diff --git a/tests/tools/test_yolo_mode.py b/tests/tools/test_yolo_mode.py
index 7d30adcc6c88..e6ad9260d0f8 100644
--- a/tests/tools/test_yolo_mode.py
+++ b/tests/tools/test_yolo_mode.py
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ def test_dangerous_command_blocked_normally(self, monkeypatch):
     def test_dangerous_command_approved_in_yolo_mode(self, monkeypatch):
         """With HERMES_YOLO_MODE, dangerous commands are auto-approved."""
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", "1")
+        monkeypatch.setattr("tools.approval._YOLO_AT_STARTUP", True)
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE", "1")
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", "test-session")
 
@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ def test_dangerous_command_approved_in_yolo_mode(self, monkeypatch):
     def test_yolo_mode_works_for_all_patterns(self, monkeypatch):
         """Yolo mode bypasses all dangerous patterns, not just some."""
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", "1")
+        monkeypatch.setattr("tools.approval._YOLO_AT_STARTUP", True)
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE", "1")
 
         dangerous_commands = [
@@ -76,6 +78,7 @@ def test_yolo_mode_works_for_all_patterns(self, monkeypatch):
     def test_combined_guard_bypasses_yolo_mode(self, monkeypatch):
         """The new combined guard should preserve yolo bypass semantics."""
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", "1")
+        monkeypatch.setattr("tools.approval._YOLO_AT_STARTUP", True)
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE", "1")
 
         called = {"value": False}
diff --git a/tools/approval.py b/tools/approval.py
index 95011173fdc4..67716e4e60ea 100644
--- a/tools/approval.py
+++ b/tools/approval.py
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@
 # Dangerous command patterns
 # =========================================================================
 
+# Snapshot YOLO mode at import time so subprocesses cannot export it
+# to bypass approval in later commands within the same session.
+_YOLO_AT_STARTUP = bool(os.getenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE"))
+
 DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
     (r'\brm\s+(-[^\s]*\s+)*/', "delete in root path"),
     (r'\brm\s+-[^\s]*r', "recursive delete"),
@@ -75,6 +79,15 @@
     (r'\b(cp|mv|install)\b.*\s/etc/', "copy/move file into /etc/"),
     (r'\bsed\s+-[^\s]*i.*\s/etc/', "in-place edit of system config"),
     (r'\bsed\s+--in-place\b.*\s/etc/', "in-place edit of system config (long flag)"),
+    # Data exfiltration vectors
+    (r'\b(nc|ncat|socat)\b.*\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+', "netcat to external IP"),
+    (r'/dev/tcp/', "bash /dev/tcp exfiltration"),
+    (r'/dev/udp/', "bash /dev/udp exfiltration"),
+    (r'\bopenssl\s+s_client\s+-connect\b', "openssl outbound connection"),
+    (r'\bcurl\b.*(-d|--data|--data-binary|--data-urlencode|--upload-file)\b', "curl with data upload"),
+    (r'\bwget\b.*(--post-data|--post-file)\b', "wget with data upload"),
+    # Credential file reads via common tools
+    (r'\b(cat|head|tail|less|more|bat)\b.*(\.ssh/|aws/credentials|\.env|\.netrc|\.gnupg/|\.kube/config)', "read credential file"),
 ]
 
 
@@ -434,7 +447,9 @@ def check_dangerous_command(command: str, env_type: str,
         return {"approved": True, "message": None}
 
     # --yolo: bypass all approval prompts
-    if os.getenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE"):
+    # Read from _YOLO_AT_STARTUP to prevent subprocesses from exporting
+    # this var to bypass approval in subsequent commands.
+    if _YOLO_AT_STARTUP:
         return {"approved": True, "message": None}
 
     is_dangerous, pattern_key, description = detect_dangerous_command(command)
@@ -536,7 +551,7 @@ def check_all_command_guards(command: str, env_type: str,
 
     # --yolo or approvals.mode=off: bypass all approval prompts
     approval_mode = _get_approval_mode()
-    if os.getenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE") or approval_mode == "off":
+    if _YOLO_AT_STARTUP or approval_mode == "off":
         return {"approved": True, "message": None}
 
     is_cli = os.getenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE")
diff --git a/tools/environments/local.py b/tools/environments/local.py
index 27282b6ef67a..cfb7503b4dd3 100644
--- a/tools/environments/local.py
+++ b/tools/environments/local.py
@@ -124,6 +124,23 @@ def _build_provider_env_blocklist() -> frozenset:
         "MODAL_TOKEN_ID",
         "MODAL_TOKEN_SECRET",
         "DAYTONA_API_KEY",
+        # Cloud provider credentials — prevent agent subprocesses from
+        # accessing the user's cloud accounts.
+        "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID",
+        "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY",
+        "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN",
+        "AWS_SECURITY_TOKEN",
+        "AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET",
+        "AZURE_CLIENT_ID",
+        "AZURE_TENANT_ID",
+        "GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS",
+        "KUBECONFIG",
+        "DOCKER_HOST",
+        "DOCKER_CERT_PATH",
+        "NPM_TOKEN",
+        "PYPI_TOKEN",
+        "SSH_AUTH_SOCK",
+        "GPG_AGENT_INFO",
     })
     return frozenset(blocked)
 
@@ -131,6 +148,16 @@ def _build_provider_env_blocklist() -> frozenset:
 _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST = _build_provider_env_blocklist()
 
 
+# Git hardening: disable hooks and credential prompts in all
+# subprocesses to prevent malicious repos from executing code via
+# .git/hooks/ or prompting for credentials on clone.
+# NOTE: We do NOT set GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/dev/null because that
+# disables credential helpers, aliases, and all user git config.
+_GIT_HARDENING_VARS = {
+    "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0",
+}
+
+
 def _sanitize_subprocess_env(base_env: dict | None, extra_env: dict | None = None) -> dict:
     """Filter Hermes-managed secrets from a subprocess environment.
 
@@ -159,6 +186,8 @@ def _sanitize_subprocess_env(base_env: dict | None, extra_env: dict | None = Non
         elif key not in _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST or _is_passthrough(key):
             sanitized[key] = value
 
+    # Apply git hardening
+    sanitized.update(_GIT_HARDENING_VARS)
     return sanitized