As Markus said, there's also the upstream manager role (ETA 2024), but that is on project scope and would co-exist in the future in addition to the domain-manager.

As an upshot for me, I think we need to have the dimension of scope for this role matrix.

Upstream work

I gathered the following upstream resources in regards to role definitions.

Keystone

Roles: admin, reader, member, service

https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/admin/service-api-protection.html

Barbican

Roles: admin, creator, observer, audit

https://docs.openstack.org/barbican/train/admin/access_control.html

Other

"Consistent and Secure RBAC" track

https://governance.openstack.org/tc/goals/selected/consistent-and-secure-rbac.html

• ongoing upstream rework of policy standards
• apply the roles mentioned under Keystone above to all services (what about Barbican though?)
• aims to introduce a manager role for projects in the final phase

Policy concepts in Nova

State in Nova: https://docs.openstack.org/nova/latest/configuration/policy-concepts.html

Side note: policy config 101

https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/ussuri/configuration/block-storage/policy-config-HOWTO.html

• upstream explains how policies are adjusted

Barbican

Roles: admin, creator, observer, audit

https://docs.openstack.org/barbican/train/admin/access_control.html

Important update from the Keystone PTG session from 2023-10-25: These Barbican-specific roles are superseded by the "Consistent and Secure RBAC" track and its roles according to the Keystone team.

This makes work on this standard substantially easier, because upstream will also deploy a consistent set of roles across all services which we can build upon.

I'm unfortunately unable to finish the Role Standard in its current state.
The reason being that the behavior between the OpenStack services regarding the new RBAC defaults¹ can differ greatly.
I'm unable to formulate a consistent policy configuration that works across all of the components for the intended goal.

Since there is no defined list of supported and allowed OpenStack services in SCS yet, the standard cannot rely on delivering and maintaining full policy configuration templates - there are just too many services. Also, writing SCS-specific and gapless policy templates for each and every possible OpenStack service would put an unfeasible development, testing and maintenance burden on SCS.

Instead I opted to describe general guidelines in the standard draft on how to work with the OpenStack defaults in order to provide a consistent role model across SCS infrastructures, i.e. not modifying the default permission sets of OpenStack and properly preserving them when making adjustments as the CSP.
The standard originally intended to incorporate the stable parts of the RBAC rework¹, leaving the rest for future inclusion.
Isolating the "stable parts" seems to be difficult due to inconsistent behavior across OpenStack services.

The standard intended to provide a way to generate default policy files using OpenStack tools, define them as the gold standard and then describe on how to make individual adjustments if necessary.
However, due to the ongoing RBAC rework¹ two oslo.policy configuration options greatly influence how and which policies are used: enforce_new_defaults and enforce_scope.
Furthermore, generated default policy templates using OpenStack tools (oslopolicy-policy-generator) do not reflect the actual default policies (if no policy.yaml file is present) at times depending on the oslo.policy options.
This makes it incredibly hard to establish a process and guidelines for consistent defaults a CSP can safely refer to in any case.

Below are just a few small examples of the various effects these settings can have and how they conflict across services.
Finding a configuration and strict guidelines for the Role Standard that ensure consistent behavior and compatibility across the whole SCS would involve a lot more research and testing.

General:

• oslo.policy's enforce_new_defaults=True is supposed to properly activate the new reader, member and admin role model of the ongoing RBAC rework²
  • this can be considered more or less stable in its implementation
• oslo.policy's enforce_scope=True is supposed to properly scope roles (e.g. to domains, projects etc.) including admin (in the future)
  • this seems more experimental and more of a breaking change

Barbican:

• when the default policy file as generated by "oslopolicy-policy-generator --namespace barbican" is used in Barbican, its behavior changes: it seems that the configuration without a policy.yaml file present diverges from using the policy file generated by oslopolicy-policy-generator
  • i.e. the policy file (allegedly generated based on defaults) does not offer the same behavior as deploying Barbican without a policy file in place
  • the SCS Role Standard intended to make the generated policy files the gold standard CSPs can rely on but it does not match with the normal Barbican behavior?
• using enforce_new_defaults=False in Barbican, will not provide the new member and reader roles but instead fall back to its old audit, observer, creator
  • in order to offer a consistent set of roles across services as intended by the standard, we'd need to set this to True in Barbican

Keystone:

• on a DevStack, using enforce_new_defaults=True in Keystone renders the default openrc file and admin login unusable for some operations
  • adjustments can fix this but it is a breaking change to users relying on the current behavior of API and client
• on a DevStack, using enforce_scope=True in Keystone renders the Domain Manager configuration of SCS unusable
  • the approach how the Domain Manager configuration works seems to be mutually exclusive to the new scope enforcement; this will most likely only be fixed when upstreaming the Domain Manager role as a whole³

I am currently reading into the secure RBAC work on upstream. So far I am concerned about the scopes especially:

Even though system scope is currently postponed (or even cancelled?) the project scope may change the behavior of the cloud. And the system scope will either break a lot of operator workflows or will need an incredible large amount of time to be implemented.

The standard should definitely describe this. But we may also need an upgrade path for CSPs and users, if we change the standard in this point.

Standardizing the roles in OpenStack is an important topic. Reading through all the current progress upstream, the problems @markus-hentsch mentioned, are still and will be most likely still in place for 2024.1. The tracking of progress shows, that Cinder does not yet fully obey the new personas (project-member and project-reader)¹.

Having not yet a wide spread consensus over the openstack-projects about those personas contradicts using the new policies right now.

But as Markus also mentioned, There are side-effects, when enabling the new policies (e.g. it breaks the domain manager role as described in the same-named standard). As the old policies do not seem to be deprecated right now.² We should be safe to use them for another year.

There are two more things to consider:

1. The newly introduced service role is used by the services themself to communicate with other services. imho we should enable them as soon as a group of openstack services the scs deems complete have implemented them and are able to deal with this new role.
2. While setting a standard for roles is important, another thing that is necessary is the Assignment of Roles. E.g. we should permit that the admin role can be assigned to anyone outside of a group of operators from the CSP. The service role as well should not be assigned to human beings.

I would like to add those two parts to the standard.

We discussed the "network rbac create" option, that lets non-admin users share security groups and networks with other projects as a default policy. Now I am thinking about adding an phrase to this standard to integrate some SCS-defined policy-optiones. It should lead to a website or document or something like this, were we should be gathering all potential security enhancements in policy, we would like to see in an scs-deployment.

So all this standard would need to to is to point at this document and state, that those changes should be integrated.

@bitkeks would that be possible way to go? If yes, the question remains, where the adjusted policy-options will be available.

@bitkeks would that be possible way to go?

That works for me! Either apply the policy patch directly in IaaS layer and explain it in the docs, or recommend the patch in the docs. Somewhere where configuration and/or security is the main focus. Release notes as well, if the patch is applied onto the release artifacts.

Currently pending on #528

Currently pending on #528

Now that we are close to finalizing the list of mandatory and supported services in #528, I looked at each applicable service and gathered which roles are currently established based on documentation and source code of the services.

List of roles

Default¹²:

• reader
• member
• manager
• admin
• service

Barbican³:

• key-manager:service-admin
• creator
• observer
• audit

(note: Barbican's special roles are planned to be superseded by the RBAC rework⁴ and replaced by the standard reader, member etc. however the special roles are currently still included as deprecated⁵; using the reworked roles requires enforce_new_defaults=True in Barbican)

Ceilometer/Swift:

• ResellerAdmin
  • used by the Ceilometer agent to access Swift and retrieve object store statistics for metering

Octavia⁵ (default configuration):

• load-balancer_observer
  • access to read-only APIs
• load-balancer_global_observer
  • access to read-only APIs including resources owned by others
• load-balancer_member
  • access to read and write APIs
• load-balancer_quota_admin
  • admin access to quota APIs only
• load-balancer_admin
  • admin access to all LB APIs including resources owned by others

EDIT (2024-05-14): according to Octavia's documentation, Octavia ships optional alternative policy files, which scrap the Octavia-specific roles and align it with the default reader, member, admin scheme:

• keystone_default_roles-policy.yaml
• keystone_default_roles_scoped-policy.yaml

Heat:

• heat_stack_user
  • this role is always attached to Keystone users that Heat creates as a result of templates to taint the users as Heat-created
  • per default, this role is not allowed to interact with stack in the Heat API, so that it cannot manipulate the stack it is part of itself
  • important note: Keystone's Application Credential API might make it possible to shed this role from a user and open up malicious activity - this needs to be investigated!
• heat_stack_owner (DEPRECATED?)
  • this seems to be a leftover
  • it is only mentioned in documentation and in a unit test but has no implementation in the current RBAC of Heat
  • originally its purpose seems to have been to allow users to create Heat stacks in the first place

Services that don't introduce additional roles:

• Cinder
• Glance
• Keystone
• Neutron
• Nova
• Placement
• Cloudkitty
• Ceilometer
  • has no API itself but uses a special role to access Swift if Swift is used
• Designate
• Gnocchi (according to the source code⁶, no RBAC docs available)
• Horizon
• Ironic (since Wallaby)
  • used two custom roles in the past: baremetal_observer and baremetal_admin, but those were deprecated in Wallaby) in favor of the standard reader, member, admin
• Manila
• Masakari
  • it seems to use admin only⁷

heat_stack_user [...] important note: Keystone's Application Credential API might make it possible to shed this role from a user and open up malicious activity - this needs to be investigated!

I added Heat to my DevStack in order to check this potential loophole.

OpenStack Heat special role behavior

I created a basic Heat template to deploy a Keystone user in order to verify the role behavior.

Heat template:

heat_template_version: 2015_04_30

resources:
  heat_created_project:
    type: OS::Keystone::Project
    properties:
      description: "A project created by Heat"
      domain: "Default"
      enabled: true
      name: "heat_created_project"
  heat_created_user:
    type: OS::Keystone::User
    properties:
      description: "A user created by Heat"
      domain: "Default"
      enabled: true
      name: "heat_created_user"
      password: "notsosecret"
  role_assignment:
    type: OS::Keystone::UserRoleAssignment
    properties:
      user: { get_resource: heat_created_user }
      roles:
      - project: { get_resource: heat_created_project }
        role: member

Then deploying the template as admin:

source openrc admin admin
openstack stack create -t heat_template.yml demo-heat-stack

According to both documentation and implementation¹, Heat should add the heat_stack_user role regardless of any other role assignments in the template.
However, I fail to observe this behavior:

openstack role assignment list --names --user heat_created_user
+--------+---------------------------+-------+---------------------------+--------+--------+-----------+
| Role   | User                      | Group | Project                   | Domain | System | Inherited |
+--------+---------------------------+-------+---------------------------+--------+--------+-----------+
| member | heat_created_user@Default |       | heat_created_project@Defa |        |        | False     |
|        |                           |       | ult                       |        |        |           |
+--------+---------------------------+-------+---------------------------+--------+--------+-----------+

... it only creates the role assignment as per template.
Furthermore, even though logging is set to debug level I fail to observe any log messages from the implementation¹.

Something is amiss here. I will look into this more and update this comment accordingly.

Update (2024-05-03):

I misinterpreted the documentation and code. The heat_stack_user role is not added to users created using the OS::Keystone::User, which is an explicit user creation using a Heat template.
Instead, this role is only attached to Keystone users created by Heat implicitly for other resources that require a Keystone user for some operation.

One example is the user_data_format property of the OS::Nova::Server resource. If it is set to the string value SOFTWARE_CONFIG, a user is created by Heat automatically for API access to retrieve config data.

resources:
  sample_server:
    type: OS::Nova::Server
    properties:
      flavor: "m1.tiny"
      image: "cirros-0.6.2-x86_64-disk"
      name: "heat-created-server"
      user_data: "bogus"
      user_data_format: "SOFTWARE_CONFIG"

This results in a technical user account which only possesses the heat_stack_user role within the Heat-stack-specific project:

+-----------------+----------------------+-------+-----------------------+--------+--------+-----------+
| Role            | User                 | Group | Project               | Domain | System | Inherited |
+-----------------+----------------------+-------+-----------------------+--------+--------+-----------+
| heat_stack_user | server-stack-sample_ |       | 80ccc0ce195c4a608b8ea |        |        | False     |
|                 | server-              |       | be5c903b6ae-87d7a182- |        |        |           |
|                 | 7vepqwax4nfp@heat    |       | a19f-478c-8f2d-       |        |        |           |
|                 |                      |       | 80be769@heat          |        |        |           |
+-----------------+----------------------+-------+-----------------------+--------+--------+-----------+

Since this user account does not possess a regular role (e.g. member) additionally, any potential role shedding through Keystone's Application Credentials API is not possible and not a problem.

Conclusion

The heat_stack_user role is not used for users created by the OS::Keystone::User Heat resources.
It is only attached to users not explicitly specified in the template but created implicitly by Heat as a requirement to realize other resources of the template.
Such technical users are only assigned the heat_stack_user role within the stack-specific project (Heat creates one for each Heat stack). They do not possess any other roles and are not part of any other project outside of the stack-specific one - role shedding is not a threat in this case.

Considerations for the standardization

Due to the large amount of services and roles involved by now, I think the standard should try to keep it as simple as possible:

1. do not diverge from upstream naming conventions unless absolutely necessary
2. offer simple & easy default configuration, try taking oslopolicy-policy-generator outputs and code defaults into consideration
   • implement any changes as "diffs" to the generated/implemented defaults, avoid creating hundreds of lines of policy files (maintenance hell!)
3. document an overview over all resulting roles, their purpose and usage scope in SCS clouds

As a result, I need to find a solution to the dissonance between implemented and generated defaults (i.e. oslopolicy-policy-generator) observed in #396 (comment) first in order to properly address point number 2.

Update (2024-05-07):

Here are some observations about oslopolicy-sample-generator and oslopolicy-policy-generator I'm noticing while trying to figure out a consistent and reliable way to generate policy files that match the in-code policies 100%:

• oslopolicy-sample-generator will generate annotated examples akin to openstack.org/docs/developer/keystone/sample_files/sample_policy
  • this does not seem exactly helpful as all rules are commented out and the comments introduce a lot of noise, which makes them unsuited to be used as templates directly
• oslopolicy-policy-generator will generate policy files by combining the local /etc/<component>/policy.yaml overrides with the in-code default policies effectively creating an exhaustive description of all policies currently in-place
• oslopolicy-policy-generator offers --config-dir and --config-file flags but those are added to the default paths (e.g. /etc/keystone/keystone.conf); it seems to be extremely hard to suppress the loading of the default config paths, which distorts the generated policy files in comparison to the in-code definitions

Update to the above: I was finally able to cleanly differentiate between in-code policy definitions and overrides by mimicking the crucial part of oslopolicy-policy-generator¹ while changing the behavior to not discard in-code defaults that have overrides but actually output them separately:

from oslo_policy import generator, policy


DEPRECATED_RULES = False
NAMESPACE = "keystone"

def ruledefault_to_yaml_entry(ruledefault):
    return generator._format_rule_default_yaml(
        ruledefault, include_help=False, comment_rule=False,
        add_deprecated_rules=DEPRECATED_RULES
    )


enforcer = generator._get_enforcer(NAMESPACE)
enforcer.load_rules()

file_rules = [policy.RuleDefault(name, default.check_str)
              for name, default in enforcer.file_rules.items()]
registered_rules = [policy.RuleDefault(name, default.check_str)
                    for name, default in enforcer.registered_rules.items()]

file_rules_out = open("file_rules.yaml", 'w')
registered_rules_out = open("registered_rules.yaml", 'w')

file_rules_out.writelines(
    [ruledefault_to_yaml_entry(df) for df in file_rules]
)
registered_rules_out.writelines(
    [ruledefault_to_yaml_entry(df) for df in registered_rules]
)

The resulting registered_rules.yaml will contain the complete set of unmodified in-code policy defaults. It uses oslo.policy's functions directly without too much custom shenanigans, so it should be pretty portable and could be the base for a small SCS tooling that can help generating universal defaults.

Now that I have the untainted defaults, I will check whether the discrepancies observed in #396 (comment) can be demystified and solved.

Solving the policy mismatch mystery

I finally found the root cause of the observed unexpected default API policy behavior described in #396 (comment)

The documentation of the oslopolicy-policy-generator¹ states (bold emphasis added by me):

The oslopolicy-policy-generator command can be used to generate a policy file that shows the effective policy in use.

... and this statement seems to be wrong.

As I uncovered below, it actually ignores deprecated policy rules even if they are actively still in use.
This makes it diverge from the respective API's actual configuration and hallucinates a set of policy rules not matching the API's observed behavior.
This is the case for most policy rules related to the ongoing RBAC rework² where not everything is the default yet and a lot of deprecated rules are still in place.

Barbican on DevStack without policy file:

file /etc/barbican/policy.yaml
    # /etc/barbican/policy.yaml: cannot open `/etc/barbican/policy.yaml' (No such file or directory)

source openrc admin admin
openstack secret list
    # (no output)
echo $?
    # 0

Authenticated with the admin role enables the listing of secrets.

Barbican on DevStack with oslo.policy-generated policy file:

/opt/stack/data/venv/bin/oslopolicy-policy-generator \
    --namespace barbican --output-file /etc/barbican/policy.yaml
file /etc/barbican/policy.yaml
    # /etc/barbican/policy.yaml: ASCII text

sudo systemctl restart [email protected]

source openrc admin admin
openstack secret list
    # 4xx Client error: Forbidden: Secret(s) retrieval attempt not allowed - please review your user/project privileges
    # Forbidden: Secret(s) retrieval attempt not allowed - please review your user/project privileges
echo $?
    # 1

Since the new policy defaults strictly require the scoped authentication with the member role, the access is denied to the user logged in solely with the system-scoped admin role.

Proper policy generation

Using the code from #396 (comment), the behavior can be adjusted to include deprecated rules instead:

use_deprecated = True

enforcer = generator._get_enforcer(namespace)
enforcer.load_rules()

registered_rules = []
for name, default in enforcer.registered_rules.items():
    if use_deprecated and default.deprecated_rule:
        rule = default.deprecated_rule.check_str
    else:
        rule = default.check_str
    registered_rules.append(policy.RuleDefault(name, rule))

Using this code I can generate a policy file from scratch that now seems to match the actual API behavior when the API is not using any policy file.

I implemented a small toolkit for batch-generating default API policy files for all (currently) SCS-mandatory and -supported APIs accordingly here: https://gist.github.com/markus-hentsch/54adc0bd5bc7c5799199bf11bf1b8abf

Upon closer inspection Octavia seems to support alternative policy defaults that omit the Octavia-specific roles. I've updated #396 (comment) accordingly.

If there's no critical loss of functionality or other downsides, it would be beneficial to the simplicity of the standard to align Octavia with the other roles, discarding the Octavia-specific ones. This would however make SCS behave differently than default Octavia in terms of role assignment processes.

I closed the existing PR and started writing a new standard draft from scratch in SovereignCloudStack/standards#590 based on all the new findings documented above.

Important note about role reworks and compatibility

As described in #396 (comment) there are a bunch of special roles in both Barbican and Octavia.
As of now, both services support alternative configurations to make use of the generic reader, member and admin roles instead with the following restrictions:

• Octavia offers alternative policy configuration files that are limited to the generic roles and omit the Octavia-specific roles; however, those only work if enforce_new_defaults is enabled¹²
• in Barbican, the generic roles are only accepted if enforce_new_defaults is enabled³, otherwise it falls back to the deprecated policy rules based on Barbican's special role set

That means for both Barbican and Octavia to get rid of the service-specific role set, the enforce_new_defaults must be enabled. However, this breaks compatibility with orchestration services such as Heat currently⁴.
Since Heat is part of the SCS supported services now, we cannot break compatibility with it.

I've documented this in the design considerations sections of the new standard draft.

It seems that for now we have to keep the service-specific roles of both Octavia and Barbican which sadly bloats our list of roles.

For the standard to be useful we need some way to verify conformance to it.

Possible Conformance Tests

Without admin rights and from the outside:

• we can check all customer-facing roles:
  • prepare a user in multiple projects, so that the user has a dedicated role in each project and in total each customer-facing role exactly once
    • reader in project 1
    • member in project 2
    • manager in project 3
    • audit in project 4
    • etc.
  • for each APIs, check that the user can successfully authenticate with each applicable role
    • check all mandatory APIs plus all optional ones that are part of the service catalog provided by Keystone

Problems with that approach:

• When keeping the new oslo.policy options (enforce_new_defaults and enforce_scope) disabled, most services will fall back to the existing (deprecated) policies which do not differentiate between reader, member and manager - they simply accept any valid role within a project.
  • This would make those tests inaccurate and less useful.
• Even when using enforce_new_defaults and enforce_scope in the future: there is no single API method in any service that simply accepts all the roles (reader, member etc.) at once. For example, there are methods that accept reader and those that accept member but they are usually mutually exclusive and on top of that the individual API methods are service-specific.
  • This would result in high implementation and maintenance effort.

With admin rights or from the inside:

• acquire role list from Keystone and ...
  • check that all core roles are present
  • check that Octavia roles are present
  • if Barbican endpoint is present, check that Barbican roles are present
  • if Swift endpoint is present, check that Ceilometer+Swift role is present
  • if Heat endpoint is present, check that Heat user role is present
• check API policies
  • how?

While implementing conformance tests I found a way to make sure that a test is executed with only the member role using limited role inheritance via application credentials. While implementing the corresponding Key Manager API tests I found and reported a bug in OpenStack SDK: https://bugs.launchpad.net/openstacksdk/+bug/2066045

Important statement/update¹ from upstream (Nova):

closed this for nova as we dont plan to allow scoping admin ever.

the way to "fix this" currently based on the secure and consistent rbac community goal is i belive the manager role.

For Nova that means a project-scoped admin token should be able to list and delete any server in any project.

Current adoption of enforce_scope and enforce_new_defaults

Thankfully, Josephine noticed that my assumption about none of the OpenStack services adopting the new RBAC defaults was incorrect because although oslo.policy still defaults them to disabled, some services override these defaults and already enable them.

I looked at the current source code repositories (2024.2) of all services that are currently considered either mandatory or supported as per #587 and classified their adoption of the new oslo.policy options (enforce_scope/enforce_new_defaults):

Note that oslo.policy still defaults to disabling those options currently. This means that any service that does not explicitly force-enable those will not use them per default.

I already corrected my erronous statements in the standard PR but I will need to revisit the whole standard in regards to deciding for or against the new options and resulting role models.

Current state of Secure RBAC regarding Heat and roadmap

Adding to the above I checked the actual state of Heat compatibility and roadmap plans in regards to Secure RBAC (enforce_scope/enforce_new_defaults).

Backstory

The "Consistent and Secure Default RBAC" TC upstream page¹ says:

It breaks OpenStack existing NFV use case and orchestration tooling:

When the deployment project started consuming the nova new policy defaults with scope enabled, we got to know that the scope enable will break heat (orchestration tooling), Tacker (NFV deployment) users or any operators script interacting all the OpenStack interfaces with administrators user.

Heat ‘create stack’ API uses the user credentials (admin) to create project and system-level resources in backend services. For example, it creates project users in keystone (system level resource), flavors in nova (system level resource), servers in nova (project level resource), and networks in neutron (project level resource). If we enable the scope checking in services, then the user calling heat ‘create stack’ APIs which are scoped to either project (existing way) or system (if we change that) will not be able to call the system and project scoped APIs on the service side.

This mailing list message from 2022 summarized the problem pretty well and described the possible solutions.

A Zed release Etherpad discussed a few solutions back in April 2022:

• Proposed solution
  • Heat accetps stack API with system scope
    • This means a stack with system resources would require system admin role => Need to check with services relying on Heat
  • Heat assigns a project-scope role to the requester during processing stack operation, and use this project scope credential to maange project resources
  • (from TC discussion): Heat start accepting the new header accpeting the extra token (say SYSTEM_TOKEN) and use that to create/intract the system level resource like create flavor.

From the above information, it is still unclear what the current state of Heat is regarding this problem now in 2024.

Current State (as of 2024.2 in development)

DevStack

• DevStack offers a ENFORCE_SCOPE=True (non-default) option for local.conf
  • this will set enforce_scope/enforce_new_defaults in all applicable services (in my case: Nova, Placement, Glance, Cinder, Neutron, Barbican, Keystone, Heat)
  • when set, admin and user interaction seems to work without issue

Heat

• a fix was merged in March 2024² adding scope compatibility for admin users creating project-scoped resources

The following template in Heat works as admin even with enforce_scope/enforce_new_defaults:

heat_template_version: 2015-10-15

resources:
  # Keystone user, a system-level resource
  heat_created_user:
    type: OS::Keystone::User
    properties:
      description: "A user created by Heat"
      domain: "Default"
      enabled: true
      name: "heat_created_user"
      password: "notsosecret"
  # Keystone project, a system-level resource
  heat_created_project:
    type: OS::Keystone::Project
    properties:
      name: "heat_created_project"
  # Cinder volume, a project-level resource
  heat_created_volume:
    type: OS::Cinder::Volume
    properties:
      image: "cirros-0.6.2-x86_64-disk"
      name: "heat_created_volume"
      size: 1

(tested on a DevStack based on current master checkouts from 2024-07-01)

Global Adoption

• for 2024.2 it is planned³ that the default for enforce_scope/enforce_new_defaults in oslo.policy will change to True
• for 2025.2 it is planned⁴ that the enforce_scope option will be retired, making it impossible to keep the new scoping behavior disabled

Conclusion

It initially seemed like roadblocks led to the upstream Secure RBAC implementation being on hold for the time being.
Despite the upstream status page on the Secure RBAC implementation¹ still mentioning the unresolved problems and the postponing of of the new RBAC scoping implementation and defaults, the main issues seem largely solved and the 2024/2025 release roadmaps³⁴ clearly indicate that implementation and adoption is moving forward again.

Judging from merged fixes² and some basic testing, the core Heat issues seem to be solved by now.
This should automatically fix Tacker: "Enabling scope checking also breaks Tacker (NFV Orchestration service) deployment as they use heat ‘create stack’ to build OpenStack infrastructure."¹.
With this, no critical technical regressions seem to remain.

Regarding SCS-specific implementations:

Only the Domain Manager approach as currently implemented downstream via policies as per SCS Domain Manager Standard will be affected and not work with the new Secure RBAC.
When the 2025.2 release lands and removes the enforce_scope toggle, the policy-based implementation will cease to function. Hopefully, upstreaming the Domain Manager functionality will be concluded by then, which will supersede the downstream policy-based implementation.

Thank you for writing all of this down. To me this makes me wondering, whether we want to have a role standard right now. It seems to me that a lot of changes are still coming up soon. Additionally with Swift, Cloudkitty and Masakari not even supporting it right now, i have another question: how do scoped tokens behave when being used with non-scoped APIs? Do they just check the role? (Would make sense)

But in the end, when the enforcing of the new version is coming in the next release as well as we are trying to bring the domain manager in for the next release - maybe we should wait for that to happen before we decide here. We may discuss this in the IaaS meeting, but I think focusing on the upstream domain-scoped manager may be a better way to go first.

Some updates:

Global Adoption

• for 2024.2 it is planned that the default for enforce_scope/enforce_new_defaults in oslo.policy will change to True
• for 2025.2 it is planned that the enforce_scope option will be retired, making it impossible to keep the new scoping behavior disabled

The new defaults have now been merged and will be part of 2024.2: openstack/oslo.policy@206ae19

Only the Domain Manager approach as currently implemented downstream via policies as per SCS Domain Manager Standard will be affected and not work with the new Secure RBAC.

Good news: it seems that this statement is not true anymore. The way that Keystone has progressed in adopting full compatibility to the scope enforcement makes the SCS implementation stay unaffected. On the latest master (upcoming 2024.2), I am able to successfully apply the SCS Domain Manager Standard and pass all tests even with the following options set in Keystone:

[oslo_policy]
enforce_new_defaults = true
enforce_scope = true

As it seems there are no roadblocks left with 2024.2 that prevent us from adopting the new options and role model.
I will rewrite the standard accordingly targeting 2024.2.

I'm currently in the process of wrapping up the rework of the standard.

Due to the progress on the upstream side, the standard will be able to pretty much use the new SRBAC model completely, even for R7. Only two things are still noteworthy:

• for R7 we will be based on OpenStack 2024.1 which does not include the domain manager yet, as such we will most likely ship the SCS downstream implementation of it according to the domain manager standard and switch to the native implementation for R8+
  • this has no direct implication on the role standard here as both approaches already use the same new role model
• Octavia's LBaaS API does use custom RBAC roles per default; alternative policy files that limit this to the SRBAC model (reader, member, admin) are provided but not default - we need to take action here

The role standard will mandate adhering to the new SRBAC default role model as provided by OpenStack with the new SRBAC options (enforce_scope/enforce_new_defaults). In 2024.1 those are still optional but default starting with 2024.2. With R7 we will want to make them the default already, even if based on 2024.1 still. Aside from this, only Octavia needs intervention where the standard will mandate to use the SRBAC-aligned policy template.

I'm currently integrating Octavia into my DevStack to verify the SRBAC policy configuration. I already adjusted the standard's text and greenlight it once I can confirm it is working.

As it seems there are no roadblocks left with 2024.2 that prevent us from adopting the new options and role model.
I will rewrite the standard accordingly targeting 2024.2.

In one of the recent SCS calls it was noted by a member of the community that there have been some upstream reports recently about remaining issues with the new defaults in the currently in-development 2024.2 release.
It seems that now that the oslo.policy defaults for enforce_new_defaults and enforce_scope have been merged, more extensive testing seems to have uncovered some more problems.

So I looked into it again.

The RBAC goal tracking page currently (2024-09-19) states:

• oslo.policy 4.4.0 (OpenStack Dalmation 2024.2 release) has enabled the scope and new defaults by default (enforce_scope=True & enforce_new_defaults=True by default):
  • Below services are not yet ready with new RBAC so they disabled the scope and new defaults:
    • Barbican
    • Tacker
    • Aodh
    • Cinder
    • Horizon (also continue running on old RBAC as default)

Notable here are Barbican, Cinder and Horizon as they are relevant for SCS releases.

For Barbican it was disabled in this commit. It says "there are many test modification is needed for the new
RBAC (using the new RBAC default role in tests)". It is not stated whether there are functional problems or only tests to be adjusted.

For Cinder it was disabled in this commit. It only says "Until Cinder is ready with the new RBAC" and does not go into detail what that entails.

For Horizon, it was disabled in this commit. It says "There are more changes (test fixes also) needed to make
Horizon work with new RBAC.".

How is the progress here?

This standard is aiming to make the new secure RBAC with scopes mandatory. But we cannot make this mandatory until upstream openstack finishes its work on this topic over all projects (Nova, Cinder, Glance, etc....). Right now it seems that Cinder as well as other service do not yet fully implement the new secure RBAC roles and scopes.

When the work is finished upstream, we can resume the work on this standard.