicised increase in the national defence budget. The government subsequently set out the conditions (fiscal tests) under which it intended to return the budget to 0.7% GNI. + +In March 2021, the UK government published the IR21. The document recognised a more competitive global context than in 2016 but reiterated now-familiar “Global Britain” themes. It signalled a wish to play a proactive role in global affairs, to work in cooperation with others, particularly “like-minded bilateral and multilateral partners”, and to better integrate foreign policy, defence, trade and international development efforts. Africa was referenced in terms of forging problem-solving partnerships and the pursuit of prosperity, democracy and security. The policy spoke of maintaining commitments to Africa with respect to ODA, but leaned strongly towards promoting trade, economic resilience and the alignment of international development with wider foreign policy. In this context, East Africa was pegged as a specific region for continued, and in some cases increased, engagement. + +On defence matters, it included a commitment to “persistent engagement”, for example, placing UK armed forces overseas for longer periods in a more proactive posture. A series of sub-strategies were subsequently released, including the 2021 Defence Command Paper and the 2022 International Development Strategy. Highly pertinent for Africa, the latter situated international development as part of a broader effort to build a network of like-minded partners with “all our capabilities – our diplomatic influence, trade policy, defence, intelligence, business partnerships and development expertise”. In doing so, it signalled an intention to use aid for both poverty reduction and wider development and foreign policy goals. + +A “refreshed” version of IR21 was released – IR23 – in March 2023. Africa was again identified as a region where the UK government should deepen relationships: “The UK’s approach in Africa will continue to be defined by a greater appreciation of the needs and perspectives of key partners across the continent, focusing on mutually beneficial development, security and defence partnerships, and support for clean infrastructure and climate adaptation”. + +IR23 also stated that the UK would “work to reinvigorate its position as a global leader on international development, pursuing patient, long-term partnerships tailored to the needs of the countries we work with, going beyond our Official Development Assistance (ODA) offer to draw on the full range of UK strengths and expertise”. Specific commitments included placing the Minister of State for Africa and International Development on the UK National Security Council (NSC), creating a new second permanent secretary role in the FCDO to oversee all UK development priorities, and establishing a new FCDO–Treasury governance structure to supervise all aid spending. The minister would subsequently clarify his own agenda for the future of UK international development. + +As a consequence, the UK policy context has evolved considerably over the research period. Transitions between prime ministers Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak, and foreign secretaries Dominic Raab, Liz Truss and James Cleverly, linked to the politics of Brexit and Covid-19, and sometimes accompanied by claims of incompetence or corruption, have also brought shifting priorities and tone. Prolonged Brexit negotiations, the Covid-19 pandemic, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have also reshaped geopolitics and economics, with significant knock-on implications for UK spending plans as political attention and increasingly scarce resources were either diverted away from East Africa or towards more short-term crisis management. With already reduced levels of UK ODA diverted towards meeting refugee assistance costs domestically, aid spending in Eastern Africa is much lower than anticipated, despite the region facing severe drought and significant political, security and economic challenges. + +#### UK Regional Policy Priorities and Engagements + +UK engagement with Eastern Africa is multifaceted, with a long history. A non-exhaustive list of topics of concern include security and counterterrorism (Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and previously Ethiopia), migration (especially Sudan), humanitarian relief, stabilisation and conflict resolution (Sudan, Somalia), international development, climate and environment and trade (especially Kenya). This paper is informed by five preceding research papers. Taken together these provide details on country contexts, UK investments, objectives and selective outcomes across the region. A brief overview of the UK’s key interests, policy priorities and engagements in each country from 2015 to 2022 is also provided. + +___Ethiopia___ + +The UK government considers Ethiopia one of a handful of high-priority countries for UK engagement in Africa due to its size, influence and strategic location. Successive UK governments have sought a stable Ethiopia that is supportive of their foreign policy priorities both globally, especially the international development agenda, but also in the Horn of Africa, for example, with regard to the War on Terror and migration and in relation to the stability of Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Given that it is one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in Africa and the world, the UK sees Ethiopia as a key country for stemming onward migration. + +Registering an annual growth rate of over 10% between 2004 and 2009, in the mid-2000s Ethiopia acted as a cheerleader for international development in global forums. Seeing Ethiopia as a quintessential “developmental state”, the UK became a staunch partner. Via the now-defunct DFID, the UK aligned strongly with the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) development agenda. Ethiopia at times became the largest single recipient of UK bilateral aid globally, much of it channelled via the government in support of service delivery. Expenditure averaged around £220 million per annum between 2016 and 2020. This made the UK the second-largest donor after the US, contributing around 11% of Ethiopia’s recorded aid income as reported via the OECD–Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Alongside investments in areas ranging from human rights to economic development and drought response, approximately 60% of the UK’s bilateral aid budget has typically been channelled via central government programmes, the bulk allocated to multi-donor, multi-year funds that supported delivery of basic services. + +In IR21, the UK planned to work in partnership with Ethiopia “to further our shared prosperity goals, our democratic values and our security interests” and to invest in “regional stability, moving towards closer defence cooperation”. But cuts to the UK aid budget and the changing context in Ethiopia dictated otherwise. By 2021, UK bilateral spend had roughly halved compared to 2019. The remaining (£120-million) UK bilateral aid allocation to Ethiopia in 2021 was £134 million lower than the year before. This was the largest cut – in absolute, though not proportional terms – of any country budget worldwide. Reductions were accompanied by reallocations to different sectors in light of a series of natural disasters, shifting ministerial priorities, Covid-19 and the Tigray War. In 2020, the UK spent £254 million in bilateral ODA in Ethiopia. Humanitarian aid (£103 million) accounted for approximately 40% of the budget as compared to 15% in 2013. + +Despite some criticism, the UK has attempted to position itself as constructively critical of Ethiopian government actions during its war in Tigray, while continuing with reduced aid programming via government channels. Meanwhile, it has lobbied the federal government repeatedly for humanitarian access and respect for international humanitarian law, and provided humanitarian funding. + +The UK government has maintained a relationship with the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence for over two decades and has a permanent defence attaché in-country. Defence-related expenditure typically runs at under £1 million per annum, mostly drawn from regional budgets with competing priorities, including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Ethiopia’s support to AMISOM was the UK’s principal focus – many AMISOM troops have received training from the UK. Levels of UK ambition on security and defence issues have, however, declined over time. Ethiopia and the UK cooperated on counterterrorism issues, but the focus has mainly been on education and training in non-combat areas linked to the Ethiopian Peace Support Training Centre since 2018. + +As well as supporting international development work, UK diplomatic interest has historically focused on issues above, ranging from trade promotion to migration, counterterrorism cooperation and Ethiopian involvement in peacekeeping. Considerable energy has also been absorbed on consular cases involving dual nationals. Diplomatic relations were tested in early to mid-2021, as Western criticisms of the Ethiopian government blockade of Tigray and reported human rights abuses led to recriminations. The UK has pursued a lower-profile approach to the Tigray War compared with more prominent critics (for example, the EU, Ireland and the US), who briskly paused aid packages and publicly condemned Ethiopian government actions. It has attempted to position itself as constructively critical while continuing to send aid via government. Amid a turbulent context that included war in Tigray and an intense government counterinsurgency campaign in Oromia, the UK has sought diplomatic engagement with the Ethiopian federal government at the highest level. With respect to Tigray, it lobbied for improved humanitarian access, ceasefires and talks. It has not invested high levels of political capital, however, with infrequent senior ministerial visits. + +___Somalia___ + +The UK was the second-largest DAC donor country to Somalia after the US between 2011 and 2020. A significant proportion of this bilateral aid has been channelled towards government assistance and structural reform, public financial management and support for subnational administration. This includes strengthening the building blocks of the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) legitimacy and accountability, from funding judicial development and service provision to supporting inclusive commercial growth. Given the ongoing threat of Al-Shabaab and jihadist militancy, long-running investments were also allocated to security sector reform and law enforcement, with UK personnel leading the policing strand of Somalia’s Comprehensive Approach to Security framework and supporting projects on stabilisation and countering violent extremism/deradicalisation. Efforts were likewise made to facilitate a political settlement at the federal level and to bolster humanitarian assistance. Resources peaked in famine or near-famine years (2011/12 and 2017/18), with food security (as a sub-stream of “humanitarian preparedness and response”) emphasised as a thematic priority in IR21, supplementing resilience programmes to improve early-warning systems, coping mechanisms, local self-reliance and access to healthcare services. + +In-country budgets saw a 56% contraction between 2020 and 2021. Although Somalia is still one of the top 10 recipients of British ODA, this put the UK below Germany’s bilateral aid spending level for the first time. The cuts came alongside a depreciating exchange rate and reallocations driven by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Although funding for famine relief remains comparatively high, only £61 million in humanitarian aid, healthcare and nutritional resourcing was provided in FY2022/23. This reflected a sharp decrease from the £170-million package offered in 2017. + +UK diplomacy has focused on “supporting and occasionally steering multilateral efforts to build up the FGS’s political anatomy, authority and capacity”. Having co-hosted or facilitated several international conferences to formalise the federal structure and provisional constitution, from 2017 UK attention increasingly shifted towards developing a basic security framework and delivering the 2018–22 Somalia Transition Plan (STP). In tandem with the US, London backed the World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief process (2016), and – alongside other donors – helped the FGS satisfy the “Decision Point” benchmarks by 2020. As UN Security Council (UNSC) penholder, the UK also facilitated debate over the structuring, resourcing and timing of AMISOM (now the African Transition Mission – ATMIS), and contributed significant funding to the UN Office for Project Services and the AMISOM Trust Fund. + +The need to develop a self-sufficient security apparatus capable of degrading Al-Shabaab was referenced in both the UK’s 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review and the 2021 Defence Command Paper. In recent years, the British Army has supplied infrastructural projects and training, stipends and equipment to the Somali National Army (SNA) under Operation Tangham, primarily for Sector 60 of the army, based around Baidoa. UK-funded advisers remain embedded across federal institutions, including in the ministries of defence and internal security. The focus continues to be on reforming and capacitating national forces so that they can assume security responsibilities from ATMIS as the mission sets to conclude in late 2024. + +___Sudan___ + +The UK has longstanding ties with the Republic of Sudan, previously a colonial condominium, and considers it one of a few high-priority countries on the continent. The view has been that worsening political and economic situations in Sudan would impact the Horn of Africa and North Africa and negatively affect the UK’s vital interests. The IR21 specifically mentioned the UK’s commitment to “continue to support conflict resolution and stabilisation efforts in … Sudan”. Outward migration has also been a concern. The UK is home to a significant and longstanding Sudanese diaspora (around 20,000 people). The UK Home Office has led efforts to curtail migration from Sudan through strengthened border management and enforcement. + +UK bilateral aid commitments to Sudan averaged around £93 million per annum between 2016 and 2020. Recent ODA-funded programmes have contributed on issues from humanitarian relief and humanitarian system reform to economic reform, reducing female genital mutilation and child marriage, to water and sanitation, civil society, and supporting the Juba Peace Agreement (2020). The highest-expenditure items have been humanitarian relief and economic reform, and social safety net support. As UK aid contributions to neighbouring countries declined, the Sudan aid budget temporarily rose from £93 million in 2019 to £139 million in 2020. This was due to a one-off increase for a new “Sudan Family Support Programme”, the UK contribution to a World Bank-run programme designed to cushion the needy from economic reforms. Alongside this, the UK campaigned hard at the World Bank and the IMF for Sudanese debt relief. Aid contributions were halted following the October 2021 coup. The UK, together with the US, World Bank and other major donors, suspended non-humanitarian aid. UK bilateral ODA funding dropped back to £93 million by the end of 2021. This still left Sudan as the fifth-largest recipient of UK bilateral ODA worldwide. + +Given Sudan’s long period of military rule and the existence of UK, UN and EU sanctions regimes, opportunities for defence engagement have been few. UK–Sudan defence engagement was completely suspended following the October 2021 coup, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) withdrew its defence attaché from Khartoum in 2022. + +The UK’s Sudan diplomacy has focused over time on issues ranging from peace negotiations to migration, counterterrorism and humanitarian access, to the imposition of sanctions and the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As a follow-on to involvement in the negotiations for the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the UK acted as “penholder” for the UN hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and its successor, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). In March 2016, a UK–Sudan Strategic Dialogue was set up – a formalised contact forum in which senior officials from the two countries met under the shadow of UK and multilateral sanctions. Economic sanctions under UN and EU auspices were central to UK policy in the hope of incentivising reduced conflict, given previous allegations of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the early 2000s. The UK was also involved in establishing the Khartoum Process, a controversial intergovernmental dialogue platform to facilitate cooperation on migration. Particularly since the ousting of President Omar Al-Bashir, UK ambassadors have been prominent voices in support of democratic transition, often working with the US and Norway “Troika”. UK diplomacy also played an important role in the June–July 2019 “Quartet” negotiations that produced a civilian-led, transitional government. + +Attempts to facilitate an agreement between key political and security factions after the 2021 military coup culminated in the December 2022 “Framework Agreement”, a deal brokered by UNITAMS, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) and backed by, among others, the UK. Despite these efforts, fighting again broke out in Khartoum on 15 April 2023. Violence subsequently spread, leading to reports of war crimes and mass displacement, especially in Darfur. While the UK and other foreign governments initially focused on evacuating nationals and calling for ceasefires and restraint, competing diplomatic tracks have gradually coalesced over time. The US and Saudi Arabia, for instance, convened talks in Jeddah but were criticised for failing to coordinate with other Quad members (including the UK) or regional organisations such as the AU. Although a temporary truce was brokered in late May, the deal – like many others before and since – collapsed under repeated violations. Separately, an IGAD summit was hosted in July, rivalling AU leadership claims over any mediation process, and bilateral and multilateral arrangements fronted by Chad and Egypt started pushing their own initiatives. The result has been “disarray” and confusion, “posing the risk that opportunities [for peace-making] will slip away unexplored”. + +___Kenya___ + +Kenya has been an enduring priority for UK engagement in Africa since the country’s independence in 1963, reflecting a relationship grounded on shared history, language, economic ties, diasporic networks and security needs. Name-checked in IR21 and the International Development Strategy, these linkages were formalised by the 2020–25 Strategic Partnership, with bilateral interests spanning mutual prosperity; regional stability; sustainable development and reduction of extreme poverty; collaborative leadership on climate and environmental issues; peer learning, knowledge sharing and research; and the expansion of individual and institutional networks. + +Eclipsed by the US in the mid-1970s, the UK’s bilateral ODA contributions to Kenya averaged around £117 million between 2016 and 2020, peaking at £152.8 million in 2017 before falling below those of Japan in 2018, and France and EU institutions in 2020, and Germany a year later. Partially tied to the drop from 0.7% to 0.5% of GNI, the government’s in-country budget reduced from £134 million (2019) to £72 million (2021) – roughly 46% over two years – slightly exceeding the 42% cut across Africa as a whole. + +In terms of coverage and content, social infrastructure has regularly consumed the largest proportion of UK ODA funding, although the specific distribution has varied over time. Support for social protection and education, for instance, diminished in 2013/14, while investment in health systems grew steadily from 2017 and extended further as part of the COVAX vaccine rollout. Attention has likewise been paid to multi-sector work – particularly environmental protections, policies and administrative management – and humanitarian aid, including emergency (drought and flood) relief, and refugee support and empowerment. After the outbreak of electoral (and state) violence in 2007/8, the UK increased its focus on governance, peace and security issues. Additional resourcing was also channelled towards improving the accountability of public institutions, anti-corruption efforts, conflict mitigation and reducing the risk of radicalisation. + +History has proven both a “benefit and burden” for diplomatic engagement. The UK retains close ties to Kenya’s political, military and economic elite, but has often been scapegoated when politically expedient. Following then-candidate Uhuru Kenyatta’s indictment by the ICC in 2013, for example, elements of Kenyatta’s Jubilee party were able to dismiss Western criticism as “neo-colonial”, refusing any renewal of UK defence cooperation and accelerating his predecessor’s “look east” strategy. While relations gradually improved, culminating in a prime ministerial visit by Theresa May in 2018, similar issues emerged over successive electoral cycles (2017 and 2022), revealing the difficult dynamics that UK officials continue to navigate. + +Contemporary relations with Nairobi are also wrapped up in UK commercial interests. Kenya is the largest African recipient of British “aid-for-trade” programming, and significant efforts are being made to boost environmental, social and corporate standards. In 2020, an Economic Partnership Agreement pledged funds to boost trade and granted Kenyans “duty and quota free” access to UK markets, although there were concerns such bilateral arrangements could disrupt regional integration within the East Africa Community, or saturate local markets with cheap imports. In 2021, Kenya was considered a priority country in British International Investment (BII)’s $1-billion pan-African suite of infrastructure, finance and climate projects, supplementing assistance to 30 regional funds and more than 80 local finance, tech and green enterprises. Later that year, then foreign secretary Dominic Raab declared a further £132 million in public and private funding aligned with Kenyatta’s “Big Four Agenda”. + +The UK has long considered Kenya an “essential” defence partner, as the country hosts significant British military assets and infrastructure, adjoins Somalia, South Sudan and Ethiopia, and offers a logistical corridor to central Africa. Much of this relationship is framed by the Security Compact, an arrangement approved in 2015 (and episodically updated) covering countering violent extremism, border and aviation policing, and criminal justice cooperation, alongside efforts to tackle instability and conflict. Defence Cooperation Agreements were also signed in 2016 and 2021, renewing the legal instruments that maintain BATUK (the British Army Training Unit Kenya, host of the multinational Askari Storm exercises) and allow capacity building with the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF). In addition, BPST-A (the British Peace Support Team) advises and assists African militaries, supporting peacekeeping operations such as AMISOM and ATMIS, and working with partners including the International Peace Support Training Centre to strengthen institutional learning and regional responses to complex emergencies. In recent years, Kenya was designated a “regional hub” in the MoD’s “persistent engagement strategy”, with the 2021 Defence Command Paper prescribing a further expansion of UK commitments and the continuation of joint training and readiness. + + +### II. Research Findings + +This project’s most prominent findings from all source data across the four case studies – including secondary source and interview data – are provided below. Where relevant, recommendations are offered for UK policymakers. + +> #### `Finding 1` + +> _`In the face of volatility, the UK has had to adapt its approach towards the region numerous times since 2015. Actions include reallocating funding towards drought relief, suspending cooperation during conflict and political upheaval (Sudan), condemning reported war crimes (Ethiopia), bolstering stabilisation efforts (Somalia), and providing support to mitigate electoral instability (Kenya and Somalia).`_ + +- Kenya offers relative stability, commercial opportunities and a good degree of judicial independence. But the economy has struggled to recover from Covid-19-era restrictions and global price increases. Political and ethnic divisions persist, and state systems are not meeting public expectations amid corruption, inequality and the high cost of living. Against this backdrop, the UK has dedicated significant time, diplomatic capital and financial resources to electoral support and institution building to help consolidate reforms prescribed in Kenya’s 2010 Constitution. With contested polls (and an eventual re-run) in 2017, the British High Commission (BHC) doubled down on its supply of technical assistance across various regulatory bodies such as the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, despite increasing contextual difficulties. Crucially, early engagement in the electoral cycle bought time for participatory planning and networking, enabling British stakeholders to better navigate the stringent restrictions imposed on donors by Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, the BHC assumed an influential role in coordinating external engagement, partially facilitated by its unusual levels of access to local institutions; the longevity and depth of bilateral UK ties to Kenya; the coincidental absence of a US ambassador; and the High Commissioner’s personal clout. Much of this leadership was “behind the scenes”, with the UK contributing towards the donor agenda while reportedly sharing or ceding ownership to mitigate the political sensitivities previously disrupting British interventions in 2013 and 2017. + +- Visible changes to Ethiopia’s existing political settlement began in 2018 with the dissolution of the ruling EPRDF. The UK enjoyed a close working relationship with the Ethiopian government until 2019, cooperating and financing significant poverty reduction efforts and pursuing shared counterterrorism objectives, despite worsening political divisions and insecurity. This began to change following the November 2020 Tigray War and subsequent security and economic crisis. The UK attempted to maintain access to newly installed prime minister Abiy Ahmed’s government at the highest level while being critical of the conduct of the war. It continued to provide financial aid and technical assistance to government departments for socioeconomic development but at lower levels than before, while lobbying for humanitarian access to Tigray. Defence cooperation outside peacekeeping training was stopped. Yet by attempting to keep all options and channels open, the UK attracted criticism from both the Ethiopian federal government and pro-Tigrayan voices. + +- Somalia remains poor and insecure, with much of the country inaccessible to governmental and international actors. In working to support a “good enough” state capable of out-competing Al-Shabaab, the UK developed new (experimental) approaches to stabilisation in support of Operation Badbaado, an SNA-led offensive focused on the liberation of several “bridge-towns” across Lower Shabelle between 2019 and 2020. By shifting towards a more politically sensitive methodology based on grassroot reconciliation, dialogue and community buy-in – fronted in large part by the Early Recovery Initiative – the UK was able to build momentum for peace committees and recovery operations. Although primarily confined to the tactical level given a lack of follow-up funding and police coverage, these inputs were nevertheless considered “significant and influential” on their own terms, while plugging a gap in international programming. British engagement also proved flexible in reallocating resources to help avert the risk of famine in 2017, marking a substantial (if imperfect) improvement on similar interventions in 2011/12. Subsequent efforts in 2022 were, however, criticised as insufficient and under-financed, leveraging technical expertise and convening power in an enabler role, rather than exercising the leadership and multiplier effects evident five years previously. + +- In Sudan, the UK acquired a reputation over many years for careful diplomacy, even-handed dealings around the north–south conflict, and ongoing support for humanitarian relief. Under President Omar Al-Bashir, relations were highly challenging. The situation pivoted to a close working relationship with the brief hybrid transitional government of 2019–21. While ending cooperation on security and development matters, the UK maintained contact with key political and military figures even after the October 2021 coup. This caused some pro-democracy actors to criticise the UK’s support for “hybrid” or compromise agreements that featured the security services. While events have moved on with the outbreak of violence in April 2023, there is still a reservoir of goodwill towards the UK in Sudan and an appetite for increased engagement. + +This rapidly changing context points to the importance of up-to-date multi-disciplinary analysis to inform decisions on strategy, action and difficult trade-offs. It also underscores that peace, adequate governance and security are fundamental for progress on other agendas. + +__Recommendation:__ Make use of the combined skills and levers that exist across government – from trade-related to cultural, diplomatic and security – to develop and periodically update internal analysis of the political, security and economic situation in the region, and identify any levers for change that will permit effective UK action at country level. + +__Recommendation:__ Ensure that future UK international development strategies and white papers recognise the importance of addressing security, conflict and governance challenges to enable progress on development and prosperity objectives in East Africa and other fragile environments. + +> #### `Finding 2` + +> _`Despite inconsistent levels of political leadership, the UK contributed to relatively successful outcomes across the four case study countries. However, these are not sufficient (or necessarily sustainable) in isolation and continue to face important constraints and challenges.`_ + +Based on interviewees’ assessments of UK inputs and successes, several example focus areas emerged: + +- In Kenya, the UK displayed flexibility, contextual awareness and diplomatic influence in delivering well-timed, long-running electoral support (and subsequent crisis management). Together with other international partners and endogenous factors, these efforts helped strengthen trust and public safety during the largely peaceful 2022 election. Similarly, defence engagement fed into tactical, doctrinal and possibly operational improvements in the KDF, and ensured a persistent, close working relationship with Nairobi. UK programming was likewise able to draw on its networking and technical expertise to contribute to a boost in Kenyan literacy rates, academic performance and girls’ progression to secondary-level education. However, such experiences also reflect the inherent difficulty of engendering sustainable change across institutional cultures, especially when navigating political sensitivities and elite interests, leaving the longer-term and higher-level impact of UK interventions (often) unclear. + +- Incremental progress was made in Ethiopia, with the UK feeding into (and funding) plans to liberalise the agriculture, manufacturing, mining, tourism, and information and communications sectors, backed by international financial institution (IFI) loans. Partly as a result of embassy efforts and relationships, a consortium including UK firm Vodafone won a licence to operate in Ethiopia in a deal that aimed to catalyse investment and jobs in 2021, although wider liberalisation plans have since faltered. More fruitfully, the UK supported a peace initiative in Ethiopia’s Somali Region, with marginalised and aggrieved populations able to participate. Despite problems with implementation, the Asmara agreement of 2018 may have contributed for a time to reduced violence and improved stability, and facilitated the movement of goods into northern Kenya and Somaliland. This demonstrates how long-term, low-key investments, when combined with political savvy and a trusted implementing partner, can generate results. + +- In Somalia, the UK remained an important international stakeholder, leveraging its financial sway in the World Bank’s Multi-Partner Fund, diplomatic capital as UNSC Penholder, and existing relationships with federal member states (FMS) authorities to help push through support for revenue generation, financial management and debt relief via the HIPC process. While donors may have downplayed or deferred corruption and accountability issues along the way, the effort to create administrative structures commensurate with the ambition of Somalia’s transition plans may be an important foundation. Programmes like the Early Recovery Initiative also appeared promising, providing innovative, dialogue-based stabilisation models to better address community needs and bolster FGS–FMS relations. Although experiencing a significant drop in resourcing compared to 2017, UK technical expertise and convening power likewise fed into ongoing efforts to supply famine relief – albeit not on the scale required. Nevertheless, the pernicious impact of economic extraversion and foreign dependency, and a lack of political unanimity among Somalis themselves, continue to hamper higher-level UK objectives, namely the development a durable federal state. + +- Despite a chequered past, the UK has displayed significant leverage at key moments in Sudan, building on a long history of engagement. Supporting good practice around conflict sensitivity, localisation, transparency and resilience-building allowed British aid to assist more than two million people with food, cash, education, healthcare and water access between 2017 and 2022. Even by linking emergency relief and high-level diplomacy, the UK – alongside other donors – nevertheless failed to win sustainable openings in the humanitarian space before the military reclaimed power. Similarly, British officials proved crucial in backing IFI efforts to cut subsidies, increase public sector wages and establish social safety nets during the political transition, enabling Sudan to eventually satisfy IMF requirements and unlock concessional finance worth $2.5 billion for the first time in 30 years. Nonetheless, limited relief payments, declining living standards, rampant inflation and food shortages all heightened political and social divisions in the lead up to the October 2021 coup, suggesting the strategy framing UK and Western approaches may have ultimately been counterproductive. + +Despite facing difficult contextual conditions, resource limitations, uncertainties over critical assumptions and persistent ministerial upheaval in London, these interventions capture important elements of the contemporary UK “offer”. While claims of progress should not be overstated, the examples above provide useful insights into how the UK might continue to advance key elements of its agenda. + +__Recommendation:__ Given the relatively small sample of outcomes, interventions and focus areas covered by this project, further research should be conducted into how the UK can pursue (and sustain) its goals, informed by an analysis of UK comparative advantages and limitations across the diplomatic, defence and developmental fields. + +> #### `Finding 3` + +> _`Attempts by UK officials to better integrate defence, international development and diplomatic (3Ds) work have made progress.`_ + +- UK policy has long emphasised the importance of joined-up action across the “3Ds” and to varying degrees – as per IR21 – have tried to incorporate questions of trade, economic resilience and even science and technology. The research showed clear examples of integrated thinking and action, tying together development, diplomacy and defence. + +- UK diplomatic, defence and developmental inputs appear, for the most part, mutually reinforcing in Kenya, with high-level engagement from Whitehall combining well with the influence, capabilities and sensitivity of country-based teams. For example, girls’ education has been a UK priority for many years, and coordination across the different sections of BHC was said to have accelerated progress on project delivery. Diplomatic outreach likewise complemented long-term electoral reforms, helping mitigate the risk of local spoilers by ensuring capacity-building efforts were palatable to Kenyan elites. There were also various cases of trade and UK private sector investment becoming better linked with development work, and progress synthesising defence coverage with other strands of UK engagement via frameworks such as CSSF (and specific units like BPST-A). Nevertheless, some respondents felt that the drive for integration may have contributed to deprioritisation of human development agendas in favour of commercial and security concerns. + +- In Somalia, integration across different government workstreams has long been pursued. Good examples include active diplomatic support for debt relief alongside technical work by development staff. This apparently helped with anti-corruption efforts in the security sector, though there was said to be room for improvement in linking up legacy DFID development work, military inputs and Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)-funded projects. + +- Sudan has provided fewer opportunities to pursue defence engagement or promote trade, but use of development aid and diplomacy has become more integrated over time. + +- In the telecoms sector, Ethiopia provided an example of joined-up working across diplomacy, trade promotion and economic development. But outside peacekeeping work, there have been few opportunities for defence engagement in recent years. + +__Recommendation:__ To support more coherent, joined-up UK policy towards Africa using the International Development/Africa ministerial NSC seat that was announced in IR23 to put key topics (for example, development, migration, debt) regularly and proactively in front of senior and mid-level decision-makers from across government. + +__Recommendation:__ Improve cross-governmental understanding of integrated working across defence, diplomacy and development issues. Measures could include objective-setting, training (for example, the FCDO diplomatic academy), work shadowing or issuing good practice guides. + +> #### `Finding 4` + +> _`While the abolition of DFID is regretted by some UK regional partners, the creation of the FCDO, though unplanned, shows early promise.`_ + +- The merger of the FCO and DFID has contributed towards stronger policy integration in several cases, and appeared to have been easier in smaller missions or where there was a range of UK interests and perspectives in play and therefore greater balance between the voices of different government departments. + +- Despite the disruption associated with internal planning and reorganisation, the FCDO’s formation was generally considered beneficial in Somalia and Sudan. For example, ambassadorial oversight of humanitarian and development work was said to have improved in Sudan since the DFID–FCO merger, corporate messaging became more unified, and dealings with the Sudanese government became easier to communicate. In both countries, DFID’s footprint and resources – though important – did not overshadow those of other departments. Additionally, there was broad acceptance that development challenges had political and security roots. + +- Likewise, UK missions hosting a variety of similarly resourced departments, and which had strong incentives to integrate cross-government cooperation into daily operations, were probably better placed to combine FCO and legacy DFID infrastructure into a unified arrangement. In the case of Kenya, the merger was thought to have increased diplomatic engagement in health-related work, and led to better links between trade and development initiatives. + +- In contrast, issues over prioritisation and leadership seem to have arisen when combining DFID Ethiopia’s sizeable staff base and budget with a far smaller FCO presence. Although benefits were noticeable over time, with former DFID humanitarian advisers now described as more cognisant of political factors associated with gaining access to the Tigray region, some partners felt the creation of the FCDO had cost the UK, undermining its hard-won reputation for aid and development leadership. This feeling was more prominent in Ethiopia and to some degree in Kenya, both countries having enjoyed long engagement with DFID linked to years of high aid spending levels. + +- A frequently referenced issue was a lack of pre-merger planning. Slow implementation, including delays with integrating teams and systems, were frustrations in all countries, with staff morale (and retention) across UK embassies suffering in many cases. Ongoing restructuring has been necessary at different levels since the new FCDO was formed, and considerable time has been taken up with iterative reorganisation and re-strategising, down to individual embassies and teams. In line with previous research on “machinery of government” changes, all indications are that the creation and refinement of the FCDO will be unfinished business for years to come. + +__Recommendation:__ Explicit change management processes should be used to guide any further organisational change. Planning should cater for foreseeable risks, draw on the merger’s early lessons and prioritise communicating future direction with external partners. + +> #### `Finding 5` + +> _`The UK retains a good reputation across the region for the calibre of its diplomats and development and defence experts, and it has broadly maintained staffing levels despite budget cuts.`_ + +- Despite budget cuts and reported staff departures at corporate level, the FCDO and the MoD have maintained similar numbers of staff with a focus on the region between 2015 and 2022, and other departments such as Investment and Trade, have slightly increased their presence in Kenya and Ethiopia. Maintaining staff numbers has provided some “damage mitigation”, allowing officials to preserve relationships, provide technical support or exert influence, despite reduced budgets. + +- The perceived quality of UK staff has similarly been a stabilising factor. It has helped to protect at least some longstanding networks amid political and budget uncertainties, supplemented by strategic staff placements to facilitate multilateral collaboration. The UK’s influence across multiple issues and sectors could however prove time-limited – research findings suggested that existing “clout” may only be sustainable if a narrower set of priorities is adopted or additional resources are brought to bear. At the same time, the increasing arrival of inexperienced civil servants across regional postings has raised questions over the durability of institutional memory in UK embassies, and the transferability of knowledge, contacts and relationships. + +__Recommendation:__ Building on lessons from the DFID–FCO merger, ensure that the FCDO’s operating model, including its staff base and handling of external relationships, is optimised to support integrated ways of working in a competitive, post-Brexit context. As part of this, ensure skilled international development professionals are attracted, retained and tasked to work effectively alongside others in pursuit of integrated policy agendas. + +> #### `Finding 6` + +> _`The UK is reasonably well regarded as a development, defence and diplomatic actor across the region. Despite this, a range of middle and great powers increasingly offer alternative forms of support to East African governments, which contribute to perceptions of declining UK influence.`_ + +- Research showed that although the UK is less well resourced than the EU or the US, it is often credited by its partners with solid technical knowledge, expertise and convening power. This is in part due to the previous work of DFID, but extends beyond development issues. UK defence and security inputs (for example, training) are also well thought of, but there is awareness that UK political sensitivities can lead to cooperation being curtailed or withdrawn, as previously happened in Ethiopia and Sudan. + +- UK diplomatic skill and outreach are also well regarded. The UK is seen as less strident than the US, with respondents mentioning the UK’s useful closed-door bilateral work and its presence in a range of diplomatic forums. While the UK is often expected to follow US positions, many feel that the UK can still act as a “bridge” between Washington and other stakeholders. + +- Prominent non-Western actors in the region include China and Russia, Turkey and the Gulf states. + +- Turkey is seen as focused on commercial and security issues. It has gained a reputation for small-scale investments and a willingness to deal at subnational level, although in Somalia it has successfully combined soft power, direct investment, military assistance, infrastructural development and humanitarian aid to become one of the FGS’s most prominent international partners. Crucially, this crosscuts elite and wider public sentiment, with Turkish officials, business delegates and NGO workers “walking the streets” and immersing themselves in the daily realities of Somali life. + +- The Gulf States are thought to seek stability that protects investments (for example, land and productive enterprises in Ethiopia and Sudan) and are seen as pursuing “cheque-book diplomacy”. + +- China has a distinctive offer – financing quickly at scale with few conditions, particularly around infrastructure or agriculture. It has had some success framing itself as more generous than traditional donors, including through swift Covid-19 “vaccine diplomacy”. Civil society actors in the region often worry that China’s lack of conditionality or interest in accountability issues can fuel corruption or lower technical standards. More recently, the attractions of its developmental model may also be starting to shift, with loans becoming more expensive, alongside Beijing’s increasing reluctance to fund loss-making “white elephant projects” amid a downturn in its domestic economy. + +- Russia was seen as competing on different grounds compared with the UK and the West, due to quite specific security (arms and miliary cooperation), commercial and political interests. It enjoys residual sympathies due to Soviet support for anti-colonial struggles and longstanding military links. In Ethiopia, Moscow benefits from a shared history of Orthodox Christianity. As with China, there is mutual interest in the principles of non-interference. + +- Linked to the arrival or revival of these “alternative” actors, it is sometimes said that Western, and UK influence, is in decline. There are several aspects to this, ranging from the idea that alternative offers are on the table, to the growing self-sufficiency and assertiveness of national leaders in countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. This perception of relative decline needs to be recognised in its own right, independent of any impact that UK aid cuts or the withdrawal from the EU may have had on the UK’s standing. Frustrations with the West’s past double standards or moral failings also shape views across the region. Yet there is no consensus on whether the UK has found the right balance in terms of “pragmatism” versus “principles”. It wins plaudits from some in the region for pursuing “practical solutions”, but is seen by others as “less principled” than countries such as Denmark and Sweden, which tend to foreground issues of human rights and gender. + +__Recommendation:__ Ensure that forging long-term partnerships with a range of constituencies becomes central to strategies in East Africa and for priority countries elsewhere, backed by sufficient time, resources and incentivising development and retention of regional expertise. + +__Recommendation:__ Building on this study, commission formal reviews of the contribution that UK defence engagement and international development efforts can feasibly make to UK foreign policy aims globally, focusing strongly on UK added value and clearer prioritisation. + +> #### `Finding 7` + +> _`The UK has established relationships and partnerships with a variety of actors. It often operates effectively through ad hoc groupings of bilateral and multilateral networks in the region and globally, bolstered by envoys and technical specialists.`_ + +- Although the UK–Kenya relationship remains strong, the UK’s cultural influence and the perceived value of its international development “offer” seems to be declining. As the UK competes for commercial advantage with China, the US and others, it has arguably shifted towards “less abrasive” terms of engagement and closer alignment to government. + +- The UK maintains a range of productive relationships in Ethiopia, but changing political dynamics and the Tigray conflict have upended a previously close partnership with the federal government. Navigating an increasingly polarised environment since 2020, the UK had to work harder to maintain influence and access as it juggled pursuit of humanitarian access, development and trade agendas and exploring ceasefires and peace-talk options. + +- The fraught security situation in Somalia makes it hard for foreign donors to build relations beyond reductive, state-centric echo-chambers in FMS palaces or Villa Somalia. Nevertheless, the UK retains a significant voice and exercises comparatively strong links at the subnational level, often acting as a broker for other international stakeholders. With its membership of the Quad and the Quint, the World Bank’s Multi-Partner Fund, the Core Security Partners Group and S6; participation in or chairmanship of several coordination platforms; and position as UN Penholder, the UK has carved a leading diplomatic role and reputation for development expertise that can sometimes catalyse effective responses from others. + +- The UK enjoys substantial depth and quality of partnerships both within Sudan and with regional actors. The UK won some praise for its political and technical support to the 2019 transitional government, and its support to debt relief. Many pro-democracy campaigners worry about Western willingness to compromise with Sudan’s military, while others would welcome increased UK engagement. Western influence may be seen as declining relative to that of players such as Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, but a strength in the UK’s approach has until recently been its engagement with such players. + +__Recommendation:__ Ensure links and communication between regional and embassy-level officials, including “special envoys”, to coordinate advocacy and diplomacy, and better align missions and engagement across the Gulf and Eastern Africa. This includes adequately resourcing envoy positions, streamlining information flows (across Whitehall and country missions), and providing access to relevant teams. + +__Recommendation:__ Push to consolidate a clear strategy for ad hoc groups such as the Quad, the Quint, S6 and Friends of Sudan, working with partners to clarify (and potentially deconflict) their respective roles, resources, membership and mandates. + +> #### `Finding 8` + +> _`Between 2019 and 2021, the UK bilateral aid budget was reduced by around 50% across the region. External relationships suffered as funding decisions were arrived at iteratively and were not always well communicated.`_ + +- The reduced UK aid budget is probably the most significant variable examined in this project. The speed and extent of cuts damaged the UK’s reputation and partnerships in all four countries. While examples were found of cutbacks driving innovation, and relationships with national governments and key partners have endured in most cases, the UK is generally seen as less reliable by many organisations that it has partnered with on international aid and development work (both up- and downstream). + +- The UK was not the only donor to have reduced funding in Kenya over the research period, but respondents routinely noted that the scale of cuts (equivalent to 46% between 2019 and 2021) lacked any obvious strategic logic and risked diminishing UK capabilities, even in areas where it had previously found success. Despite the recognised need to consolidate procedural and institutional improvements over successive ballot cycles, for instance, stakeholders faced pressure to slash funding for electoral support, detracting from the sustainability of long-term cultural, normative and structural change. + +- In Ethiopia, where past UK aid funding had contributed to impressive reductions in the poverty rate, the decrease in UK bilateral aid by over 50% between 2019 and 2021 was poorly received by many stakeholders. Shrinking budgets did in some cases lead to fresh thinking from UK officials about delivery options, for example, focusing minds on how to draw in resources from elsewhere. But the overall drop hampered the ability of the FCDO’s implementing partners to plan, deliver and maintain good relations. + +- Flows of UK bilateral aid to Somalia rose considerably between 2019 and 2020, but diminished by 56% the following year, with cuts in staple activities including support for public administration, subnational governance and humanitarian relief. Although the UK is still respected and able to deliver impact with well-designed programming (as, for example, on famine relief and stabilisation), the reductions were described by many as detrimental to UK capacity and likely to diminish influence. While UK officials have been recognised for their expertise, capabilities and coordination during the 2017 humanitarian relief effort in Somalia, federal government stakeholders recently criticised the UK for becoming a “smaller player” and neglecting its leadership role. The disruption or scaling down of projects, delays in tendering or launching follow-up programmes, and confusion over long-term funding have reduced confidence in UK commitments. Resource levels are now arguably mismatched to the UK’s long-term state-building ambitions. + +- In contrast to Kenya and Ethiopia, UK budget allocations for Sudan increased in 2020, as the UK sought to demonstrably support Khartoum’s political transition, becoming Whitehall’s fifth-largest bilateral commitment globally. However, funding levels fell back by roughly 55% in 2021/22, due to the 2021 coup, when all non-humanitarian assistance was suspended. Although the UK has traditionally been the largest donor to the UN-run Sudan Humanitarian Fund, today the US, Germany and the Netherlands make larger contributions, leading humanitarian partners to expect a decline in UK influence. + +__Recommendation:__ Clarify intentions regarding the 0.7% GNI spending target, including spending priorities in the event of either future budget increases or cutbacks. Ad interim, introduce flexibility by confirming that the current 0.5% GNI spending measure is a floor, not a ceiling. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/i5gYgTb.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: Total UK Net Bilateral ODA (£ Millions) from 2015 to 2021.__ Source: [Figures for 2015 to 2020 from FCDO, Annual Report and Accounts 2021–22 (London: The Stationery Office, 2022)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fcdo-annual-report-and-accounts-2021-to-2022), Table B.2, p. 257. [Figures for 2021 from FCDO and UK Aid, “Statistics on International Development: Final UK Aid Spend 2021”, last updated March 2023](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/statistics-on-international-development-final-uk-aid-spend-2021), p. 74._ + +> #### `Finding 9` + +> _`Brexit did not significantly impair the UK’s operational effectiveness in the region, but alongside other factors has probably contributed to a perception of declining influence.`_ + +Leaving the EU has excluded the UK from country-level EU coordination forums in the region. This means that the UK no longer has a formal role in determining the direction of EU defence, development and humanitarian priorities, nor in agreeing common positions. But this has cut two ways. The UK bilateral aid budget received a boost following EU withdrawal, as member contributions were no longer required of the UK. In terms of diplomatic positioning, UK officials now have a freer hand. In these respects, Brexit appeared to have little overt impact on the UK’s reputation or effectiveness in Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. Yet media coverage of protracted UK–EU withdrawal negotiations, and very public politicking around the issue in the UK, did negatively affect perceptions of the UK in the region. Some variations were evident across countries: + +- While Brexit did not dramatically change UK standing and influence in Kenya, some interviewees argued that it had lost strategic cover – previously able to “lead from the back” on sensitive policy issues in a former colony, the UK now has one fewer channel for exercising influence. When combined with high ministerial turnover and poorly communicated aid reductions, there was also a widespread sense that the UK had become a less predictable partner. + +- Coming alongside large aid budget cuts and the end of DFID, leaving the EU was felt by many Ethiopian interviewees who valued the UK and DFID’s track record to have diminished UK influence. + +- The UK’s existing relationships in Sudan have weathered Brexit comparatively well. Despite withdrawing from EU members’ meetings, workarounds have been found to coordinate with EU players. The UK’s network of officials operated effectively across multiple forums in Khartoum, the wider region and New York. Active in the UK–US–Norwegian “Troika” and the “Quad” (the UK with the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), Whitehall appears to have offset its loss of influence over EU policy. Field research showed many believed that UK dexterity and messaging improved after Brexit, although it was argued that UK ministers might have concentrated more on Sudan’s early political transition in 2019 had it not been for Brexit negotiations at that time. + +- Respondents in Somalia also noted a diversion of UK diplomatic attention during the negotiation period. Others warned that withdrawing UK personnel from Somalia-facing EU activities could undermine local commitments, in part because UK funding contributions and political advocacy helped drive support for AMISOM/ATMIS in Brussels. However, the approval of successive EU financial packages in 2022 and 2023 appeared to have defused these concerns, at least in the short term. + +__Recommendation:__ Ensure there is sufficient flexibility to continue informal engagement and coordination between UK and EU officials over the long term, particularly at the operational level. + +__Recommendation:__ Invest in working groups and bilateral platforms to enable the UK to continue its role as a “transatlantic bridge” between the EU and the US. + +__Recommendation:__ Clearly communicate the scope, scale and mechanics of continuing UK–EU cooperation to help defuse perceptions of an isolated, post-Brexit foreign policy, particularly to local audiences. + +> #### `Finding 10` + +> _`UK strategies at the country level were sometimes unclear, overly broad or outpaced by contextual changes. The lack of a regional strategy also remains a significant gap, given the transnational nature of the opportunities and challenges facing Eastern Africa.`_ + +- Research suggests that the UK could improve its efficacy across Eastern Africa by looking afresh at strategy and providing support for implementation. At the country and sub-regional level, strategies were often vague or outdated, with contentious assumptions, disparities between goals and resources, and a lack of plausible delivery plans contributing to confusion and inefficiency. Similarly, theories of change, shared objectives and priorities were not always well articulated or connected, and at the regional level there appears to be little in the way of a viable roadmap. Given the transnationalised dynamics of local insecurity, development, politics and economic systems – especially across comparatively deprived borderlands – the lack of an East Africa strategy is a serious omission. It is also true that a policy of integrated working across the “3Ds”, linking to other policy areas (for example, trade, science and technology) as prescribed in IR21 and IR23, is complex to execute and cannot be driven by rhetoric alone. + +- Despite the Strategic Partnership, the hierarchy of UK objectives in Kenya was not always well framed or understood – although in reality defence and trade relations increasingly appeared to overshadow concerns around accountability or human development. Additionally, there were indications that UK defence engagement and relationship building would benefit from being placed within a clearer overarching strategy, backed up by appropriate political outreach, although this process may reportedly already be under review as the MoD looks to clarify how “persistent engagement” will function in practice. + +- It was not clear whether UK action in Ethiopia was guided by an up-to-date detailed strategy that matched well-articulated goals and interests to available resources and political will. A wide range of engagements, some in tension with one another, had been kept in play for some years amid a deteriorating context. The UK is not alone here – most Western actors have struggled to adapt to the pace of developments across the country. + +- Similarly, recent events in Sudan are prompting renewed scrutiny of Western and UK strategy. Sudanese interviewees were often sceptical of international efforts to integrate military and security stakeholders into transitional government arrangements, despite the UK’s ability to dialogue with “all sides”. Others argued that UK and other Western actors had focused unduly on technocratic economic reforms during the failed 2019–21 political transition – at the expense of expanding non-elite networks and deepening political analysis to help chart a long-term path towards democratisation. + +- Despite reduced resources, Whitehall’s strategy towards Somalia has proved fairly consistent. Formally committed to the STP, the UK and other “likeminded” countries are continuing to back a “good enough” federal government capable of containing Al-Shabaab. That said, some query the execution and underlying assumptions of this approach, particularly the feasibility of building a stable state without prior societal and clan agreement on basic political questions. In the absence of local buy-in, ownership and shared alignment, the creation of artificial systems dependent on external resourcing raises the risk of aid diversion and economic extraversion that may disrupt or undermine Somali-led peacebuilding. At the same time, a reduction or withdrawal of donor support would likely precipitate a complete government collapse akin to that in Afghanistan. Amid new priorities in Ukraine, implausible timelines, international fatigue, and deeply embedded political and developmental challenges, the gulf between the strategic ambitions and hard realities of UK engagement seem to be growing. + +__Recommendation:__ Develop integrated strategies for UK engagement with priority African countries and regions, including those in Eastern Africa. Guided by high-level policy such as IR23 and NSC decisions and informed by the context, these strategies should clearly articulate interests, values and objectives, while offering a means to revisit assumptions, possible dilemmas and trade-offs. + +__Recommendation:__ Measures could include setting shared objectives, training (for example, the FCDO diplomatic academy), work shadowing or issuing good practice guides. + + +### Conclusion + +This paper has set out research findings on the UK’s use of international development, diplomacy and defence engagement in Eastern Africa from 2015 to 2022. It finds that the region has not been allotted the resources or level of attention initially signalled by IR21. It is notable that the UK has made progress on a number of its policy agendas despite domestic, regional and global challenges. The UK’s best results often seem to derive from long-term engagements. These have generated contextual understanding and broad-based relationships that could be leveraged in future for positive change. With strong cultural ties and a track record of providing life-saving humanitarian assistance and development and defence know-how, many in the region recognise the UK’s contributions and might welcome increased engagement from the UK on genuinely shared priorities. + +Nevertheless, in a post-Brexit world of increasing geopolitical competition, the UK will have to face questions about its positioning towards Africa. The research surfaces important questions concerning the nature of UK–Africa relations and the role of aid, development and defence engagement within an integrated foreign policy. For example, policy statements in favour of “integration” or “partnerships”, while useful, do not in themselves constitute an effective strategy. With a contracting resource base, positive results may become harder to demonstrate in an increasingly competitive and transactional environment. African governments also now have a wider array of potential partners and greater leverage in shaping foreign engagement. This fact, together with policy decisions such as a reduced aid budget, contributes to perceptions of declining UK influence within the region. In the face of this, the UK will need to communicate its added value towards Africa very clearly. + +As the initial struggles around changes from Brexit to the FCDO merger recede, new opportunities could emerge for the UK to forge effective two-way partnerships. The UK should now clearly articulate its policy priorities towards the region and Africa writ large and establish a two-way dialogue with African partners at government and societal level on shared priorities. Whereas UK approaches were previously characterised by the use of aid for poverty reduction, the scope of UK development engagement is broadening, focusing more explicitly on the national interest and on establishing wider partnerships. + +As the country moves through its next electoral cycle by 2024, the UK government would do well to consider how the UK can pursue its significant diplomatic, security and development interests towards Africa in light of this project’s findings and recommendations, as well as their implications for engagement elsewhere. + +--- + +__Simon Rynn__ is Senior Research Fellow for Africa at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His experience covers conflict prevention and peacebuilding, stabilisation, security and justice, de-mining, humanitarian, governance and small arms control. His main research focus is on the security of East Africa and the Horn, particularly the security sector, external engagement with stabilisation and peace support operations, as well as economic security and the relationship between security and international development. + +__Michael Jones__ is a Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team examining political violence, governance by non/pseudo-state armed groups, and the convergence of violent extremism and insurgent militancy in East and sub-Saharan Africa. He has led investigative fieldwork across various countries including Sudan, Kenya and Lebanon; managed conflict focused projects looking into Darfur and Somalia; and worked in RUSI’s Nairobi Office on a range of projects related to the EU’s STRIVE Horn of Africa and STRIVE II programming. + +__Larry Attree__ is a globally recognised expert on peace, conflict and security issues. Former Head of Global Policy and Advocacy at Saferworld, Larry has over two decades’ experience, and helped craft global agreements on peace, governance and development themes, including the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, the Busan Partnership and the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals.