Using unsafe GitHub Actions trigger may allow privilege escalation via CI/CD

[tolgaOzen]

Find more live information in Aikido here: https://app.aikido.dev/queue?sidebarIssue=4402684&groupId=6798&sidebarIssueTask=134520&sidebarTab=tasks

==== Scope ====
This task includes issues in the following code repository:

• permify: .github/workflows/validate-pr-title.yml

==== TLDR ====
Using pull_request_target or workflow_run as a trigger is not recommended, as it may allow an attacker to elevate its privileges via the CI/CD pipeline by exfiltrating secrets (e.g. by reading out the caches of the GitHub Actions pipeline or listing loaded secrets in the environment). If the affected repository is open source, the attacker doesn't have to be an insider but could be any GitHub user.

==== How to fix ====
Avoid using pull_request_target or workflow_run as a trigger.