diff --git a/tests/tools/test_hardline_blocklist.py b/tests/tools/test_hardline_blocklist.py
index 3ba0084fb9267..a93db4fc84201 100644
--- a/tests/tools/test_hardline_blocklist.py
+++ b/tests/tools/test_hardline_blocklist.py
@@ -447,3 +447,40 @@ def test_container_bypasses_self_host_kill(clean_session):
     # container namespace are not the host gateway's.
     result = check_all_command_guards(f"kill {_os.getpid()}", "docker")
     assert result["approved"] is True
+
+
+def test_self_host_kill_blocks_command_and_builtin_wrappers(clean_session):
+    # `command kill` and `builtin kill` are plain shell spellings that
+    # still execute kill; they must not slip past the command-position
+    # anchor.
+    pid = _os.getpid()
+    assert _check_self_host_kill(f"command kill {pid}")[0] is True
+    assert _check_self_host_kill(f"builtin kill {pid}")[0] is True
+    assert _check_self_host_kill("command -p kill $$")[0] is True
+    assert _check_self_host_kill(f"command builtin kill {pid}")[0] is True
+
+
+def test_self_host_kill_blocks_standard_wrapper_prefixes(clean_session):
+    pid = _os.getpid()
+    assert _check_self_host_kill(f"sudo kill {pid}")[0] is True
+    assert _check_self_host_kill(f"env kill {pid}")[0] is True
+    assert _check_self_host_kill("exec kill $PPID")[0] is True
+    assert _check_self_host_kill(f"nohup setsid kill -9 {pid}")[0] is True
+
+
+def test_self_host_kill_allows_foreign_pid_via_wrappers(clean_session):
+    assert _check_self_host_kill("command kill 999999999")[0] is False
+    assert _check_self_host_kill("builtin kill -9 999999998")[0] is False
+
+
+def test_self_host_kill_allows_command_v_lookup(clean_session):
+    # `command -v kill` resolves the name without executing kill, so it
+    # is not a wrapper; only `command [-p]` executes its operand.
+    assert _check_self_host_kill(f"command -v kill {_os.getpid()}")[0] is False
+
+
+def test_check_all_command_guards_blocks_wrapped_self_host_kill(clean_session):
+    for cmd in (f"command kill {_os.getpid()}", f"builtin kill {_os.getpid()}"):
+        result = check_all_command_guards(cmd, "local")
+        assert result["approved"] is False, cmd
+        assert result.get("hardline") is True, cmd
diff --git a/tools/approval.py b/tools/approval.py
index 61777fec41db2..d39ad241050b8 100644
--- a/tools/approval.py
+++ b/tools/approval.py
@@ -236,13 +236,15 @@ def _is_gateway_approval_context() -> bool:
 # patterns so they don't fire on "echo reboot" or "grep 'shutdown' log".
 # Matches: start of string, after command separators (; && || | newline),
 # after subshell openers ( `$(` or backtick ), optionally consuming
-# leading wrapper commands (sudo, env VAR=VAL, exec, nohup, setsid).
+# leading wrapper commands (sudo, env VAR=VAL, exec, nohup, setsid,
+# `command [-p]`, builtin). Only `command -p` is treated as a wrapper:
+# `command -v`/`-V` resolve a name without executing it.
 _CMDPOS = (
     r'(?:^|[;&|\n`]|\$\()'         # start position
     r'\s*'                          # optional whitespace
     r'(?:sudo\s+(?:-[^\s]+\s+)*)?'  # optional sudo with flags
     r'(?:env\s+(?:\w+=\S*\s+)*)?'   # optional env with VAR=VAL pairs
-    r'(?:(?:exec|nohup|setsid|time)\s+)*'  # optional wrapper commands
+    r'(?:(?:exec|nohup|setsid|time|builtin|command(?:\s+-p)?)\s+)*'  # optional wrapper commands
     r'\s*'
 )
 
@@ -343,13 +345,17 @@ def detect_hardline_command(command: str) -> tuple:
 # (desktop app, launchd, `hermes gateway restart`), not the hosted agent.
 #
 # Static patterns can't express "our PID", so this is a function guard
-# like the sudo-stdin one: it extracts kill/pkill numeric targets and the
+# like the sudo-stdin one: it extracts numeric ``kill`` targets and the
 # shell self-tokens ``$$`` / ``$PPID`` and compares against this process
-# and its parent. Process-group kills (negative PIDs) are intentionally
-# out of scope here — ``kill -1`` is already hardline-blocked above.
+# and its parent. ``kill`` is anchored at command position via _CMDPOS,
+# so wrapper spellings that still execute it (``command kill``,
+# ``builtin kill``, ``sudo``/``env``/``exec``/``nohup``/``setsid``/
+# ``time`` prefixes, and chains of those) are recognized too.
+# Process-group kills (negative PIDs) are intentionally out of scope
+# here — ``kill -1`` is already hardline-blocked above.
 
 _KILL_CMD_RE = re.compile(
-    r'(?:^|[;&|`\n]|&&|\|\||\$\()\s*kill\s+(?P<args>[^;&|`\n]*)',
+    _CMDPOS + r'kill\s+(?P<args>[^;&|`\n]*)',
     re.IGNORECASE)
 _KILL_SELF_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r'\$\$|\$\{?PPID\}?\b')