diff --git a/docs/security/best-practices.mdx b/docs/security/best-practices.mdx
index acd2c2059ba..3f06ea51b93 100644
--- a/docs/security/best-practices.mdx
+++ b/docs/security/best-practices.mdx
@@ -306,6 +306,8 @@ Two exemption kinds keep runtime data writable.
 The lock inventory omits top-level Hermes runtime dirs (`sessions/`, `memories/`, `logs/`, `cache/`, `plans/`) and the image-build-regenerated `openclaw-weixin/`.
 The lock helper never touches those paths.
 Inside a locked tree, the helper keeps each `agents/<agent-id>/sessions/` root at `sandbox:sandbox 2770` so the OpenClaw TUI can create and write session metadata under an otherwise root-owned parent.
+After containment, when an agent directory has no `sessions` entry, lockdown creates that carve-out root.
+An agent booting for the first time under an active lock can then write sessions.
 It validates the carve-out root but deliberately does not traverse or rewrite live session descendants.
 Cross-device entries, detected traversal races, or failures to remove or replace an unsafe entry make lockdown fail closed with the exact path and reason.
 
diff --git a/scripts/state-dir-guard.py b/scripts/state-dir-guard.py
index d2913e61f45..12e7ffacc94 100755
--- a/scripts/state-dir-guard.py
+++ b/scripts/state-dir-guard.py
@@ -243,6 +243,14 @@ def _is_under_runtime_carveout(relative_path: str) -> bool:
     )
 
 
+def _is_runtime_carveout_parent(relative_path: str) -> bool:
+    """Return whether this is an agent directory whose ``sessions`` child is
+    the carveout location."""
+
+    parts = relative_path.split("/")
+    return len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "agents" and parts[1] not in {"", ".", ".."}
+
+
 def _no_follow_flag() -> int:
     flag = getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
     if not flag:
@@ -1226,6 +1234,73 @@ def _chown_symlink(
             raise GuardOperationError(issue)
 
 
+def _ensure_runtime_carveout(
+    context: TraversalContext,
+    parent_fd: int,
+    relative_dir: str,
+    policy: Policy,
+    identity: Identity,
+    result: GuardResult,
+) -> None:
+    """Create the writable sessions carveout for an agent that has none.
+
+    The locked agent directory is root-owned and read-only for the sandbox
+    identity, so an agent booting for the first time after shields-up cannot
+    create its own sessions directory and fails with EACCES.  ``_mutate_dir``
+    calls this after its entry loop so an agent whose unsafe ``sessions``
+    entry was removed earlier in the same lock pass also converges on a
+    created carveout; a surviving non-directory entry keeps its locked
+    posture.  A name that appears between the existence check and the mkdir
+    makes the lock fail closed, matching the raced-entry policy.
+    """
+
+    relative_path = posixpath.join(relative_dir, "sessions")
+    path = context.display(relative_path)
+    try:
+        os.stat("sessions", dir_fd=parent_fd, follow_symlinks=False)
+        return
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        pass
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise GuardOperationError(
+            _os_issue(
+                "carveout-create-failed",
+                path,
+                "check for a sessions carveout",
+                exc,
+            )
+        ) from exc
+    try:
+        os.mkdir("sessions", mode=0o700, dir_fd=parent_fd)
+        os.fsync(parent_fd)
+        created = os.stat("sessions", dir_fd=parent_fd, follow_symlinks=False)
+        context.budget.observe_entry(path, created)
+        child_fd = _open_child_dir(parent_fd, "sessions", created)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise GuardOperationError(
+            _os_issue(
+                "carveout-create-failed",
+                path,
+                "create writable sessions carveout",
+                exc,
+            )
+        ) from exc
+    try:
+        _set_dir_metadata(child_fd, policy, "unlock", identity)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise GuardOperationError(
+            _os_issue(
+                "metadata-update-failed",
+                path,
+                "prepare writable sessions carveout",
+                exc,
+            )
+        ) from exc
+    finally:
+        os.close(child_fd)
+    result.directories += 1
+
+
 def _mutate_dir(
     context: TraversalContext,
     dir_fd: int,
@@ -1397,6 +1472,11 @@ def _mutate_dir(
                 ) from exc
             result.removed_entries += 1
 
+    if action == "lock" and _is_runtime_carveout_parent(relative_dir):
+        _ensure_runtime_carveout(
+            context, dir_fd, relative_dir, policy, identity, result
+        )
+
     if action == "unlock":
         try:
             _set_dir_metadata(dir_fd, policy, action, identity)
diff --git a/test/state-dir-guard.test.ts b/test/state-dir-guard.test.ts
index c5e0caf2b20..5041221ac11 100644
--- a/test/state-dir-guard.test.ts
+++ b/test/state-dir-guard.test.ts
@@ -136,6 +136,33 @@ finally:
     os.close(config_fd)
 `;
 
+const RUN_CARVEOUT_MKDIR_RACE = String.raw`
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+guard_path, config_dir = sys.argv[1:3]
+spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("nemoclaw_state_dir_guard_carveout", guard_path)
+module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+identity = module.Identity(
+    root_uid=os.getuid(), root_gid=os.getgid(),
+    sandbox_uid=os.getuid(), sandbox_gid=os.getgid(),
+)
+
+def racing_mkdir(*args, **kwargs):
+    raise FileExistsError(17, "File exists", "sessions")
+
+module.os.mkdir = racing_mkdir
+result = module.run_guard("lock", config_dir, identity)
+print(json.dumps({
+    "ok": result.ok,
+    "issues": [issue.as_json() for issue in result.issues],
+}))
+`;
+
 const RUN_FAKE_MOUNT_BOUNDARY = String.raw`
 import importlib.util
 import json
@@ -865,6 +892,95 @@ describe("state-dir-guard", () => {
     expect(mode(agentDir)).toBe(0o2770);
   });
 
+  it("creates a missing sessions carveout during lock so a first-boot agent can write sessions (#7545)", () => {
+    const { configDir } = fixture(".openclaw");
+    const agentDir = path.join(configDir, "agents", "main");
+    const sessionsDir = path.join(agentDir, "sessions");
+    const memoryDir = path.join(agentDir, "memory");
+    const stagedDir = path.join(configDir, "agents", "second");
+    const stagedSessions = path.join(stagedDir, "sessions");
+    const pluginsDir = path.join(configDir, "plugins", "nested");
+    fs.mkdirSync(agentDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.mkdirSync(memoryDir);
+    fs.mkdirSync(stagedDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.mkdirSync(pluginsDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(agentDir, "agent.js"), "export {};\n", { mode: 0o664 });
+    fs.symlinkSync("../../plugins/nested", stagedSessions);
+
+    const locked = runGuard("lock", configDir);
+
+    expect(locked.status, locked.stderr).toBe(0);
+    expect(fs.statSync(sessionsDir).isDirectory()).toBe(true);
+    expect(mode(sessionsDir)).toBe(0o2770);
+    expect(fs.lstatSync(stagedSessions).isDirectory()).toBe(true);
+    expect(mode(stagedSessions)).toBe(0o2770);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(memoryDir, "sessions"))).toBe(false);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(pluginsDir, "sessions"))).toBe(false);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(configDir, "agents", "sessions"))).toBe(false);
+
+    const sessionPath = path.join(sessionsDir, "active.jsonl");
+    fs.writeFileSync(sessionPath, "runtime\n", { mode: 0o660 });
+    expect(fs.readFileSync(sessionPath, "utf-8")).toBe("runtime\n");
+
+    const relocked = runGuard("lock", configDir);
+
+    expect(relocked.status, relocked.stderr).toBe(0);
+    expect(mode(sessionsDir)).toBe(0o2770);
+    expect(fs.readFileSync(sessionPath, "utf-8")).toBe("runtime\n");
+
+    const unlocked = runGuard("unlock", configDir);
+
+    expect(unlocked.status, unlocked.stderr).toBe(0);
+    expect(mode(sessionsDir)).toBe(0o2770);
+  });
+
+  it("fails closed when a sessions entry appears between the carveout check and its mkdir (#7545)", () => {
+    const { configDir } = fixture(".openclaw");
+    const agentDir = path.join(configDir, "agents", "main");
+    fs.mkdirSync(agentDir, { recursive: true });
+
+    const result = spawnSync("python3", ["-c", RUN_CARVEOUT_MKDIR_RACE, GUARD_PATH, configDir], {
+      encoding: "utf-8",
+      timeout: 15_000,
+    });
+
+    expect(result.status, result.stderr).toBe(0);
+    expect(JSON.parse(result.stdout.trim())).toEqual(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        ok: false,
+        issues: expect.arrayContaining([
+          expect.objectContaining({
+            code: "carveout-create-failed",
+            path: path.join(agentDir, "sessions"),
+          }),
+        ]),
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(agentDir, "sessions"))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("keeps a regular-file sessions entry locked instead of creating a writable carveout (#7545)", () => {
+    const { configDir } = fixture(".openclaw");
+    const agentDir = path.join(configDir, "agents", "main");
+    const sessionsPath = path.join(agentDir, "sessions");
+    fs.mkdirSync(agentDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(sessionsPath, "not a directory\n", { mode: 0o664 });
+    const oldInode = fs.statSync(sessionsPath).ino;
+
+    const locked = runGuard("lock", configDir);
+
+    expect(locked.status, locked.stderr).toBe(0);
+    expect(fs.lstatSync(sessionsPath).isFile()).toBe(true);
+    expect(mode(sessionsPath)).toBe(0o644);
+    expect(fs.statSync(sessionsPath).ino).not.toBe(oldInode);
+
+    const relocked = runGuard("lock", configDir);
+
+    expect(relocked.status, relocked.stderr).toBe(0);
+    expect(fs.lstatSync(sessionsPath).isFile()).toBe(true);
+    expect(mode(sessionsPath)).toBe(0o644);
+  });
+
   it("rejects hardlinks and special entries during the read-only preflight", () => {
     const { configDir } = fixture();
     const skillsDir = path.join(configDir, "skills");